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Bilateral  exchange  networks  are structures  in which  a finite  set  of players  have  a 
restricted framework of bargaining opportunities with each other.  The key restric­
tions are that each player may participate in only one ‘exchange’  and each of these
may only involve  a pair of players.  There is  a large sociology  literature  which in- 
/
vestigates  these networks  as a simplified model of social exchange.  This literature 
contains many predictions and experimental results, but not a non-cooperative game 
theoretic analysis.  The aim of the thesis is to provide this.
The analysis builds on the economic theory  literature  on  non-cooperative  bar­
gaining,  principally  the  alternating  offers  and  Nash  demand  games.  Two  novel 
perfect information models based on the alternating offers game are considered and 
it  is demonstrated that they suffer from several difficulties.  In  particular,  analysis 
of an example network shows that for these two  models  multiple subgame perfect 
equilibria exist  with  considerable  qualitative  differences.  It  is  argued  that  an  al­
ternating offers  approach  to the problem is  therefore  unlikely  to  be successful  for 
general networks.
Models  based  on  Nash  demand  games  also  have  multiple  solutions,  but  their 
simpler structure allows investigation of equilibrium selection by evolutionary meth­
ods.  An  agent  based  evolutionary  model  is  proposed.  The  results  of computer 
simulations based on this model under a variety of learning rules are presented.  For 
small networks the agents often converge to unique long-term outcomes which offer 
support both for theoretical predictions of 2 and 3 player alternating offers models 
and experimental results of the sociology literature.  For larger networks the results 
become less precise and it is shown they sometimes leave the core.  It is argued that 
a modified evolutionary model has scope for avoiding these difficulties and providing 
a constructive approach to the problem for large networks.Acknowledgements
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15Chapter  1
Introduction and  Overview
Social exchange is a framework for studying a wide range of ongoing mutually prof­
itable social interactions  which take place between pairs of participants.  These in­
teractions typically take place within networks of many possible exchanges.  Network 
position can  be  a crucial  determinant  of the  outcomes  that  a participant  receives 
from social  exchange.  As  a simple  example  of social  exchange,  suppose  that  one 
person in a community has a monopoly on a valuable skill  (e.g.  literacy or medical 
training) whereas all the others have identical skills and resources and are incapable 
of acting  collectively.  The  monopolist  will  receive  many  offers  to  exchange  their 
skill  (e.g.  requests to read letters  or  provide medical  aid)  and over time exchange 
outcomes will develop which they find favourable  (e.g.  monetary rewards, pleasant 
company, actions denoting social status).
The relationship between network structure and the outcome of social exchange 
has  recently  been the focus  of considerable  research  by sociologists.  One research 
direction has concentrated on a simplified model of social exchange networks in which 
there are many discrete rounds and in each round every participant may take part in 
at most one exchange with another participant.  There is a network of opportunities 
for  exchange  which  is  fixed  over  all  rounds.  The  bilateral  exchange  networks  of 
the title  mathematically  describe such  settings.  Sociologists  have  proposed  many
16theories predicting exchange in these settings and carried out extensive laboratory 
experiments with human subjects.
Bilateral exchange networks can also be used to model special cases of economic 
exchange.  There exists a substantial economic theory literature on non-cooperative 
game theoretic models of bargaining between two participants.  This thesis develops 
extensions of these models which apply to general bilateral exchange networks.  This 
is  of use  to  the  theories  of  both  economic  and  social  exchange.  In  particular,  it 
allows an investigation of whether the sociological theories mentioned above can be 
supported by rigorous non-cooperative game theoretic models.  Also,  the extensive 
experimental  results  of  the  sociology  literature  provide  a  convenient  test  for  the 
predictions of game theoretic models.  The overall aims of this research are to find 
models which:
a)  Adequately support experimental results and satisfy other reasonable proper­
ties1  ,
b)  Produce predictions for large networks representing typical social networks.
c)  Explain the relationship between network parameters and outcome.
There are two leading approaches to non-cooperative models of bargaining be­
tween a pair of participants in the economic theory literature.  The first is based on 
the  alternating  offers game of Rubinstein  [56].  It models the bargaining process as 
a sequence  of proposals  made  alternately  by  the two  participants.  Each  proposal 
must be accepted or rejected before a counter-proposal is made.  The first accepted 
proposal is binding.  The  bargaining  process  entails  costly  delays  which,  although 
typically  small,  turn  out  to  be  the  mechanism  providing  the  game  with  a  unique 
outcome under a solution concept motivated by assumptions of players’ rationality, 
namely subgame perfect equilibrium.  However, the complicated strategies spaces of 
this game preclude an evolutionary approach.  The second approach is based on the
1Some ‘reasonable properties’  are developed throughout the thesis and collated  in section 9.1.1.
17Nash demand game proposed by Nash [53].  This game abstracts away many details 
of the bargaining process and simply requires each player to simultaneously demand 
a utility value.  If it is feasible for both players to receive their demand then they do 
so.  Otherwise both receive nothing.  Under solution concepts motivated by players’  
rationality, this model supports a very wide range of outcomes.  However, its simple 
strategy structure is well suited to an evolutionary approach.
It  is easy to state many plausible sounding extensions  of the alternating  offers 
game  to  the  setting  of bilateral  exchange  networks.  However,  seemingly  innocent 
variations in the rules of these extensions can hide significant  implicit  assumptions 
about the bargaining opportunities available to players.  In this thesis, the features of 
such extensions are investigated and, based on this, two novel models are proposed 
which apply to general bilateral exchange networks and allow appropriate bargaining 
opportunities to players.
Once  the  possibility  of more  than  one  exchange  is  introduced,  the  analysis  of 
models based on the alternating offers game using subgame perfect equilibrium typ­
ically requires considerable effort.  Even intuitively obvious results can require com­
plicated proofs2.  However,  this thesis succeeds in proving several results describing 
the SPE behaviour of the two novel models mentioned above for several small net­
works.  The  models  are  shown  to  support  a  wide  range  of solution  outcomes  for 
certain  networks  involving  significant  qualitative  payoff  differences.  It  is  argued 
that the underlying causes of this multiplicity are likely to also apply to most large 
networks.  It  is  concluded  that,  except  for  the  smallest  networks,  only  weak  pre­
dictions are likely to be produced by the alternating offers approach,  such as loose 
upper and lower bounds on the payoffs of certain positions.  These do not match the 
more precise experimental results of the sociology literature, failing aim a)  above.
Evolutionary models based on the approach of the Nash demand game are shown 
to be a much more successful approach.  In this thesis, an evolutionary model is de­
2For example,  many such results are contained in section 5.4.
18veloped  and  implemented  as  a  computer  simulation.  The  simulation  results  give 
strong predictions for the outcomes of bargaining in several bilateral exchange net­
works.  These  predictions  match  the patterns  found  by  sociology  experiments  for 
some networks,  such  as  line  networks,  as  required  by  aim  a)  above.  Furthermore 
they  complement  the  experimental  results  by  showing  that  in  some  settings  they 
remain valid over  much  longer time scales.  Also,  very strong support  is  found for 
the von Neumman-Morgenstern triple solution to 3 player ring networks.  This com­
plements  the  theoretical  support  this  solution  receives  from  an  alternating  offers 
approach of Binmore [3]  (where this solution is first proposed).  A theoretical result, 
theorem 7.3, on the evolutionary model is also proved, predicting the payoffs of cer­
tain  networks  positions  under various  conditions  representing  a  limiting  case  (low 
mutation) of the evolutionary model.  The predictions of this theorem are supported 
qualitatively  by  the  simulation  results  but  not  quantitatively.  Thus  theorem  7.3 
reveals  one mechanism by which  network  parameters can  drive the  results of bar­
gaining,  matching aim c)  above,  but results are also affected by other evolutionary 
pressures.
For  a particular  network  the simulation  results  offer  support  to  non-core  solu­
tions.  It  is  argued  that  the  support  for  these  solutions  is  due  to  the  bargaining 
opportunities available to players being overly restricted in the game underlying the 
evolutionary  model.  This hinders the potential usefulness of this particular  evolu­
tionary  model  for  large  networks.  However,  in  general  the  evolutionary  approach 
based on the Nash demand game shows considerable  potential for development  to 
study large networks; aim b)  above.
Both approaches mentioned above provide support for some qualitative features 
of theoretical predictions of the sociology literature,  and many of the experimental 
results.  Also the theoretical results described above provide support for some of the 
intuitions  described  in  the  sociology  papers for  factors  that  drive  the  outcome  of 
bargaining.  However  no support is found for  the ad-hoc  assumptions at  the heart
19of the theories of the sociology literature.  This research suggests that theories and 
experiments of social exchange should seek to investigate how network level outcomes 
are generated from individual level behaviour rather than such assumptions.
Chapter 2 is a literature review of social exchange,  focusing on network effects. 
In particular,  it contains a summary of experimental results.  Chapter 3 consists of 
some preliminary mathematical material, such as a definition of a bilateral exchange 
network and an outline of the game theoretic concepts which are used later.  Chapter 
4 contains a literature review of the alternating offers game and various extensions of 
this game which model bargaining situations with more players.  Some novel material 
is  included  as well,  exploring various features  of these  models  and  their  effects  on 
subgame perfect equilibrium behaviour.  Chapter 5  defines two novel  extensions of 
the  alternating  offers  game  and  analyses  them  for various  example  networks  with 
a  small  number  of players.  Chapters  6 - 8   are  concerned  with  the  evolutionary 
approach based on the Nash demand game.  Chapter 6  defines an extension of the 
Nash  demand game to large  bilateral  exchange  networks  and gives  an overview of 
an  evolutionary  model.  A  review  of related  literature  is  also  contained.  Chapter 
7 discusses the details of this model in more depth and also contains some limited 
theoretical  analysis  of it.  Chapter  8  contains  the  results  of simulations  using this 
model.
Chapter  9  is the conclusion.  One section of this chapter summarizes the theo­
retical results and simulation data obtained for various bilateral exchange networks 
throughout  the  thesis.  These  results  are  compared  with  each  other  and  with  the 
theories  and experimental data of the sociology  literature.  There is  also some dis­
cussion on what this reveals about the forces driving the outcome of bargaining in 
particular networks.  The other main section of the conclusion is a discussion of the 
suitability of the models proposed throughout the thesis.  Also, some future research 
directions are proposed, including possible ways to adapt the evolutionary model of 
chapter 6 to allow the investigation of larger networks.
20Finally, note that the more technical material of many chapters, mainly lengthy 
proofs,  is relegated  to  appendices.  These  appear  at  the  end  of the  corresponding 
chapters.
21Chapter  2
Sociological Background
This chapter reviews the sociology  literature on social exchange.  Section  2.1  is on 
early work on social exchange and also serves to describe what is usually meant by 
the term ‘social exchange’.  Section 2.2 focuses on the simple case of dyadic exchange; 
exchange between a pair.  Section 2.3 discusses extending the investigation of social 
exchange  from  dyads  to  networks  and  also  briefly  mentions  one  area  of  applica­
tion.  Many  social  exchange  researchers  have  concentrated  on  studying  negatively 
connected  networks.  These are discussed in section  2.4  and form the  basis for the 
bilateral exchange networks investigated in this thesis.  Section 2.5 describes several 
predictive theories from the sociology literature for negatively connected networks. 
The remaining sections  discuss laboratory experiments  in this setting.  Section  2.6 
describes typical features of the experimental designs used.  Section 2.7 summarizes 
some experimental results obtained from the literature.  Section 2.8 briefly discusses 
some issues raised by these results.  In chapter 9 this experimental data is compared 
to the results of this thesis.
222.1  Early Work
The  roots  of  the  literature  on  social  exchange  include  the  work  of  Homans  [35] 
(chapters  3  and  4),  Blau  [12],  and  Emerson  [25].  The  area  of study  is  any  form 
of pairwise exchange in a social setting.  Indeed,  Emerson sees social exchange as a 
framework for the investigation of any observations about reciprocal social behaviour 
based on interactions  between pairs.  This allows  a very wide definition of what  is 
exchanged.  However, requiring a social setting puts some constraints on the domain 
of study.  Some conditions which are typically mentioned are that exchanges are face- 
to-face  and bilateral,  opportunities for exchange are repeated rather than one-offs, 
and there is no mechanism for participants to enter into formal  binding contracts. 
Thus, only special cases of economic exchange can be considered as social exchange.
An example of social exchange considered by all three authors mentioned above 
is a workplace where workers sometimes ask each others1  advice1.  Homans describes 
this  as  social  exchange  where  advice  is  exchanged  for  "approval”,  e.g.  flattery. 
Emerson offers an interpretation where exchanges take  place with the expectation 
of future reciprocal exchange.  If the exchange relationship is to continue, the advisee 
must  supply something the  advisor  values,  e.g.  help  around the  office  or  pleasant 
company.  Blau interprets help as being exchanged for “status”, a social signal which 
plays several roles.  It signals that the advisor is a good source of help on this subject, 
which presumably is valuable for the receiver.  It also signals that the advisee is under 
certain social obligations.  If these are reneged upon then he is liable to some form of 
punishment by his social group, e.g.  he will not be supplied with advice by anyone 
else.  Thus possible sources of reciprocity are due to social pressure or to maintain a
1This  is  based  on  a  field  study  by  Blau  [11]  of  an  office  of  federal  agents  auditing  firms  to 
enforce  certain  laws.  Discussing  details  of a  case  is  officially  forbidden.  However,  the  cases  are 
quite complex and the agents often  feel  they require assistance.  They  are  reluctant  to go to their 
supervisor,  believing  it  may  adversely  influence  their  annual  rating.  Instead  they  often  ask  the 
advice of a more experienced agent,  which is unofficially permitted.
23valuable flow of exchange.
Other examples of social exchange given by these authors include the exchange 
of favours between neighbours e.g.  the loan of items, or the exchange of invitations 
to  participate  in some social  activity  such  as dinner parties  or  tennis  matches.  A 
more large scale example is the  “Kula ring”  studied by Malinowski  [41].  This was 
a complicated  system of ceremonial exchange  between  Melanesian  islanders  which 
entailed  considerable  social  obligations  and  offered  opportunities  for  strategic  be­
haviour.  The custom of exchange indirectly  linked  a large  ring of islands many of 
which had little direct contact.
Blau  discusses  some  limits  to  what  can  be  modelled  by  social  exchange.  He 
contrasts the local  influence  that  can  be  achieved  through  these  means  with  “im­
personal  power  on  a  large  scale”.  This  is  split  into  economic  power  and  political 
authority.  Differences  between  economic  and  social  exchange  have  already  been 
mentioned.  Political  authority requires  institutions to  transmit  commands.  These 
may  act  partly  through networks  of social  exchange,  but  also  partly  through  eco­
nomic action or through actions that affect  large numbers of people without social 
contact, e.g.  mass media.
For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter it is convenient to assume that 
a player’s2 outcome from exchange can be easily quantified by a numerical measure, 
which I shall refer to as their payoff.  The authors mentioned above construct various 
theories of how this can be achieved which differ from standard economic theories of 
utility.  The measures used by Homans and Emerson3  are related  to the frequency 
with which a valued action is performed by a potential exchange partner, and so have 
some basis in concrete experimental data.  The exact details of what is meant by a
2The  sociology  literature  generally  uses  the  term  ‘actor’  for  a  participant  in  exchange.  I  use 
‘player’  for  consistency  with  the  game  theoretic  terminology  used  in  the  other  chapters  of  the 
thesis.
3This refers to the measure Emerson used in [25].  In [21] a frequency based measure is no longer 
used.
24payoff can be glossed over in this chapter, since most of the discussion below requires 
only a qualitative notion of payoff.  The exception is the laboratory experiments of 
sections  2.6  and  2.7.  In  these  payoffs  have  a  concrete  meaning  in  terms  of  the 
payments the experimental subjects receive.
2.2  Dyadic  Exchange  and Power
Early research pays particular attention to dyadic (i.e.  two player) exchange.  Emer­
son’s approach to dyadic exchange influences much of the subsequent literature.  His 
theory developed over time and the version I describe here is taken from  [22]4.  An 
exchange relation between players A and B is considered in which these players have 
resources x  and y respectively which they can exchange.  The following  definitions 
are made5:
“The dependence  (D a b)  of A on B  in  a dyadic  exchange  relation  ... is  a joint 
function (1) varying directly with the value of y to A, and (2) varying inversely with 
the availability of y to A from alternate sources.”
“.. .the power of A over  B  (Pa b)  is the potential of A to obtain favorable out­
comes at B’s expense.”
The  latter  definition  is  supported  (in  [25])  by  a  quote  from  Weber  [69]  (page 
152):
“Power  is the probability  that  one actor  with a social  relationship  will  be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance.”
4The earlier version of [25]  is in terms of what is referred to in section 2.3 as a reciprocal setting; 
the  players  occasionally  have  opportunities  to  make  rewarding  actions  to  each  other.  The  later 
version of [22]  which  is  presented  in the text  is  in terms of what  is  referred  to  in  section  2.3  as  a 
negotiated  setting;  in  each  time  period  the players  must  agree  the  terms  of a  bilateral  exchange. 
One reason for the switch to a negotiated  setting is that this matches the experimental setup used 
in  [22].
°Emerson does not appear to explicitly define a value for D b a ,   although in [25] he writes “this can 
readily be accomplished with considerable precision”  of the definition of a closely  related quantity.
25Emerson  equates  Pab  and  D b a■   Furthermore,  in  [21],  in  the  context  of two 
players who must split a unit of payoff, Emerson and Cook argue that if P ab  = Pba 
then  the  payoff  is  split  equally6,  and  if there  is  an  inequality  then  this  indicates 
which player takes the majority of the payoff.
Markovsky et  al  [45]  make the following similar  but  more straightforward defi­
nition of power:
“Power is ... [a]  potential for obtaining relatively favourable resource levels.”
In this and Emerson’s definitions of power it is important to note the use of the 
word  ‘potential’.  The literature commonly makes a distinction  between power and 
exercised  power  (or  power  use).  For  example,  Markovsky  et  al  [44]  claim  that  a 
player with a power  advantage  (under a measure of power  defined in section  2.5.1 
below)  could  obtain  the  maximum  available  gains  from  exchange  if they  chose  to 
fully  exert  their  power.  Some  reasons  which  are  given  in  the  literature  (e.g.  see 
Cook and Emerson  [21])  for why not all power is exercised include equity norms or 
other psychological biases,  players who are not fully rational,  and social pressure.
The above discussion of the definition of power is given because many sociological 
predictions on social exchange in networks are phrased in terms of power differences 
between network positions.  On the other hand,  the laboratory experiments of the 
literature reveal only exercised power.
Homans  [35]  makes several qualitative  propositions on the frequency of actions 
in an ongoing dyadic relationship where the players may take actions which reward 
each  other.  These  propositions  are  not  detailed  here  as  they  do  not  generate  a 
specific  prediction  for  a  dyadic  exchange.  However,  he  does  conclude  from  them 
that  in a situation where one  central  player  has  an opportunity to  exchange with 
two outlying players, the outliers do worse than they would if the other outlier did
6This is a vague conclusion as it is not robust to a reinterpretation of the meaning of ‘payoff’.  In 
[21] details are not provided of how a payoff scale representing preferences is constructed.  However 
in an experiment later in [21], experimental subjects earn cash payments proportional to their total 
payoffs over many exchanges.
26not exist whereas the central player does better.
2.3  Exchange Networks
In practice,  social exchange is not restricted to two player settings.  An interesting 
question to sociologists is the effect of the structure of a network of exchange oppor­
tunities on the payoffs that  the players  receive.  Emerson  [25]  provides some ideas 
on how to move from studying exchange in pairs to studying networks.  He proposes 
a classification of connections between exchanges.  A pair of exchange opportunities 
with a player in common can have a positive or negative connection.  Two exchange 
opportunities  have  a positive  connection  if exchange  in one  “facilitates  exchange” 
in  the  other7.  They  are  said  to  be  negatively  connected  if exchange  in  one  will 
“diminish  or  prohibit  exchange”  in  the  other8.  Emerson  acknowledges  that  this 
classification does not include all possible connections.
In  many  subsequent  papers,  the  terms  positive  and  negative  are  usually  used 
-   and  often  defined  -   to  mean  the  following  stronger  forms  of  these  definitions. 
Positively  connected  exchanges  may  only  form together  and  negatively  connected 
exchanges may never form together.  These strong definitions are useful in a negoti­
ated exchange setting.  In this there are a series of rounds.  In each the players must 
come to a set of bilateral agreements amongst themselves giving terms of exchange, 
constrained by the connections  between  exchange opportunities.  An  alternative  is 
a reciprocal setting in which players make each other unilateral gifts in the hope of 
future reciprocity9.  Most of the subsequent work has concentrated on the negotiated 
setting.  An exception is the work of Molm et al (e.g.  [48, 50]) which investigates net­
work effects in a reciprocal framework.  The definitions of negotiated and reciprocal 
settings are taken from Molm et al  [50].
7These quotes are taken from the summary of Emerson’s classification  in  [73].
8According to  Emerson’s  scheme  these  are  the  bilateral  versions  of connections.  In  unilateral
connections, the effects mentioned are one-way.
9It is hard to see how the strong definitions could be applied  in this setting.
27One  reason  for  an  interest  in  power  in  exchange  networks  is  its  influence  011 
network  formation,  as  discussed  by  Emerson  in  [25]10.  One  example  lie  considers 
is  a network  in which all  exchange opportunities are  between  a central  player  and 
a large set  of outlying players,  and all exchanges are negatively  connected.  This is 
a unilateral  monopoly  in  which  the central  player  can  extract  a  large  payoff from 
the outliers.  Emerson argues that this situation provides incentives for an outlier to 
diversify what they can exchange with the central player in order that their exchange 
opportunity  becomes  less  negatively  connected  to  the  others.  Alternatively,  there 
is also an incentive for the outliers to bargain collectively.  Emerson draws parallels 
between these processes and possible paths in the development of a society.
2.4  Negatively  Connected  Networks
Most  sociological  research  has  concentrated  on  studying  negatively  connected  ex­
change networks11.  These use the negotiated setting of the previous section and the 
restriction  that  the  strong  form  of negative  connection  exists  between  any  pair  of 
exchanges  involving  a  common  player.  Thus  in  a round  of  play  a  player  may  be 
involved in at most one exchange.  A rationale for concentrating 011 this case is given 
by Emerson and Cook in  [21]:
“... a) the relation of power and dependence to position in negatively connected 
networks is relatively straightforward,  and b)  negative connections  are easily oper­
ationalized in the laboratory.”
Another standard assumption is that each exchange opportunity takes the form 
of splitting a number of payoff points.  This  number  is  usually  constant  across  all 
exchange  opportunities12.  Also  note  that  networks  are  assumed  to  stay  constant
10Network formation  has  not  been  a major  interest  of subsequent  research.  Two exceptions  are
Cook and Emerson  [21]  and Walker et  al  [68]  which contain some material  on network  formation.
11 Papers which consider other types of exchange network  include Markovsky et al  [45].  Skvoretz
and Wilier  [66]  and Yamaguchi  [75].
12Some  papers,  such  as  Cook  and  Emerson  [21]  and  Molm  et  al  [50].  investigate  negatively
28over time.  That is, the exchange opportunities do not vary.
Several  competing predictive theories  have emerged,  a  few  of which  are briefly 
summarized in section 2.5 below.  These approaches typically rely 011 some parameter 
values or functions which are chosen on an ad-hoc basis13.  A common characteristic 
of these approaches is that they are not generated directly from assumptions about 
individuals.  Indeed the outcome is often claimed to be fairly robust to the specifica­
tion of individual behaviour.  For example Lovaglia et al  [39]  state of a certain class 
of networks:
“...structural determinants are so powerful... that actor cognitions can introduce 
only minor variations at best.”
However,  assumptions about the behaviour of individual players  are sometimes 
made.  For example, it is often assumed that players who are excluded from exchang­
ing will lower their subsequent demands, and those who are included in an exchange 
will  raise  theirs.  These  sometimes  occur  as  assumptions  used  in  simulations  (e.g. 
in Cook et al  [22])  and sometimes  as general  assumptions  (e.g.  in Markovsky et  al
[45]14).
Many  laboratory  experiments  have  also  been  carried  out  as  empirical  tests  of 
the  competing theories  of the  literature.  Section  2.6  describes  the  design  of these 
experiments.  They concentrate on investigating the outcomes produced in different 
network settings,  and test  hypotheses  about  aggregate  outcomes  rather than indi­
vidual behaviour.  The literature also mentions many simulation results.  These are 
not discussed here because usually only a few derived statistics are published rather 
than  detailed  results  and  the  models  implemented  by  the  simulations  are  usually
connected  networks  in  which  the  number  of  payoff  points  available  varies  in  different  exchange 
opportunities.
13For example the functional form of D b a   mentioned earlier,  or the weights in  the GPI  function
described  in section 2.5.1.
14Here they take the form  of ‘scope conditions'  which  delimit  the domain  of applicability  of the
theory.  It follows that these scope conditions are assumed to capture an aspect of players’ behaviour 
in some interesting situations.
29not documented in much depth15.
A  central  concern  for a non-cooperative  game theoretic  approach  to  modelling 
bargaining is the structure of the bargaining process.  For example,  is there a time 
limit  at  which  bargaining must  cease?  How  much communication  between players 
is allowed?  Can a player bargain with two others simultaneously?  These details can 
greatly affect the outcomes supported by such models as is made clear in the follow­
ing chapters10.  The sociology literature is generally agnostic 011 most of these points. 
It  may  be  that  the  solutions  proposed  by  the  literature  are  thought  to  be  robust 
to these details;  this is often the case with information,  as discussed shortly.  How­
ever, in the majority of laboratory experiments, subjects interact through computer 
terminals  and  thus  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  detailed  specification  of a  bargaining 
process.  Such specifications are described in section  2.G.  These may  give  some  in­
sight  into the assumptions made by researchers.  However,  it  is quite possible that 
many of these assumptions are made for experimental expediency rather than 011 a 
theoretical basis, so too much should not be read into them.
One element of the bargaining process which is discussed explicitly in the litera­
ture is information.  However,  there is not a consensus 011 the effect, of information. 
For example in  [45]  Markovsky et al state:
“Having information 011 negotiations other than one's own is expected to accel­
erate the use of power, but not  affect relative power.5 '
On the other hand in  [22]  Cook et al state:
“An important feature of our laboratory research is that actors.. . have 110 knowl­
edge of the network beyond their own opportunity set.  ... This feature allows us to 
examine ‘purely5  structural determinants of behaviour.''
In other words, they do not rule out the possibility that information could affect 
the outcome.  The role of information has been explored experimentally (e.g.  in Lo- 
vaglia [39]).  However,  as discussed in section 2.8 below, the results are inconclusive.
loAn exception is Markovsky  [42].
10For example see the discussion of section 4.4.5.
30The sociology literature generally makes little use of game theory to model social 
exchange networks.  One exception is the work of Bienenstock and Bonacich (e.g.  [1, 
2]) who apply cooperative game theoretic solution concepts to the problem.  However, 
they do not  probe the assumptions underlying these different  solution  concepts  to 
form a view on which, if any, is most appropriate to the situation.  Also,  Wilier and 
Skvoretz  [72]  consider  a  simplified  non-cooperative  model  of  bargaining  in  which 
some  players  have  limited  strategy  choices  while  others  act  "parametrically”  i.e. 
according to fixed rules.  For example they consider a negatively connected exchange 
network in which a central player can split 24 payoff units with one of two outlying 
players  in  each  round.  In  their  model,  in  each  round  the  outlying  players  must 
choose simultaneously from two possible strategies:  demand d units or d —  1  units. 
These correspond  to  sticking  to  a convention  or  undercutting.  The  central  player 
simply (randomly) chooses a player with the lowest demand, gives them the number 
of points which thej^ demanded and keeps the rest.  In the following round d is set to 
whatever value the preceding lowest demand was17.  This illustrates a mechanism by 
which the outlying players undercut each other in this network,  driving down their 
payoffs over time.
2.5  Predictive  Theories
This section briefly sketches some theories from the sociology  literature which pre­
dict the outcome of negatively connected exchange networks in which all exchanges 
involve splitting the same number of payoff points.  The main motivation for this is 
to allow some similarities between parts of these theories and the results of this the­
sis to be highlighted in the discussion of the concluding chapter.  Thus the theories
discussed are those mentioned in later discussions.
17This  is  essentially  a version  of an  extension  of the  Nash  demand  game  to  3  players  with  very 
simplified strategy sets played repeatedly.  Chapter 6 discusses extensions of the Nash demand game 
to bargaining situations with  more than 2 players.
31Many other theories exist  in  the literature.  Some continue to  be developed  by 
their  authors,  whereas others  have been  abandoned following  poor  performance in 
experiments18.  One active branch of research concerns theories based on the power- 
dependence arguments outlined  in section  2.2.  Some examples  are  Molm et  al  [49] 
and Yamagishi et al  [73].
2.5.1  N ET:  G PI
In  [45]  (1988),  Markovsky,  Wilier  et  al  introduce  a  predictive  theory  which  they 
name  ‘network  exchange  theory’.  Later,  other  researchers  often  used  this term  to 
describe the whole field of social exchange in networks, so in  [43]  (1997)  Markovsky 
coins the acronym NET to refer to the particular research program based on  [45].  I 
follow this convention here.  Over the course of several papers.  NET has undergone 
several revisions  and grown  quite complicated;  various techniques  must  be applied 
in different cases.  This section  discusses one particular technique from the original 
paper in the context of negatively connected networks.  Section 2.5.2 discusses some 
other aspects of NET.
The graph-theoretic power index  (GPI)  is defined in  [45]  as follows:
px =
where  is the number of elements in any set of paths19 starting from x of length
i such that no vertex other than x occurs in two paths20.
18 An example is the network vulnerability measures proposed in Cook et al  [22]  which performed
badly in an experiment of Markovsky et al  [45].
19This  entails  viewing  the  network  as  a graph  whose  vertices  are  the  set  of players  and  whose
edges  are  the  set  of unordered  player  pairs  which  have exchange opportunities.  A  path  is  defined
in section 3.2.  Cycles are not viewed as paths for this definition  (this can  be deduced from  the GPI
values given for the kite and stem networks in Markovsky et al  [44]).
20m,;x is not well defined.  For example consider a network with players {1.2. 3. 4. 5} and exchange
opportunities  between  the  pairs  {12.13,23,24.35}.  For  x  =  1   and  i  =  3.  two  sets  of  paths  as
described  in  the definition  are  {123}.  {124,135}.  If m,T   was  defined  as  the  maximum  number  of
elements in any such set then it would be well  defined.
32The rationale  for  this expression is  that  odd length  paths  are beneficial to  the 
power of a player  x  but even length paths  are detrimental.  For  example,  consider 
a  player  x  in  a  negatively  connected  exchange  network.  Suppose  a  new  player  y 
is added whose only exchange opportunity is with x.  This can only strengthen the 
bargaining position of x.  However suppose another new player z is now added whose 
only exchange opportunity is with y.  This improves the bargaining position of y and 
thus  weakens  x.  This  argument  can  be extended  inductively.  The  weighting  that 
the formula gives to these effects is ad-hoc.  A subset of paths are given weights  of 
identical  magnitude,  1,  and  the  others  are  given  no  weight  (i.e.  those  that  would 
produce at least one overlapping path if they were included)  .
A possible motivation for the ‘non-overlapping'  condition in the GPI definition, 
based on an example given in  [45]  is as follows.  Consider a player x in a negatively 
connected  exchange  network.  Suppose  a  player  y  is  added  whose  only  exchange 
opportunity is with x.  Then player  x receives  an added contribution of 1  to px.  If 
y were connected to another bargaining network, then the contribution to px of the 
branch including  y  must  be  between  0  and  1.  That  is,  player  x  does  better  than 
if y  did  not  exist,  but  worse  than  if x  could  monopolise  y.  The  non-overlapping 
condition  ensures  that  the  contribution  of the  y  branch  falls  within  these  limits. 
However,  this argument is only persuasive in a tree setting.
The  GPI  values  are  assumed  to  predict  which  player  receives  a  greater  payoff 
conditional on an exchange occuring.  Only a qualitative prediction about outcomes 
is made in  [45]:  given that  players x  and  y exchange,  x  receives  a greater  share of 
the payoff than y if and only if px  > py.  In  [44], Markovsky et al state that in these 
cases:
“exchange  outcomes  approach  maximum  differentiation  across  positions,  con­
strained only by the size of the resource pools"
The question of which exchanges form is addressed in other NET papers such as 
Lovaglia et al  [38],
332.5.2  NET:  O ther  Predictions
Various papers have pointed out networks for which versions of NET perform badly. 
For example Yamagishi  and Cook  [74]  contains simulation  results for two networks 
(including the stem network, a diagram of which is given in section 2.7)  which GPI 
methods  match  poorly.  These  have  prompted  various  modifications  to  NET.  For 
example Markovsky et al [44] introduces an ‘iterative extension’  of GPI to deal with 
these networks.
An extension to NET which is particularly relevant  to the results of this thesis 
is the concept of weak and strong power.  This is introduced in Markovsky et al  [44]. 
A  summary  of this  theory  is  as  follows.  Strong power  results  in  near-total  payoff 
differentiation and is more characteristic of small sparsely connected networks.  It is 
stated in  [44]  that the source of large differentiation is that:
“strong power structures exhibit  a ‘ratcheting’  process whereby actors in struc­
turally disadvantaged positions serially outbid one another...”
In Markovsky et al [44] strong power effects are predicted by an iterative version 
of GPI. Rules are given which classify players as having high and low strong power 
network positions based on their GPI values.  Players in high and low strong power 
positions are predicted to receive payoffs of 1  and  0 respectively.  When these GPI 
rules  predict  no  strong  power  differences,  weak  power  effects  may  result  in  mild 
payoff differentiation.  Weak power is said to be more characteristic of large densely 
connected networks which are more typical of social relations.  It  is claimed  in  [44] 
that:
“Weak power differentials have the same microfoundation as strong power differ­
entials:  Actors seeking to avoid exclusion from exchanges accept deals...  unfavorable 
to themselves.”
Weak  power  is  predicted  by  a  method  that  gives  a  “probability  of exclusion”. 
Lovaglia et al  [39]  extend this weak power model to give quantitative predictions of 
payoffs.
34Lovaglia et  al  [38]  give the following heuristics on strong power as a simpler al­
ternative  to iterative  GPI calculations.  Note that  a  "relation'  means  an exchange 
opportunity,  a  “break”  means an exchange opportunity which never forms in prac­
tice,  and an  “equal power structure”  is one in which neither strong nor weak power 
effects  exists  and  all  exchanges  which  form  involve  an  equal  split  of the  available 
payoff.  The comment in brackets is mine.
“i)  Adding a relation betwreen a low strong-power position and a high strong-power 
position does not  change the type of power  [i.e.  high  or  low]  of any  position 
in the network.
ii)  Adding a relation  between  two  high  strong-power  positions  does  not  change 
the type of power of any position in the network.
iii)  Adding a relation  between two  low  strong-power  positions  creates  a weak or 
equal power structure.
iv)  Adding a relation between weak or equal power positions cannot create a strong 
power structure.
v)  Breaks  occur  between  high  strong-power  positions  or  between  high  strong- 
power positions and equal or weak power positions, but  not  between equal or 
weak power positions.”
In Lovaglia et al  [40],  the authors admit that the version of NET current at the 
time of writing (2001)  typically produces poor predictions for large networks.  They 
argue  that  a  reason  for  this  is  because  interior  high  strong  power  positions  have 
significant chances of being excluded,  and therefore payoffs do not reach maximum
differentiation21.  Also they suggest  that  as  more players are  included  in networks.
21 The  experimental  results  in  section  2.6  below  illustrate  that  in  odd  length  line  networks,  in 
which strong power is predicted by GPI, payoff differ ences become lower for longer lengths.  The only 
players in such networks who  are guaranteed  to exchange are those with  an  exchange opportunity 
with a player at the end of the line.
35there is a greater chance of at least one deviating from standard behaviour and thus 
disrupting the expected outcome.
2.5.3  D egree  D ependence
A player’s degree is defined to be the number of exchange opportunities they have. 
Lovaglia  et  al  [39]  state  the  following  prediction,  based  011  Marsden  [46],  which  I 
refer to as  degree dependence:
“The higher an actor’s degree,  the higher the actor’s expected profit.”
In  Lovaglia  et  al  [39],  the  following  argument  is  presented  as  one  possible  ex­
planation  for  this effect.  Players  are not  fully rational  and  base  their  decisions on 
information which seems particularly salient to the situation at hand.  This includes 
their degrees and the degrees of their neighbours.  This argument seems plausible in 
the short-run for inexperienced players.  It is less obvious whet tier it  applies in the 
long term  as  players  are  able  to  learn  about  their  bargaining  opportunities  in  the 
network.  Therefore whether experimental results support this effect is an interesting 
question.
2.6  Experimental  Design
The experimental  designs  of laboratory  studies of social  exchange  networks  in the 
sociology literature vary considerably.  Also, full details of the bargaining procedures 
used  are not  always given.  However some features  are almost  always  present.  The 
experimental  subjects participate  in  a number of rounds.  In each  round  a subject 
is  associated  with  each  position  in  the  network  under investigation.  The  network 
does not change between rounds, although subjects are occasionally moved to other 
positions (e.g.  Skvoretz and Wilier [66]).  In each round any subject may participate 
in at most one exchange.  Every exchange opportunity is  represented  by a number 
of payoff points  which  can  be  split  between  the  two  subjects.  At  the  end  of the 
experiment subjects receive cash payments depending on the points they have won.
36The number of rounds used in the experiments detailed in section 2.7 varies from 16 
(for some networks in Skvoretz  and Wilier  [66])  to 60  (Lucas et.  al  [40]).  Typically 
there are 24 points in each exchange opportunity.  However Lucas et al  [40]  and one 
experiment  in  Lovaglia et  al  [39]  use  30  points in each  exchange  opportunity,  and 
Cook  and  Emerson  [21]  and  Cook  et  al  [22]  contain  some  exchange  opportunities 
with  24  points  and  others  with  only  8  points.  The  payment  per  payoff  point  is 
usually  constant  but  sometimes  increases  in  later  rounds  (e.g.  Lucas  et  al  [40]). 
Multiple sessions are played replicating the experiment with different subjects.
The  remainder  of  this  section  details  some  of  the  variations  in  experimental 
design  which  occur.  In  a  few  experiments  (e.g.  Markovsky  et  al  [45])  subjects 
bargain face-to-face,  and choose their own bargaining process,  under a few restric­
tions.  However,  typically  subjects  communicate  through  computer  terminals.  In 
this case,  the experimenters must  design a bargaining  process,  effectively  choosing 
a  non-cooperative  game  to  model  bargaining.  The  details  of this  process  are  not 
always fully described in the experimental papers.  The features which are given are 
quite  diverse.  Some experiments  (e.g.  experiment  2  in  Lovaglia  et  al  [39])  require 
subjects to make simultaneous22  demands,  and exchanges  form when demands  are 
jointly feasible23.  This is a similar  approach to the Nash demand game  (described 
in  chapter  6).  Some  such  experiments  (e.g.  Lucas  et  al  [40])  also  allow  a  ‘second 
chance’ bargaining round for subjects who do not exchange immediately.  Other ex­
periments  (e.g.  Bienenstock and Bonacich  [1])  require subjects to repeatedly make 
offers to each other, and exchanges form when an offer is accepted.  This is a similar 
approach to  the  alternating  offers  game  (described  in  chapter  4).  In some experi­
22Decisions are ‘simultaneous’  in this context if they are  not  revealed  or acted on  until everyone 
has made one.  That is, the computer program waits until a decision has been received from everyone
before allowing subjects to make further input.
23Sometimes many configurations of exchanges may  be possible  under this restriction.  In exper­
iment  2  of Lovaglia  [39]  the  computer  uses  an  exogenous  rule  to  decide  which  exchanges  form  in 
such cases.
37ments  these offers  must  be  made simultaneously  and  in others  they  may  be made 
at  any time.  A  fairly complicated  system is sometimes  used  to  decide  acceptance, 
requiring several  signals  being sent  between the subjects.  This  is especially  neces­
sary in the case where acceptance decisions  are made simultaneously.  Subjects are 
sometimes (e.g.  Lovaglia et al [39]) restricted to only changing their offers by 1 point 
from that of the previous round.
The level of information given to subjects by experimenters differs.  Indeed,  the 
aims of some experiments  (e.g.  Lovaglia et  al  [39])  include investigating the effects 
of information.  Others  (e.g.  Lucas et  al  [40])  restrict  information in an attempt  to 
avoid the use of fairness norms; subject preferences which depend not just on payoffs 
earned, but also on whether the payoffs to other subjects are perceived to be ‘fail '. 
Some pieces of information that  are withheld from subjects include:  the actions  of 
other subjects, the global structure of the network, and the payoffs of other subjects 
- sometimes even the payoffs of subjects' exchange partners were disguised.
The  treatment  of  subjects  outside  the  experiment  also  varies.  Many  papers 
(e.g.  Cook and Emerson [21]) describe allowing the subjects to meet beforehand for 
instruction  about  the  experiment.  It  can  be  argued  that  this  may  encourage  the 
use of fairness norms and reputational effects; subjects acting as if they would meet 
the others again and playing to establish a good reputation.  The rationale given by 
Cook and Emerson  [21]  for this is to reassure subjects that they are playing against 
humans not computer programs24.
2.7  Experimental  Results
This section summarizes experimental results from the sociology literature.  As men­
tioned  above,  there  is  considerable  variation  in  the  experimental  designs  used  to 
generate these  results.  The  results  are  included only  as  a guide to  the  qualitative
24Indeed  in  Wilier  and  Skvoretz  [72],  this  method  was  used  because  subjects  sometimes  were 
playing against computer programs!
38features they reveal in these networks, so only particularly striking variations in de­
sign are noted.  However it is noted whether subjects are given •complete' or ‘limited’  
information25.  This is done to illustrate that  it  is not  obvious  whether  this choice 
has a powerful effect  on the outcomes.
The level of detail to which experimental results are given  in the corresponding 
papers  varies.  The  results  in  this  section  have  been  taken  from  papers  which  at 
least give average payoff splits in most exchange opportunities.  A payoff split is the 
average number of payoff points received by each player in an exchange opportunity 
conditional  on  that  exchange  forming.  Some  other  papers  only  publish  variables 
derived from this data.  Even some of the results below have been slightly modified 
from the raw  data  (e.g.  Markovsky  et  al  [44]).  Where it  has  been  published,  the 
frequency of each  exchange  is  also  included.  Blanks  in  the  tables  below  represent 
information  which  is  not  provided.  Note  that  results  for  symmetric  positions  in 
networks are often aggregated.  For example, for the 4 player line' network discussed 
below most  papers do not  give  the average payoff splits in  each  exchange  but give 
the average of any split between  an inner player - i.e.  player  2  or  3 in figure 2.3 - 
and an outer player - i.e.  player 1 or 4  and the average of any split between inner 
players26.  Another variation is in the rounds of play that  average  results are given 
for.  Sometimes they are given over all rounds and sometimes  (e.g.  Lucas et al  [40]) 
only over  a final  portion of rounds.  The experiments  below  use cakes  of 24 payoff 
points in all exchanges except where mentioned otherwise.
Most  papers  also  include  statistics  on  the  distribution  of the  data  around  the 
mean  values.  This  is  used  to  check  that  the  results  are  significant  compared  to 
various null hypotheses  based  on network position being unimportant.  This is not 
included as these results are only used as a rough qualitative guide to behaviour in 
this thesis.  Note  that  the  issue of whether play  has  converged  to  a stable pattern 
which will survive for future rounds is not directly investigated by these experiments.
25Papers are not always precise  in  what  they  mean  by these terms.
2G This makes it difficult to assess the extent  to which average payoffs  are symmetric.
39Most of the data in the tables below lies in average split columns.  The heading 
of such a column gives the players involved in the split  e.g.  T-2‘.  The data in this 
column is of the form ix\-X2' where x\ + X2 = 1.  These are the average proportions 
of the  available  payoff points that  the  players  receive  conditional  011  the exchange 
forming.  Sometimes  the  heading contains  two  exchanges  e.g.  1-2  or  3-4'.  I11  this 
case the data of the column is also of the form \t\-x-y  where x.[ + xo —   1.  This time 
x\  is the average proportion of the available payoff points that  player  1 or 3 receives 
in any exchange with player 2 or 4 respectively.
Star  Networks
i
/   \   i
Figure 2.1:  3 and 4 player star networks
I  refer  to  networks  of at  least  3  players  with  the  property  that  all  exchanges 
involve  one common  player  as  star networks.  I  refer  to  the  common  player  as the 
central player and the others as the outliers.  Both [40] and [04]  contain experiments 
on a 3 player star network.  The other papers listed in table 2.1 contain results for a 
4 player star network.  In  [40],  30 point cakes and a limited  information setting are 
used.  A complete information setting is used in [66] and [64], but I am unsure about 
the remaining experiments.  In  [72]  the  central position  was  played  by  a computer 
program which always accepted the best offer made to it.
Stem Network
In  [39]  two experiments  are performed.  That  labelled  b)  in table 2.2  uses 30 point 
cakes  and  has  a  limited  information  setting.  That  labelled  a)  uses  24  point  cakes 
and a complete information setting, as do the remaining experiments listed in table 
2.2.
40Paper Average centre-outlier split
[65) 0.793 - 0.207
[66] 0.901  - 0.089
[72] 0.988 - 0.012
[64] 0.665 - 0.335
[40] 0.832 - 0.168
Table 2.1:  Star network results
!   / '
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Figure 2.2:  Stem network
Paper
Average split Number of 
2  3 or 2-4 exchanges 2-1 2-3 or 2-4 3-4
[66] 
[44] 
[39]  a) 
[39]  b)
0.637 - 0.363 
0.601  - 0.399 
0.663 - 0.337 
0.671  - 0.332
0.687 - 0.313 
0.639 - 0.361 
0.583 - 0.417 
0.582 - 0.418 0.606 - 0.397
8  (of 64 possible) 
2
■•infrequent"
Table 2.2:  Stem network results
414  Player  Line
4  3  2  1
•---------- • ---------- •-------- •
Figure 2.3:  4 player line network
The  experiment  of  [40]  uses  a limited  information  setting  and  30  point  cakes. 
A  complete  information  setting  is  used  in  [66]  and  [39].  It  is  unclear  what  the 
informational  assumptions of the remaining experiments listed  in table  2.3  are.  In 
[72] the central positions, 2 and 3, were played by a computer programs which always 
accepted the best offers made to them and sometimes made offers of 12 payoff points 
to each other.
Paper
Average split
Frequency of 2  3 exchange 2 -  1  or 3 - 4 2  3
[65] 0.522 - 0.478
[1] 0.597 - 0.403 0.517 - 0.483 0.16%  27
[66] 0.585 - 0.415 0.18
[39] 0.600 - 0.400
[72] 0.542 - 0.458
[40] 0.647 - 0.337 0.501  0.499 0.11
Table 2.3:  4 player line network results
5  Player  Line
1  2  3  4  5
Figure 2.4:  5 player line network
27This seems surprisingly  low.  Possibly  the % symbol  in  [1]  is a  typographical error.
42The experiment of [40]  uses a limited information setting and 30 point  cakes.  A 
limited information setting is also used in  [22], whereas  [04]  uses complete informa­
tion.  The network of [22]  is not strictly a 5 player line; it also contains an exchange 
opportunity for players  1  and  5  to split  8  payoff points.  This exchange  was  rarely 
used.
Paper
Average split
2-3 or 4-3 2  1  or 4  5
[22] 0.556  0.444 0.600  0.400
[64] 0.608 - 0.392 0.640 -0.360
[40] 0.831  0.169 0.879  - 0.121
Table 2.4:  5 player line network results
In [64] the frequencies of each exchange are also recorded.  The other experiments 
listed in table 2.4 do not give any data about the frequency of exchanges.
Exchange 12 23 34 45
Frequency 0.70 0.29 0.38 0.62
7 Player  Line
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Figure 2.5:  7 player line network
Two experiments were carried out on this network.  In [64].  40 rounds of play are 
used whereas  [40]  uses 60.  The outcomes in [40] are from the last  20 rounds of play, 
whereas  [64]  does  not  mention  whether  or  not  its  results  are  similarly  taken  from 
the  later  part  of the  experiment.  As  before.  [40]  uses  30  point  cakes .and  limited 
information and  [64]  has complete information.
43Average split
Paper 2-1  or 6-7 2-3 or 6-5 4-3 or 4-5
[64] 0.581  -0.419 0.582 -0.418 0.523  0.473
[40] 0.792 -0.208 0.745 -0.255 0.708 -0.292
Table 2.5:  7 player line network results 
In  [64], the frequencies of each exchange are also given:
Exchange 12 23 34 45 56 67
Frequency 0.73 0.25 0.47 0.50 0.25 0.74
In [40], average payoffs for each position are given.  The following table presents 
these as a proportion of the maximum available payoff .
Player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Payoff propotion 0.260 0.750 0.279 0.708 0.296 0.807 0.187
Other Networks
In [64] experiments are carried out on several other networks.  Partial results of one 
network,  the  “Strong4”  network,  are  given  here as  they  lend  some  support  to  the 
degree dependence hypothesis.  This experiment uses complete information.
Dr
B
c
Figure 2.6:  Strong4 network
44Exchange opportunity Average split Frequency
BA or BC 
BD 
BF 
BH
0.874  -0.126 
0.815 -0.185 
0.812 -0.188 
0.914 -0.086
BA:  0.49 BC:  0.36 
0.05 
0.03 
0.06
Table 2.6:  Strong4 results
2.8  Discussion
The  most  clear-cut  experimental  results  are  those of Lovaglia  et  al  [40].  That  is, 
these  have  the  greatest  relative  differences  between  average  payoffs  for  different 
players.  Producing such results was a deliberate aim of this paper.  Two features of 
the design which were intended to aid this are that a larger than typical number of 
experimental rounds is used with results only taken from the final third of rounds, 
and that limited  information is used.  The motivation for limiting information is to 
avoid fairness norms.
The experimental data given above provides some support for the degree depen­
dence hypothesis.  Positions A B and C in the St,rong4 network studied in Skvoret.z 
[64] form a 3 player star, but player A also has other neighbours.  Player A does bet­
ter than the central player in any star network experiment,  including those carried 
out in the same paper under the same experimental design28.
The  experiments  do  not  give  any  clear  indications  about  the  effect  of limiting 
information.  Lovaglia et al [39] contains two experiments on the stem network under 
different  informational  settings  and  finds no significant  variations.  However,  there 
is a lot of variation between some results above and the available evidence does not 
allow a strong view to be taken on whether information has a significant effect.
28The only variation  in experiment desgin mentioned  in  [64]  is that  12 sessions of 30  rounds are 
used  for the 3 player line and 8 sessions of 32 rounds are used for the Strong'4 network.
45In the networks for which NET predicts strong power, such as odd length lines, 
high  and low  strong  power  players do not  receive  payoffs  of  1  and  0  as  predicted. 
Payoff differences  between  high  and  low  power  players  (respectively  even  and  odd 
numbered players in odd length line networks) seem smaller for larger networks, for 
example for the 7 player line in comparison to the 3 player lines
Finally,  the  experiments  do  not  give  unconditional  support  to  symmetric  out­
comes  forming.  The  experiment  of [39]  on  the stem  network,  which  is  labelled  b) 
in the table above,  the average payoff split between players 3  and 4 is significantly 
unequal.
46Chapter  3
Mathematical Preliminaries  and 
Definitions
This  chapter contains  definitions  which  are  repeatedly  used  later  and  summarizes 
relevant  mathematical  background  material.  Section  3.1  defines bilateral exchange 
networks.  These  are  mathematical  descriptions of the  negatively  connected  social 
exchange  networks  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  and  form  the  main  focus  of 
study in this thesis.  Section 3.2 is comprised of relevant graph theoretic definitions. 
Section 3.3 contains background material on game theory.  Appendix 3.4 develops the 
game theory material more formally.  This level of formality  is  required for various 
results, but for the purpose of clarity is only used in appendices and footnotes.  The 
appendix  also  presents  a  theorem  of  Harris  on  the  existence  of  subgame  perfect 
equilibria.  A  corollary  is  proved  showing existence  for  a class of games  commonly 
used in this thesis.
3.1  Bilateral  Exchange  Networks
Section 3.1.1  contains the definition of a bilateral exchange network,  and other re­
lated  definitions.  Section  3.1.2  discusses  how  these  definitions  represent  the  neg­
47atively  connected  networks  described  in  section  2.4.  This  principally  involves  a 
discussion of the use of utility functions.  Finally,  section  3.1.3  defines notation  for 
some example networks which are often used.
3.1.1  D efinitions  and  N otation
Definition  3.1.  is the non-negative real interval  [O.oc).
Definition  3.2.  A  (2 player)  utility cake is a compact  convex  non-empty subset  of
R+  which allows free disposal i.e.  if (a. b)  is contained  then  so  is  every  (c. d)  such
that c . < a, d < b.
Let JC *  be the set of all utility cakes.
Definition 3.3.  A bilateral exchange network is a triple N —   (P. E. K), where P is 
a finite set of players, E is a set of exchange opportunities. which are unordered pairs 
of distinct players, and K :P x P — > / C *  U{0}  is a utility cake function satisfying
1.  I\(a, b) —  0 if and only if (a, b) $ E.
2.  I<(b,a) = {(crb,aa)  |  (cra,cr6) € I<(a,b)}
The  set  P  is  the  set  of distinct  bargainers.  Since  an  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to 
represent the process of bargaining as a game,  P is referred to as the set of players. 
For simplicity,  P takes the form {1,2,3.... , n)  unless specified otherwise.
An  exchange  opportunity  represents  a  pair  of players  who  have  the  possibility 
of forming  an  exchange1.  An  exchange  opportunity  (a, b)  is  often  referred  to  by 
the  shorthand  ab  and  K(ab)  by  }C ab,  where  this  will  not  cause  confusion.  The 
utility cake function K maps two players with an exchange opportunity to the set of 
feasible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility pairs for that coalition2.  In the expression 
(va,°b)  €  /C°6,  ax  refers  to  the  utility  of player  x.  Thus condition  2  above  means 
that Kab  and )Cba  effectively refer to the same set of utility pairs.
Tn the terminology of economic theory.  E represents the set of feasible coalitions.
2Section 3.1.2  discusses the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  functions.
48Note that E is not strictly necessary in the definition above.  It could be defined 
in terms of K and P as3 {(a, b)  | a, b G  P and K(u. b) /  0}.  However, it is convenient 
to include E.  For example, this allows a network to be defined by stating P,  E and 
a single utility cake which applies to all exchange opportunit ies.
A  cake  fCab  —   {(0,0)}  can  be  interpreted  as  showing  that  the  only  possible 
interactions  between  a  and  b  are  non-profit able.  It  seem  intuitively  obvious  that 
the outcome of a bargaining situation should be robust to whether or not any such 
opportunities exist4.  The possibility of such cakes is only included in the definition 
because  they  do  affect  the  outcomes  of some  later  bargaining  models5,  indicating 
that they are not robust in this sense6.
Definition 3.4.  For ab 6 P, the boundary function f"'b :   [0. M lll> )   — >   is given by
f a'b(x)  = max{;y  |  (x./y)  6 JC ab) 
where M ab —  rnax{M  |  (A/, 0)  6 ICab}.
Recall that utility cakes are compact.  Thus the sets used in this definition have 
maximum elements as required.
As a shorthand for the composition of boundary functions,  let
r Ac  =
Note that the domain of such a function may be empty ‘.
JAlso,  it would  be necessary to replace condition  1  on  K  with  A'(a.a)  = 0.
4This assumes that transmission of information does not occur through  t hese interactions.  This
possibility is outside the scope of this thesis and the bargaining models studied do not include any
mechanisms for such information  transfer.
°See section 4.4.4  for example.
°The same results can be usually be found using cakes containing only  ut ilities of less than some
sufficiently small e.  Sometime it is also necessary to take the limit t — >  0.  Cakes of the form  {(0. 0)}
simply permit straightforward  examples.
7For example  suppose  f1,2(x) =  / 3,1(x)  =  1   -  x  and  f2 ' 3(x)  =  4 -  x.  The  respective  domains
of these  functions are  [0, 1].  [0. 1]  and  [0.4].  The  function  f l' 2 ' 3(x)  =  2  + x  has domain  [0. 1]  and
range  [2,3],  which does not  intersect the domain of / 3,i.  Thus the domain  of / is empty.
49payoff to player  b
payoff to player a
Figure 3.1:  A utility cake and its boundary function
Stating a boundary function defines a corresponding utility cake.  In fact, giving 
an extension of a boundary function  e.g.  some polynomial f (!'b  :  R — >  R --is usually 
the easiest way to define a utility cake8.
Definition  3.5.  The  m-unit  cake  is  generated  by  the  boundary  function  m —  x. 
The (one) unit cake is written as /C„„it.  The unit cake function is Knnit(ab) = /Cunjt.
Such cakes  are  referred  to  as  m-unit  cakes  since they  correspond  to  situations 
where 2 players have an opportunity to split m units of utility.
Definition  3.6.  The  outer boundary of a utility cake JC ab  is the set
{(re, y)  £ /C  |  x' > x and y  > y  (x , y')
Note that the outer boundaries of )Cab and JC ba  represent the same set of utility 
pairs for players a and b.
Definition  3.7.  The  cake  )Cab  is  said  to  be  insatiable  if f u-b   and  f b'a  are strictly 
monotonic.
8In  this  case  the  domain  of  the  actual  boundary  function  should  be  t aken  to  be  [0. / ]  where 
r = minfx > 0 |/o,,>(x)  = 0}.
50An  equivalent  condition  is  that  f a-b'a  is  the  identity.  A  consequence  of  the 
definition is that the outer boundary of K,ab contains 110 straight  line segments.
An interpretation of this condition is as follows.  For any pair a —  (cra,c7(,)  G  K,ub 
such that  aa  >  0,  there exists  another  pair  (Aa,A^)  G  IC(lb   such  that  A(J   <  aa   and 
A/, >  Thus from any bargaining outcome a as described, player a has an available 
concession; a utility pair which reduces his own share of the cake and increases that 
of player b.
Definition  3.8.  An  outcome  for  a bilateral  exchange  network  N —   (P.E.K)  is  a 
pair o =  {F,q)  where F C E is the set of realised exchanges  and q :  P — >  K+  is the 
share function.  An outcome is feasible if it satisfies the following conditions:
1.  A player may only exchange once.  i.e.
ab G  F and ac G  F => b —  c
2.  The shares of any pair of exchanging players must be in their utility cake.  i.e.
abeF^ (qa.qb) 6 K.ab
3.  Non-exchanging players receives zero shares,  i.e.
ac ^ F Vc G  P  qa  = 0
A value x  G  M+ is said to be feasible from i to j for some players i and  j if ij  G  E
and x < / lJ (0).
3.1.2  U tility  T heory
To  make  any  investigation  into  players’  behaviour  in  a  bargaining  situation  it  is 
necessary  to  know  something  about  their  preferences  over the  possible  outcomes.
This  section  briefly  discusses how  assumptions  about  preferences  and  other  con­
siderations  lead  to  the  situations  described  in  section  2.4  as  negatively-connected 
networks being represented by bilateral exchange networks.
51It is assumed that each player has a transitive and complete preference relation 
over all possible outcomes of bargaining9.  A player’s preferences can then be repre­
sented by a utility function assigning a real number to each outcome.  One outcome 
is strictly preferred to another if and only it has a higher associated utility.
A  two player  bargaining problem can then be represented  by  a set  /C  of utility 
pairs for all possible outcomes.  However,  note that  many different  representations 
are  possible,  as  utility  functions under  the definition  above  only  represent  ordinal 
preferences.  Under the assumption of a non-discrete set /C,  it  can be shown that  a 
reasonable resolution of the 2 player bargaining problem cannot be based 011 ordinal 
utility functions alone (see section 4.3.2 of Shubik [63]  for example).  A 11011-discrete 
utility  cake  seems  desirable  in  a  social  exchange  setting  because  the  intensity  of 
player’s actions may vary continuously, and in an economic setting because contracts 
may allow outcomes constructed as lotteries over other outcomes.
To  make  any  progress  on  analysis  of general  a bargaining  problem  it  is  neces­
sary to introduce more preference structure.  One resolution  is to  use cardinal  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.  These also require players’  preferences on 
lotteries  of outcomes  to  be  specified.  That  is,  they  encapsulate  attitudes  toward 
risk.  Various extra axioms on preferences over lotteries  must  be satisfied  (see Mv- 
erson  [52]  for example).  The result  is  a utility  function  in which  a player’s  utility 
of a lottery is equal to the expectation of their realised utility value in that lottery. 
Another important property is that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are 
unique up to positive affine transformations10.  In this thesis, players’ von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility scales are normalised so that a payoff of zero corresponds to the 
payoff of not taking part in an exchange11.
9These  assumptions  and  some  of the  other  axioms  of von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  men­
tioned  below  can  be criticised  on  experimental  grounds.  For  example,  see section  1.7  of Myerson
[52]  for a summary of some experimental results.
10A transformation of the form x 1— ►  ax + f 3  where a  > 0.
11 It is assumed that players are indifferent between all outcomes in which  they do not exchange.
52Consider  the  conditions  on  a utility  cake  given  in  definition  3.2.  Utility  cakes 
are assumed to be in K+2 by only considering outcomes such that no player strictly 
prefers  not  to  exchange.  Utility  cakes  are  assumed to  be non-empty  because oth­
erwise there is no opportunity for an exchange which both players view as at  least 
as  good  as  not  exchanging.  In  an  economic  context,  free  disposal  corresponds  to 
allowing players to sign contracts agreeing to ‘throw away'  some of the proceeds of 
exchange e.g.  by burning money.  In the context  of social  exchange,  as  mentioned 
above,  the intensity of player’s actions may vary continuously.  This goes some way 
towards  generating  free  disposal12.  Utility  cakes  are  assumed  to  be convex  by  al­
lowing  any outcome  which  is  a lottery  over  other outcomes  and  applying the  first 
property of von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility mentioned  above.  Utility cakes  can 
be defined as the minimal sets satisfying the above properties and containing  a fi­
nite set of points corresponding to the  ‘basic outcomes'  of bargaining.  Under this 
definition the cakes also satisfy compactness.
Consider  a  negatively  connected  network  in  the  sense  of section  2.4.  Assume 
that  each  player’s  utility  depends only  011  his  own  exchange.  That  is,  a player  is 
indifferent between different global outcomes in which he makes the same exchange 
on the same terms.  This is reasonable if players have little knowledge of how their 
exchange  may  affect  the pattern  of exchange  elsewhere  in  the1   network13.  The set 
of outcomes  of the  network  can  then  be  represented  in  terms  of the  utility  cakes 
representing the  possible  outcomes  of each  exchange  opportunity.  This  generates 
the definitions of a bilateral exchange network and the outcome of such a network
12Pree  disposal  is  not just  included  in  the  list  of conditions  for  convenience.  It  is  necessary  for 
some later results such as that of footnote 20 of chapter 4.  Also, note that insatiability (see definition
3.7), convexity and the inclusion of (0,0)  in a utility cake imply free disposal in any case.
13In small  networks this  may  be  unlikely.  For example consider a  four  player  line  network  with
exchange opportunities 12,  23,  34  (L4  in the notation of section 3.1.3).  if players 2 and 3 know the 
structure  of the  network  then  they  know  that  in  the  case  that  they  form  an  exchange  with  each 
other,  players  1  and  4  receive  utilities  of zero.  Should  players  2  and  3  have  some  preference  for 
‘fairness’,  their utility in the exchange 23 is reduced.
53used in section 3.1.1.
3.1.3  Example  Networks
This subsection defines networks which are used later.  Recall from section 3.1.1 that 
P = {l,2,...,n}.
Definition 3.9.  An n-player line network satisfies E —  {12,23...., (n —  l,?i)}.  The 
n-player unit line network Ln  also satisfies K = Aunit.
Definition 3.10.  An n-player ring network satisfies E = {12, 23,... , (n—  l, n), nl). 
The n-player unit ring network  Rn  also satisfies K —  Kunit.
Definition 3.11.  For n > 3, an n-player star network satisfies E —   (1A |2 < k < n}. 
Player 1  is called the  central player,  and the others are called  outliers.
Note that a 3 player line network is a star network.
Definition  3.12.  A network is  bipartite  if P can be partitioned  into  sides  P\  and 
P2 such that all exchanges ab 6  E contain one player from each side.
Note that 2n-player ring networks and all line and star networks are bipartite.
3.2  Graph Theoretic  Definitions
Definition  3.13.  A  graph  is a pair  (V,E)  where  V  is  a  set  of  vertices and  E is  a
set  of  edges,  pairs of distinct  elements  of V.  A graph  is  said  to  be  directed  if the
pairs in E are ordered and  undirected  if not.
In all the graphs considered in this thesis V is a finite set.  An edge (a,b) is often 
written as ab where this will not cause confusion.  A subgraph of (V, E) is any graph 
(V'iE') such that  V'  C  V and E'  C  E.  The subgraph of  (V, E)  induced by IT C  V
is  (W,F)  where F = {ab 6 E  |  (a, b}  C  W}.
Given  a graph  (V,E),  b  €  V  is  said  to  be  a  neighbour  of  a  €  V  if  ab  G  E  or 
ba € E.  The number of neighbours of v e  V is called its  degree.
54A  walk  in graph (V. E)  is a sequence  (e7 ;)o<7 ;<n such that  e,r’7 +i  E  E.  A  path  in 
graph (V, E) from a to b is a walk (v,;)o<i<n such that vq = a. vn —  b and all vertices 
in the sequence are distinct with the permissible exception that  i.’o may equal vn.  In 
the latter case if also n > 0 then the path is called a  cycle.
An  undirected  graph is  said  to  be  connected  if there  is  a  path  between  every 
distinct pair of vertices.  A connected component of an undirected graph is a maximal 
connected subgraph.  That is, it is a connected subgraph S such that there exists 110 
distinct connected subgraph S' such that S is a subgraph of S'.  Any graph may be 
partitioned into connected components.
An undirected graph is called a (undirected)  tree if it is connected and contains 
no  cycles.  A  directed  graph  T  —   (V, E)  is  called  a  (directed)  tree  if contains  110 
cycles and there exists a  root  r  E  V such that there is a path in  T from r to every 
other node in  V.
3.3  Game Theoretic Definitions  and Results
Section 3.3.1  informally defines a game.  The formal details are contained in section
3.4.1  in the appendix to this chapter.  Section  3.3.2 contains some other game the­
oretic  material.  Again,  many  of the  formal  details  are  relegated  to  the  appendix, 
mainly section 3.4.2.  Section 3.3.3 describes how games can represent the outcome 
of bargaining in bilateral exchange networks.  Section  3.3.4  discusses subgame per­
fect equilibrium (SPE), the main game theoretic solution concept used in chapters 4 
and 5.  It also contains the statement of an existence result for SPEs which applies 
to most of the games considered in these chapters.  The proof is contained in section
3.4.3 in the appendix, and is a corollary of a SPE existence theorem of Harris  [33].
3.3.1  A  Summary  of the Definition of a Game
There is a finite set P of players.  The set of periods is given by the non-zero natural 
numbers N+.  In each period, every player chooses some action independently of the
55other players.  A vector of actions for all players is called an  action profile.
An  infinite  history  of the game is  a sequence  of action  profiles for each  period 
and also a ‘zero period’, which is included for notational convenience.  The definition 
of a game is based on the set of possible infinite histories of the game,  H°°.
A finite  history  is  a subsequence of the first  n  elements  of any  infinite  history 
for any n.  Finite histories are often referred to below simply as histories, since they 
are discussed more often than infinite histories.
Given  a finite history of length n,  consider the set  of action  profiles which can 
be appended to this sequence to produce a valid finite history of length n-1 - 1.  Since 
players choose their actions independently, this set factorises into sets of actions for 
each player called  action sets.
A  (pure)  strategy  for  a  player  maps  from  a  finite  history  to  an  action  in  the 
corresponding action set.  A vector of strategies  for  each  player  is called  a  strategy 
profile.  A strategy profile specifies a unique infinite history of the game which results 
if the players choose actions  according to these strategies14.
A payoff function tt maps from a infinite history to a vector containing a payoff 
in R for each player.  The payoff for player i is written 7r,;.  In this thesis, these values 
typically represent utilities available to players in utility cakes and thus lie in R+.
A  game  is  a  pair  (H°°, 7r)  as  described  above.  A  game  of perfect  information 
is one such that  given  any finite history,  at  most one action set  is not  a singleton. 
That is, only one player may take a lion-trivial action in each period.
3.3.2  Further  Game  Theoretic  Terms
A  mixed strategy  maps  from  a finite history  to  a probability  distribution over  the 
corresponding action set.  These are rarely used in this thesis.
The  decision function  D  maps from a finite history to  the* player whose action 
set is not a singleton.  In the case where no such player exists  D{h)  can be defined
14A technical condition is introduced in section 3.4.1  to ensure that  this is the case.
56as 0.
In a game of perfect information, a history can effectively  be represented by the 
sequence of actions  made in each period by the player with  a  non-singleton action 
set  (no entries  need  be made for periods where no such  player exists).  The action 
profile at  each period can be inferred from this,  as described in section  3.4.2.  This 
is usually the most convenient method of representing histories.
It  is  often  useful  to  allow  terminal  finite  histories.  Such  a  history  has  an  as­
sociated  payoff and empty  action sets;  the game is over  once  a terminal  history is 
reached.  Section  3.4.2  shows that  the above  definition of a game  allows  a method 
of expressing  terminal  finite  histories.  In  the  remainder  of  the  thesis  (except  the 
appendix of this  chapter)  games  are often  defined  assuming  terminal  histories  are 
possible without reference to the details of this method.  In such a definition payoffs 
must be given for both terminal and non-terminal infinite histories.  In making these 
definitions, the phrase ‘infinite history’ is often used as a shorthand for ‘non-terminal 
infinitie history’, where this does not cause confusion.
A  2  x  2  game  is  a  2  player  game  such  that  both  players  have  two  actions  in 
their  action  set  in  the  first  period  and  all  one  period  histories  are  terminal.  The 
payoffs of such a game can be represented by functions pr(xi . xo) giving the payoff to 
player i if players 1 and 2 make actions x\  and x2 respectively in the first period.  A 
2 x 2 game is symmetric if both players have the same action set in the first period 
and pi(x\,X2)  =  P2(x2,x 1)  for  all  actions  (£1,0:2).  A  definition  of  more  general 
symmetric games can be made similarly.
Given  a finite or  infinite history £,  a  subhistory  is  a subsequence of the first n 
elements of x for any n less than the length of x.  A subhistory is a finite history.
Given a game Q and a non-terminal finite history x of length £,  the subgame T L  
of Q  generated  by  x  is  (informally)  constructed  as  follows.  Take  all  histories  of Q 
with £ as a subhistory,  and delete the first t terms.  Use the resulting set  as the set 
of histories of H.  Payoffs,  strategies  and  other terms must  be  defined  accordingly
57for H.  The subgame hi represents  a game beginning after  the  history x  has taken 
place.  A more formal definition is given in section 3.4.2.
A  game with  random  moves  is  as  follows.  Following  certain  finite  histories  an 
action is taken at random according to a fixed probability distribution rather than by 
a player.  Introducing random moves complicates the proof of corollary 3.1.  However 
the only games with random moves analysed in this thesis1:j  have a simple form so 
that this result is not required.  Some more complicated games with random moves 
are mentioned in passing.
Given  a pure strategy  profile  /   for  a game  Q  without  random moves,  a  (pure) 
best reply (or best response) to this profile for player i is any pure strategy for player 
i  which maximises  the  payoff to  player  i  when  all  other  players  play  according  to 
/.  If /  contains mixed strategies or the game includes random moves then a (pure) 
best reply to /  for player i is any pure strategy which maximises the expected payoff 
to player i when all other players play according to /.  A best reply for i can also be 
given if a strategy is only specified for every player other than i.
A  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  game  is  a  strategy  profile  /   satisfying  the  following 
property.  No  player  can  increase  their  payoff by deviating  from  /   while  all  other 
players play according to /.  A strict Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which 
any  player  receives  a  lower  payoff  by  deviating  in  this  way.  A  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium  (SPE)  of a game  is  a strategy  profile satisfying  the  following  stronger 
property.  In any subgame  no  player can  increase their  payoff by  deviating  from  /  
while all other players play according to /.
Definition  3.14.  Suppose  Q{e)  is  a  family  of games  indexed  by  parameter  e.  A 
limiting SPE payoff  of this  family  under the  limit  e  — ►   e*  is  a vector p —   {pi)«=p 
with pi  €  R satisfying the following  property.  For  any  sequence  (e^eN  such  that 
limj^ooej  =  e*,  there exists  a sequence  {pJ)jen  such  that  there  is  a SPE  of G{(j) 
with payoff vector pi  and linij—ooP7   —  P-
15That is, the extensions of the Nash demand game defined in chapter (i.
583.3.3  Bargaining  G am es  and  M odels
A  bargaining game on a network N = (P, E, K)  is a game with players P such that 
each terminal and infinite history of the game is associated with a feasible outcome 
of A T   as well  as  a payoff.  For  any  terminal  or infinite history  h of the game,  qr(h) 
represents the share of player  i  in the corresponding feasible  outcome.  The payoff 
of each player  i  must satisfy  7r,;(/i)  < q^h).  This bound ensures that  the feasibility 
constraints of definition 3.8  apply to payoffs as well as shares.  Associating an out­
come with terminal and infinite histories also allows discussion of which exchanges 
form in such histories.
A share represents the utility a player places on a particular exchange agreement. 
A payoff represent the utility also taking into account the cost of participating in the 
bargaining process.  For example an agreement reached immediately would typically 
be preferred to the same agreement reached after a lengthy period of bargaining.  A 
terminal or infinite history has both shares and payoffs defined for later convenience.
A  bargaining model  is a function which maps a bilateral exchange network and 
certain extra structure to a bargaining game.  Such a model represents specific rules 
for  bargaining  which  can  apply  to  many  networks16.  The  extra structure  is  split 
into two parts.  Endogenous structure is an integral part of the bargaining situation 
which  is  not  described  by  the  bilateral  exchange  network17  (e.g.  discount  factors 
representing the time preferences of players).  Exogenous structure is not an integral 
part of the bargaining situation but is necessary to provide a well defined game (e.g. 
specification of a first mover).
The division between exogenous and endogenous structure is subjective.  Indeed, 
so  is  the  division  between  exogenous  structure  and  the  model  itself;  a  complete 
specification of the bargaining model could be included in the exogenous structure!
16This is similar to Muthoo’s  notion of a ‘procedure’  in  [51].
17Typically endogenous structure contains only  functions with domain  P or E  i.e.  properties  of 
individual players or exchange opportunities.
59The choice of where to draw the line is a modelling choice to aid in interpretation. 
Section 4.4.1  on the market  bargaining game provide an example of the usefulness 
of endogenous and exogenous structure.
In this thesis bargaining games are represented by script letters - e.g.  Q - whereas 
bargaining models are represented by plain text e.g.  M .  Note that a model and its 
arguments also represents a bargaining game e.g.  M(N. E,X)  = M .
3.3.4  Subgam e  Perfect  Equilibrium
SPE is the usual solution concept used for games of perfect information.  The usual 
motivation  for  its  use  is  as  follows  (see  Binmore  [5]  or  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  [30] 
for more details).  Nash equilibrium is a necessary requirement for a strategy profile 
to  represent  a stable solution of any  game.  Given  any other  strategy  profile there 
exists  a  player  who  would  prefer  to  unilaterally  deviate  from  it.  However  some 
games possess multiple Nash equilibria,  and some seem more plausible as solutions 
of  the  game  than  others.  The  results  in  an  equilibrium  selection  problem.  One 
reason  for  some  Nash  equilibria  being  less  plausible  is  that  they  allow  players  to 
make  ‘incredible threats’.  An example of this in a 2 player  bargaining situation is 
that  one  bargainer  may  make  an  initial  demand  and  threaten  to  never  exchange 
should it  be  refused.  Should  this  bargainer  be put  in  the  position  where  he must 
carry  out  this  threat  then  it  is  clearly  not  in  his  own  interest  to  do so.  However, 
in  an  appropriate  game  modelling  2  player  bargaining  (e.g.  the  alternating  offers 
game  of section  4.2)  a  Nash  equilibrium  can  be  constructed  in  which  one  player 
uses  a strategy  corresponding  to  this  incredible  threat  and  the  other  accepts  the 
initial demand.  The motivation for SPE is to avoid  incredible threats by requiring 
strategies to form Nash equilibria of every subgame.  In the example just given this 
rules out the threat of never exchanging.
Note that for a game in which a terminal history is always reached within a finite 
number of a periods,  an equivalent  definition of SPE to that  given in section  3.3.2
60is  as  follows.  In  any  subgame  no  player  can  increase  their  payoff  by  unilaterally 
deviating to another  action in any single period.  In this thesis, this distinction is of 
little conceptual importance and can usually be neglected except in proofs18.
The existence of SPEs is straightforward to prove for games of perfect information 
in which all infinite histories have a terminal subhistory and there are a finite number 
of terminal histories19 using Zermelo’s algorithm (see theorem 3.2 of Fudenberg and 
Tirole  [30]  for  example).  This  condition  does not  hold  for many  of the bargaining 
games in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  In this case, the existence of SPEs is a more 
complicated issue.  Indeed it is easy to define games in which no SPE exists20.  For 
most games in chapters 4 and 5, a SPE existence theorem of Harris [33] resolves this 
issue.  Bargaining  literature  generally  does not  require such  an existence  theorem. 
Instead, a typical resolution is as follows.  Existence is assumed, and some properties 
of a SPE are deduced - e.g.  a unique SPE outcome is found.  These properties are 
then used to construct a simple strategy profile - e.g.  a stationary strategy profile - 
which can easily be verified to be a SPE. This method does not always suffice in this 
thesis because in some cases it is not straightforward to explicitly construct example 
SPEs (see section  5.4.7 for example).
For several  bargaining games  used  later21,  the method just described  does suf­
fice.  Section 3.4.3  of the appendix to this chapter defines a class E  which captures 
the remaining bargaining games of perfect  information which are used below.  The 
following corollary of Harris’ theorem is then proved:
Corollary  3.1.  There exists a SPE for all games in the class E.
18In the proofs of section 5.4,  lemma 5.8 is used to take care of the technicalities relating to this 
distinction.
19That is,  games of perfect  information with  a finite set of infinite histories.
20For example,  consider the one-player game in  which a player must choose an element x G   [0. 1)
and receives payoff x.
2 1 That is, the alternating offers game,  the telephoning model and Herrero’s  model.
013.3.5  E volutionary  G am e  Theory
Non-cooperative  game  theory  typically  concentrates  on  finding  the  equilibria  of 
games, especially Nash equilibria.  This raises the positive question of whether these 
equilibria describe how players  actually  play  the game  and if so.  how  players  con­
centrate on an equilibrium.  One traditional answer is that players are rational and 
concentrate on an equilibrium through a process of introspection bcised 011 common 
knowledge  of the  details  of  the  game22.  This  is  problematic  for  several  reasons. 
Firstly, common knowledge of the details of the game seems a heavy requirement23. 
Secondly, finding an equilibrium through introspection may be a very difficult task24. 
Thirdly,  in  a game  for  which  multiple  equilibria exist,  a mechanism  must  be  pro­
vided for all players to coordinate their play upon a particular equilibrium.  Another 
difficulty  is  the  equilibrium  selection  problem  mentioned  in  the  previous  section. 
Equilibrium  refinements  strengthen  the  conditions  of  Nash  equilibrium  in  an  at­
tempt  to  select  the  more  plausible  equilibria.  Subgame  perfect  equilibrium  is  an 
example.  However  a  large  number  of refinements  exist  in  the  literature  (e.g.  see 
chapter 5 of Myerson  [52])  and it is often difficult to decide which one is appropri­
ate,  especially  when intuitive  insight  into  the situation  being modelling is  hard  to 
come by.
Evolutionary game theory offers a different approach to the questions mentioned 
above.  This  posits  a  process  where  players  repeatedly  play  a  game  and  use  trial 
and error methods to decide what strategies to play.  Strategies which earn players 
higher  payoffs  flourish  and  eventually  a  stable  pattern  of play  may  emerge.  This
22See chapter  1  of Fudenberg and  Tirole  [30]  for a development of this argument.
23In particular,  in the case that mixed strategies are considered  and von  Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities are used, these details must include the preferences of all players over all lotteries of terminal
or infinite histories of the game.
24For example, two player zero-sum games are guaranteed a unique SPE outcome (see section 3.8
of Myerson [52] for example) but for complicated many games in this class (e.g.  chess)  this outcome
is not known and  it is certainly  not the case that players always coordinate  011  it.
G2setting can be formalized mathematically as a dynamical system.
Simple trial  and error methods or  learning  rules  have the  advantage that they 
do not necessarily require a large amount of information about the game.  In a social 
setting they are also attractive because they capture the intuition that people have 
limited  cognitive  resources to  apply to  a large number of decisions  and  thus often 
use simple heuristics.  A  problem is which learning rules to use.  This suggests  the 
application  of psychological  results and the search for  results which  are robust  for 
many learning rules.
Evolutionary game theory typically postulates a large population of players for 
player  position  in  the  underlying  game.  One  approach  is  to  study  the  expected 
behaviour  of these  populations  under  particular  dynamics.  This  generates  deter­
ministic population equations, such as the replicator dynamics.  See Weibull [70]  for 
a survey of results  following this  approach.  Another  approach  is  to  study  models 
retaining stochastic features25.
Evolutionary  game  theory  provides  some  support  to  the  equilibrium  concepts 
mentioned  at  the  start  of  this  section.  For  example  see  sections  3.3  and  5.2  of 
Weibull  [70]  on the connection between Nash equilibria and the stationary states of 
the replicator dynamics, or section 4.2 of Samuelson [57] for more general dynamics. 
Also, some stochastic models provide methods of selecting between multiple equilib­
ria in certain settings.  For example see Binmore et al [8] and Kandori et al [37].  The 
approach of the latter forms the basis for the evolutionary model of chapter 6 and is 
discussed in more depth in section 6.1.  Also, for some situations evolutionary game 
theory offers an explanation for the departure of behaviour from that  predicted by 
equilibrium concepts.  For example Gale et al  [31]  and Seymour [60]  investigate evo­
lutionary models of the ultimatum game.  This game has a unique SPE but it is not 
supported by evidence from laboratory experiments, whereas the papers mentioned
25Many  papers  investigate the  connection  between  these  two  approaches,  for  example  Binmore 
et al  [ 8 ]  and Seymour  [61].
63contain predictions from evolutionary models which are a close match.
3.4  Appendix:  Formal  Game Theoretic  Details
Section 3.4.1  contains the definition of a game used by Harris in  [33].  Section 3.4.2 
contains  brief  note  on  the  application  of  this  definition  and  makes  some  further 
definitions in this setting.  Section 3.4.3 contains Harris’s theorem on SPE existence 
and proves corollary 3.1  showing existence for a class of games used in this thesis.
3.4.1  Full  D efinition  of a  Gam e
This section is based on the setting used by Harris in [33].  Some terms are renamed 
for later convenience.  In particular Harris's use of ‘history’  is replaced with ‘infinite 
history’  to  allow  ‘history’  to refer to finite subhistories,  since these are most  often 
under discussion outside this section.
The  definition  is  based  on  the  set  of infinite  histories  of the  game,  H°°.  For 
convenience  in stating theorem  3.2,  this  is  embedded in  a larger  product space  5’, 
which is defined as follows.
There is a finite set P of players, indexed in this appendix by i.  The set of periods 
is given by the non-zero natural numbers N+,  indexed here by t.  In each period t., 
each  player  i  chooses,  independently  of  the  other  players,  some  action  which  can 
be represented  by an element  of Sa.  The outcome of each period can therefore be 
represented by an element of
S i=n
ieP
Play begins in period  1.  An  infinite history  of the game can  be represented as an 
element of
s ={ o }  x  n  st
/.eN+
where {0}  is included for later notational convenience.
64Any x G S can be written as x —   (xt)teN  where xq —  0,  and xt  G  St  for t  G  N+. 
Any Xt  G  St  can be written as xt = (xti)ieP  where xu  G  Sa-  Finally,  given x  G  S, 
define Atx = (^s)s6N,o<s<t-
The set H°°  of infinite histories of the game is a non-empty subset of S.  Let
XtH = {Xtx\x  G  H°°}
be the set  of all finite histories  of length  t.  Finite histories  are usually referred  to 
simply as histories.
The set of outcomes  possible in period t depends upon the initial history up to 
period t —  1:
At{Xt-\x) —  {yt\y G  H°°, Xt-iy = At_ix}
Players choose their actions independently so AfiXt-ix)  factorises as
At(Xt-ix) —   Ati(Xt~ix)
i€P
Ati{Xt-ix)  is  the  action set  of player  i  following history  Xt-\x.  Note  that  At  and 
Ati are correspondences.
In any period t a period-strategy  for player i in that period is a function
hi '•  At-iH -  Sti
which satisfies
hi(A/.-ix)  G  An(Xt-ix)
for all x G H°°.  That is, period-strategies must always specify actions in the appro­
priate action set.  Given a period-strategy for each player in each period,  a strategy 
for player i is
fi —  (Jti)te N+
and a strategy profile  is
/  —  {Ii)i£P
G5Let F(H°°) be the set of all strategy profiles.  The notation reflects that this set 
is defined by the choice of H°°.  Denote by F^H00)  the set of strategies of player  i. 
If /  G  F(H°°)  and g3  G  Fj(H°°), let
f\9j = (hi)ieP 
/
9j  for i = j 
ft  otherwise
where hi  -
Given  a strategy  profile  f,xE  H°°  and  t  G  N,  define  a(f,x,t)  as  the  infinite 
history  resulting  from  the  strategy  profile  /   being  used  following  history  Atx.  In 
other words,  a(f,x,t)  has the recursive definition:
asi(f,x,t) = xsi  for s < t
&si(f  i %  it) —  /s7 ,[(o:t)o<t<6 ']  foi  S > t
To guarantee that  a(f,x,t)  G  H°°,  the  following condition is  introduced.  For  any 
x  G  S such  that  Atx  G  AtH  for  all  t  G  N,  it  is  the case  that  x  G  H°°.  That  is,  if 
every finite initial subsequence of a: is a history, then x is an infinite history.
A payoff function 7r = (t ti)iep is made up of functions of the form ir7 . : H°°  K. 
Each function 7 r7 ;  describes an individual's payoff in each outcome of the game.
Definition  3.15.  A game is a pair  (H°°, tt)  as described above.
Definition  3.16.  A game of perfect information  is one that satisfies the following 
condition.  Given any  h G  H°°  and any t > 0,  there is at  most one i  G  P such that 
the action set Ati(At~ix)  is not a singleton.
Definition  3.17.  Given  a game  (FT00,7r),  a strategy  profile  /   is  called  a  subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it satisfies the following condition for all x  G  H°°, t G  N, 
i  G  P and all strategies gr   G  Fi{H°°):
t t i(a(f,x,t))  >  iri(a(f\gi,x,t))  (3 .1)
663.4.2  Further  D efinitions  and  N otes
Note that the only form of imperfect information that  definition 3.15  can describe 
is  simultaneous  actions.  This  is sufficient  for  the  games  used  in  this  thesis.  Also 
note that to construct a game in the form of definition 3.15,  the choice of S t,i  is not 
important.  For  example  this  set  could  be  constructed  as  the  union  of all  actions 
that  might  be taken  in  any  history  of the  game.  The choice  of Su  only  becomes 
important in applying the conditions of theorem 3.2 in section 3.4.3.
Definition 3.15  requires all finite histories to have actions sets and only assigns 
payoffs to infinite histories.  The possibility of a finite terminal history is not directly 
allowed.  However,  a finite history Xtx can effectively represent a terminal history if 
the only y E  H°° such that At,y = Xtx is y —  x.  For s > £, the action set A6t(As_ix) 
is a singleton,  so the infinite history x and its associated payoff's  are guaranteed  to 
be realised.
The  decision function  from finite  histories  to  P can  be  defined as  follows.  For 
x E H°° and t  E  D(Xt~ix) is defined to be the unique i  E  P such that Ati{Xt-\x) 
is not a singleton,  where such an i  exists.  In the case where no such player exists, 
D{Xt~ix)  can be defined as 0.
Given  x  E  H°°  for  a  game  of  perfect  information,  let  xt,   —   xtD(\t~ix)  (or  if 
D(Xt-ix)  —   0,  let  xt  —   0).  The  sequence  x  =  {xt)t£^+  then  fully  describes  the 
history x,  as follows.  Suppose that the first  t —  1  action profiles are known.  Then 
D(Xt-ix)  can  be  found.  The  action  of this  player  in  period  t  is  xt,.  Every  other 
player26  has a singleton action set,  so they have only one possible action at  period 
t.  Thus the action profile at period t can be constructed.  A sequence of the form of 
x is usually the most convenient method of representing histories, especially in this 
thesis where the rules governing the order of play are always reasonably simple.
A  Nash  equilibrium  of a  game  (H°° .it)  can  be  defined  as  a strategy  profile  /  
which satisfies equation (3.1) for any x E  H°°, i  E  P, all strategies gr   E  FjfH00) and
2G In the case D(Xt-\x) = 0, this means every player.
67t =  0.
A  subgame  of (H°°, t t )  can  be defined as follows.  For  x  £  H°°  and  t  £  N,  the 
subgame generated by the history \ tx is (Hoc, 7f)  where Hx  = {y £ H°°\Xiy —  A/.x} 
and  7r  is  the  restriction  of  7 r  to  domain  /f00.  Strategies  can  also  be  mapped  to 
restricted  forms  for  subgames;  it  is  only  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  actions  for 
periods up to t correspond to those of x.  The notational details are omitted.  Using 
these definitions, it is possible to state the equivalent definition of a SPE as a strategy 
profile which is a Nash equilibrium of every subgame.
3.4.3  P roof of C orollary  3.1
First the class of games  8  mentioned in corollary 3.1  is defined.  The first condition 
on this class is:
8  1  Su  Q  A U B  and  B  —   I  x  C,  where  A  and  C  are  finite  sets  and  I  is  a  real 
interval  [0, M]  with M > 0.
An interpretation of this condition is given below.  To define the remaining conditions 
on  8 some more notation  is required.  Assume that condition  8.1  holds 011  a game 
(H°°, 7r)  of perfect information.  Given x £ H°°, let
Q(x) = {t. £ N+|x^  £ B}
be the set of periods t at which an action in B is taken  by27  D(A/_ix).  For  t £ Q, 
Xt can be written as  (fit, q)  £ / x C.  Let
J —  {(rlt)t.eN+l7 ? *   e
For if £  J and x £  H°°,  define  b(x,rj)  by replacing fit  with  ift  in x for all t £  Q(x). 
Let
K(x) —   {77 £  J\b(x,if)  £ H°°}
be the set of all sequences in J which generate a valid history in this way.
27It does not  matter that this set excludes periods where all action sets are singletons.
G8Definition 3.18.  The class 8 is the set of those games of perfect information which 
satisfy the condition 8 .1  and:
8.2  For any x 6 H°° there exists pt.{x)  6 K for each t e Q(x)  such that
K(x) = {r/ 6 J|Vt 6 Q(x) j]t  €  [0,pt}}
8.3  For any x 6  H°°,  under the subspace topology induced on K{x)  by the weak 
topology,  the function pi  :   K(h)  — >   M+  defined by p,(i])  =  7Y r(b(x:  rj))  is  con­
tinuous.
This class is meant to represent those bargaining games of chapters 4 and 5 which 
are games of perfect  information  and for which SPE existence cannot  be easily be 
proved by construction.  It is now shown that these games do indeed lie in  8 .  This 
is  done informally  but  the details  are straightforward  to check  for  each  individual 
game.
Condition 8.1  is straightforward.  The actions  in A  represent  acceptance  or re­
fusal decisions, the values in I represent numerical demand levels28, and the elements 
in C represent decisions  about  to whom demands are made.  C  can be taken to be 
a singleton if no decisions of this sort are required.
28The set I is restricted to a closed and bounded interval to satisfy the first  condition of theorem 
3.2  below.  If I  were  allowed  to  be  any  compact  set  in  the  definition  of £,  then  the  class  would 
include the alternating offers game, the telephoning game and Herrero’s model.  Corollary 3.1  could 
be proved by a similar  method to that used  below.  This  is not done in  order to keep the notation 
required simple and because SPE existence can be proved by construction for the models mentioned.
It seems plausible that SPE existence is  conserved for the bargaining games  under investigation 
if I were an  unbounded  interval.  However,  there seems  no  great  benefit  in  extending the  allowed 
form of I thus since this would only amount to extending the range of non-feasible demands which 
players can make.
09Next, condition £.3 is demonstrated.  For the games in question
in case i 
kijt  in case ii
0  otherwise
where k  is a constant  which is independent of //.  Case i  is  ‘in  x player  z  accepts  a 
demand made by player j in period £ and case ii is ‘in x a demand made by player 
z in period t is later accepted’.
By the definition of a utility cake,  f JJ  is continuous (in the Euclidean topology) 
over  its range  for  all  values  of z  and j.  In case i,  for  7/  G  I\ (;r),  q,  must  be in the 
range of fi,% .  Otherwise b(x, 77) would not be a valid history, contradicting  77  G  K(x). 
This shows that condition £.3 holds.
It  remains  to  demonstrate  condition  £.2.  The  bargaining  games  in  question 
fall  into one of two  classes.  For  each  class  values  of pt(x)  are  given  to  satisfy  the 
condition.
The first class29 comprises games where a proposer (a player making a demand) 
may make any numerical demand in I  (as defined in condition  £.1).  For  this class 
pt(x) = / 7J (0)  in the case that in x player z accepts a demand made by player j  in 
period t,  and pt(x) = M  otherwise.  That is,  numerical demands that are accepted 
can be changed to any value which is feasible to the acceptor.  Numerical demands 
which are not accepted can be changed to any value in I.
29Typically this class contains games with exogenous orders of play.  Games in this class are:  the 
market  bargaining  game,  unilateral  demand  exogenous  order  models  and  the exogenous  ordering 
model.
70The  second  class30  comprises  games  where  a  proposer  i  must  specify31  a  set 
of responders  R C  P  and may make any numerical  demands up to minj6y?/J,l(0). 
That is, numerical demands must be feasible to all players in R.  These games satisfy 
condition S.2 with
pt(x) = min 
.ye/?
The  following  result  is  theorem  1  of  Harris  [33].  I  have  slightly  altered  the 
statement of the theorem but made no alterations to the content.
Theorem  3.2.  Suppose  that (H°°, P)  is  a game  of perfect  information.  The fol­
lowing is a sufficient condition for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in 
(H°°,P).  Topologies on the sets Sa  exist such that the 'resulting product topology on 
S satisfies:
1.  For all t € N+  and i € P, Su  is compact.
2.  For all t 6 N+  and i 6 P,  Su  is Hausdorff.
3.  H°°  is a closed subset of S.
4.  For all t € N+,  the correspondence At  is lower herrdcontinuous.
5.  For all i £ P,  7t7 ;  is continuous.
Notes:
1.  The continuity conditions 4 and 5 use appropriate topologies induced by those 
on S and Sti.-  For example, condition 5 uses the subspace topology induced on 
F[°°  by that on S.
30Typically this class contains games with endogenous orders of play.  Games in this class are:  the 
telephoning game, the perfect information models of Calvo-Armengol. and the endogenous ordering- 
model.
3 1 Formally,  it  could  be required that there is  a  function from C  (as defined  in condition £ .1 )  to 
the set of subsets of P.
712.  Condition 4 means that given any x G  H°° and any open set U C St. containing 
Xu  there  exists  an  open  set  V  C  Xt.-\H  containing  A/_|X  such  that  for  all 
Xt-iv G V, At(Xt-\v) n U ± 0.
The proof of the following corollary can now be given.
Corollary 3.1.  There exists a SPE for all games in the class E.
Proof.  Let  Tj  be the subspace topology  on  I  induced  by  Euclidean space.  Let  Ta 
and Tc be the discrete topologies on A and C.  Let T# be the topology on B given by 
the product topology of Tj and Tc-  Let T' be the topology on Stl given by arbitrary 
unions of elements of Ta U Tb -   Let T be the resulting product topology on S.
It is immediate from this definition that T' satisfies properties 1 and 2 of theorem 
3.2.  Property 5 is a consequence of conditions E. 1  and E.3.
To prove property 3, consider a sequence (x(1)h6n with xa   G  H°°  for all a, which 
is  convergent  in  T.  Let  x  be  its  limit.  By  definition  of  T  there  exists  some  a 
such  that  for  a  >  a,  xa  =  b(xa, f]a)  for  some  rju.  Furthermore,  for  t  G  Q(h), 
{Vt)a€N  is  convergent  under  Tj.  By  condition  E.2,  itf  €  [0, It  follows  that 
7]t =  lim a^oo Tjf e  [0,p t]  and thus x =  b(xN,v)  e H°° where  77  =   (rit.)teQ(h)-
To  prove  property  4,  suppose  that  x  G  H°°  and  t  G  N + .  By  definition  of T' 
and condition E.2, there exists an open set V C  Xt-\H  such that  \t-\v  G  V implies 
\t-\v  =  Xt-\b{x,r])  for  some  7/.  Fix some  such  V.  Select  any  v  G  H°°  such  that 
Xt-iv  G  V.  Define  w —  (ws)se^  by ws —  vs  for  s < t  and  ws —  xs  for  s > t.  Note 
that w  = b(x,r])  for some 7 7  such that rg  G  [0,£g(x)],  so by condition E.2,  w  G  H°°.  
Since  = A^-iv,  xt  6 At{Xt-\v)  as required.  □
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The  Alternating  Offers  Game 
and  Multi-Player Extensions  in 
the Literature
Rubinstein’s  alternating  offers  game  [56]  is  a  highly  suc cessful  model  of  2  player 
bargaining over a utility cake.  In the notation of the previous chapter, this situation 
is  a 2  player  bilateral  exchange  network  with  the single  exchange  opportunity  12; 
the  simplest  non-trivial  bilateral  exchange  network.  The structure of the  game  is 
follows.  A player,  the proposer,  proposes a feasible utility pair from the cake.  The 
other player, the responder, then chooses whether to accept or refuse it.  If she refuses 
it becomes her turn to make a proposal.  If she accepts,  the game ends.  The game 
continues in this way until a proposal is accepted.  The initial proposer is player  1.
The  accepted  utility  pair  represents  players’  shares.  In  the  alternating  offers 
game the bargaining process is costly.  There is a discount factor eg  E (0,1)  for each 
player  i  modelling  their  time  preferences,  and  bargaining  incurs  a  delay,  r.  The 
payoff of player  i  is  found by  multiplying  their share  by  SJ.   In  an infinite history 
in which no proposal is accepted  payoffs  are zero.  Rubinstein  [56]  proves  that  this 
game  has a unique  SPE.  A  version  of the  game  with  costless  bargaining  given  by
73taking Si = 1  can easily be shown to support a wide range SPE outcomes.
It is greatly desirable that games with a high level of bargaining detail, such as the 
alternating offers game,  possess a unique SPE, or at least  that their SPE outcomes 
lie close together,  since equilibrium selection is problematic.  Imposing a subjective 
choice  of  equilibrium  refinement  relies  011  having  a  strong  intuitive  grasp  of  the 
situation being modelled.  In all but the simplest  multi-player bargaining situations 
this  is  not  the  case.  The  alternative  is  to  use  evolutionary  methods.  However, 
current  evolutionary  methods  cannot  easily  be  applied  to  such  games  since  they 
have  strategy  spaces  of large  dimension1.  A  similar  problem  applies  to  computer 
simulations  of evolutionary  models2.  It  is  hard  for  a computer  to  store  or  access 
quickly  highly  complicated  strategies.  For  example  in  the  alternating  offers  game 
for each player there are infinitely many subgames in which proposals must be made, 
resulting in strategy spaces of infinite dimension.
The simple structure and unique SPE of the alternating offers game makes it an 
attractive candidate for generalisation to other bargaining situations.  This chapter 
investigates the alternating offers game and various generalisations which have been 
proposed  in  the  literature.  The  purpose  is  to  prove  results  and  develop  concepts 
that  are  used  in  chapter  5  to  construct  extensions  applicable  to  general  bilateral 
exchange networks.
An outline  of this  chapter  is  as  follows.  Section  4.1  describes  various  concepts 
from  the  economic  theory  approach  to  bargaining  which  are  required  in  this  and 
later  chapters.  Section  4.2  is  on the  alternating  offers  game.  Sections  4.3  and  4.4 
describe two generalisations of this model to 3 player ring networks which are defined
1See Seymour  [59]  for  an  approach  to constructing and  analysing dynamics  for  2   player games 
of infinite dimension.  Also, see Seymour [60]  for an application of these dynamics to the ultimatum 
game  which  does  not  support  the  unique  SPE  of that  game  under  all  conditions.  This  cautions 
against viewing a unique SPE outcome in the alternating offers game or its extensions as necessarily
also being an exact prediction in an evolutionary setting.
2 To  make  any  progress  on  this  approach  it  seems  necessary  to  make  simplifying  assumptions
about the form of strategies.
74by  Binmore in  [3]:  the telephoning game and the market  bargaining game.  These 
games  both have  unique  SPEs,  which  suggests  that  it  may  be  possible  to  extend 
them to model bargaining in larger networks.  Sections 4.2  4.4 each begin with a lit­
erature review.  Further discussion and analysis of the alternating offers and market 
bargaining games relevant to later work is also provided.  This includes a discussion 
of Binmore’s  argument  for preferring the approach of the market  bargaining game 
to  that  of the  telephoning  game,  and  a  case  for  altering  the  delay  scheme  of the 
market  bargaining game.  Section 4.5  briefly summarizes other  relevant  bargaining 
models from the literature.
4.1  Definitions  from  Bargaining Theory
The outcomes of a general bargaining situation with set of players P can be described 
by  giving  a  multiplayer  utility  cake  C(Q)  for  each  Q  C  P.  The  elements  of  a 
multiplayer  utility  cake  are  of the  form  (x7 ;)7 ;eQ  with xt  E  R+  for  all  i  E  Q.  They 
represent the utility vectors which can be realised by the players in Q if all members 
of Q agree3.
Suppose  C(Q)  is  a  multiplayer  utility  cake.  A  Pareto  improvement  on  x  —  
(xi)i<=Q  is  a  vector  y  =  (yi)ieQ  such  that  yi  >  xt  for  all  i  E  Q  and  y  ^   x.  A 
utility vector x E C(Q) is Pareto optimal if it has no Pareto improvement in C(Q). 
The  Pareto  boundary  of a  utility  cake  is  its  Pareto  optimal  subset.  For  example, 
the Pareto boundary of a  2  player  utility  cake  is its outer  boundary,  as  defined in 
definition 3.6,  minus any vertical  or horizontal line segments except the end points
which do not lie on an axis.
3 Various properties can be placed on the function C to capture reasonable features of bargaining 
situations.  Some such properties are convexity and compactness of utility cakes, and superadditivity 
(informally; if players in Q can realise a utility vector if all members of Q agree,  they can also realise 
this vector under an agreement  by all  members of Q'  D  Q).  These  properties are not  required  for 
the limited discussion of multiplayer utility cakes in this thesis.
75Definition  4.1.  Given  a set  of players  P and a multiplayer  utility  cake  C(Q)  for 
all  Q  C  P,  the  core  of this bargaining situation is the set of outcomes  {xr)iep such 
that  (xi)i6Q  is Pareto optimal in C(Q)  for all Q  C  P.
A bilateral exchange network (P, E , I\) can be described1  in terms of multiplayer 
utility cakes by defining C{Q) from K,ab in the case that Q =  {a. b} and ab E E, and 
C(Q)  =  0  otherwise.  It  is  then  straightforward  to see  that  the core  of a  bilateral 
exchange  network  N  is  the  set  of all  share  vectors  x  —   (x/),ep  corresponding  to 
feasible outcomes of N  such that for all ab E E , (xa,x(j) has no Pareto improvement 
in Kab.
In a non-core bargaining outcome, some subset Q of players have incentives (or at 
least  no disincentives)  to switch multilaterally  to  different  behaviour.  Nonetheless, 
non-core bargaining solutions are not  automatically implausible.  Players in Q may 
have disincentives to switch to different behaviours unilaterally.  This depends on the 
details of the bargaining process.  For example, switching to a Pareto improvement 
may  be  an  involved  task  if  Q  is  large.  It  could  entail  a  risk  of miscoordination: 
if some players in Q  do not participate in the switch and instead make agreements 
with players outside Q then the remainder might be left with poor available utilities. 
In this thesis,  bargaining solutions of small networks are expected to usually lie in 
the core.  If not,  a plausible explanation is required.
Definition  4.2.  An  (asymmetric)  Nash  bargaining  solution  is  a  function  <?(/C,£) 
from a (2 player)  utility cake K, and a status-quo element £ E 1 C  satisfying axioms 1 
- 4 below.  If axiom 5 is also satisfied then the function is called a symmetric Nash 
bargaining solution.
1.  Individual rationality
For i =  1 or 2,  #»(£,£)  > &.
4A  more  natural  description would  be to  define non-empty values of C'(Q)  for  all  Q  satisfying 
superadditivity  (see footnote 3).  However the description given in the text suffices to allow the core 
of N to be found.2.  Pareto optimality
g(IC, f)  is Pareto optimal in JC .
3.  Independence  of irrelevant alternatives
If £ C  /C and c/(/C,£)  6 £ then g(£,f) —  </(/C,£).
4.  Scale independence
For any positive affine transformation5  a : R2 — >  R2:
g{a/C,a£) = ag{lC,£)
5.  Symmetry
For the transformation6 (3 which maps  (aq,^)  to  (aq.xi):
g{fiJC,SO  =   (3g{IC:0
It can be shown that g(JC,f)  is a Nash bargaining solution  if and only if
g(JC,£)  = arg max(xijX2)(ri  - ^ i) 7(x2
where the maximisation is taken over the subset of  1 C  containing elements  on which
£  is not  a Pareto improvement,  and 7  €  (0,1).  There is  a  unique Nash  bargaining
solution  associated  with  each 7 .  The  values  7  and  1  —   7   are called  the  bargaining 
powers  of players  1  and  2  respectively.  Equal bargaining powers,  1  —   gives  the 
unique symmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution.  Proofs of these  facts  are  included  in 
Roth  [55].
The status-quo point  £ represents the outcome if bargaining breaks down.  Re­
call  from  section  3.1.2  that  the  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  functions  used 
in  utility  cakes  are chosen  so that  f  —   (0,0).  Henceforth  any  reference  to  a Nash 
bargaining solution assumes this value of £
°And its corresponding extension to subsets of R2.
cAnd its corresponding extension to subsets of R2.
77Many of the axioms in definition 4.2 can be criticised on both experimental and 
conceptual grounds (for example see Roth  [55]), and other solutions exist which use 
different  axioms.  An example is the bargaining solution of Kalai  and  Smorodinski
[36].
4.2  Alternating  Offers  Game
4.2.1  Literature  R eview
Given  a  utility  cake  /C12  and  a  discount  factor  vector  A  =  (^1.^2)  €  (0, l)2,  the 
alternating offers game A(/C12, A)  is as follows.
1.  Player  1  is the first proposer.
2.  The proposer, p, makes a proposal a € /C12.
3.  The  other  player,  r,  is  the  responder  and  must  either  accept  or  refuse.  Ac­
cepting terminates the game.
4.  Following  a refusal,  the  responder  becomes the  next  proposer  and  the  game 
returns to step 2.
Delay:  The delay, r(h), of any finite history h is equal to the number of refusals 
that have occurred.
Payoffs:  If proposal a is accepted in history h then payoffs are (<5[^cri, £2^ 02). 
In an infinite history  (i.e.  one in which no proposal is accepted)  payoffs are zero.
Given a proposal by player p of a = (a\,02),  ap is referred to as the  demand of 
p and < jt as the offer of p to the other player r (the next responder).  If the proposal 
cr is accepted  then in the terminology  of section  3.3.3,  oq  and  02  ai’e the shares of 
players  1  and 2.
Lemma 4.1.  A(K,unit, A)  has the unique SPE payoff:The following  proof is essentially that of Shaked  and  Sutton  [62]. The statement
below highlights methods  which  are used repeatedly later.  The theorem of [62]  also
applies  to  non-unit  cakes  and similarly  finds  a unique  SPE  payoff.  Only  the  unit 
cake case is given here to avoid introducing too much notation, but few extra details 
are required7.
Proof.  Fix A and let A = A(/Cnnit, A).  Assume that A has a SPE. By the definition 
of SPE it follows that all subgames of A have SPEs.  Define a pre-proposal subgame 
of A to be one at the start of step 2 of the game.  Let  B,  be the set of pre-proposal 
subgames of A with proposer i.
For  a subgame B,  let  r(B)  be the  associated  delay.  Let  Pr(B)  be the set  of all 
values 5i T^ 7rt such that 7r,; is a SPE payoff to player i in B.  Let IT >  —   ^(^)-
Let tt1 = supll,;  and 7r,  —  inf 11,..
Let  (i,j)  = (1,2)  or  (2, 1).  The following relations are now proved:
7f,;  <  1 —  fijlLj  (4.2)
Kt  >  1 —  SjTtj  (4.3)
Consider any subgame B E B\,.  Suppose player j  refuses  the initial proposal made 
in  B.  Then the set  of SPE payoffs  to  player j  in  the resulting  game is  a subset of 
{ (5 j^ +1 x  |  x  E  Ilj}.  So  in  B  the  SPE  payoff of player  j  is  at  least  If
player i received a SPE share of more than 1 —  5jHj in B such a payoff would not be 
possible.  This proves equation  (4.2).
Suppose player i offers A > 53 7t3  in B.  If player j  refuses, her payoff in any SPE 
is  at  most  < 5 ^ ^ +17f7 -.  Thus in any  SPE of B she accepts  the proposal involving  A.
J   J
This proves equation  (4.3).
rThe only significant extra detail is to show that the analogues of equations (4.4) and  (4.5) yield 
a unique solution.
79Combining these inequalities gives:
*5  < 1 -  <$j(l -  Siffi)  (4.4)
Zi  >  1 ~ fy(l -  hZi)  (4.5)
Solving  these  yields  7fj  <  hi  <  n ■   where  ht  =  1 .  By  definition  7 r?   <  7 r,.,  so
7T _ i  —  7Tj  —  Tlj.
Consider  a  SPE  of A  in  which  the  initial  proposal  of player  1  is  refused.  Let 
(PI1P2)  be the  payoffs  to  players  1  and  2.  By  the  above  it  must  be the  case that 
pi  = hi  and P2 = < $ 2^2  which gives p\ + p2 —   1.  But, since a proposal is refused in 
the history generated by this SPE, it must be the case that
(pi,P2) = (<5i 0-1, <52^2)  (4.G)
for  some  (0 1 ,0- 2)  €  /Cunit  and  r  >  1.  Thus pi + P2  <  $  which  is  a contradiction. 
Therefore in  any  SPE,  players  1  and  2  exchange  immediately,  and  the SPE  payoff 
must be (hi, 1 —  hi),  as required.
It  remains to prove that A has a SPE as  assumed  above.  It is easy to confirm 
that  the following strategy  profile is  a SPE8.  Let  (i,j)  —   (1,2)  or  (2,1)  as  before. 
Player  i  always  makes  the  proposal  (p\, p2)  where p,  —   h,  and  pj  —   1  —  hi,  and 
accepts offers if and only if they are 1 —  hj  = S^hi or better.  □
Binmore [4] argues that the most important case of the alternating offers game is 
where the costs of bargaining are small.  The justification is that following a refusal, 
players have an incentive to make new offers as soon as possible.  Situations in which 
this is not possible seem rare.  This case can be investigated by setting9  5r   —  r)\  and
8 Indeed,  it can be shown that this is the unique SPE.
9See Osborne and Rubinstein [54] for an axiomatic approach to preferences over time/share pairs 
which yields a utility  function using this  form of discounting.  A general  method of solution  to the 
alternating offers game which also applies to other specifications of time/share preferences is given 
in  Binmore  [4].  This  shows  that  under  some  other  time/share  preferences  the  characterisation  of 
the limiting outcomes made here does not  hold.
80taking the  limit  e  — »   0.  In  this  relation,  5i  is  the  discount  factor  for  a refusal, 
represents the discount factor for a unit of delay, and e represents the length of delay 
following a refusal.
In this case it can easily be shown that the outcome of equation  (4.1)  converges 
in the limit e — >  0.  The same is true of the analogous result for an arbitrary utility 
cake /C12.  This  limiting outcome  has two  important  features10.  Firstly,  it  is  equal 
to the corresponding limiting outcome to a variation on the alternating offers game 
in  which  player  2  acts  first.  This  shows  that  the  exogenous  choice  of first  mover 
has no influence in this limiting case.  Secondly,  it is equal to the asymmetric Nash 
bargaining solution when player  1  has bargaining power  lu  (Y i •   This shows that 
time preferences over incurred delays can select a unique outcome1 1  even in the case 
where delays are arbitrarily small.  This is in contrast to the case of costless delays -
i.e.  < $ i  = S2 = 1 - in which any utility pair on the Pareto boundary can be supported 
as a SPE outcome12.
A variation on the alternating offers game is to allow  outside options,  as follows. 
Each  player  has  an  outside option share  of m r   E  K+.  At  step  3  of the  game,  the 
responder has additional choice of opting out of bargaining.  If this option is exercised 
by player  i  in  history  h then the payoff of player  i  is  and the other player
receives  payoff zero.  This setting  is  especially  interesting  with  respect  to  bilateral 
exchange  networks.  It  can  be viewed  as  a simplified  model  of a case  where either 
player has a chance to participate in an alternative exchange13, but only one player 
may take this opportunity.
10For a proof see Binmore  [4].
n Indeed,  these  time  preferences  can  select  any  asymmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution  and  any
outcome on the Pareto boundary.
12Let  cr  =  (e x   1,(72)  be  on  the  Pareto  boundary.  The  following  strategies  form  a  SPE  yielding
the payoff a.  Both players always propose  o.  Player i  accepts a proposal  A =  (Ai, A 2 )  if and only 
A? ;   >   <7,;.
13A player who has no such alternative can simply be endowed  with ///,,  =  0 .
81It can be shown  (see Binmore  [3]  and Muthoo  [51])  that,  with discount  factors 
again taking the form 5t —  77-, the limiting SPE payoffs14  of this variation as e — >  0 
are the same as those of the alternating offers game where the cake /C12  is replaced 
by15
{ (X 1 ,X 2 )  6   JCU   |  X \  >   7771, X 2  >   7772 }
These payoffs can be represented algebraically as  (< p , 1 -  o)  where:
( j) =   m i  V  I /2’1 ( 7 7 7 2)  A 771 ]
and 77]  is the limiting SPE payoff to player  1 in the alternating offers game without 
outside  options.  Note  that  V  and  A  are  infix  maximum  and  minimum  operators 
respectively.
4.2.2  D iscussion  and  a  V ariation
In  the  terms  of  section  3.3.3,  A(IC12, A)  is  a  bargaining  model  with  endogenous 
structure  A.  There  is  also  exogenous  structure;  the  choice  of  the  first  proposer. 
This is embedded in the choice of which player is labelled as  1,  but could easily be 
made explicit.
The core of the proof of lemma 4.1 is robust to many variations of the game rules 
(for example see Binmore  [4]).  The following variation,  which  introduces personal 
delays,  is  especially  relevant  to later  work.  In  particular,  the  models of chapter  5 
reduce to this game for 2 player networks.  The motivation for using personal delays 
is the subject of section 4.4.4.
The  alternating offers game with personal delays,  ApeIsonal(/C12, A),  is the same 
as A(JC12, A)  except for the specification of delay and payoffs.  In any finite history 
/i,  the personal delay of player  z,  t 7 ;(/z).  is the number of times player  i  has refused
14In the sense of definition 3.14.
15If  777i  or  m 2  is  non-zero  then  this  new  set  is  not  strictly  a  utility  cake  as  it  does  not  satisfy 
free disposal.  However the same  proof applies  to this case.  Alternatively  the  minimal  utility  cake 
containing this set could be used to give the same result.
82in the course of the history.  If proposal a is accepted in finite history h then payoffs 
are  (d^1^ 0 \,  0 2)-  In an infinite history payoffs are zero.
Corollary  4.2.  Apersonal(JC12, A)  has the same unique SPE as A(JC12. A).
Proof.  The  proof of lemma 4.1  applies  here with  the  following  modifications.  Let 
A =   A personal(/Cunit , A).  For a subgame  B , let  t,.(B )  be the associated personal delay 
of player  i.  For  x  £  {i,j},  replace  each  occurrence  of r(B)  in  the exponent  of 5X  
with tx(B).  Equation  (4.6)  should be replaced with
(Pi,P2) = ( 8?  0 1,52* 0 2) 
where T\ + T2  >  1.  It is still the case that pi + p2 < 1.  as required.  □
4.3  The Telephoning  Game
The telephoning game  is  defined  by  Binmore  in  [3].  In  the  terminology  of section 
3.3.3,  this is  a bargaining model for  3  player  ring networks.  It  requires  a discount 
factor vector A = (<5i, < 52, £3)  £  (0, l)3.
The telephoning game for network  N. T(N.A),  is defined as follows:
1.  Player  1  is the first proposer.
2.  Denote  the  proposer  by p.  The  proposer  selects  a  different  player  to  be  re­
sponder r and makes a proposal a £ J C pr.
3.  The responder must either accept or refuse.  Accepting terminates the game.
4.  Following  a  refusal  the  responder  becomes  the  next  proposer  and  the  game 
returns to step  2.
Delay:  The delay, r(h),  of any finite history h is equal to the number of refusals 
that have occurred.
83Payoffs:  If player r accepts the proposal o of player p in history h, then players p 
and r receive payoffs Sp^ a p and Sl^cr,- respectively.  The remaining player receives 
payoff zero.  In an infinite history all payoffs are zero.
Recall  from definition  3.10  that  R3  is  a 3  player  ring network  with unit cakes. 
Binmore [3] proves that for 5\  < 62 < S3, the game T = T(R3. A) has a SPE in which 
the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are the same as in the alternating offers game on /Cu„it 
with the same  discount  factors  for players  1  and  2.  Furthermore  it  is  shown  that 
in a game with the same definition as T except that player  3  is the first proposer, 
there is a SPE in which player 3 earns only as much as player  2 does in the SPE of 
T  just described.  It is argued that this is an unreasonable property of a bargaining 
model since player 3 is the most patient player.
The  telephoning  model  is  not  considered  as  a  good  bargaining  model  in  this 
thesis due to  the existence  of the SPEs just  mentioned.  Further discussion of this 
case  is  postponed  until  section  4.4.5  as  it  is  more  fruitful  to  discuss  it  in  parallel 
with the market  bargaining game.  Part of this discussion explicates the arguments 
against the use of the telephoning model in more depth.
4.4  The  Market  Bargaining  Game
4.4.1  L iterature  R eview
Binmore [3] defines a bargaining model for 3 player ring networks which he names the 
market bargaining game.  It is referred to here as  the market bargaining game with 
public delays  to distinguish it  from a modified version  which  will  be introduced  in 
section 4.4.4.  Sometimes I refer simply to ‘the market bargaining game5  in contexts 
where the  differences  between  these  versions  are  irrelevant.  The  model  requires  a 
discount factor vector A = (<5i, £2, £3)  6  (0, l)3.
The market  bargaining game with public delays for network  N,  M pubhc(N, A), 
is as follows.
841.  Player  1  is the first proposer.
2.  Denote  the  proposer  by  p.  The  responder,  r,  is  the  player  satisfying16  r  = 
p + l(mod 3).
3.  The proposer makes a demand17 ap  E  [0. m(N)\.
4.  The responder may accept the most recent demand of any other player if one 
exists and it is feasible, or refuse all demands.  Accepting a demand terminates 
the game.
5.  Following  a  refusal,  the  responder  becomes  the  new  proposer  and  the  game 
returns to step  2.
Recall from section 3.1.1  that  a demand crp  by player p is said to be feasible to 
player r if ap < f r,p(0).  Define m(N)  to be the maximum demand which is feasible 
from some player to another in N.
In  [3], Binmore does not explicitly define how delays occ ur and affect payoffs in 
this game.  It seems reasonable to assume that he intended the use of public delays 
as in the original alternating offers game.  That is, as follows.
Delay:  The delay, r(fi), of any finite history /? is equal to the number of refusals 
which have occurred.
Payoffs:  If a demand ap  made by player p is accepted  by  player  r  in history  h 
then players p and r receive payoffs bp< y h ' > crp and 8T r^  f v,r{ap) respectively.  The third 
player receives payoff zero.  In an infinite history all payoffs are zero.
The solution to this model involves the following set.  Recall definition 3.6 of an 
outer boundary.
1 0In other words,  for p =  1  or  2.  r = p + I.  Fur p = 3.  r =  1   since  this  is the  unique element  of
{1,2,3}  equivalent to p +■  1  modulo 3.  This construction  is used several  times in this thesis.
17m(N)  is  defined  following the definition  of the game.  The  restriction  on  demands  to  a closed
interval is a technical condition required  for  corollary  3.1  to  hold.  A  greater  value of ni(N)  would
not affect the following analysis.
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Figure 4.1:  A 3 player network with a von Neumann-Morgenstern triple
Definition  4.3.  A  von Neumann-Morgenstern triple  is a set of points  {(cri, 02,0), 
(ai,0,cr3),  (0, < 72, < ^3)}  such  that  (<j,;,crj)  lies  on  the  outer  boundary  of IClJ.  The 
values cr7 ;  are referred to as the  components  of the triple.
It  is  proved  in  [3]  that  for  cakes  which  are insatiable  in  the sense  of definition 
3.7, if a von Neumann-Morgenstern triple exists then it is unique18.
Binmore argues that the market bargaining game with public discounting has a 
unique SPE  in  the  limit  e  — >   0  in  the  case where discount  factors  are  of the form 
< 5 7   =  j]\.  The  following  theorem  summarizes  one  case  of his  results.  Recall  that 
definition 3.14 defines a limiting SPE payoff.
Theorem 4.3.  Let N   be a 3 player ring network with insatiable cakes in the sense 
of definition 3.7 and an  empty core.  For i  £  P fix ip,  £  (0.1)  and let A = 
where  6i  —   j]\  for e  >  0.  There  is  a  unique  limiting  SPE payoff of (ctl , 02,0)  to 
MPubUc(N ,A)  as  e  —>   0,  where  {<j\, 02. < 73)  are  the  components  of the  unique  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern triple of N .
A  proof is  given  in  the  next  section.  It  is  essentially  that  of Binmore  [3]  but 
explicates the limiting process in slightly more detail.
18This  is  straightforward  since  such  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple  must  satisfy  o\  = 
y 1 ’2 ’3 ’1 (< 7 1 )  and the right  hand side is a strictly  decreasing function of a\.
86In  the  case  that  the  core  of a  3  player  ring  network  is  non-empty,  then  there 
exists  a  player  who  receives  zero  in  all  core  outcomes19.  Suppose without  loss  of 
generality  that  this  is  player  3.  This  case  is  illustrated  by  figure  4.2  (page  104). 
Binmore argued that in this case the unique limiting SPE of the market bargaining 
game  with  public  discounting  is  equivalent  to  that  of the  alternating  offers  game 
between players  1  and 2 on K} 2  with outside options f 3A{0)  and  / 3,2(0)  for players 
1  and  2  respectively.  In  section  4.6  it  is  proved  that  this  conclusion  is  false;  it 
requires personal discounting.
It is important to note that the unique SPE of the market bargaining game when 
a von Neumann-Morgenstern triple exists does not correspond to a unique solution 
of the  bargaining situation.  This is  because the unique  SPE  which is  produced is 
dependent  on  the  identity  of the  first  player  i.e.  on  which  player  is  labelled  as  1. 
Binmore argues:
“... one  may  ask  which  coalition  would  be  expected  to  form.  The  question  is 
clearly unanswerable... without further structure being applied".
In the market bargaining game, this extra structure is supplied by the numbering 
of the players.
In  a  major  difference  to  the  telephoning  game,  the  market  bargaining  game 
players  allows  player  to  commit  to  multilateral  demands.  That  is,  a  player  may 
make a demand which either neighbour may choose to accept.  Binmore argues that 
allowing such demands is more natural from the following premise:
“... one cannot  expect  players  to submit  to constraints  that  limit  their payoffs 
unless there is some mechanism that forces the constraint on them.”
He goes on to say that the instability he found in the telephoning game suggests 
that:
n. .. if it were the custom to deal exclusively by telephone (or bilaterally through
19Suppose otherwise.  Then there must exist distinct core outcomes o and  a' such that  (oa-f)  G  
K .ij  and  (a', erf)  G  IC jk  for  some  distinct  i,j,k  G   P .  Whichever  has  the  higher  utility  for  j  is  a 
Pareto improvement on the other for a pair of  players.
87private conversations),  then there would be players who would wish to disturb the 
custom by advertising or shouting or  whatever was necessary to gain attention  for 
their offers.”
The use of multilateral demands and the preceding argument are discussed fur­
ther in section 4.4.5.
4.4.2  Further  Analysis
Lemma  4.4.  In  a 3 player ring  network with insatiable  cakes  in the  sense  of defi­
nition 3.7,  the  core  is  empty if and only if a von Neumann-Morgeastern  triple with 
non-zero  components  exists.
Proof.  Suppose the core is non-empty.  Let c = (01,02,03) be an element of the core. 
Choose k G P such that o*.  —  0.  Let i and j  be the other players.  For p G   {i, j }  and 
any x G  (0, fp,k(0)},  it must be the case that  f k’ p(x) < cp.   Otherwise (fk,p(x),x)  is 
a Pareto improvement on (cp,c/t.) in IC pk.   Therefore (fk'l{x),fkj(x)) does not lie 011 
the outer boundary of K lJ  for any x  >  0,  and 110 von Neumann-Morgenstern triple 
can exist in which player  k has a non-zero component.
Suppose the core is empty.  Select  i  —   1  or  2  to minimise  f l" \0).  Let j  be the 
other element of {1,2}.  Let a = f h3(0).  Let g(x) —  (f3'l{x), f 3'2{x))  for x  G  [0, a]. 
It  must be the case  that  g(0)  $ /C12.  Otherwise  (a, 6,0)  is in  the core where  (a, b ) 
lies on the Pareto  boundary of K } 2  and either equals  (f3'l(0),f3'2(0))  or a Pareto 
improvement  on  it.  It  must  be  the  case  that  g (a )  G  int  /C12  otherwise  the  vector 
(ci,C2,q)  is  in the core,  where c7 ;  =  0  and  cj —  f 3'J(a).  Since g  is  continuous  and 
strictly monotonic,  it follows that some g(a3) —   (cri,cr2)  lies on the outer boundary 
of J C 12  and < 71,02,0-3  are all positive.  These are the components of the required von 
Neumann-Morgenstern triple.  □
As mentioned  above,  the following proof of theorem  4.3  contains slightly more 
detail about the limiting process than that in Binmore  [3].Theorem 4.3.  Let N   be a 3 player ring network with insatiable  cakes in the sense 
of definition  3.7 and  an  empty  core.  For i  e  P fix g,.  6  (0,1)  and  let A  =  (A,.)f :eP 
where  5j.  =  g\  for e  >  0.  There  is  a  unique  limiting  SPE  payoff of (oq.u^.O)  to 
MPubhc(N ,A)  as  e  —>   0;  where  (07, 02. 03)  are  the  components  of the  unique  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern  triple  of N.
Proof.  Let Ad = Afpubllc(7V, A)  for some A.  Note that by corollary 3.1 a SPE of Ad 
exists.
Suppose  player  1  makes  an  initial  demand  of  Ai  <  07  in  Ad.  Let  A  be  the 
resulting  subgame.  First  it  is  proved  that  in  any  SPE  this  is  accepted  by  either 
player  2  or  3.  Suppose otherwise.  Fix  a SPE  e of A  in  which  2  and  3  both refuse 
Ai.  Let  0  and  7  be  the  payoffs  of players  2  and  3  in  e.  Then  3   >  / 12(Ai)  and 
7 > / 1,3(Ai).  Hence  ( 3   > a2  and 7 > 07  which is a contradiction since (07,07)  is 011 
the outer boundary of /C23.  Thus in any SPE of Ad  the payoff of player  1  is at least
G\.
Suppose  player  2  makes  an  initial  demand  of  Ai  >  o\  in  A4.  Let  B  be  the 
resulting subgame.  Suppose player  2 refuses and makes a demand of A2  < cr2  in B. 
Let  B' be the resulting subgame.  Observe that  / 1,3(Ai)  <  07  <  f 2'3(X2).  Hence in 
any SPE of B', player 3 does not accept the demand A].  There cannot be a SPE of 
B' in which players 3 and 1 both refuse the demand A2  by a similar argument to the 
previous paragraph.  Hence in any SPE of B the payoff of player 2 is at least  8 2a2.
Thus in any  SPE of M.  the payoff of player  1  is in  the interval  [<ti . f 2'l(82a2)\. 
In the limit 5 2  — * ►   1 both bounds tend to 07  so this is the unique limiting SPE payoff 
to player  1 in Ad.
Note that in A player 2 may earn / 1,2(Ai)  > o2 by accepting the initial demand. 
Thus the SPE payoff of player  2  in Ad  is at  least  < $ 202-   Therefore  02  is the unique 
limiting SPE payoff to player  2  in Ad.  A  higher limiting payoff would result in an 
non-feasible SPE payoff for all sufficiently small e.  □
89In  the case  that  the  insatiability  condition  does  not  hold,  the  proof still  holds 
under the condition that  a unique von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple exists20.  The 
only  additions  necessary  are  as  follows.  In  the  second  paragraph,  the  case  that 
/ 1,2(Ai) —   and / 1,3(Ai) —  cr3  is not possible because otherwise  (Ai, < 72,03)  would 
then be the components of a second von Neumann-Morgenstern triple.  In the third 
paragraph the case that / 1,3(Ai) = / 2-3(A3) = 03 is not  possible.  Otherwise it must 
be the case that 03 is the maximum feasible payoff to player 3. and (A], / L2(Ai).<73) 
are the components of a second von Neumann-Morgenstern triple.
4.4.3  General  Notes
The market  bargaining game demonstrates that multiple  solutions of a bargaining 
network can be described by a game with a unique SPE.  The choice of player num­
bering  selects  between  these  outcomes.  I11  the  terms  of  section  3.3.3.  the  model 
has exogenous structure which is embedded in the player  labelling.  This exogenous 
structure could be made explicit by instead requiring a bisection q from P to {1, 2,3} 
representing the order in which players act.
The market bargaining game can provide a prediction for any network of up to 3 
players.  If the network does not contain  3 cakes, the missing cakes can be replaced 
by21  {(0,0)}.  Adding  non-profitable  exchange  relations  to  a  bargaining  situation 
should not change the solution22.
The market bargaining and telephoning games could be defined for any network
20  Multiple von Neumann-Morgenstern triples can exist when the insatiability condition  fails.  It 
can be shown that should this occur,  it must be the case that a pair of components from each triple 
must  lie  on  a vertical  or  horizontal  part  of the  outer  boundary of t he corresponding  utility  cake. 
It  can  be  proved  that  theorem  4.3  still  holds  under  the  additional  condition  that  (cri. c r - 2 , cr.i)  are 
the  components  of the  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple  maximising  the  component  of  player  1. 
However,  case seems of little interest as the outcome is not  robust  to  many small  variations  in the
outer boundary of the cake.
21 An alternative is to replace them with c-unit cakes and  take the limit  t — >  0.
22 See footnote 4 of chapter 3.
90of more than 3 players.  In most such networks multiple exchanges may form.  How­
ever,  the market bargaining and telephoning games do not  provide mechanisms for 
bargaining to continue  after a single exchange.  The models of chapter  5 introduce 
such mechanisms.
A  feature of the model is that  the proposer is  allowed  to make demands which 
are  non-feasible  to  either  neighbour23.  It  is  certainly  necessary  to  allow  demands 
which  are  non-feasible  to  one  player  (e.g.  suppose  JCrI  is  a  unit  cake  and  /C23  = 
JC 13  =  {(0,0)}).  An  alternative  approach  would  be  to  only  allow  demands  which 
are feasible to at least one neighbour.  If this approach were used, corollary 3.1  can 
no longer be used to prove the existence of SPEs.  If existence is assumed, the proof 
of theorem  4.3  still  applies  so  the  SPE  outcome  is  unchanged.  The  SPE  analysis 
of the  market  bargaining game24  shows  that  players  choose  not  to  make  demands 
which are non-feasible to both neighbours (except for the case of a player who does 
not  exchange  in  any  SPE,  whose  demand  does  not  affect  play).  For  this  reason 
and the difficulty of proving SPE existence, the alternative rule seems unnecessarily 
complicated,  especially  if it  must  later  be  generalized  to  the  case  of more  than  3 
players.
Another feature that arguably seems unrealistic is that if a player is a responder 
and all her offers are infeasible then she must still make the action of refusing them 
and incur a delay.  This feature is a technical condition required to apply corollary
3.1  on SPE existence25,  although intuitively  it still seems likely  that  SPEs exist in
23The specification of m(N)  means that there exists a player who must  make demands which are 
feasible to at least one neighbour.  This fact does not have any significance;  rn(N)  can be increased
without affecting any results.
24That  is,  the proof of theorem 4.3 above and  that of lemma 4.0  below.
25 Suppose a responder did not incur a delay should she have no feasible demands in step 4 of the 
game.  Consider the following  (infinite)  history h.  In period t-2  the responder r has a single feasible 
demand,  made by player p  in period  t\.  The demand  is  A =  0).  Player r refuses this demand
and eventually receives share sr  after delay r.  Any open set  (under the topology of S described  in 
corollary 3.1)  containing h contains a history  /?'  which is the same as h   except that the demand  in
91models without it26.  There are some plausible arguments in support of this feature. 
For example, the delay could be viewed as modelling the time required to prepare a 
proposal.
4.4.4  Public  and  Personal  Delays
This section argues the case for using personal delays rather than public delays.  The 
argument  can  be summed up  as  follows.  A  perfect  information  model with  public 
delay  may  require  players  to  wait  and  accumulate  delay  while distant  players  act. 
The use of personal delays  captures  the  intuition  that  each  player  is  only  affected 
by delays caused by local actions.
The market bargaining game with personal delays.  4 /|M ‘1 ' sol);il(.V, A) has the same 
definition as A/publlc(iV, A) except for the specification of delays and payoffs.  In any 
finite history /i, the personal delay of player i,  T,fh), is the number of times player i 
has refused in the course of the history.  If a demand ap made by player p is accepted 
by player r in history h then players p and r receive payoffs 3p^,l' > op and  f p'r(ap) 
respectively.  The third player receives payoff zero.  In an infinite history all  payoffs 
are zero.
Using personal rather than public delays has little effect if the conditions of theo­
rem 4.3 hold.  This is not surprising as the solution described there is independent of 
the relative time preferences of players,  and delay only features briefly in the proof.
Corollary  4.5.  Under the  conditions  of theorem f.3,  the  limiting SPE outcome  of 
personal  ^  ^   same  as fjiat of APpubllc(N, A)  given by theorem f.S.
Proof.  As for theorem 4.3.  □
period  t\  is  A  + e  for  e  >  0  sufficiently  small.  In  li  player  r  does  not  incur  a  delay  in  period  t - 2 -
Thus  7Tr(h) = 5rSr  but  7T,-(h')6i~1  sT ■ ■   This violates continuity on  tc;  condition 5 of theorem 3.2.
20As  discussed  in  the  next  section,  such  SPEs  would  have some  advantageous  properties;  there
would be no need to introduce personal delays for the market bargaining game.  However, as argued
in  section  4.4.4,  it  is  still  desirable  to  introduce  them  for  bargaining  models  on  larger  bilateral
exchange networks.
92At first sight,  personal delays do not  seem appropriate in a realistic bargaining 
model.  After  all,  why  should  it  be possible for  two  players  to exchange with each 
other and experience non-equal delays?  The following lemma illustrates the motiva­
tion for the use of personal delays.  It describes the SPE behaviour of both variations 
of the market  bargaining game for a case where theorem 4.3 does not apply.
Lemma  4.6.  Suppose  N   is  a  3  player  ring  network  such  that  /C12  —   f c u m t  a n ( ^ 
the  core  of N   contains  an  element  c  —   (ci,C2.0).  For  each  i  6  P fix ip  e  (0,1). 
For e  >  0,  let  A  =  (Si, 52,5s)  where  dr   =  //■.  Let  M.  be  cither  M pubhc(N, A)  or 
M personal(N ,A).  The  unique  limiting  SPE  outcome  of M.  in  the  limit  e  — »   0  is 
(4>, 1 —  4 > , 0)  where
0 = / 3'1(O )V [[l-/3'2(O )] A n,]
1 -  < W '
n i   —  h m       r - r —
f —*0  1  —  (i| d f
and w  is  1  in the  case  of personal  delay  and 2 in  the  case  of public delay.
The infix operators  V  and  A  represent  the maximum  and minimum operations 
respectively.  An  equivalent  definition  of  0  is  ‘the  element  of  the  closed  interval 
bounded  by  / 3,1(0)  and  1  —   / 3,2(0)  closest  to  n\  .  It  is  easy  to  shown  that  the 
conditions on 5%  guarantee that the limit given for ii[  converges.  Figure 4.2 shows a 
network where the conditions of this lemma are met.
Proof  See section 4.6.  □
This  lemma states  that  the  solution  of A/personal  coincides  with that  of the  al­
ternating  offers  game  on  /C12  with  the  same  discount  factors,  and  outside  options 
/ 3,z(0)  for players  i =  1  and  2.  For  j\/pubilc  the solution  coincides with that of the 
same  alternating offers  game with outside options,  except  that  the discount  factor 
of player 2 is 5\.
It  can be proved that the characterisation  of the result just  made also  holds in 
the more general case where /C12  ^  /Cunit.  In the case where the core is non-empty
93and  contains  an  element  c  such  that  c-j  >  0  and  c,;  =  0.  a  similar  result  can  be 
proved27.  The details  of the  proof of the general  case  are  along  the same  lines  as 
the proof given in section 4.6.  Only the special case is given to minimise the length 
of the proof.
A  sketch  of the  proof of  lemma  4.6  is  as  follows.  In  a  subgame  at  the  start 
of step  4  with  responder  i  =  1  or  2,  the  responder  is  guaranteed  a  SPE  share  of 
/ 3,l(0).  For example suppose i = 2.  Player 2 may accept  the demand of player  1  if 
it  yields  a share of at  least  / 3,2(0).  Otherwise,  the demand  of player  1  cannot  be 
feasible  to  player  3.  In  this  case  player  2  may  refuse the  demand  of player  1  and 
make  any  demand  feasible  to  player  3  and  it  will  be  accepted  in  SPE.  If it  were 
refused by players  1  and  3  in a SPE they must  both receive  higher payoffs,  but no 
such outcome is feasible.  Players  1  and  2 therefore effectively  have outside options 
equal to the lowest payoff they could receive in the core.  Now the arguments of the 
alternating  offers game  with outside  options  can  be used.  However,  in  the case  of 
public demands,  if player  2  refuses  and  the most  recent  demands of players  1  and 
2 are not feasible to player 3,  then the delay is incremented by 2 since player 2  has 
refused and player 3 must also refuse.  Thus the arguments of the alternating offers 
game must be used but with player 2 effectively having the discount factor J,2.
Lemma  4.6  illustrates  that  the  solution  of  the  market  bargaining  game  with 
public  discounting  is  not  consistent  with  that  of the  alternating  offers  game.  As 
discussed  in  section  3.1.1,  this  can  be  seen  from  the  case  where  /C13  and  /C23  are 
both the trivial cake containing only the origin.  The reason for the inconsistency is 
that player 2 is forced to incur an extra delay by waiting for player 3 to act.
It can be argued that the inconsistent solution produced by the public discount­
ing version of the market  bargaining game is simply an  artifact  of requiring player
27There  is  one case  which  displays  a novel  SPE.  Let j  be the player  ot her than i  and  3.  If the 
payoff of player j  in  the  alternating  offers  game  with  player  3  on  cake  AP'1   with  the -appropriate 
discount  factors  is less  than any  payoff he could  receive in  the core,  then  the exchange ij  forms  in 
SPE,  the limiting SPE payoff of player j  is f' J(0)  and  the others receive zero.
943 to refuse and incur a delay when she has no feasible demands.  If this were not the 
case then all resulting limiting SPEs would match those of the personal delay model. 
Indeed,  perhaps this rule is what was intended  by Binmore  in  [3].  This resolution 
has two problems.  Firstly, as noted above  (in footnote 25 of this chapter), corollary
3.1  can no longer be used to prove the existence of SPEs.  Secondly, it is not obvious 
that this resolution works successfully for larger networks, although it certainly does 
not  seem  impossible.  If it  is  the  case  that  exchanges  form  immediately  in  SPE  - 
and  this usually seems  to  be the case  for  perfect  information  models - then there 
may not be players available to provide disruptive delays after the first round.  The 
inconsistent result of lemma 4.6 hinges on the fact that player 3 provides such a de­
lay in every round.  However, it may not be straightforward to prove this immediate 
exchange result28.  I prefer to  use personal delays  because it  rules out this possible 
source of inconsistent solution from the outset.
Note that games using personal delays cannot  be referred to as  temporal mono­
poly games.  This term is useful for games in which players have time preferences, and 
there is a time value associated with each history of the game satisfying appropriate 
conditions  such  as  monotonicity.  In  a  temporal  monopoly  game,  only  one  player 
may  act  at  a  particular  time  value.  However,  in  a  game  using  personal  delays  a 
single history may represent different time values to different players.
Another application of lemma 4.6 is to the network given by /C12 = /C23 —  /CU nit 
and /C31  = {(0,0)}.  The limiting SPE outcome is29  (0,1.0).  As discussed in section
4.4.3,  this can be viewed as a prediction for the network L,5  defined in section 3.1.1.
28The proof of this result  is  typically  quite  straightforward  for  games  with  unilateral  demands, 
such as the telephoning game and various models discussed  in section 4.5.  However,  it  is argued in
section 4.4.5 that it  is desirable to allow  multilateral demands to be  made in  models.
29This outcome is in a von Neumman-Morgenstern  triple.  It  can  also  be demonstrated  that  this
is the outcome by a method  based  011  theorem 4.3.
954.4.5  M ultilateral Demands
It  is  problematic  to justify  multilateral  demands  of  the  sort  used  in  the  market 
bargaining  game  as  part  of  a  realistic  bargaining  process.  One  problem  is  that 
making proposals to several neighbours with the guarant ee that each neighbour will 
have  a  chance  to  accept  before  the  proposer  takes  anv  further  actions  requires  a 
high level of commitment.  Another problem occurs if the outcomes in a bargaining 
situation are more complicated  objects than a single numerical value.  It may then 
be  a difficult  task  to  create  proposals  to  several  neighbours  which  the  proposer  is 
indifferent  between,  and certainly  not one that can be performed immediately in a 
bargaining situation30.
In light of these difficulties, I interpret the argument given at the end of section
4.4.1  which Binmore made for  allowing  the use of multilateral  demands as follows. 
Multilateral  demands  are  not  intended  as  a  literal  description  of  the  bargaining 
process.  Instead  they  operate  as  a  device  allowing  ongoing  bilateral  bargaining 
between players  to  be interrupted.  The proof of theorem  4.3  illustrates that  there 
exists a situation in which an individual player has an incentive to do so, as discussed 
presently.  In a more realistic bargaining model, other devices could be employed for 
this  purpose.  One  candidate  is  to  use  a random  order  of play.  Another  is  to  use 
unilateral demands and a well chosen order of play, as discussed in section 4.5 below. 
However,  multilateral  demands  have  the  advantage  of  producing  a  tractable  and 
concise model which is consistent  with the solution of the alternating offers game.
In  the  proof  of  theorem  4.3,  it  is  shown  that  in  the  case  where  the  core  is 
empty (and the cakes are insatiable), if the first player in a market bargaining game 
makes  any demand less than their  SPE  payoff then it  is accepted  by the following 
player  in  SPE.  This  central  argument  of the  proof is  quite  robust  to  variations  of 
the  rules.  It  only  requires  that  both  neighbours  of  the  proposer  have  a  chance
30This  task  may  be  easier  in  a  setting  where  the  bargaining  situation  is  repeated.  Bargainers 
then have an opportunity to become familiar  with the available proposals of this sort.
96to  accept  his  demand.  Indeed,  it  holds  even  if no  further  multilateral  offers  are 
permitted.  This can be interpreted as meaning that if only a single player is willing to 
bargain non-bilaterally then they can secure at least as much as in the von Neumann- 
Morgenstern triple outcome described in theorem 4.3.  Since in any other outcome at 
least one player who exchanges can do better in a von Neumann-Morgenstern triple 
outcome,  this  player  has  an  incentive  to  break  a  bilateral  bargaining  convention. 
Thus maintaining such a convention requires exogenous pressure and it can be seen 
as the less  usual  case.  This  is the main  argument  in this  thesis  against  the use of 
telephoning game.
The  market  bargaining  game  assumes  that  proposers  must  demand  the  same 
utility  from  each  possible  responder.  One  may  reasonably  wonder  whether  this 
assumption  of public  demands  is  necessary  since,  as  noted  above,  the  difficulty  to 
players of producing such proposals may be significant.  That is, the case for public 
demands as part of a literal description of a bargaining process is weak.  However. ;is 
argued above, the intention of introducing multilateral demands is not to make such 
a literal  description,  but  to  capture the  realistic  possibility  of bilateral  bargaining 
being interrupted.  The use of public multilateral  demands also  allows  players  the 
opportunity to commit to unrealistic threats, as illustrated by the following example. 
Suppose all cakes  are unit.  Player  1  can initially demand utility x <  1  from player 
2  and  utility  0  from  player  3.  Player  2  must  accept  this  demand in  SPE  because 
otherwise  player  3  is  guaranteed  to  receive  a  SPE  payoff  of  1,  giving  player  2  a 
SPE payoff of zero.  In effect player  1  has given player  2  an ultimatum that  he will 
capitulate to player 3 unless player 2 accepts his terms.
974.5  Other  Models
Herrero’s  M odel
Herrero’s bargaining model of [34]  is for a bargaining situation with a set of players 
P and the single multiplayer utility cake31
K, —  {(xi)izp  |  : v i   G  R- 1 - . ^  X j  —  1 }
A single discount factor 5 G  (0,1)  which applies to all players is also required.  The 
model is the following straightforward extension of the alternating offers game.
1.  Player  1  is the first proposer p.
2.  The proposer, p,  makes a proposal a  G  K.
3.  Each player other than the proposer sequentially decides whether to accept or 
refuse the  proposal.  If all accept then the game is terminated.
4.  Following  a  refusal,  the  next  proposer  is  the player  satisfying  p’ =  p + 1
(mod  |P|)  and the game returns to step 2.
Delay:  The delay,  r(/i),  of any finite history h  is equal to the number of refusals 
which have occurred.
Payoffs:  If the proposal a is accepted in history /?,,  then the payoff of player i is 
< 5 T^cq.  In an infinite history all payoffs are zero.
Herrero proves the following result  (proposition 4.1  in  [34]).
Theorem 4.7.  If 6 >  |-pl— j-  then any a G  JC  is  a SPE outcome  of the model.
The details of the proof are omitted as they are not required in later arguments. 
The crucial step  is to construct SPEs for each i G  P in which player i receives share  1
and all other players receive zero.  If a player deviates  from this SPE, he is  punished
31In  fact  this  definition  of  a  game  holds  for  any  utility  cake  /C  C  (IR+)iP|.  Herrero’s  proof of 
theorem 4.7 also  holds for this case with only a lew cosmetic  modifications.
98by the play of a SPE in which the deviator receives zero.  If the deviation involved 
making  a  proposal,  then  in  the  punishment  SPE  a  player  for  whom  the  deviator 
proposed the lowest share receives a share of 1.  To tempt the other players into not 
playing  this  punishment  SPE,  the deviator  must  offer  them  each  a payoff  of more 
than 8.  But this is not possible given the condition placed 011 d.
The reason that this argument does not apply in bargaining games on bilateral 
exchange networks is that not all the other players have a veto.  To avoid a punish­
ment SPE of the sort described, the deviator need offer only one other player more 
than d,  which is always possible32.
Herrero’s  theorem  shows  that  generalisations  of the  alternating  offers game  to 
general  bargaining  problems  suffer  from  indeterminate  solutions.  The  result  that 
the market bargaining game possesses a unique SPE suggests that generalisations to 
the restricted  setting of bilateral  exchange networks may avoid  this problem.  This 
is a motivation for the attempt to develop such models in chapter  5.
Unilateral Demand Exogenous  Order Models
In [3], Binmore briefly considers a generalisation of the alternating offers game with 
the same rules as  the market  bargaining game  (with public delay)  except  that the 
responder may accept only the demand of the most, recent  proposer.  I11 this model, 
only unilateral demands may be made, but, unlike the telephoning game, the order 
of play  is  exogenously  fixed.  The  nth  proposer  is  the  player  pn  satisfying  pn  =
32A  variation  on  Herrero’s  model  is  to  require  the  proposer  to  only  make  a  demand,  and  let 
an  exchange  form  once  the  sum  of  the  most  recent  demands  is  no  more  than  1.  Then  such  a 
punishment  SPE  could  not  always  exist.  For  example  in  the  3  player  case,  consider  a  strategy 
profile  in  which  the  initial  demands of players  1.  2.  and  3  are  I),  t).  and  1.  Player  2  could  instead 
demand  A  <  1  —  6  and  in  SPE  an  exchange  would  form  after  player 3's  demand.  This  argument 
holds under various delay  schemes e.g.  delay  for  player i  equals a)  number of demands of player i 
minus one  (a personal scheme)  or  b)  number of demands of player  1  minus one  (a public scheme). 
In Osborne and  Rubinstein  [54]  (section 3.13)  it  is  mentioned that for a version of this model with 
more restrictions on play  no complete analysis  is available.
99?z(mod 3).  Binmore shows that in the case where the core is empty the solution of 
this model coincides with that of the market bargaining game.  However, in the case 
where the core is non-empty,  the model has a serious deficiency.  Consider the case 
where  /C12  is  a  unit  cake  and  /C23  and  /C3i  are  c-unit  cakes.  Player  1  has  a  large 
advantage in this case since he can make demands to player  2,  but player  2 cannot 
make counterdemands.  This produces33 a SPE payoff strongly biased towards player
1.  The bias is due to the choice of ordering rather than any aspect of the bargaining 
situation, so this is not  a good candidate for a bargaining model.
For the network just discussed, an alternative player ordering which allows play­
ers  1  and  2  to  make  demands to  each  other  and  treats  them symmetrically  seems 
more appropriate.  However, for this model to be useful, a player ordering is required 
which is appropriate for any  network.  Thus it  must  implement  the von Neumann- 
Morgenstern triple solution  in the case of a network whose core is empty.  A model 
involving such an intricate ordering seems a less appealing candidate for a bargain­
ing model than the market bargaining game on grounds of concision, especially as it 
seems likely that the necessary player ordering would become even more complicated 
for larger networks.
A  M odel of Corominas-Bosch
In  [23],  Corominas-Bosch  introduces  a  model  of bargaining  for  a setting  in  which 
players  are  partitioned  into  a  set  of  buyers  and  a  set  of sellers  and  all  exchange 
opportunities involve one player from each set.  It  is assumed that each seller owns 
an indivisible good  and each  buyer possesses  money.  If a seller  and  a buyer trade 
at price p and time £,  they receive utilities of 8lp and (^ (l —  p)  respectively.  In the 
terminology  of section  3.1.1,  this  setting  is  a bipartite  bilateral  exchange  network 
with unit cakes.
33This can easily be proved along the lines of the proof of lemma 4.1.  Define t c t   and zf,  as in that 
proof.  Then  7r1   >  1  -  52t t 2   and  7 f2  <  / 3,2(0) V [1  -  ttJ.  Combining these gives 7f2  < f y2(0) V S2n2 , 
so it must be the case that  tt2  < f'i,2(0)  = t.
100An outline of the model is as follows.  Either the buyers or sellers are chosen to 
be the initial proposers.  The other players are the responders.  The proposers simul­
taneously  make  demands.  Then each  responder  must  choose  to  either  accept  one 
proposed demand value or refuse them all.  This decision is made simultaneously by 
all responders.  A deterministic matching rule is given that selects which exchanges 
take place34.  This matching rule guarantees that the maximum possible number of 
exchanges form.  In cases where no two responders accept the same demand, this rule 
is straightforward, but in other cases it can be quite complex.  Agents who exchange 
are removed from the network.  The process is then repeated with the players who 
responded most  recently  now  taking the  proposing role.  The time of an exchange 
corresponds to how many times this process was repeated before the exchange took 
place.
Corominas-Bosch shows that for many networks there exists a unique SPE out­
come under this  model.  However,  there  are also networks  for which multiple SPE 
outcomes  exist.  She gives  the  example  of L5  (as  defined  in  section  3.1.3).  This is 
a bilateral network with players 2  and 4 011 one side and players  1,  3  and  5 on the 
other.  In the case where players 2 and 4 propose first,  for certain parameters used 
by the matching rule there  are multiple  SPE  payoffs3'.  The set  of SPE  payoffs  to 
players  2  and  4  is  Recall  that  yyj  is  the  unique  SPE  payoff to  the  first
proposer in an alternating offers game 011  a unit cake with common discount factor 
5.
This model allows simultaneous actions.  An equivalent representation is in terms 
of imperfect  information.  Proposers do  not  necessarily  make proposals simultane-
34The alternative where responders may choose to accept a particular neighbour is also considered 
in  Corominas-Bosch  [23]  (in  section  3.8).  The  details  of the  argument  mentioned  below  showing
that  Lo  produces multiple SPEs continue to hold.
35In the case where players  1,  3 and  5 propose lirst, there is a unique SPE outcome in which they
receive payoff zero and player 2 and 4 receive payoff 1.  Since all  players thus have some interest in
not proposing first, this suggests  incorporating the decision of when to enter the market <is part of
the model.
101ously,  but do make them without  knowledge of the other proposals  (e.g.  proposals 
are  placed  in  sealed  envelopes).  This  seems  a  more  realistic  description  of a  bar­
gaining situation  than  either  simultaneous  actions  or  perfect  information.  Indeed, 
this avoids some unrealistic features of perfect information bargaining models.  For 
example  there  is  no  necessity  to  use personal  delays  since  every  player  gets to  act 
in every time period.  Also it  provides a method to avoid the problems of instantly 
adaptive exchange  (discussed below in section 5.3.1).  On the other hand, given the 
presence  of simultaneous  actions,  it  seems  natural  to  allow  players  to  use  mixed 
strategies.  This suggests SPE analysis may not  find all  the solutions.
A difficulty with applying the Corominas-Bosch model to the setting of bilateral 
exchange networks is how to deal with non-bipartite networks.  There are many such 
networks  (for  example,  complete networks)  with 110 obvious structure suggesting a 
rule to determine which players  are the proposers in a given round.  Since this rule 
is  likely  to  have  a significant  influence  011  the  outcome’  of the  model,  an  arbitrary 
choice  does  not  seem  satisfactory.  It  seems  more  natural  to  extend  the  model  in 
alternative  bargaining  settings  which  do  not  restrict  players  to  a  single  exchange. 
This would allow some players to be both proposers and responders.
Chatterjee and D utta [19] investigate similar models to those of Corominas Bosch 
in the case of a 4 player bipartite network in which each player is connected to both 
players on the other side of the network.  The principal difference is that is 110 longer 
assumed  that  all  utility  cakes  are  unit  cakes36.  It  is  shown  that  for  each  of their 
-  models there  is  a case  where  either  the  model  has  110  SPE  or  any  SPE  involves  a 
delay  in reaching  agreement.  This is in  contrast  to the  behaviour of the  model of 
Corominas-Bosch on the  unit cake  versions of this networks and casts  doubt upon
the robustness of the unit cake solutions.
3G There are other differences.  For example, players choose to accept demands of particular players 
rather than simply demand values.
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Calvo-Armengol  [16,  17,  18]  proposes  a  series  of  bargaining  models  for  bilateral 
exchange  networks  with  unit  cakes  under  the  constraint  that  all  negotiations  are 
bilateral.  In  [18],  a  perfect  information  model  is  presented  in  which  a  neighbour 
of the  proposer  is  randomly  selected  to  be  the  responder,  and  the  proposer  must 
then make a unilateral  offer to the responder.  The responder may accept  the offer 
or  refuse  and  become  the  next  proposer.  This  model  has  the  restriction  that  the 
game ends when a single exchange forms and non-exclianging players receive payoff 
zero37.  A unique stationary SPE is found for any network.  In  [16],  a similar model 
of bargaining  in  a  3  player  line  network  is  proposed,  with  the  difference  that  the 
responders  are  chosen  according  to  a  pre-specified  order.  On  the  other  hand  [17] 
contains  a 2-stage  model.  In  the  first  stage each  player  selects  a single  neighbour 
as their bargaining partner.  In the second stage a randomly chosen initial proposer 
makes  a demand.  Their  bargaining  partner  is  the  responder  and  may  accept  the 
demand or refuse and become the next proposer.  Again this game terminates once a 
single exchange forms and non-exchanging players receive zero.  The usual approach 
to  discounting  is  used  in  all  these  models.  None  of  these1   models  reproduce  the 
limiting prediction of the market bargaining game for the  L3  given in section  4.4.4 
above.  Instead  they  produce  an  outcomes  in  which  the  central  player  receives  an 
outcome identical  to that  in  the alternating offers game over  one of the two  cakes. 
This  underlines  the  discussion  in  section  4.4.5  that  the  market  bargaining  game 
supports qualitatively different outcomes to the case of purely bilateral negotiations 
by providing a mechanism for them to be interrupted.
37This  allows  the  models  to  illustrate1   features  arising  from  the  bargaining  situation  without 
having to deal with complications of instantly adaptive exchange as discussed  below in section 5.3.i 
(although a one-exchange rule could  be viewed as an extreme case of instantly adaptive exchange).
1034.6  Appendix:  Proof of Lemma 4.6
Lem m a  4.6.  Suppose  N   is  a  3  player  ring  network  such  that  /C12  =  JCuntt  and 
the  core  of N   contains  an  element  c  —   (ci.cy.O).  For  each  i  6  P fix q,  E  (0,1). 
For e  >  0,  let  A  =  (<X, 62, 63)  where  6,  —   q).  Let  M   be  either  APmbhc(N, A)  or 
]\fpersonal(N, A).  The  unique  limiting  SPE  outcome  o  f M.  in  the  limit  e  — >   0  is 
(0,1 —  0,0)  where
and w  is  1  in the  case  of personal  delay  and 2 in  the  case  of public delay.
Recall  that  V  and  A  are  infix  maximum  and  minimum  operators.  Figure  4.2 
shows a network where the conditions of this lemma are met.
player  1
I
0 =  / 3’1( o ) v [ [ i- / 3-2(o)]a»1] 
_  1 -  d?
1
player 3
1 \
player 2
Figure 4.2:  A 3 player network with a 11011-empty core
Proof.  Let  w\  =  1  and  W2  =  w.  Fix  A.  Define  pre-proposal  and  post-proposal 
subgames of M.  to be those at the start of,  respectively, steps 3 and 4 of the game. 
Let Bi be the set of pre-proposal subgames of M   with proposer  i.Let  B  be  a  subgame  of  A4.  In  the  case  of  personal  delay,  let  Tt{B)  be  the 
associated  personal  delay  of player  i.  In  the  case  of public  delay,  let  rt(B)  be the 
associated  delay.  Let  Pt{B)  be the set of all values  5~r,(B )7T ,   such that  7r,  is a SPE 
payoff to player  i  in B.  Note that  by corollary  3.1,  M   has  a SPE and therefore so 
does B.  Hence  is non-empty.
Let  n i  =  UeeBi P\{P)-  Let  n < 2   —   when'  the  union is taken over  the
subset of £?2 such that the most recent demand of player  1 is more than / 3,1(0).  Let 
7fz  = sup n i and n 7 = inf  .
It must be the case that for x e  {1,2}.  cx  > f   3-x(0).  Otherwise (0,cx)  would be 
Pareto dominated  by  (0 ,/3,x'(0))  e JC3x  and c. would not  be in the core.  This gives 
1 ~ / 3,2(0)  >  1 —  C2 = c\  > / 3,1(0)  and so:
1-f'2(0) >  f iA(0)  (4.7)
Let (i, j) —   (1, 2) or (2,1).  Let A be a pre-proposal subgame of M. with proposer 
z.  In the case  i =  2  suppose also that  the most  recent  demand  of player  1  in A is 
more than / 3,1(0).
Suppose player  i  demands  Xt  <  / 3 ,(0)  in A.  Let  B  be  the  resulting subgame. 
Suppose that  in a SPE of B a post-proposal subgame  B'  is reached with responder 
j  in which the demand  A *  is  available.  By  (4.7),  A ,;  <  1 —  / 3-J(0).  Thus the share 
of player  j  in  any  SPE  of B'  is  more  than  / 3j (0)  so  the  exchange  ij  must  form. 
Suppose that in a SPE of B a post-proposal subgame B" is reached with responder 
_   3  in which  the  demand  A;  is  available.  Then the share  of player  3  in  any  SPE of 
B" is non-zero.  Thus in any SPE of B the first responder, r,  must accept a demand 
otherwise a contradiction is produced.  If r —  3 then the only feasible demand is that 
of player i.  If r = j  then accepting the demand of player i results in a better payoff 
than accepting any demand of player 3 since 1 —  A ,;  >  ,/3j (U).  Thus the demand Xt  
is accepted in SPE and so:
2L ,  >  / 3l’(0)  (4.8)
105Suppose player  i  demands  A *  <  [1 -  f 3j {0 )}  A  [1  -  d*J7t3 ]   in  A.  Let  C   be the 
resulting subgame.  In the case  where  A7   <  / 3 '(0)  it  has  already  been shown  that 
this demand is accepted in any SPE of C .  So suppose A,  > / 3,l(0).  If player 3 is the 
responder in C then j must be  1 and player 3 cannot accept the demand of player j 
since it is infeasible.  Thus in any SPE of C ,  either player 3  accepts the demand of 
player i,  or a post-proposal subgame of C   with responder j,  C',  is reached in which 
the demand A ,;  is available  (In the case i —   1,  then C —  C ).  Since  1 -  A7   > / 3’J(0), 
it must be the case that the exchange 3j does not form in any SPE of C'.  If player j 
refuses in C then the delay she incurs when an exchange forms is at least Tj(Cf)  +  1. 
In the  case that  j =  2,  if player  2  refuses  in  a  SPE  of C  then  player  3  must  also 
refuse before an exchange forms in that SPE. If public discounting is used then the 
delay  that  player  2  incurs when  an  exchange  forms  is  at  least  7*2 (C;) + 2.  Thus if 
player j refuses in a SPE of C then her SPE payoff is at most  which is less
than that  of accepting  Ai   in C.   This shows  that  A,  is  accepted  in  any  SPE  of A. 
However,  if i —  2  and public discounting is used,  the delay may be incremented by 
1 before it is accepted.  Thus
TLi  > C 1  {[1 -  / 3J'(0)] A [1 -   (4.9)
Suppose there is a SPE  e of A in which player i receives a share of
/A  > f ,l{ 0) V [1 -  S j'J K j]
Suppose the play  e involves  a post-proposal subgame of A with responder 3 being 
reached.  Then it  must  be  the  case  that  in  e  player  3  refuses  in  this subgame for
the following reason.  If the  exchange 3i  forms then the share of player i is  no  more
than f 3,l(0).  If the exchange 3j  forms then the share of player i  is zero.  Therefore 
it  must  be  the  case  that  the  play  of e  involves  a  post-proposal  subgame  V  with 
responder j  being reached.  In the play of e,  player j  receives a payoff of.less than 
aj =  —   fii).  Let Aj be the most recent demand of player i in V.  If Xt  < / 3,*(0)
then player j  could  earn  a higher  payoff than  aj  in  D by  accepted  the demand of
106player  i.  If A,  >  / 3’*(0)  then player j  could earn a payoff of at  least  d^{T ))+ W j^   in 
SPE of V.  This contradicts the existence of e .  Thus
(4.io)
Let
Note  that  mr   has  the  property  that  x —   [1  —   6^J  (1   —   ‘x)}  has  the  same  sign  as
x —  77ij.  Thus  substituting (4.10) into (4.9) and combining the result  with (4.8)  gives:
Xt >  {/*-'(0) V [[1 -  f^(0)j Am*]}  (4.11)
Substituting this into  (4.10)  gives:
7f,;  <  f ' l{l))V A V  B  (4.12)
where
A=[ 1  -  6*f'J{ 0 ) }   A  [1  -  5 *   +  5\f3'l{  0)]
B =   [1  -  <T/3 j(0)] A  [1  -  S*7rij]
=   ^2wj— l
Observe  that  taking  the  limit  e  — ►   0  in  equations  (4.11)  and  (4.12)  yields
linie-^oILi  >  0  and  lixxie_> .0 7fi  <  0-  Since  7^  <  t t  1,  it  must  be  the  case  that
lime_*o:7Li  = hme_*o7fi  =  0-  Thus  0  is  the  unique  limiting  SPE payoff to  player
1 as required.
Let £ be the subgame resulting from an initial demand of Ai  by player  1  in Ad. 
In the case that Ai  < / 3)1 (0) the SPE payoff of player 2 in £ is at least 1 -  Ai  >  1-0. 
In the case that Ai  > / 3,1(0)  the SPE payoff of player 2 in S is at least < 5 27t2.  Using 
equation  (4.11)  and taking the limit  e — >   0,  this also gives  a lower bound of 1 -  0 . 
Thus the limiting  SPE payoff of player 2 in M is at least. 1 - 0 .  It cannot be  higher
or for some  e >  0 there must be a SPE with payoff's that are not feasible in  N.  □
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Novel  Extensions  of the 
Alternating  Offers  Game
This chapter  contains  two  bargaining  models  which  extend  the market  bargaining- 
game  of the  previous  chapter  to  model  bargaining  in  bilateral  exchange  networks 
with more than 3 players.  Section 5.1  presents the  exogenous  ordering model.  This 
is a straightforward extension of the market bargaining game.  It requires an exoge­
nously  specified  ordering  on  the  players  which  represents  the order  in  which  they 
play.  This model does not produce as precise a prediction as the market bargaining 
game; the SPE outcome is shown to be highly dependent on the exogenous ordering. 
This is illustrated for the network L5  tvs defined in section 3.1.3.
The existence of multiple solutions motivates the  endogenous  ordering model of 
section 5.2.  In this model players’ actions determine the order of play, although the 
first player to act must still be exogenously chosen.  It is shown that this model also 
supports a wide  range  of SPE  outcomes  for  L5.  Also,  proving this result  requires 
exhaustive  consideration  of  many  cases.  This  suggests  that  there  may  be  many 
larger networks for which solving this model is not practical.  Finally, the rules that 
are  required  to  allow  an  endogenous  ordering  while retaining  the  character  of the 
market bargaining game seem quite unrealistic.
108Section  5.3  discusses  the  multiple  solutions  found  for  both  models  in  greater 
depth.  It also introduces and discusses the concept of instantly adaptive exchange, an 
often  undesirable feature of many perfect  information  bargaining models including 
those of this chapter.  Sections  5.4 is an appendix containing most of the proofs for 
this chapter.
Due to the problems detailed in this chapter, an approach to modelling bargain­
ing  in  general  bilateral  exchange  networks  based  on  the  market  bargaining  game 
does not seem feasible.  This conclusion  is discussed in  more detail in section 9.1.2 
of the  concluding  chapter.  However,  the  models  of this  chapter  do  produce some 
predictions,  especially  for  small  networks.  Interpretation  of these  results  is  post­
poned until section 9.2 of the concluding chapter, where they are compared with the 
predictions of other chapters.
5.1  The Exogenous  Ordering Model
5.1.1  D efinition
This  is  a direct  generalisation  of the  market  bargaining  game  in  that  it  also  uses 
an  exogenous  order  of play.  As  in  the  market  bargaining  game,  the  player  order­
ing  is  embedded  in  the  labelling  of  the  players;  recall  the  assumption  that  P  = 
{1,2,... ,n}.  As  well  as  a  network  T V   —   (P, £\/C),  the  model  requires  a vector  of 
discount  factors  A  =  (St)iep  where  Sr  e  (0,1).  Define  m(N)  to  be  the maximum 
demand which is feasible1   from some player to another in  T V .
The exogenous ordering model produces the following game,  A (TV, A):
1.  Initially  all  players  are  active.  Players  1  and  2  are  respectively the first  pro­
poser and responder.
1  Recall  from  section  3.1.1  that  a  demand  a,,  by  player  p  is  said  to  be  feasible  to  player  r  if
< f"'P(0).
1092.  The proposer p  makes a demand2  ap e  [0,?n(Ar)].
3.  The responder r  may  either  accept  the  most  recent  demand  of  any  active
neighbour if it is feasible,  or refuse all demands.
4.  a) If r accepts then players p and r exchange and become inactive.  Any players 
with no  active  neighbours  also  become  inactive.  If no  active  players  remain
then the  game  terminates.  Otherwise  the  new  responder  r'  is  the  minimal
active  player  i  >  r,  or  if  no  such  player  exists,  simply  the  minimal  active 
player i.  The game returns to step 3.
b) If r refuses, the new proposer p' is r and the new responder r' is as defined 
in 4 a).  The game returns to step  2.
Delay:  In any finite history h, the personal delay of player z, r,(/z), is the number 
of times player i has refused in the course of the history.
Payoffs:  Let  h be a terminal or infinite history.  If a demand ap made by player 
p was accepted by player r in a subhistory h' of h then the payoffs of players p and r 
in h are  8pv< yh  ^ap  and 5rr^h ^  fp'r{ < J p )   respectively.  All players who are not allocated 
a payoff in this way receive zero.
Note  that  once  players  exchange  their  personal  delays  do  not  increase.  Thus 
payoffs are well defined.  The definition of a payoff is slightly more complicated than 
in the previous chapter because there is now the possibility of an infinite history in 
which some players exchange but others continue to bargain indefinitely.
The definition above of an active player aims to describe those who have not yet 
exchanged but still have a possibility of doing so.  Thus a player can become inactive 
either by taking part in an exchange or by all their neighbours doing so and thereby 
losing the possibility of taking part in an exchange.
A  subgame  in  which the  next  action  to be taken  must  be in  step  2  is  called  a
2The restriction  on  demands to  a closed  interval  is  a technical  condition  required  for  corollary 
3.1  to hold.  Defining m(N)  to take a greater value would  not affect the following analysis.
110pre-proposal  subgame.  One  in  which  the  next  action  must  be  in step  3  is  called  a 
post-proposal subgame.  Thus the subgames of a game X generated by this bargaining 
model are partitioned into pre- and post-proposal subgames.  Note that there exists 
another game which is clearly equivalent'5  to X  but does not permit such a partition 
to  be  made.  This  game  requires  a  responder  to  either  accept  a demand  or  make 
a new demand.  The latter  case implies that  the responder has rejected  all feasible 
demands.  Choosing a representation of the model which allows a partition into pre- 
and post- proposal subgames simplifies SPE analysis.  For example, observe that the 
proof of lemma 4.1  on the SPE behaviour of the alternating offers game is based 011 
the SPE payoffs in similarly defined pre-proposal subgames.
Observe  that  in  a  post-proposal  subgame  where  the  responder  has  no  feasible 
demand it is necessary for her to refuse and incur a delay cost.  A similar feature is 
found in the market  bargaining game.  The reasons for this are discussed  in section
4.4.4.
For  2  and  3  player  networks,  the  exogenous  ordering  model  gives  bargaining 
games  which  are  the  personal  delay  versions  of the  alternating  offers  and  market 
bargaining  games  respectively.  Hence  it  is  consistent  with earlier  results on these 
networks.  Also note that for games generated by this model, if a situation is reached 
in which a connected component of the subgraph induced by active players contains 
only 2 or 3 players then in this component play continues4 as in the alternating offers 
or market bargaining game.  This observation is often crucial to the SPE behaviour 
of this model.
3In the sense that there is a payoff preserving Injection between t he sets of infinite histories which 
also preserves the identities of players who must  make actions.  See the definition of equivalence up
to discounting in section  5.4.1  for  a more precise definition.
4That  is,  the  players  in  this  component  continue  using  the  rules  of  the  alternating  offers  or
market bargaining game.  However,  they  may  already  have mack1  some demands which can still  be 
accepted,  and  have  already  incurred  some  delays.  Also,  play  may  also  be  occurring  outside  this 
component.
Ill5.1.2  A nalysis  for  L 5
This section investigates the SPE behaviour of the exogenous ordering model for the 
network  L5.  I11  particular,  the  effect  of different  orders of play  is  explored.  Since 
the  order  of play  is  embedded  in  the  player  numbering,  this  requires  using  other 
networks  which  are  equivalent  to  L5  except  for  this  numbering.  For  this  section, 
let  P  =  {1,2,3,4,5}.  Given  a  sequence  p  =  (p,.)i<t<r,  such  that  {pt}  —   P,  let 
E(p)  =  {P1P2,P2P3,P3P 4,P4P 5}-  Then  L-fp)  =  (P,E{p),I\ unit)  is  a  5  player  line 
network with  unit  cakes.  The sequence  p  can  be written p  1P2 P3 P4 P5  as there is 110 
risk of confusion.  For example,  54321  represents the sequence such that p?  = 6 —  i.
By  corollary  3.1,  X(N, A)  has  a SPE,  and  hence  so does  every  subgame.  The 
following  two  lemmas  are  on  the  SPE  outcomes  of  X{Lr,{p), A)  for  two  values5 
of p.  The  proofs  of these  results  rely  on  a  number  of supporting  lemmas  and  so 
are  relegating  to  section  5.4.3  in  the  appendix of this  chapter.  However  the  main 
arguments are straightforward and are sketched  below.
Lemma 5.1.  For each i E P fix 777 ;  E  (0,1).  For e > 0.  let A = (5z)l6p where 8r — rft . 
Then X (L5 (31524), A)  has a unique limiting SPE payoff*  in the limit e — >  0 in which 
players  1  and  2 receive payoff 1  and the  others  receive zero.
The key part of the proof is as follows.  Suppose players 1 and 2 initially demand 
less  than  1.  If play  reaches  player  5  then  player  5  is  guaranteed  a  non-zero  SPE 
payoff and it must be the case that either player 3 or 4 receives a SPE payoff of zero.
~   This player would have preferred to accept the initial demand of their neighbour, so 
this is not SPE play.  Thus in SPE both players 3 and 4 accept.
Note  that  this  argument  hinges  on  the  fact  that  players  3  and  4  know  which 
exchange will  form  if they  both  refuse.  If player  5  randomised  between  accepting 
players 1 and 2 this would not be true.  Then in the case where players 3 and 4 both
5  For some other orderings I could  not solve the corresponding bargaining game.  An example is 
54123.
G Recall that definition  3.14  defines a limiting SPE payofi.
112refuse they would both have non-zero expected payoffs.  This would disrupt the SPE 
argument  given  and support a solution  in which the  payoffs to the players are less 
extreme than 0 and  1.
Lemma  5.2.  Let A s  =   (<5».)ieP  such  that  5t  =   5 for  all i.  Then X(L5{41325), Aa) 
has two SPE outcomes,  (1 -  n, n, 1 -  h, n. U)  and (0. n. I -  77, 77. 1 -  77)  where  77  =   .
Recall from lemma 4.1 that h is the SPE payoff to the first mover in an alternating 
offers game on a unit cake in which both discount factors are J.
A sketch of the proof is as follows.  Suppose players 1 and 2 initially demand less 
than 1.  If play reaches players 4 and 5, then they are both guaranteed non-zero SPE 
payoffs, and player 3 receives zero.  Hence in SPE player 3 accepts the lowest demand 
from players 1 and 2.  Suppose player 1 demands A < 77.  Then either player 3 accepts 
this,  or  players  2  and  3  exchange  in  SPE.  In  the  latter  case  player  1  is  effectively 
left  in an alternating  offers game with  player  4 who thus accepts  the demand of A  
in SPE.  Suppose player  1  demands A  >  h initially.  If player  2  demands more than 
A then players 1  and 3 exchange,  leaving player 2 effectively in an alternating offers 
game  with  player  5  so  player  2  receives  a  SPE  payoff of 5h.  A  better  action  for 
player 2 is to demand slightly less than A  since this is accepted by player 3 in SPE. 
This  leaves  player  1  in  an  alternating  offers  game with  player  4  in  which  player  1 
receives a SPE payoff of 5h.  Thus the initial action of player 1 in SPE is to demand 
h.  Using the arguments just given it  is quite easy to show that  player  2  then also 
demands fi in SPE. Which of the two SPE outcomes described in the lemma occurs 
depends on which neighbour player 3 chooses to accept.
5.2  The  Endogenous  Ordering Model
The endogenous  ordering  model  is  defined  in  section  5.2.2.  Section  5.2.1  is  a pre­
liminary section  discussing the  motation  for  the rules  of  this  model.  Section  5.2.3 
discusses some features of these rules.  Amongst other things, it is proved that they
113produce a well defined game.  Finally,  section  5.2.4 describes the  SPE  behaviour of 
games  generated  by  this  model  for  various  networks.  The  proofs  are  contained  in 
the appendix to this chapter.
5.2.1  M otivation
At first sight the rules of the endogenous ordering model described in section  5.2.2 
below seem an unnatural choice.  This preliminary section  explains how these rules 
arise  from  the  motivation  of  producing  a  perfect  information  model  allowing  an 
endogenous ordering of play while retaining the character of the market bargaining 
game.
By  the latter statement  I  mean that  players must be able to  make multilateral 
demands as described in section 4.4.5.  In a perfect information setting such demands 
must  entail  a degree of forward  commitment;  the proposer  commits  to  making no 
further  action  until  all  players to whom  the demand was  made  have  had  a chance 
to consider it.
Consider  the  question  of  how  the  next  player  to  act  in  a  perfect  information 
bargaining  model  is  decided  endogenously.  In  a  model  based  on  the  alternating 
offers game, the natural mechanism by which a player can influence the future order 
of play is  by  making somebody a  proposal.  Therefore in  the endogenous  ordering 
model,  the  proposer chooses  one  player  to  whom his  multilateral  demand  is made 
as the candidate for next responder.
However  such  a  model  allows  a  situation  where  a  proposer  is  surrounded  by 
neighbours who have made forward commitments and thus cannot immediately con­
sider the proposer’s next demand.  In the endogenous ordering model, the proposer 
chooses  a  pseudo-responder.  If the  pseudo-responder  has  made  a  multilateral  de­
mand to some players who have not yet considered it, the right to act next is passed 
on  to  one  of these.  Which  of these  players  receives  this  right  has  a  crucial  effect 
on  the  order  of play.  Thus  this  choice  is  endogenised.  Proposers  must  choose  an
114ordering over the set of players to whom their multilateral demand is made.  If they 
later  become  pseudo-responder,  the  right  to  act  is  passed  on to  the first  player  in 
this set who has not yet  had a chance to respond.
In the endogenous  ordering game,  players  are allowed  to make  multilateral de­
mands  to  any  set  of neighbours.  There  seems  110  reason  to  force players  to  make 
demands to all neighbours.  Players with many neighbours would then be forced into 
much longer-term forward commitment  than those with few neighbours which may 
well be a significant disadvantage.
The model resulting from the argument in this section does not appear a natural 
model of bargaining.  It seems overly complicated and has artificial seeming features 
which do not  obviously correspond to  anything from  the original  bargaining situa­
tion.  For example following a proposal it  is quite possible for there to be a sequence 
of pseudo-responders ending  in  a next  responder far  from  the  proposer  and  SPEs 
can depend on the opportunity to set up such sequences.  This model is investigated 
anyway to  find out  whether  the two motivating features  given  at  the  beginning of 
this section produce an interesting SPE outcome despite these drawbacks.
5.2.2  D efinition
The endogenous ordering model is for a network Ar = (P, E,JC) such that (P, E)  is a 
connected graph7.  The model also requires a vector of discount factors A =  (Si)isp 
where 5 i £  (0,1),  and a first proposer p\  £  P.
The model produces the following game,  F(N, A,pi):
1.  Initially all players are active.  p\  is first proposer.
2.  The proposer p makes a demand ov  £ R+  and chooses an ordered non-empty 
sequence Vp  of distinct active neighbours.  ap  must be feasible to all players in
rThere is no reason to investigate a non-connected bilateral exchange network rather than study 
its connected  components  individually.  The condition  is  imposed  simply  because  it  is  required  for 
the game to be well defined.Vp.  The pseudo-responder is the first element of Vv.
3.  The  pseudoresponder  ip  becomes  the  responder  if  contains  110  players. 
Otherwise the first  element of Vf  is chosen as the next pseudoresponder and 
this step is repeated.
4.  Let R be the set of active neighbours q of the responder r such that Vq contains 
r.  r  may  accept  the  most  recent  demand  of  any  player  in  R  or  refuse  all 
demands.
5.  a)  If r  accepts,  players p  and  r  exchange  and  become  inactive.  Any  players 
with  no  active  neighbours  also  become inactive.  For  all  x  €  P,  p  and  r  are 
removed from the sequence Vx  if they are contained in it.  If no active players 
remain the game terminates.  Otherwise,  the new pseudoresponder is chosen 
from  the  set  of active  players  who  are  neighbours  of  either  x  or  ;< /,  where  x 
and  y  are  the  most  recently  exchanged  pair  such  that  either  has  an  active 
neighbour.  An unspecified rule is used to make this choice deterministic.  The 
game returns to step 3.
b)  If r  refuses  then,  for  all  x  G  P.  r  is  removed  from the sequence  Vx if  it is
contained in it.  The new proposer is r.  The game returns to step 2.
Delay:  In any finite history h, the personal delay of player i, r7  (/r), is the number 
of times player i has refused in the course of the history.
Payoffs:  Let  h be a terminal or infinite history.  If a demand ap  made  by player
p was accepted by player r in a subhistorv h' of h then the payoffs of players p and r 
in h are  6pp^h ^crp  and 5T rr< < h  ^/ 9,1 (crp)  respectively.  All players who are not  allocated 
a payoff in this way receive zero.
In  step  2  an  action  must  be  taken  of  the  form  giving  values  of  op  and  Vp. 
Such  a  pair  is  referred  to  as  a  proposition.  A  proposition  is  written  in  the  form 
[<jp, (vi,v2,  -. •)]  where (vi,v2,.  ..) = Vp.   A proposition of the form  [crp, (tq)J  is often
116referred  to  below  as  a  unilateral  demand  of ap  to  A  proposition  of the  form 
[ < fp , Vp\ where Vp includes all active neighbours of p is often referred to a multilateral 
demand of crp.
Note that  in this description  Vj  refers to the most recent  value of this variable. 
Formally,  it  should  be  thought  of as  a  function  whose  domain  is  the  set  of finite 
histories of the game.  In the analysis of this model the notation Vx(h)  is sometimes 
used to make it clear which value is referred to.
A  subgame  in  which  the  next  action  to  be  taken  is  in  step  2  is  called  a  pre­
proposal subgame.  One in which the next action is in step 4 is called a post-proposal 
subgame.  As for the exogenous ordering model, the subgames of a game generated 
by this bargaining model are partitioned  into pre- and post-proposal subgames.
5.2.3  D iscussion
First it is shown that the model produces well defined games.  The choice of a new 
pseudo-responder in step 5a) is well defined since (P, E) is connected.  The following 
argument  shows  that  step  3  terminates  and  thus  the  selection  of  a  responder  is 
well  defined.  Let  /i  be  a  finite  history  which  ends  with  a  proposition.  Let  = 
(V'o, Vh5  ^2, •  •  •)  be the sequence of pseudo-responders produced by step 3  following 
h.  By step  3,  ifi+i  occurs  in  V^fh).  If  i'i+i  proposed  more recently  than  i/),  in  h 
then  1 was removed from  in step 5.  Thus it must be the case that ifci proposed 
more recently than ?/),:+1   in h,  and the sequence  T must be finite as required.
The following example for a 4 player line network illustrates a potential problem 
with the rules  of the  model.  Suppose player  1  and  2  use strategies  in which they 
refuse all demands and always make  propositions such that  V\  —   (2)  and V2 —   (1). 
This results in an infinite history in which 110 exchanges form and all players therefore 
receive  payoff zero.  Players  3  and  4  are  denied  an  opportunity  to  exchange  even 
though  they  take  no  actions  and  incur  110  delays.  A  possible  resolution  of  this 
problem is that if such strategies  are used then players  1  and 2 are deemed to have
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which covers  all  cases of this  problem would be complicated.  However,  this is  not 
required as the problem is unlikely to emerge in SPE; it would require neighbouring 
players to refuse all demands from each other and prefer to receive payoff zero8.  It 
certainly does not affect  SPE behaviour in the results of this section.
By corollary  3.1,  F(N, A ./q)  has a SPE and hence so do all its subgames.  The 
restriction on  the demand ap  to  be feasible to  players  included  in  Vp  is a technical 
condition required by this corollary.  It seems intuitively unlikely that players would 
wish to make  non-feasible  demands  in  SPE.  This is especially so  for the unit cake 
networks studied  in this  section since a demand is either  feasible  to all  neighbours 
or to none.  In general  however  it  cannot  be ruled out since propositions  involving 
non-feasible demands could allow the future order of play to be influenced in such a 
way as to alter SPE behaviour.
The  method  of choosing  a  new  pseudo-responder  following  an  exchange  which 
is  outlined  in  step  5a)  is  natural  for  tree  networks  such  as  those  investigated  in 
this section.  In this case,  following an exchange the active  players are split up into 
separate connected components.  Play in each component should continue, and since 
there  are no exchange  opportunities  between  components,  which  component  plays 
first is irrelevant.  Consider any component.  Amongst  all players in this component 
with  an  exchanged  neighbour,  let  a  be  that  with  an  exchanged  neighbour  whose 
exchange  was  most  recent.  The  choice  is  unique  since  (P, E)  is  a  tree.  Had  an 
-  exchange not taken place then a would have been the next pseudo-responder in this 
component.  So it is consistent to let a be the first pseudo-responder in its component 
following the exchange.  The choice of pseudo-responder is deterministic because, as 
discussed in section  3.3.2,  the introduction of random moves complicates the proof
8Problematic  SPEs  are  thus only  possible  in  a  network with  a cake of the  form  {(0,0)}.  Even 
in a network where such a SPE exists there would  be another SPE in  which the players in question 
receive zero by exchanging.  The problematic SPE could then simply be ignored rather than adding 
extra rules to eliminate it.
118of corollary  3.1  on  SPE  existence.  However,  it  is  intuitively  obvious  that  for  tree 
networks a random rule will give the same SPE structure.
Although the choice of a pseudo-responder is well-defined for 11011-tree networks, 
it  is rather  ad-hoc.  In  addition  the particular  deterministic  (or  random)  rule used 
may  well  affect  the  SPE  structure.  Further  work  would  be  required  to  determine 
which, if any,  rule is suitable for these networks.
5.2.4  A nalysis  for  P articular  N etw orks
This section describes the SPE behaviour of the endogenous ordering model for var­
ious small networks.  The proof of the results  in this section  are placed  in sections
5.4.4  -   5.4.7  of the  appendix  to  this  chapter  as  they  are  quite  lengthy.  However 
sketches of the key  parts of these proofs are given.  Note'  that discussion and inter­
pretation of this behaviour is postponed to section 5.3.2. which discusses the results 
of both models in this chapter,  and the conclusion,  chapter 9.
In the case of a 2 player bilateral exchange network,  F reduces to an alternating 
offers  game  with  personal  delays.  In  the  case  of a  3  player  line  network,  lemma
5.4 shows that  the limiting  SPE payoffs  are  (0, 1,0).  In the case of a 3 player ring 
network,  F  does  not  reduce  to  the  market  bargaining  game with  personal  delays. 
Section 4.4 contains results giving the limiting SPE outcomes of the market bargain­
ing game in two situations.  These results are theorem 4.3 and lemma 4.6.  Under the 
conditions of these results,  F has limiting SPE outcomes which represent essentially
-  the same solutions9.  The proofs for these cases  are by similar methods to theorem
4.3  and  lemma  4.6.  However  under  the  conditions  of lemma  4.6  another  class  of 
SPEs exists for F,  providing other possible limiting SPE payoffs.
9There are two differences.  First, in F the first actor inay be any player, rather than 1.  Secondly, 
under the conditions of theorem 4.3  -  a von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple exists - the result  for F 
does not predict whom the first actor chooses to exchange  with.  However,  the exchange reached is 
the same as in theorem  4 . 3   if the first actor were renumbered as player  1  and  the other exchanging 
player were renumbered  as player  2 .
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lemma 4.6 are that  = /Cunit  and there is an element  ol the core in which player 
3  receives  payoff zero.  See  diagram  4.2  (page  104)  for  an  illustration  of this case. 
Suppose player 3 is the first to act and makes an initial proposition of (< 73, [1,2])  for 
any value of <r3.  Player  1  then  makes  the  proposition  (/^(O ). [3]).  This  results in 
a post-proposal subgame with responder  2  in which player  3  has an offer of payoff 
zero on the table from player 1.  In the SPE under discussion, player 2 now makes a 
particular demand of 02  to player  1.  Player  3  then refuses the offer of zero,  makes 
some  other  proposition  and  player  1  accepts  the  demand  of player  2.  If player  2 
makes an initial demand of more than cr2 then player 3 accepts the offer of zero from 
player  1  and player  2 receives zero.  The value of o-i can be chosen sufficiently small 
so that player  1  receives  a better payoff from his initial  action  than by acting as in 
the SPE described in lemma 4.6.
These  SPEs  involve  player  3  deciding  to  accept  and  refuse  offers  of zero  as  it 
benefits player  1.  They therefore do not seem very robust10.
For the network L\ and uniform discount factors of S. multiple limiting SPE out­
comes again exist under F.  However, there are only two:  (^,  and  (0,  | , 0).
In the case of L5, the endogenous ordering model supports a wide range of mul­
tiple SPE outcomes.  However,  these are much more plausible than those described 
above  for  L3.  In  section  5.4.7  of the  appendix it  is shown  that  at  least  two  SPEs 
exist for the game A 3 = F{L5, As, 3).  Recall that A <* refers to discount factor vector 
in which  all  discount  factors  equal  d.  I11  the  high payoff SPE,  player  3  receives  a 
payoff of n.  In the low payoff SPE,  player 3 receives a payoff in an interval close to 
0, both bounds of which tend to 0 as S — >   1.
The key difference in behaviour in these two SPEs is as follows.  Suppose player 
3  makes  an  initial  proposition  of (cr3, [2,4])  where a3  <  n.  Suppose that  player  2
10For  example  they  seem  unlikely  to  be  stable  evolutionarily.  Also,  suppose  players’  payoffs 
from exchanging were subject  to small  random  positive  perturatious.  Then  player 3  would  not be 
indifferent between an  offer of zero  and  not exchanging.
120eventually  makes  a  counter  demand  of a>  >  h  to  player  3,  either  unilaterally  or 
multilaterally.  The  resulting  subgame  is  a  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder 
player 4.  Suppose player 4 refuses.  It turns out that the resulting subgame effectively 
has the same SPE behaviour as a 3 player  line network  with players 3,4.5 in which 
player  4  is  the  central  player  and  proposer  and  player  3  has  an  outside  option  of
1 —  (J2.  That is, in any SPE of this subgame player 4 makes a multilateral demand of 
(72  and it is accepted.  However,  player 4 can choose to exchange with either player 
3 or 5 and is indifferent between these choices.  If the exchange 34 forms then player
2 is left in an alternating offers game and would have preferred to accept the initial 
demand of (73.  This supports the high payoff SPE of A 3 .  If the exchange 45 forms 
instead  then  player  3  is  left  in  bargaining  game  011  a  3  player  line  network  with 
players  1,2,3  and  would  wish  to  have  made  a very low  initial  offer.  This supports 
the low payoff SPE of .A 3 1 1 .
It is also proved that in any bargaining game generated by the endogenous order­
ing model on L5 with discount factors A<$, players 1,3,5 receive limiting SPE payoffs 
of no more than  \ and players 2,4 receive limiting SPE payoffs of at least  Indeed, 
it can be shown that the limiting SPE payoffs of player i in F(L5. A<yi)  in the limit 
£ — >   1  are  [0, \]  for 2  = 1,3,5  and  [^, 1]  for  i = 2, 4.  The proof of this is omitted as 
it is very lengthy and does not  add much to the discussion of this model.
5.3  Discussion
Section  5.3.1  introduces  and  discusses  the  concept  of  instantly  adaptive  exchange, 
a feature of many perfect information models of bargaining,  including those of this 
chapter,  which  limits  their  potential  usefulness  in  modelling  bargaining  in  large 
networks.  Section 5.3.2  attempts to interpret the multiple solutions that have been 
found  for  L5  under  the  bargaining  models  of  this  chapter  and  discusses  possible
11 Other possible initial propositions of player 3 are also considered in the full proof of the existence 
of this SPE.
121resolutions to this problem.
Five player line networks with unit cakes  are often under discussion in this sec­
tion.  Throughout  the  players  in  these  networks  are  numbered  according  to  the 
definition of L5  from section 3.1.3,  not  the alternative definitions of the form L$(p) 
used in section  5.1.2.
5.3.1  In stan tly  A daptive  Exchange
Once bilateral exchange networks with more than 3 players are considered, the pos­
sibility is introduced that  more than one exchange occurs.  This section describes a 
difficulty of modelling this within the framework of a perfect information game.  The 
problem is that such games do not seem able to capture time lag in the transmission 
of information about the formation of exchanges.  I  use the term  instantly adaptive 
exchange  to  describe  a  situation  in  which  exchanges  all  form  in  different  periods 
of the game  and  the  identity  or  the  terms  of the  exchanges  that  form  in  SPE  are 
highly  sensitive  to  the  structure  of the  active  network  in  the  period  at  which  the 
exchange  forms.  In such  a situation  players  must  be able  to  instantly  adapt  their 
behaviours to  take  account  of the  reduced  network of active  players that  remains. 
It is also necessary that any opportunities for forward commitment do not override 
this adaptation.  This definition of instantly adaptive exchange is somewhat vague12. 
However,  the  most  important  feature is that  it  precludes  a situation  in which  two 
exchanges in a bargaining network form based 011 the same knowledge of active net- 
-  work structure.  Such an outcome seems a  likely  feature of bargaining situations in 
large  networks  where exchanges  may  form  near-simultaneouslv  in  distant  parts of 
the network.  A consequence of instantly adaptive exchange is that the order of play
12  For example,  any  game can  be expressed  in  an  equivalent  form  (i.e.  strategic  form)  in  which 
players  all  simultaneously  choose  a  strategy  in  the  first  period  and  this  decides  the  outcome.  In 
this  case  all  exchanges  form  in  the  first  period.  To  avoid  this  problem  the  phrase  hinder  some 
representation of the game’  could  be added  to the definition above.  The resulting definition would 
be hard to apply  in practice.
122becomes crucial in deciding the SPE outcome.  This section discusses these points.
Consider an extension of the telephoning game of section  4.3 in which any bar­
gaining network can be used  and there is  a rule choosing a new proposer following 
an exchange.  The structure of any subgame of this model in which a demand must 
be made depends entirely on the active  network remaining and which player is the 
proposer13.  This model can clearly  only support  instantly  adaptive exchange.  For 
models based  on  the  market  bargaining  game  there  is  some scope  for  avoiding in­
stantly  adaptive  exchange.  The  structure  of subgames  in  these  models  also often 
depends on  the most  recent  demands of some players.  In other words, multilateral 
demands allow an element  of forward commitment.  However,  such a demand must 
still be accepted  by a responder who is fully informed of the current active network 
structure.  Whether this mechanism can  avoid  instantly adaptive exchange must be 
resolved by SPE analysis.
Instantly adaptive exchange is crucial in generating many of the solutions of this 
chapter.  For example,  consider the SPE described in  lemma 5.2  for  the exogenous 
ordering model on network L5.  As discussed in section 5.1/2, on her first turn player14 
3 accepts the demand of either player 2 or 4.  The player that is not accepted faces 
a 2  player  bargaining  situation  in which  their  SPE  payoff is  at  most  5n.  It  is this 
payoff which drives the initial interaction between players 2 3 and 4.  Also there are 
many examples  in the  arguments  of sections  5.4.6  and  5.4.7  where player  1  3 or  5 
accepts a demand because otherwise they  would be left  as the outlying player of 3 
-  remaining active players  and thus receive a SPE payoff close to zero.
In  a bargaining  network  of many  players,  it  is  intuitively  likely  that  some  ex-
13More  formally,  any  two  subgames  in  which  the  active  network  and  proposing  player  are  the 
same  could  be said  to  be  equivalent  up  to  discounting,  as  defined  in  section  5.4.1.  Lemma 5.3  of 
that section then  proves that  these subgames  have the same  SPE  structure.  To  use the  definition 
of equivalence up to discounting would  require analogues of some terms  defined  for the exogenous 
and  endogenous  models to  be  defined  for  the  telephoning  model  under discussion,  but this  is  not 
complicated.
14Recall that the players are  numbered  as in  L -,  here,  not  L :,{p)  as in  lemma 5.2.
123changes  may  form  ‘as-if simultaneously .  That  is.  players  can  form  an  exchange 
without realising that an exchange in a distant part of the network formed very re­
cently.  This may be because it is physically impossible due to the distances involved, 
or simply because the players cannot pay attention to all aspects of the situation at 
once.  In any case,  this behaviour is not possible under instantly adaptive exchange.
It  is  not  obvious  that  instantly  adaptive  exchange  has  a  significant  effect  on 
the outcome of an exchange in a large bargaining network.  For example consider a 
bipartite unit cake network  (as defined in section 3.1.3)  in which each player has an 
exchange opportunity with all players on the other side and both sides contain a large 
number of players.  Intuitively,  the effect  of any removing any one exchange is very 
small.  However  for a more sparsely connected  network intuitively  the formation of 
a single exchange can have a significant effect at least 011 a few players.  For example 
a player’s position can be significantly strengthened by the removal of a neighbour’s 
only alternative partner.
An important consequence of instantly adaptive exchange develops from its rela­
tion with perfect information.  A common feature of perfect information bargaining 
models  is  that  players  who  exchange  in  SPE  do  so without  incurring delay.  That 
is, their first action is either to accept a demand or to make a demand that is later 
accepted.  In this case the structure of the subnetwork of active players at any period 
in the game is highly influenced by the order of play.  This can have a large influence 
on the solution through instantly adaptive exchange.  This is especially true for the 
-  last  few players  to  exchange.  For  example  in  a unit  cake  network  there  is  a wide 
difference  between  being  left  in  an  active  subnetwork  which  is  a 3  player  line  and 
one with 2 players.
One method of avoiding instantly adaptive exchange is to use a model allowing 
simultaneous  actions  so  that  more than  one  exchange  can  form in  a period of the 
game15.  The  model  of  Corominas-Bosch  in  section  4.5  does  this  while  retaining
15This should  be done so that  it  naturally  represents simultaneous  bargaining rather  than com-
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extension  of the Nash demand  game  to  general  bilateral  exchange  networks.  This 
model abstracts away much of the detail of bargaining and produces games in which 
players  all  take  a  single  simple  action  simultaneously.  Another  method  to  avoid 
instantly  adaptive  exchange  is  to  use  models  with  more  complex  specifications  of 
imperfect information.  However these demand more complicated  solution concepts 
such  as sequential  equilibrium  (see e.g.  Myserson  [52]).  which make them unlikely 
to be amenable to analysis.
Instantly adaptive exchange seems more realistic in situations containing features 
such as a small number of players,  fast transfer of information about the formation 
of exchanges to all bargainers, a slow pace of bargaining, or a team of people in each 
bargaining position  (on  the grounds that  teams will  be able to  keep  track of more 
information  than  individuals).  A  possible  example  is  firms  competing  for  a small 
number of contracts.  A situation lacking these features is a busy marketplace.  Given 
their small size, there is a case that instantly adaptive exchange is more relevant for 
the networks  discussed  in  this  chapter.  Thus the comments  of this section mainly 
raise concerns about modelling large networks using games of perfect information.
Finally,  note  that  the  design  of  computer  based  laboratory  experiments  may 
often influence whether  play  can match instantly  adaptive  exchange.  For  example 
if the  computer  program  allows  subjects  to  act  at  any  time  and  gives  them  full 
information about exchanges then this may make it unlikely for subjects to exchange 
-  without  being aware of all  information  about  prior exchanges.  On the other hand 
if subjects  must  take  simultaneous  actions  or  are  given  limited  information  about 
other exchanges then this possibility may often occur.  Therefore experimental results 
should not be used to infer results about the conditions in which instantly adaptive 
exchange takes place unless this source of possible bias has been taken into account, 
pressing  non-simultaneous  actions  into  a  single  period  by  use  of  complicated  strategies,  as  in  the 
example of footnote  1 2  of this chapter.
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This section begins with an interpretation of the results in this chapter demonstrat­
ing  the existence  of multiple  solutions  for  L 5 .  The  wider  question  of whether  the 
problem of multiple solutions for this network can be resolved using these models or 
other methods is then addressed.
The SPE for the exogenous ordering model described in lemma 5.2 can be inter­
preted as follows.  Players 2  and 4 cooperate so that  players  1  and 5  are both faced 
with the threat that their only neighbour will exchange with player 3 if they do not 
meet  his terms.  In the SPE described  in lemma 5.1  if.  say,  player  2  attempted  to 
make a similar threat by demanding more than n, then player 4 would undercut this 
demand and exchange with player 3, leaving player 2 a payoff of slightly less than h 
from the resulting alternating offers game with player  1.  I11 this case players 2 and 
4 compete rather than cooperate and this drives down their payoffs.
For a solution of the exogenous ordering model to describe a stable outcome in 
an ongoing bargaining process,  it must be the case that  the corresponding ordering 
remains  constant.  In  an  actual  bargaining  process  this  seems  unrealistic.  For  ex­
ample the exogenous  factors  determining order might  change very  easily.  Also the 
players have  strong incentives  to  alter  their  position  in the ordering.  For  example 
given the ordering of lemma 5.1,  player 3 would wish to act before players  1  and 5 
to produce the ordering of lemma 5.2.  This raises the possibility that a model with 
an endogenous order of play might select among the multiple solutions mentioned.
However, the endogenous ordering model on L5 can support solutions with simi­
lar interpretations to those of the exogenous ordering game.  Section 5.2.4 states that 
in a game in which player 3 is the first proposer, she can attain a limiting SPE payoff 
of -  or 0.  A crucial difference between behaviour in these SPEs that generates this 
difference in payoff for  player  3  occurs  in a subgame in  which  player  4 is  proposer 
for the first time.  Player 4 can exchange immediately with either player 3 or 5 and 
is indifferent between these choices.  If player 4 undercuts player 2 to exchange with
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a poor  SPE payoff.  If player  4  instead  exchanges  with  player  5  then  a player  2  is 
left at the centre of a three player subnetwork of active players and receives a high 
SPE  payoff.  The  former  case  can  be  interpreted  as  player  4  choosing  to  compete 
with player 2 to exchange with player 3,  whereas the latter case can be interpreted 
as player 4 instead cooperating with player 2.  Thus this model does not resolve the 
tension between cooperation and competition16.
This interpretation  of the multiple  SPE  outcomes  in  L5  suggests  that  for both 
models the existence  of SPE outcomes  with  large  qualitative  differences in payoffs 
is  likely  to  be  robust  to  many  variations  in  the cakes1'.  Recall  that  the  model  of 
Corominas Bosch described in section 4.5 can also support limiting SPE payoffs in 
the  range  [^,1]  for  players  2  and  4  in  L5.  This  is  interesting  because  it  suggests 
that  the  existence  of  multiple  solutions  may  not  be  driven  by  instantly  adaptive 
exchange.
The results of section  5.2.4  show that  the endogenous ordering model supports 
a  near-unique  SPE  outcome  for  the  network  L4.  However  it  seems  unlikely  that 
the  models  of this  chapter  can  support  such  SPE  behaviour  for  sufficiently  large 
networks.  This  is  a  consequence  of  instantly  adaptive  exchange.  As  argued  in 
section 5.3.1,  under instantly adaptive exchange the order of play has a large effect 
on  the  order  of  exchange.  If  an  order  of  exchange  is  possible  in  SPE  leaving  a 
connected  component  sufficiently  similar  to  L5,  then  the arguments  earlier  in  this 
section suggest that this has a wide range of SPE outcomes.  This possibility could 
easily  cause  a wide  range  of multiple  SPE  payoffs  in  many  other  positions  in the 
network.
The  existence  of  a  certain  kind  of  diversity  in  bargaining  outcomes  for  large
1G Indeed the full characterisation of the SPEs of this model mentioned at the end of section 5.2.4
shows that these extremes can be used  to generate a wide range of intermediate SPE outcomes.
17The proofs  for  the exogenous  ordering game  offer  scope  for  adaptation  to  settings  with  other
cakes.  That of the endogenous ordering game  is too complicated  to easily allow  this.
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players get  to  act  first  and  exchanges  are formed by  local  decisions,  there appears 
to be no mechanism to enforce the appearance of the same global pattern of which 
exchanges form.  Also, since players are only interested in their payoff upon exchange 
they can thus be indifferent between some alternatives which have a significant effect 
on  the  future order  of play.  As  described  above,  this  provides  a mechanism18  for 
generating multiple SPE outcomes in the endogenous ordering model on L5.  These 
arguments suggest  that  multiple solutions are not  necessarily unrealistic, especially 
for large networks.  However, the results for L5 in this chapter allow only a very weak 
characterisation of possible solutions19.  The allowed solutions are not necessarily all 
of equal relevance.  For  example,  the  experimental  results  011  L5  in section  2.7  are 
sharper.  One  possible  resolution  is  to  use  an  evolutionary  approach:  construct  a 
dynamic model of behaviour in a bargaining situation repeated over time.  Chapter 
6 outlines such an approach.
It could be argued that for particular networks certain exogenous orders of play 
based  on the structure  of the  network  are  more natural  than other orderings.  An 
example is  for  play  in  a line  network to  begin  at one end  and move  along  the line 
towards  the other  end.  However,  it  is  not  clear that  the ease of stating  this order 
corresponds to a natural order of play.  Also this network structure vanishes,  or  at 
least becomes less clear,  if other negligibly small exchange opportunities are added, 
so this is not a robust resolution.
Another possible resolution is to endogenise the ordering by introducing a ‘pre- 
bargaining’  game  which  decides  it.  However,  the wide  difference in  solutions sup­
ported by different orderings for L5 means that the pre-bargaining game must itself 
effectively solve a substantial bargaining problem.  Furthermore it seems more nat­
ural to  allow  players  to  make  ordering  decisions  as  part  of  the  bargaining  process
18Note that instantly adaptive exchange also  plays a major role in  this mechanism.
19That  is,  corollary  5 .6 ,  which  states  that  players  1  3  and  5  receive  payoff's of no  more  than  j
whereas player 2 and 4 receive payoffs of  no less than
128rather than committing themselves beforehand.
5.4  Appendix:  Proofs
Section  5.4.1  introduces  some  definitions  and  notation  for  use  in  this  appendix. 
These  involve  concepts  which  are  easy  to  deal  with  in  an  ad-hoc  manner  in  the 
proofs in chapter 4.  Section  5.4.2  contains various supporting lemmas for both the 
exogenous and endogenous ordering models which are used throughout the remaining 
material.  Section 5.4.3 proves the lemmas of section 5.1.2 on the exogenous ordering 
model.  Sections  5.4.4  -   5.4.7  prove  the  results  of section  5.2.4  on  the endogenous 
ordering model.
5.4.1  D efinitions 
Relative  Payoffs
In  each  of the  bargaining  models  of this  chapter,  all  pre-proposal  subgames  have 
a similar  structure.  Players’  roles  may  change  (e.g.  the  players  who  are  proposer 
and  responder  change),  as  may  various  other  properties  of the  game  (e.g.  the set 
of active players or the set of demands which have been made and not yet refused). 
One particular such property is the values of the delays which players have already 
incurred.  The following definition allows for comparisons between subgames without 
having to take these delays into account.
Consider  a bargaining game  Q  generated  by either of the bargaining models of 
this chapter from the network N = (P,E,JC)  and discount  factors  (Si)t£p.  Let h  be 
a terminal or infinite history  of Q  and  h'  be a subhistory  of h.  The  relative payoff 
to player i  in h with respect to /?/  is20
7r,(/i|/>')  = S-T 'U,'\,(h)
^Recall that the expression on  the right  hand side of this  formula has already been  used  in the 
proofs of lemmas 4.1  and 4.6.
129Let  be the subgame generated by h!.  Then the relative payoff to player i  from h 
with respect to J is
*i{h\J)  =   7T j (/l|/?')
Note  that  7Ti(h\h')  is  occasionally  referred  to  simply  as  ‘the  relative  payoff to 
player  i  in  h'  when there is  no confusion about the value of h'.  Also,  observe that 
for terminal  h:
That is,  7Ti(h\h')  is the share player i receives from the history h discounted by only 
the delay that has been incurred after the subhistory /?/.
Suppose that Pi is a subgame of Q and J  is subgame of P L.  Define Tti{J\Pi)  and 
j£.i(J'\PC)  as the supremum and infinum of the set of relative payoffs with respect to 
P C  to player i in any SPE of the subgame J  .  Define 7 and T L x{Pi)  as shorthand 
for TTi{r H\'H)  and n _ x{PL\Pi).  Recall that for the bargaining models considered in this 
chapter,  corollary  3.1  can be used to prove that the existence of a SPE of Q which 
implies the existence of a SPE of J .  Thus these definitions are well-defined.
Equivalence  up  to  D iscounting
Suppose bargaining  games  Q1  and  Q2  are  generated  by  bargaining  models  of this 
chapter  from  networks  with  player  sets  P l  and  P2  using  discount  factors  A 1   = 
(^i)ieP1   aRd  A2  —   (fif)ieP2'  Two  subgames  A 1  and  A 2  of Q1   and  Q2  respectively 
are  equivalent up to discounting  if the following conditions are met:
1.  There is a bijection  c from the set of active  players of A 1  to the set of active 
players of A 2.
2.  If player i is active  in A 1  then d7 -   = S2(iy
3.  There is a bijection b from the set of infinite histories21  of A 1  to that of ^l2.
21 This definition  is  made  from the  formal  definition of a game  of section  3.4.1,  not  the informal
version including terminal histories.4.  For n —  1 or 2, define qn as the minimal value such that there exists an infinite 
history  x  of A n  such  that  some  player  has  a  11011-singleton  action  set  in  A n 
following  history22  A7»a:  (or  let  qn  =  0  if  110  such  value  exists).  Then  the 
following  condition  must  hold for  any  infinite history  x  of A 1  and  t  G  N.  If 
player  i  has  a  11011-singleton  action  set  following  history  \ t+1ix  in  A 1  then 
player c(i)  has a non-singleton action set following history  b(x)  in A2.
5.  For any infinite history x of A and active player i of A the payoff functions of 
A 1  and A 2,  7r1   and n2  satisfy
n\{x\Al) =  7^2c {l){b{x)\A2 )   (5.1)
This  relation  is  intended  to  capture  situations  where  two  subgames have  the
same  structure  apart  from  the  delays  active  players  have  already  incurred.  Rela­
tively few conditions  are  needed  for  this  definition  because under the  definition of 
a game introduced in  section  3.4.1,  most  properties of a  game  are  defined from its 
set of infinite histories.  Condition 4 essentially means that23 players’ action sets are 
conserved under the bijection b.  This ensures that players do not ‘swap’ their action 
sets while retaining their payoffs.  The first lemma of the next section shows that two 
subgames which are equivalent  up to discounting have the same SPE structure24.
22Recall the definition  from section 3.4.1  that  Xtx represents the initial subsequence of x up and 
including period t.
23The length of this condition is due to the possibility that the set of infinite histories of one game 
is  obtained  by  appending  a  fixed  finite  sequence  to  the  start  of each  infinite  history  of the other 
game.  This could easily occur if the games A1   and ,4 2  are constructed by the method described in
section 3.4.2  for representing subgames.
24This fact was essentially used in the proof of lemma 4.1  on the alternating offers game.  For that
game  any  two  pre-proposal  subgames  (as  defined  in  the  proof)  are  equivalent up  to  discounting.
The similarity of their SPE structures  allows  the recursive nature of the proof.
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Lem m a  5.3.  Suppose  subgames A 1  and A 2  are  equivalent  up  to  discounting,  e1  
is  a  SPE  of A 1  and  b  is  the  bijection  desciibed  in  condition  3  of the  definition 
of equivalence  up  to  discounting.  Then  a  SPE  of A~.  e2,  can  be  constructed  as 
follows.  Let 7 1  and -y2  be as defined in condition 4 of equivalence up to discounting. 
Suppose ef specifies that following history \ t+^\x an action is made producing history 
Xt+T+iP’  then e2  specifies that following history At+1->b(x)  the action made produces 
history \ t+12+lb{y).
Proof.  Given  any  strategy  profile  f 1  of A 1,  let  G(fl)  be the strategy  profile of A 2 
constructed from f 1 by the method described in the statement of this lemma.  Recall 
the definition of a from section 3.4.1.  Then given a infinite history x of A 1 and t 6 N:
b{a(fl,x,t)) = a{0 ( fl),b(x),t + V -  71)
Let c be the bijection described in condition 2 of the definition of equivalence up 
to discounting.  Expanding equation  (5.1)  gives:
=   ^~s^c(i)(b(x))
where t is the initial delay25  for player i in subgame A J  and s is the initial delay for 
player c(i)  in subgame .42.
Substituting  these  two  relations  into  equation  (3.1)  and  noting that  9  is  a  bi­
jection between  the  sets  of strategy  profiles  for ^l1   and  A 2  shows  that  if the  SPE 
conditions hold for e1  in A 1  they also hold for e2  in *42.  □
The  remaining  lemmas  establish  some  results  which  are  common  for  both  the 
exogenous  and  endogenous  ordering  models.  Recall  that  these  models  are  repre­
sented by X   and F respectively.  Note that these results also hold for many similar 
bargaining models.  For  example it  is easy to extend most26  of them to the market 
bargaining game.
25Strictly speaking,  the delay for player i in  the finite history generating this subgame.
26The exception is corollary 5.6 which  is particular to the network  L a -
132Lemma 5.4.  Let Q  be a bargaining game on a network N  = (P. E. K unit) generated 
by the  bargaining  model Q  —   A  or F.  Suppose  Qb   is  u  pre-proposal subgame  of Q  
with proposer b  and  exactly  3  active players  {a, 6, c}  such that  {ab.bc}  C  E,  and 
ac £ E.  Then Kb(Qb) = nb(gb) = 1.
Proof.  Suppose player  b makes a multilateral demand of ab  <  1  in  Q b-  Note that if 
Q —   F  then  there  is  a choice  between  multilateral  and  unilateral  demands  and  if 
Q = X  then only multilateral demands are allowed.  Let P L  be the resulting subgame. 
PL  is a post-proposal subgame with responder a or c.  Should the responder accept, 
then  they  receive  a  share  of  1  —  < jb   >  0.  Should  they  refuse the  other  of players 
a  and  c becomes  the responder.  If this new responder accepts  then they  receive a 
share of 1 —  ab  >  0.  Suppose that  there exists  a SPE of PL  in which players  a  and 
c both refuse.  Then players  a and c both receive a non-zero  SPE  payoff.  This is a 
non-feasible outcome,  so it must be the case that in any SPE of PL (Jb  is accepted by 
player a or c.
By corollary 3.1,  Qb  has a SPE.  Suppose that  7rb{Gb) —  P <  1-  Select p < p'  <  1. 
Then the previous paragraph shows that following a multilateral demand of p', player 
b receives  a relative  payoff with respect  to Qb   of more than p in any SPE, which is 
a contradiction.  □
Notes:
1.  This lemma is independent of the choice of discount factors.
2.  This  lemma  can  be  extended  to  the  case  of non-unit  cakes.  Observe that  if 
player  b  makes  a  multilateral  demand  which  earns  players  a  and  c non-zero 
payoffs should they accept it, then the same argument can be used to show that 
it is accepted in SPE.  Hence player b earns at least  as much as the maximum 
demand which is feasible to both players a and  c.
3.  This lemma can also be extended to all cases where a. b and c are active players, 
{ab, be]  C  E and there are no other exchange opportunities for players a  and
133c with active players.  Observe that if player b makes a multilateral demand to 
a and  c of  <  1  then the  argument that  player a  and c cannot  both refuse 
remains valid.  Thus in this case player  b earns at  least as much as if a, 6 and 
c were the only  active  players.
4.  It  is  straightforward  to  use  this  lemma to  deduce  the  unique  SPE  payoff in 
any subgame with  3  active  players in a line formation.  This task is  done for 
the bargaining model F in corollary 5.9 below.
The  following  lemma  places  an  upper bound  on  the  SPE  payoff of an  isolated 
player, in the sense that they have a single neighbour, for the case where the isolated 
player  has  a unit  exchange  cake.  The  proof is  based  on  the method  of proof used 
for the alternating offers game in lemma 4.1.
Lem m a  5.5.  Consider  a  network N  —   (P,E,K)  and players p,q  £  P  such  that 
pq £ E, fCpq = 1C unit  and px $ E for any other x £  P.  Let Q  be a bargaining game 
on a network N generated by the bargaining model Q —  X  or F and discount factors 
such that 6P  = 5q = 5 £  (0,1).  Let Qr   be a pre-proposal subgame of Q  with proposer 
i.  Then HqiQq)  > n  and Ttq{Gq)  < h where n =
Note that equation  (5.3) in the following proof is stronger than is necessary.  This 
is to facilitate the proof of corollary 5.6.
Proof  Let  Px  be the set of all pre-proposal subgames of Q with proposer x.  Define
=  sup
neP-.r
X   =   inf  7rx(7~ t)
— x  HePr
The following relations hold27:
Xq  >  1 -  $Xp   (5-2)
<  max  gy'x(5x  )  for any x £ P  (5.3)
y\xy£ E   ~V
27Recall V  is an infix maximum operator.
134where  gy,x  is  an  extension  of  j y,x  onto  R.  taking  the  value  zero  when  f y'x  is  not 
defined.
Equation  (5.2):
Fix  P   (E   Pq.  In P.,  player  q  is  active  so  player  p  must  also  be.  Let  A  be  the 
quantity  on  the  right  hand  side  of the  inequality.  In  t he  case  Q  =  X.  suppose 
player q demands  aq  <  A.  In the case  Q  =  F.  suppose'  player  q demands  <jq   <  A 
unilaterally  to  player  p.  In either  case,  let  P'  be the  resulting subgame.  Consider 
a subgame P" of P'  in which player p is the responder and the demand of oq   from 
player q is available.  If player p accepts then she earns a relative payoff with respect 
to P' of more than 5xp.  By definition, this is more that her supremum SPE relative 
payoff from  refusing.  So  in  any  SPE  of  P',  the  demand  aq   is  accepted  by  some 
player.
Equation (5.3):
Let  B  be  the  quantity  on  the  right  hand  side  of this  equation.  Fix  P  6  Px-  
Suppose that there exists a SPE e of P  such that player x receives a relative payoff 
with respect to P  of more than B.  As this value is non-zero, player x must exchange 
with some  neighbour  y  under  e.  Then  under  e,  player  y  receives  a relative  payoff 
with  respect  to  P   of  less  than  5\  .  Since  y  exchanges  under  e,  its  play  involves 
some post-proposal subgame  with  responder y.  Let  P'  be the first  such subgame. 
Suppose  player  y  refuses  in  this  subgame.  Then  her  SPE  payoff  with  respect  to 
P  is at  least  5x  ■   This  is  higher  than  the  SPE  relative  payoff under  e  which is  a 
contradiction.
Combining equations  (5.2)  and  (5.3)  gives:
Xq  >   1 “  £(! -  sXq)
Solving this gives  x^  —   Substituting this into equation  (5.3)  yields Xp —   ll-   1
Corollary  5 .6 «   For  N  — —   L5,  Qj  as  dGscmb&d  tn  tha  pvsvious  lonzma  satisjics. 
lLi(Gi)  ^  h for i — 2  or 4,  arid nr(Gi)  <  h for *  =  1,3  or 5.
135Proof.  For  i  /   3,  the  results  follow  by  direct  application  of the  lemma.  The case 
i —  3 follows by substituting the results for i —  2 and i = 4 into equation  (5.3).  □
The final lemma of this section describes situations in which a player is guaran­
teed to accept  a demand in SPE play.
Lem m a 5.7.  Let Q be a bargaining game on a network N —  (P,E,K unit) generated 
by the  bargaining model Q = X   or F.  Let P L   be a post-proposal subgame  of Q  with 
responder r.  If the most recent demand of any neighbour of r is no more than (less 
than)  1  —  5r  in P C   then  in  some  (any)  SPE  of P L   the  action  of r  is  to  accept  the 
demand of a neighbour whose most recent demand is lowest.
Proof.  By corollary 3.1,  a SPE of P L exists.  Let PL'  be the subgame which results if 
player  r  refuses  in  PL.  The  maximum share  player  r  can  achieve in  PL'  is  1.  Since 
player  r  incurs  a  delay  of  1  by  refusing  in  the  maximum  relative  payoff with 
respect to  Pi that  r  can  achieve in  PC  is  6,.  Hence if the most  recent  demand of a 
neighbour of r is A <  1 —  5r in PL, then there is a SPE of P L  in which player r accepts 
a lowest most recent demand.  If A <  1 —  5r  then this action is taken in any SPE of 
P L.  □
5.4.3  T he  E xogen ou s  O rdering  M odel  on  Lr >
Lem ma  5.1.  For  each  i  £  P fix rg  £  (0,1).  For e  >  0,  let  A  =  (5,;);;6p  where 
= rf{.  Then X{L${31524), A)  has a unique limiting SPE payoff in the limit e — >  0 
in which players  1  and 2 receive payoff  1  and the others receive zero.
Proof.  Let  X\  be  a  pre-proposal  subgame  of A(L5(31524), A)  with  proposer  1  in 
which  all  players  are  active  and  the  most  recent  demands  of  players  4  and  5,  if 
any,  are  o4  >  1  -  d2  and  cr5  >  1  -  S2.  Let  X3  be  a  post-proposal  subgame of X\ 
with responder 3 such that  all players are active.  Let o\  and <72 be the most recent 
demands of players  1  and  2  respectively  in  this subgame.  Let  be the subgame 
resulting from refusal in X3.
136Suppose player 3 makes a demand of zero in X3.  Consider a SPE e of the resulting 
subgame.  In the case  that  e  specifies that  player  5  on her next  turn as  responder 
accepts the most recent demand of player 1 then player 3 receives payoff zero.  In the 
case that  e does not  specify this then by lemma 5.7 in this SPE player  1  accepts a 
demand on his next turn as proposer.  Whichever player he accepts, player 3 receives 
payoff zero.
Suppose player 3 makes a demand (J3  > 0 in X^.  Let X.\ be the resulting subgame. 
The following argument shows that players 4 and 5 receive non-zero SPE payoffs in 
X4  and  thus  player  3  must  receive  a SPE  payoff of zero  by feasability constraints. 
Suppose in X4  player 4  refuses  and demands  a4.  Let  the resulting subgame be X3. 
Suppose  in  X3  player  5  refuses  and  demands  less  than  min[l  —  ^2-^3]-  Then  by 
lemma  5.7,  player  1  accepts  this  demand.  So  775(^5)  >  < $5 min[l  —   < 52,(73].  Now 
suppose (J4  <  5$ min[l —  £1,1 —  < 5 2. < 73].  Then  >  1  —  04  >  1 —  EsiXs), so the
exchange  15 must form in SPE of X3.  By lemma 5.7,  when SPE play of X-t  reaches 
player 2 with such a value of < 74,  player 2  must accept a demand in SPE.  Since the 
exchange 15 forms in any SPE, it must be the case that player 2 accepts the demand 
of player  4.  Hence  player  4  is  guaranteed  a non-zero  SPE payoff in  X4.  Note that 
if player 4 accepts in X4,  then a demand of less than min[l —  < 52,(73]  still guarantees 
player 5 a non-zero SPE payoff (this can be seen using lemma 5.4).
The above shows that if a\  <  1 in X3 then player 3 accepts in any SPE. Suppose 
player 1 makes a demand < 7i  <  1 in X\ .  Let X2 be the resulting subgame.  In the case 
that  players  4  and  5  have  already  made demands  this  is  a post-proposal subgame 
with responder 2.  If player 2 refuses and make a demand of a2  <  1 then in any SPE 
player 3 accepts the demand < 7i  and player 2 is left at the centre of a 3 player line of 
active players.  Hence by lemma 5.4 the demand cr2  of player  2 is accepted in SPE. 
This yields player 2 a payoff of < 5 2  relative to  X2, so his SPE action in X2 cannot be 
to accept one of the demands <74  or  <75.  Hence in any SPE of T2 a game of the form 
X3 is reached and therefore the demand o\  of player  1  is accepted.  This proves that
137the SPE demand and relative payoff of player  1  in Xx   must be 1.
Let 3d  be the post-proposal siibgame resulting from  player  1  making a demand 
of 1 in X\.  Let 3d  be the post-proposal subgame of X\  resulting from players  1  and 
2 making the demands  1  and a2.  Consider the case
< J ‘ 2 < A = min[l -  £5(1 —  <5i), 1 —  < 5 5(1 -  < S 2). 1  -  <d(l -  £•>)]
It is shown below that  in any SPE of 3d  player 4 accept s  the demand of <72-  So in 
any SPE of X\  player  1  earns relative payoff 1  and the relative payoff of player 2 is 
bounded below by A which tends to  1  in the limit  e — ►  0.  as required.
Consider  a  SPE  of  3d  in  which  player  3  accepts.  Player  4  must  accept  the 
demand  a2  in  this  SPE  otherwise player  5  is  guaranteed  a non-zero payoff in SPE 
giving player 4 a payoff of zero.  Consider a SPE of 3d  in which players 3 and 4 refuse 
but player 5 accepts  (The possibility that player 3 refuses in a SPE of 3d  cannot be 
ruled out since player 2 may have made a non-SPE demand.).  Since a2  <  1, player 5 
must accept the demand of player 2 rather than player  1.  Player 4 therefore receives 
a SPE payoff of zero.  However this is a contradiction as she refused the demand a2 
earlier in the play of this SPE.
Finally,  consider  a SPE  e  of 3d  in which players  3  4  and 5  refuse.  Then under 
e  player 4  must  receive  a payoff of at  least  1 —  < r 2  >  Tj(l  —  S2) relative  to 3d  nnd 
player 5 must receive a payoff of at least  1 —  < j2 > < 55(1 —  rh) V £5(1 —  £2)  relative to 
3d-  Therefore e cannot specify that in 3d  player 4 or 5 makes a demand of less than 
or equal to  1 —  64  or  1 —  J5  respectively since if these demands were accepted they 
would  contradict  the payoff bounds just  stated  and  in  SPE players  1  and 2 would 
only refuse such demands if they could receive equal or higher payoffs, also breaking 
the bounds mentioned.  Also,  the play of e must reach a post-proposal subgame 3d 
with responder  1  in  wrhich  all  players  are  active.  Let, 3d  bo  the subgame resulting 
from a refusal in 3d-  It has just been shown that 3d  is equivalent up to discounting 
to X\.  Thus by the argument above and lemma 5.3, in any SPE of y{ player 1 makes 
the demand 1 and it is accepted.  Thus under e the lelative payoff of playei  1 in 3d is
138at least 5i.  Since player 5 refuses at least once under e. her share must be more than 
1 —  ^l-  Thus  it  cannot  be the case  that  the exchange  15  forms  and it  is infeasible 
for players 4 and 5 to both receive non-zero payoffs.  This is a contradiction as both 
refused the demand cr2  earlier  in the play of this SPE.  □
Lem m a  5.2.  Let As  =   (5,;),.ep  such that Sr  —   6 for all i.  Then X (L5(41325), Ay) 
has two SPE outcomes,  (1 —  ? 1, h, 1 -  n, /I, 0)  and (0. n, 1 -  h. n, 1 -  h) where n =
Proof.  Let  Wi  =  X(L$(41325), A<*)-  Consider  a  post-proposal  subgame IA 3  of Wj 
in which player  3  is  the  responder for  the first  time  and  the most  recent  demands 
of players  1  and  2  are less  than  1.  Suppose there is  a SPE of U3  in which player  3 
refuses.  In this SPE, players 3 4 and 5 all have a chance to accept a non-zero offer, 
and hence must all have non-zero payoffs.  This is infeasible.  Thus in any SPE of U 
player 3 accepts the highest initial offer.
By  lemma  5.5,  any  initial  demand  by  player  1  of o\  <  h  in  Wi  is  accepted. 
Suppose  player  1  makes  a  demand  of  a\  >  n  in  W j.  Let  the  resulting  subgame 
be  W2.  Suppose  player  2  makes  a  demand  cr2  <  1  in  V V 2.  Then  in  SPE  player  3 
accepts whichever of demands < j\  and <r2  is lower and in the case o\  —  cr2  there are 
SPEs  in  which  either  is  accepted  by  player  3.  Suppose  a 2  >  < T \.  Then  player  3 
accepts <ti  in SPE. Let the resulting subgame be Vty,.  This a post-proposal subgame 
with  responder  player  5.  If player  5  refuses  in  W5  then  the  resulting  subgame  is 
essentially an alternating offers between players 2 and 5 so the SPE payoff of player 
5 is 5h >  1 —  cr2.  Thus player  2 receives a SPE payoff of only 5(1 —  n)  < g\  in  W 5 .
Hence the SPE payoff of player  2  in W2  is o\.  In the case  o\  >  n,  it must also 
be the case that  in  any  SPE of W2  player  2  demands o\  and  player  3  accepts  this 
demand  (from player  2  rather than player  1).  Consider the resulting post-proposal 
subgame  with  responder  4,  W4.  If player  4  refuses  then  the  resulting subgame  is 
essentially an alternating offers game between players 4  and 1  so the SPE payoff of 
player 4 is Sh >  l- o i-   Thus in any SPE of W.  1   player 4 refuses.  By lemma 5.3 and
139corollary 4.2 again, the payoff to player  1  in this SPE must be 1 -  h.
Hence  in  any  SPE  of  Wi  players  1  and  2  demand  h  and  these  demands  are 
accepted.  There are two SPEs depending on whom player 3 exchanges with.  □
5.4.4  T he  E ndogenous  O rdering  M odel  on  3  Player  N etw orks 
Conditions  of Theorem   4.3
Recall that  the conditions  of theorem  4.3  are as follows.  Let  N be  a 3  player  ring 
network with insatiable cakes in the sense of definition 3.7 and an empty core.  For 
i € P fix rji  E  (0,1) and let A =  (d7  )l6/j where 5r  —   for (  > 0.  Recall from corollary
4.5  that the limiting SPE payoff to A4 —  A/personal(/V, A) as e — >  0 is (oq, oq, 0) where 
(04 5  02 >  < 73)  are  the  components  of the  unique von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple of 
N.
This  section  shows  that  under  the  conditions  of theorem  4.3,  T  —   F(N,A,l) 
either  has  a  limiting  SPE  outcome  of  (oq.oq.O)  or  a  limiting  SPE  outcome  of 
(< 71,0,03),  or  both.  The  proof  below  proceeds  by  applying  various  cases  of  the 
proof of theorem 4.3.
Suppose player  1  makes  an  initial  multilateral  demand of Ai  <  0-1  in T .  Then 
the responder  accepts  this demand in any SPE of the resulting subgame.  This can 
be proved by the argument in the proof of theorem 4.3 for subgame A of that proof. 
Suppose  player  1  makes  an  initial  multilateral  demand  of  Ai  > 0 1   in  J-.  In  any 
SPE of the resulting subgame the responder r receives  a payoff of at least  5rar by 
the argument of theorem 4.3 for subgame B of that proof.  Suppose player  1  makes 
an initial  unilateral  demand  in  T.  Let  the resulting  subgame  be T '.  Suppose the 
responder r in T'  refuses and demands Ar  < < jv  multilatei ally.  Then in any SPE of 
the resulting subgame this is accepted by the argument in the proof of theorem 4.3 
for subgame A of that proof.  Thus in any SPE of T' player r receives a payoff of at 
least 5r< jr.
Therefore in any SPE of T  the payoff of player 1 is in the interval [a\, / 2’1(< 5 2ct2) V
140/   ’   (53*3)}.  In the limit e  >  0, both bounds tend to a\  so this is the unique limiting 
SPE payoff to player 1 in J-.  Also, in any SPE of J-  the payoff of the first responder r 
is at least 5Tcrr.  Therefore in any limiting SPE payoff of J-. at is the unique limiting 
SPE  payoff to  the  player  i  ^   1  who  receives  a non-zero  payoff.  A  higher  limiting 
payoff would result in an infeasible SPE payoff for all sufficiently small e.
C onditions  of Lemma 4.6
This  section  describes  the  limiting  SPE  outcomes  of  Q  =  F(N. A, 1)  under  the 
conditions of lemma 4.6.
Recall that  the conditions of lemma 4.6 are as follows.  Suppose T V  is a 3 player 
ring  network  such  that  /C12  =  /Cumt  and  the  core  of T V   contains  an  element  c  = 
(ci,C2 , 0).  For  each  i  6  P  fix  r/,  €  (0,1).  For  e  >  0,  let  A  -   (d'i.^2-^:})  where 
Si  ~  rj\.  Recall  from  lemma  4.6  that  the  unique  limiting  SPE  outcome  of Ai  = 
Mpersonal(TV, A)  in the limit  e — >  0 is  (0 ,1 —  0 , 0) where28
<P=/3'1(0)V[[l-/3- 2(0)]An1 j
1 -  < h
7ii = Inn  -----——
e— +o 1 -  SiS2
For  a subgame  7i  of Q  define  a  restricted, subgame perfect  equilibrium  (RSPE) 
as a SPE  e such that  player  x  €  {1,2}  never  makes the proposition  [/3,x(0), (3)]  if 
e is played  in H.  The following argument shows that an RSPE of Q  exists and the 
limiting RSPE payoff of player  1 as S  1 is 0 .  It also shows that if 0 > / 3,1(0) then 
player 2 receives a limiting RSPE payoff as 5 — ►   1 of 1 —  u > .  In the case 0 = / 3’*(0) a 
RSPE may exist in which player  1 exchanges with player 3.  It is not shown whether 
this occurs or not.
Recall equation  (4.7)  from the proof of lemma 4.6
1 -  / 3'2(0)  > / 3’‘(0)  (5.4)
28Recall that A  and  V are respectively infix maximum and  minimum operators.
141Let (i,j)  be (1, 2)  or (2,1).  Let B,  be the set of pre-proposal subgames of Q with 
proposer i such that  Vj  = 0.
For  B  6  Bj,  let  Pj(B)  be  the set  of  relative  payoffs  with respect to  B to player
i  in  any  RSPE of B.  Let  n ,  =  (Js6s, P,(B).  Let  -   sup 11*  and *.  -  inf n*.  It
is shown at the end of this section that  a RSPE of Q exists so that these quantities 
are well defined.
It is shown below that the following relations hold:
Xi  < f X'(0) V  [1  -  <5^]  (5.5)
X,:  >  [1  -  / 3 j(0)] A  {/^(O ) V [1  -  <VYj]}  (5.6)
Combining these relations are taking the limit  < 5  — ►   1  yields
Xi  =   =   / 3,' (0) V  [[1 -  / 3j (0)] A m]
where n*  —   pz^--  This  is sufficient  to support  the characterisation  of RSPE out­
comes made above.
Equation  (5.5):
Let  A  be  the  quantity  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  equation.  Fix  T >   6  Br.  
Suppose there is  an  RSPE  e  of T >   in which  player  i  receives  a relative  payoff with 
respect to T) of more than A.  Then it must be the case that the exchange 12 forms. 
Hence  in  the  play  of  T >   under  e  a  post-proposal  subgame  must  be  reached  with 
responder j.  Let V  be the first such subgame.
In T>', if Vt does not contain 3 then player j can refuse and earn a relative payoff 
with respect  to  V  of at  least  <5.;x .   bi  any  SPE  of the  resulting subgame.  In  if 
Vi contains 3 and j  then it must be the case that the most recent demand of player 
i  is  no  more  than  / 3,t(0).  Then  player  j  can  earn  a  payoff of at  least  / 3j (0)  by 
accepting this demand  (by equation  (5.4)).  In either of these cases player i receives 
a relative payoff with respect to  of less than A.
The remaining case is that  in V   the value of Vr   is  (3).  Since j  is the responder 
in V , it must also be the case that  V3 = (j).  It must also be the case that the most
142recent demand of player i is less than / i> a(0), otherwise e would not be a RSPE29. If 
player j accepts the demand of player 3 in T)' then the exchange j3 forms.  If player 
j refuses the demand of player 3 in T)' then player 3 is guaranteed a non-zero payoff 
so the  exchange  12  cannot  form.  Thus  no  RSPE  of the  form  described  for  e  can 
exist.
Equation  (5.6):
Let  B be the quantity on the right hand side of the equation.  Fix £ e B7.
Consider  the  case  B  <  / 3,?(0).  Suppose  in  £  player  i  makes  the  proposition 
[<T i, (3, j )]  where  <r7   <  B.  Let  £'  be  the  resulting  subgame.  By  equation  (5.4), 
1 —  Gi > / 3,J(0).  Thus in any SPE of £'  if a post-proposal subgame with responder 
j  is reached then the exchange  12 forms.  However if a post-proposal subgame with 
responder 3 is reached then player 3 exchanges.  Hence it must be the case that one 
of players 3 or j  accepts the demand cr7.
Consider  the  case  B  <  1  —  SjXj-  Suppose in  S  player  i  makes  the proposition 
[<7j, (j)] where a7 .  <  B.  Then 1 —  cr7   >  / 3 j(0) so player j does not accept the demand 
of player  3  in  any  SPE  of the  resulting  subgame.  £'.  Also  1 —  o,  >  SjXj  so  given 
that an RSPE of £' exists,  there exists an RSPE in which player j  accepts.
RSPE existence:
Finally,  the existence of a RSPE  for Q  is demonstrated.  Consider any SPE e of 
Q.  Consider  any  subgame  Q3  of Q  such  that  player  3  must  take  an  action  for  the 
first time.  Let e(<73)  be the SPE of £3  induced by e.  If player 3 receives a non-zero 
payoff in this SPE then let e'(Q3) —  e(Qa).  Otherwise it must be the case that player 
3 can receive only zero by  accepting  a demand in Q3.  Let  e'{Q3)  be the SPE e{Qz) 
modified so that player  3 accepts  a demand of zero in Q3.  This is also a SPE.
Consider the  following strategy  profile  /   of Q.  In  any  pre-proposal subgame of 
Q with proposer  i  in which  player  3  has  never  made an  action,  player i  makes the
29The failure of this part of the proof if e  is  a SPE  but  not  a RSPE geneiates  the class of SPEs 
sketched in section  5 .2 . 4   which are  interpreted  t here as  not  robust.
143proposition  [7ir, (j )].  In any post-proposal subgame of Q  with responder  i  in which 
player 3 has never made an action,  player  i  accepts the best demand which yields a 
payoff of at least  Srii  or,  if no such demand exist,  refuses all demands.  In any other 
subgame, play is according to the corresponding value of e'((/3).  If /  is a SPE then 
it is also a RSPE.
If /   is  not  a  SPE,  it  must  be  the  case  that  some  player  A :  =  1  or  2  prefers  to 
make a demand of f k:i(0)  to player 3.  Let  k' be the player  1 or 2 other than k.  The 
following strategy profile g of Q then forms a RSPE and it can be checked that it also 
forms a SPE.  Let  \\~  — f 3,k(0).  Let  A^  —   1  —   In  any pre-proposal subgame
of Q with proposer  k  in  which  player  3  lias  never  made an  action,  player  k  makes 
the proposition  [A/c, (3, A/)].  In  any  pre-proposal subgame  of Q  with proposer  k'  in 
which player 3 has never made an action,  player A :' makes the proposition  [A/y, (A)]. 
In any post-proposal subgame of Q with responder i —   1  or 2 in which player 3 has 
never made an action,  player  i  accepts  tire best demand which yields a payoff of at 
least  8Xi  or,  if no such  demand exist,  refuses  all  demands.  I11  any other subgame, 
play is according to the corresponding value of e'(Q3).
5.4.5  T he  E n d ogen ous  O rdering  M odel  on  L4
This section is on the SPE behaviour of games of the form A t —  F{L4, A<j. i).
It  proves  that  for  i  =  2  or  3,  the  limiting  SPE  payoffs  of  A t  as  5  — ♦   1  are 
(0, 5, 5,0)  and  (5 , 5 , 5 ,!).  For  i  —  I  or  4  the  latter  is  the  unique  limiting  SPE 
payoff.  The proof is as follows.
Let  Si  be  the  set  of  all  subgames  of A t  and  S  =  Let  Bj  be  tbe  set  of
pre-proposal subgames in  S such  that  all  players are active,  the proposer is j,  and 
for x e {2,3} either Vx = 0 or the most recent demand of player x is at least n.  For 
B e Bj, let  Pj(B)  be the set  of relative  payoffs with respect to B to player j in any 
SPE of B.  Let  n j  = \JBeBj Pj{B).  Let  Xj  =  and  X7  -  inf U3.  By corrolary
3.1 a SPE of A 7 .  exists for each 1, so these quantities are well defined.  By lemma 5.5,
144Xi  <n, X2 > n, x 3 > n and X4 < n  (recall that n —   y ^ ).
Consider C2  E  B2.  Suppose X2  >  n-  Consider  a SPE  c of C2  in which player  2 
receives  a relative  payoff with  respect  to  C2  of  X2  —  c  >  1 1 ■   Since  >  fi,  it  must 
be the case  that  the  exchange  12  forms  in  the  play  of e.  Thus  in  the  play  of e  a 
post-proposal  subgame  C\  must  be  reached  with responder  1.  Let  02  be the  most 
recent demand of player  2  in this  subgaine.  I11 the case  that  o2  <  X2 ~ e,  player  1 
receives a share of more than  1 —  (X2 —  0   hi e  which contradicts  the relative payoff
with respect to C2  of player 2 in e.
So  it  must  be  the  case  that  <72  >  X2 ~  Suppose  player  1  refuses  in C\  and 
demands  &i  <  1  —   6x 2■   Let  be  the  resulting  subgame.  In  the  play  of e  in  C[
player 3 does  not  accept  the  demand  a2  since  x3  >  h.  Thus the  play of e reaches 
a post-proposal  subgame  of C[  with  responder  2,  T > 2,  in  which  the  demand  o\  is 
available.  The following shows that player  2 accepts the demand o\  in T> 2  under e.
case i)
Suppose exchange 34 has taken place in T > 2.  Then V 2 is essentially an alternating 
offers game.  Under e  player  2 accepts in T>2  since o\  < n.
case ii)
Suppose the responder in C{  is player  3 or 4 and the most recent proposition of 
player 3 in X>2  is  [<73, (2)].  Let V 3  be the subgame of C[  in which player 3 made this 
proposition.  By  refusing in X >2  player  2  enters  a game  T > f,  E  B2.  The relative  SPE
payoff of player  2  in V 2  with respect  to  V 2  is  at most  5\ 2-   Thus under e  player 2
accepts the lowest demand in T> 2 •   If this is a3 then player 3 receives a relative payoff 
with respect to T > 3  of less than h.  Note that T > 3  E  B3 so this contradicts x^ > n.
case in)
Suppose the most recent proposition of player 3 in B 2 is multilateral.  Let T )3 be 
the subgame in which  it  was  made.  Note  that  B 3  E  B3.  The most lecent  demand 
of player 3 in B 2  must be more than 71.  Otherwise undei  e at least one of playeis 2 
or 4 would accept  this by lemma 5.5,  contradicting x^  >  11.  Thus by the aigument
145in case ii),  under e player  2  accepts the demand a1  in V2.
case iv)
Suppose the responder in C[  is  player  2  and either  the most  recent  proposition 
of player 3 in T> 2  is  [< 7 3 , (2)]  or player 3 has made 110 propositions in X > 2.  It is proved 
below that <73  >  1 —  8x 2■   Thus by the argument in case ii)  under e player 2 accepts 
the demand < j\  in C{.
The  claim  in  case  iv)  can  be  proved  as  follows.  Let  T>3  be  the  subgame  of 
C 2  in  which  player  3  made  her  most  recent  proposition  relative  to  C[.  Suppose 
03  <  1  —  <5x2-  Then  by  the  argument  in  c;ise  ii),  under  e  in  C\  player  2  accepts 
the  lowest  demand.  Hence  in  C\  under  c  player  1  must  either  accept  or  make  a 
demand which is accepted,  as  the alternative is to receive  payoff zero.  This results 
in a subgame which is essentially  an  alternating offers game between players 3 and
4.  So under e player  3 receives  relative  payoff 8h with respect to T> 3.  But  P 3  G  B3 
so this contradicts  X3  >  h.
It has been shown that  player  1  earns a realtive payoff with respect to C2  of at 
least  <5(1  —   8x 2)  bi  any  SPE  of C2.  It  must  therefore  be  the  case  that  xi ~ £   < 
1 —  <5(1 —  8x 2)-  If X2 > h this is a contradiction for sufficiently small e.
This  proves  that  X2  -  X2   ~  Similarly,  X3  —   —   b-  It  follows  that in  any
game  T >   G  B\  if player  1  demands  o\  <  h  it  is  accepted  in  SPE.  Hence  xi  —   X^ 
Similarly  X4  —   X4-   The  limiting  payoff vectors  described  above  are the  only  ones 
compatible with these  values.  To prove  that  both can be supported it  is sufficient 
to note that  in any  game T >   G  B,  for  1  G  P there is  a SPE  in which any unilateral 
demand of n is accepted.
5.4.6  Supporting  L em m as
This section  contains  various  lemmas  which  are  necessary  to  prove  the  results  on 
the endogenous ordering model for the network  L5  contained in section 5.4.7.  The 
game *43  =  F(L5, A^,3)  is  of particular  interest  in that section.  Thus the lemmas
14Gof this section often refer to this game in their statements.  However,  many of them 
can be generalised to other settings.
Note that appeals to the symmetry of Ly are often used.  That is, the numbering 
of players  in any  result  can  be reversed  so that  i t— »   6 —   1.  The proofs then hold if 
the same transformation of player numbering is used.
The first lemma is on constructing a SPE of a game A from SPEs of its immediate 
subgames.  It states that if the supremum payoff to the player who must act in A in 
these subgame SPEs is attainable in one subgame SPE then A has a SPE in which 
the subgame SPEs  are  played30.  The long statement  of the lemma is necessary  to 
define ‘the player who must act  in A the game could begin with several periods in 
which all action  sets are singletons.  This could easily occur for a game A which is 
constructed by the method described in section 3.4.2 for representing subgames.
Lemma 5.8.  Given a game of perfect information, A. let Z be the set of its subgames 
which are generated by finite histories such that only one action is made from a non­
singleton action set.  Let i  be the player who  has this non-singleton action set.  Let 
E be a function mapping each Z  G  Z  to a SPE of Z.  Let nl(E(Z))  be the payoff to 
player i when E(Z)  is played in Z.
There exists a SPE of A in which E (Z )  is played in Z for all Z  G  Z if and only 
if the following condition holds for some y G  Z:
7n(E(y))  =  sup 7 T j(E (Z ))  (5.7)
z e z
Proof.  If (5.7)  holds then  a SPE satisfying the required conditions is as follows.  In 
A player i takes the action which induces y.  In any Z  G  Z the SPE E(Z) is played. 
If (5.7) does not hold then suppose /  is a SPE of A in which for any Z E Z the SPE
■^An example of when  the condition  fails  is  in  the  ultimatum game.  In this game player  1  must 
make a demand  in x G  [0. 1],  then player  2  may  eithei  accept or  iefuse.  On acceptance the payoffs 
to  1  and  2 are x and  1  —  x  respectively.  On  refusal  they  are  both  zero.  Let  Z(x)  be the subgame 
in which the demand x has been  made.  Then  ACCEPT is  a SPE  of  Z(x)  for x  <  1  and  REFUSE 
is a SPE of Z{ 1).  But there is no SPE of the overall  game consistent  with  these.
147E{2)  is played.  Then player  i  can choose an  action in A inducing a subgame in Z 
in which he receives a higher payoff under /   than his SPE payoff.  □
The following lemma is a corollary to lemma 5.4 summarising some particularly 
useful cases.
Corollary  5.9.  Consider  a  subgame B  of A:\  such  that  the  set  of active players  is 
{a, a + l,a  + 2}.  Let  (i ,j )  =  (a, a + 2)  or  (a + 2, a).  In  the  case  that  B  is  a pre­
proposal subgame  with proposer i  or  a post-proposal  subgame  with  responder a + 1. 
then in any SPE of B,  player i  receives a, relative payoff with respect to B  of no more 
than 1—6.  In the  case  that B  is  a post-proposal  subgame with proposer j  then there 
is a SPE of B  in which player i  receives  a payoff of zero.
Proof.  Suppose B is  a post-proposal subgame  with responder a + 1.  Should player 
a +1 refuse in B then in any SPE she attains a relative payoff with respect to B of 6 
by lemma 5.4.  Thus in any SPE of B , player i receives a relative payoff with respect 
to B of no more than  1 —  S.
Suppose B is  a pre-proposal subgame with proposer  i.  In any  SPE of B,  either 
the exchange  (a -1- l,j)  forms  and  player  i  receives  payoff zero,  or  a post-proposal 
subgame  with  responder  a + 1  is  reached  and  the  previous  case  gives  the  desired 
result.
Suppose  B  is  a  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder j.  Let  the  most  recent 
demand  of player  a +  1  be  A.  In  the  case  that  A   <  1,  player  j  is  guaranteed  a 
non-zero SPE payoff in B and so player i must receive payoff zero in any SPE. In the 
case that  A =  1  suppose there exists a SPE  e of B in which player  i receives payoff 
U\.  Then player j  receives  payoff zero.  Alter the strategy profile e so that player j 
accepts in B.  This is also a SPE and has the required property.  □
Lemma  5.10.  Consider a pre-proposal  subgame C  of A:\  with proposer  2 .  Suppose 
there  exists  a  SPE e  of C  with  the follow trig  propeity.  Should player  2  make  any 
action  in C  other  than  a  unilateral  demand  to  player  1  then  he  receives  a  relative
148payoff with  respect  to  C  of no  more  than  AI  >  n  under v.  In  this  case  there  also 
exists a SPE f  of C  in which player 2 'receives  a payoff with respect to C  of no more 
than M .
Proof.  Suppose 7r2(C)  = I  >  M .  Consider a SPE a of C in which player 2 receives a 
relative payoff with respect  to C of m = l + e  for some e  > 0.  Construct a SPE b of 
C using lemma 5.8 and the following SPEs of each subgame resulting from an action 
of player  2  in C.  If the  initial  action of player  2  in C  is not  a unilateral demand to 
player  1 then play proceeds as in e.  Let  in' =  1 -  <5(1 -  Sin).  If in C player 2 makes 
a unilateral  demand  to  player  1  of in'  or  less  then  player  1  accepts.  If in C  player 
2 makes a unilateral demand to player  1  of more than in'  then player  1  refuses and 
makes a unilateral demand of 1 -- Sin to player 2 who accepts.  To show that this is 
SPE behaviour it is sufficient to use lemma 5.8 and the following fact.  Let C2 be the 
subgame that results from a unilateral demand of player 2 in C followed by a refusal 
and demand by  player  1  and  a refusal  by  player  2.  This subgame is equivalent  up 
to discounting to C.  So  by  application  of lemma 5.3  there is a SPE of C'2  in which 
player 2 receives  a relative  payoff with respect to C2  of m.
Note that in the SPE b player 2 can receive a payoff of no more than maxjm', AI}. 
For e sufficiently small, in'  < I so by contradiction,  it must  be the case that 7r2(C)  < 
M.  For M  >  n it  is  possible to  construct  a SPE of the form required for  /  by the 
method above,  taking m  —  M  + e  for  e sufficiently small.
For M  —  h a SPE of the form required for /  can by applying lemma 5.8 and the 
following SPE behaviour  for  each subgame  of C  following  an  action of player  2.  If 
the initial  action  of player  2  in C  is  not  a unilateral  demand to player  1  then play 
proceeds  as  in  e.  If in  C  player  2  makes  a  unilateral  demand  to  player  1  of 7 7   or 
less then player  1  accepts.  If in C player 2 makes a unilateral demand to player  1 of 
a2  > h then player 1 refuses and makes a demand of 1-SX where A = h + e for some 
c(A)  > 0 such that  <5(1  —  6 X)  >  1  -  a2-   Player  2  accepts  in the resulting subgame. 
In the case that  player  2  instead  refuses  a  SPE  is  played  in  the lesulting subgame
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since C2  is equivalent  up to discounting to C  and tt2 (C )  <  h.  Application of lemma 
5.8 shows that this is SPE behaviour.  □
Lemma 5.11.  Consider a game T>   which is  a pre-proposal subgame of As  in which 
player 1  is  the proposer and V2  = 0.  There  is  a SPE of V   in  which player  1  makes 
a demand to player  2  and it is  accepted.
Proof.  In the case  that,  in  Z>,  Vs  contains  2,  let  oq  be  the most  recent  demand of 
player 2.  Otherwise let  0-3  =  1.
Suppose player 1 makes a demand oq  in X >.  Let T>2 (&i)  he the resulting subgame. 
Suppose player  2 then refuses.  Let Vf2(cr  1)  be the resulting subgame.  Note that for 
any oq, £>2(oq)  equivalent  up to discounting to ^(O ).
Applying lemma 5.3. there is a strategy profile e which is a SPE of X >2(oq) for all 
oq.  Let A2 be the payoff of player 2 in V 2(0)  under e.  Define a strategy profile /(oq) 
of V 2 {a\) as follows.  Should the subgame £>2(oq)  be  reached,  play is according  to e.
In V2, player 2 accepts a lowest demand if  it  is 110  more than  1 —  8 X2  and  otherwise
refuses.  In the case that  oq  = 0-3  <  8 X2,  player  2 accepts the demand of player  1.
The demand  profile  /(oq)  is  a  SPE of £>2(^1)-  Applying lemma 5.8,  there is  a 
SPE, q, of V in which player  1  makes the demand min[oq. (1 -  < 5A 2)] and following a 
demand oq of player 1, the SPE /(oq) is played.  The SPE g satisfies the requirements 
of the lemma.  O
Corollary  5.12.  Consider  a  game  S  which  is  a  post-proposal  subgame  of As  in 
which player 1 is the responder and V2 =  (1).  There is a SPE of £  in which player 1 
either accepts  the  demand of player 2  or refuses and makes  a demand which player 
2  accepts.
Proof.  Let S 1 be the subgame of £ in which playei  1 leluses.  By lemma 5.11. theie is 
a SPE e of £* in which player  1  makes a demand which player 2 accepts.  By lemma
1505.8, there is a SPE f  of S in which e is played should S' be reached.  The SPE must 
satisfy the conditions of the corollary.  □
Lemma  5.13.  Consider  a  post-proposal  subgame  T 3  of A.3  with  proposer  3   such 
that  the  current  value  of  V2  is  (3, 1)  and  the  most  recent  demand  of player  2  is 
° 2   <  1 —  5 + 52.  There  exists  an  SPE of T 4  in  which player  3   accepts  the  demand 
of player 2  or f.
Proof.  Let T'^ be the subgame resulting from a refusal by player 3 in  It is shown 
that following any action by player 3 in  there is a SPE of the resulting subgame 
in which player 3 receives a relative payoff with respect to JF'  of no more than 1 —  5. 
By lemma 5.8  there  is  therefore  a  SPE of T 3  in  which  player  3  accepts  the lowest 
available demand.
case  i
Suppose  in  player  3  makes  a  proposition  [ < 73,(2)]  or  [ < 73, (2, 4)].  Let  T\  be 
the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder  1.  By corollary 5.12 there is a 
SPE of T\  in which player  1  accepts the demand of player 2 or refuses and makes a 
demand to player  2 which is accepted.  By corollary 5.9 in any SPE of the resulting 
subgame player 3 receives a relative payoff with respect to  of 110 more than 1 —  5.
case ii
Suppose in  player 3 makes a proposition [ < 73, (4, 2)].  In the case that 73 <  1 —  5 
then by lemma 5.7 it must be the case that in any SPE either this demand is accepted 
or player 3 does not exchange.
Suppose <73  >  1 —  5.  Following the proposition of player 3 mentioned,  there are 
two  possibilities  in  SPE  play.  The  first  is  that  the  exchange  45  forms  and  there 
results  a  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder  1  and  active  players  12   3.  By 
corollary  5.9  player  3  receives  SPE payoff zero in this case.  The second  possibility 
is that SPE results in a post-proposal subgame Q4  with responder 4.
Suppose in  Q4  player  4  refuses  and  makes  the  proposition  [1,(3, 5)].  Let Q\  be 
the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder  1.  By coiollaiv 5.12  tlieie is a
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a demand to player 2 which is accepted.  By corollary  5.9  there exists a SPE of the 
resulting subgame in which  player  3  receives  payoff zero and,  by lemma 5.4, player 
4 receives a relative  payoff with  respect  to QA   of 5.  A  SPE of Qx  in which player  3 
receives payoff zero can thus be constructed using lemma 5.8.
case  Hi
Suppose in T \  player 3 makes a proposition  [ < 73. (4)].  I1 1 the case that <73  <  1 -  5 
then  by  lemma  5.7  it  must  be  the  case  that  in  any  SPE  either  this  demand  is 
accepted or the exchange 45 forms and player  3 is the proposer in a 3 player active 
subnetwork.  In the latter case, by lemma 5.9 player 3 receives a SPE payoff relative 
to jTg  of no more than  1—5 .
Suppose (73  >  1 —  5.  Following the proposition of player 3 mentioned,  there are 
two  possibilities  in  SPE  play.  The  first  is  that  the  exchange  45  forms  and  there 
results  a  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder  1  and  active  players  1 2   3.  By 
corollary  5.9  player  3  receives  SPE payoff zero in this case.  The second possibility 
is that SPE results in a post-proposal subgame H 4  with responder 4.
Suppose in H 4  player 4 refuses  and makes the proposition  [1, (3,5)].  Let Hz  be 
the resulting subgame.  Should  player  3  refuse in  Hz  and  make  a proposal  then  a 
post-proposal subgame  H  with  responder  1  or  5  is reached.  By corollary  5.12  and 
symmetry there is a SPE of H in which the responder either accepts or refuses and 
makes  a demand  to  their  neighbour which  is  accepted.  By corollary  5.9  there is  a 
SPE of the resulting subgame in which player 3 receives payoff zero.  A SPE e of Hz 
in which player  3  receives  payoff  zero can  thus be constructed  using lemma 5.8.  If 
player 3 does not already do so, alter e so that she accepts the demand of player 4 in 
Hz-  This is also a SPE.  In this SPE player 4 receives a relative payoff with respect 
to H 4  of 1  -   6 .  Hence  a  SPE  of H 4  in  which  player  3  receives  payoff zero can be 
constructed by lemma 5.8.  D
Lemma. 5.14.  Considev a pve-pvoposal subpame 5Ji  of A 3  with pToposev 2 such that
152Vi  V3  Vs  0  and V4  —  0  or (3).  Then  there  is  a SPE of J 2  in  which player 2 
receives  a relative payoff with  respect  to fj2  of no  more  than  1 —  < 5  -t- S'*.
Proof.  Suppose there exists a SPE e of J 2 in which player 2 receives a relative payoff 
with respect  to  fj2  of more  than  1  —   6 + 52.  The  following  argument  constructs  a 
SPE /  of J 2  from e which satisfies the claim of the lemma.
Suppose  that  the  initial  proposition  of  player  2  in  ff2  under  e  is  a  unilateral 
demand to  player  1.  Should  player  1  refuse  in  the  resulting  subgame  and  make  a 
unilateral demand of a x  <  1 —  < 5  then it is accepted in any SPE by lemma 5.7.  Hence 
player  1  receives  a relative  payoff with  respect  to  J 2  of at  least  1  -  S  under e  and 
therefore player  2  cannot  achieve the payoff claimed.
Suppose e specifies that the initial proposition of player 2 in J 2  is  [a2, (1,3)]  for 
some (J2.  Let J \  be the resulting subgame.  Suppose player 1 refuses in J\  and makes 
the  proposition  [cri,(2)j  where  o\  <  1  —  S.  Let  J 3  be  the  resulting  subgame.  By 
lemma 5.7, in any SPE of J 3 player 2 accepts a lowest demand in any post-proposal 
subgame of J 3 in which he is responder and (Ji  is available.  In J 3 , if player 3 makes a 
proposition of [<73, (4)] where (73  <  1 —  5 then it is accepted in any SPE by lemma 5.7. 
Hence in J 3  under e the exchange 23 does not form and player  1  receives a relative 
payoff with respect to J 3  of g\.  Hence  >  1 —  < 5  which is a contradiction.
The  remaining  case  is  that  the  initial  propost ion  of  player  2  is  [(7* 2, (3,1)]  or 
[(72, (3)]  for some < j 2.  Let /C3  be the resulting subgame.  Should player 3 refuse in /C3 
and make a proposition of [(73, (4)]  where (73  <  1 —  5 then it is accepted in any SPE 
by lemma 5.7.  Thus 273(^ 3)  —   1 —  ^ an{^ the exchange 23 cannot form in e.
Let £3  be the last pre-proposal subgame of /C3 with proposer 3 which is reached 
in  the  play  of  e  before  player  1  acts.  Suppose  e  specifies  that  player  3  makes  a 
multilateral demand of <73  <  1 —  S in £ 3.  By lemma 5.7, under e player 2 or 4 accepts 
a demand in any resulting post-proposal subgame in which they are responder.  Thus 
under e player 3 receives a relative payoff with respect to fj2 of (73 01  zeio.  Howevei 
this is a contradiction  as  >  1  —
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< 73  <  1 —  5.  Let  C[  be the resulting subgame.  Then by lemma 5.7 in SPE player 2 
must  accept  a demand  when  he  is  next  proposer.  Since the exchange  12  forms,  it 
must be the case that in C\  under e player  1  either accepts the demand of player 2 
or makes a demand which is  accepted  by  player  2.  In the resulting subgame under 
e  player  3  receives  a  relative  payoff with  respect  to  J 2  of 110  more  than  1  —   6  by 
corollary  5.9.  Construct  a  new  strategy  profile  /   by  altering  e  such  that  player  3 
makes  the  proposition  [1  -   5, (4)]  in  /C3  and  player  4  accepts  this  proposal.  This 
must  also  be  a SPE.  If the  case  at  the  start  of this  paragraph  does  not  apply,  let 
/  =  e.
Under  /,  a  post-proposal  subgame  of J 2  is  reached  with  proposer  1  such  that 
the most recent demand of player 3 is at least  1 —  5.  Suppose player  1  refuses in J 2 
and demands o\  <  1 —  5.  Then by lemma 5.7, player 2 accepts.  Thus j  satisfies the 
conditions of the lemma.  □
The following lemma describes  some conditions  in which a proposer cannot re­
ceive a positive payoff.
Lemma  5.15.  Under  either of the following  conditions  on  a pre-proposal  subgame 
M.  of A 2 ,  the proposer receives payoff zero  in  any SPE.
1)  A4  has proposer 3,  V2  contains  1  and V4  contains  5.
2)  M   has proposer  1 ,  V2  contains  3,  V4  contains  5 and ifV 4  contains  3 then the 
most recent  demand of player 4  is  1 -
Proof.  In case  1)  let  (i,j,k)  =  (3,1.5).  I1 1   case  2)  let  (i.j,k)  -  (1,3,5).  Suppose
there is a SPE e of M   in which player i receives a non-zero payoff.  The exchange ix 
must form for x = 2 or 4.  Consider the first proposition  [crj, V)]  made by player i in 
the play of e such that V ); contains x.  It must be the case that u7   > 0, othei wise playei 
x would receive a share of  1  in e.  Let A4„  be the first post-pioposal subgame of A4
154under e with lespondei  u where u is the neighbour of x other than i.  Suppose in A\ „ 
player u refuses  and makes  a proposition  [cr„, (x)]  where 0 <  a u  <  min[cr7  . (1 —  d)]. 
By lemma 5.7 player x accepts this under e.  Thus player u receives a non-zero payoff 
from e in M x l.   This finishes the proof for the case  1).
For  case  2)  it  has  been  shown  that  player  3  receives  a non-zero  payoff in  A4 j 
under e.  Thus if V4  contains 3  in A4  then player  3 must refuse at least once under 
e.  Suppose the exchange 34 forms in e.  Consider the first proposition  [A3. V3] made 
by  player  3  in  the  play  of  e  such  that  V3  contains  4.  It  must  be  the  case  that 
A 3 > 0, otherwise player 4 would receive a share of 1 in e contradicting the non-zero 
payoff of player  3.  Let  be the first post-proposal subgame in the play of e with 
responder 5.  Suppose in A4s player 5 refuses and makes a proposition [A5. (4)] where
0 < A5 < min[A3, 1 —  5].  By lemma 5.7 player 4 accepts this in e.  Thus the exchange 
34 cannot form in e.  Instead the exchange 23 must form and player  1 receives payoff 
zero which is the required contradiction.  □
The following lemma shows that  an SPE of a subgame V of A 3  in which player
1 has no offer on the table is still valid if the game is altered so that player  1 has an 
offer of n on the table.
Lemma  5.16.  Let V   and  Q  be  subgames  of A 3  satisfying the following  conditions. 
Either both are pre-proposal subgames with responder i >  1  or both are post-proposal 
subgames with responder i  >  1.  All players  are  active in both.  For j  >  1,  Vj  has the 
same  value  in  both  subgames.  For j  >  1  such  that V3  A 0,  the  most recent demand 
of player j  in  both  subgames  is  the  same,  hi V,  Vj  —  0.  In  Q,  V3  —   (2)  and  the 
most recent  demand  of player  1  is n.
Let e  be  a SPE ofV.  There  is  an SPE e'  of Q  such that following any sequence 
of actions  in Q,  which  is  also permissable  in P  the action specified  by e  is  taken.
Proof.  The construction at  the end of the statement of the lemma can be extended 
to produce a strategy profile e7  of Q by describing the actions specified following all
155sequences of actions  not  permissable in 'P.  Construct e'  by letting these actions be 
the same as in any fixed SPE /  of V.
Let 7Z be any  subgame  of  Q.  In  the  case that  7Z is  produced  by  a sequence of 
actions not permissable in “ P then a player cannot profitably deviate from e' because 
this would imply that  /  was not a SPE.  Consider the case that 71 is produced by a 
sequence of actions  which  is  permissable in P.  A  player  cannot  profitably deviate 
from e' to a strategy producing a sequence of actions permissable in P because this 
would imply that e was not a SPE. The only other possible deviation is for player 2 
to use a strategy  producing acceptance of the demand of h  of player  1.  Let S be a 
post-proposal subgame of 7Z in which player 2 is responder and has this option.  By 
lemma 5.5,  under  e!  player  2  receives  a relative  payoff of at  least  5n in  S.  So  the 
deviation described does not increase the payoff of player 2.  Thus e' is a SPE of Q. 
as required.  □
5.4.7  T he  E n d ogen ous  O rdering  M odel  on  L5
In  this  section  it  is  shown  that  As  =  F(Ls, As,3)  has  multiple  SPE  payoffs.  In 
particular  in  it  is  proved  that  there  exist  SPEs  of As  in  which  player  3  receives 
payoffs n and 7 = 1  —  £ + < 5 2 —  53  respectively.
Low payoff equilibrium
Suppose player  3  makes  an initial unilateral demand of <73  < 7 in ^ 3.  Lemma 5.14 
and  symmetry  shows  that  there  exists  a  SPE  of  the  resulting  subgame  in  which 
the  responder  accepts  this  demand.  It  is  shown  that  following  any  other  initial 
proposition in As there is a SPE of the resulting subgame in which player 3 earns a 
payoff of no more than 7 .  The result then follows by lemma 5.8.
Suppose player  3  makes  an  initial  demand  <73  >  7  unilaterally  in As-  Without 
loss of generality suppose the responder is player 2.  Let A2 be the lesulting subgame. 
By lemma 5.14  there  is  a  SPE  f  of  A2  in  which playei  2  leceives  a SPE  payoff of
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the proposition  [1 —  5 4- S2,  (3,1)].  Let  6 3  be the resulting subgame.  By lemma 5.13 
there is a SPE e of B3  in which player 3 accepts.  Further alter /  by specifying that 
e is played  in  B3 .   This  results  in  a  SPE of A 2  in which  player  3  earns a payoff of 
S  —  S 2  < 7 .
Suppose player 3 makes an initial demand <73  < 7 multilaterally  in A3 .   Then in 
any SPE of the resulting subgame either this demand is accepted or both of players 
2 and 4 receive payoffs of at least  1 —  cr3.  In either case player 3 receives a payoff of 
no more than < 73.
Suppose  player  3  makes  an  initial  demand  <73  >  7  multilaterally  in  A3.   Note 
that thus cr3  >  1 —  8 .   W ithout loss of generality suppose that the initial proposition 
is  [<t3,(2,4)].  Let  C 2  be  the  resulting  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder  2. 
Suppose player 2 refuses and makes the proposition [1, (3,1)].  Let C 4 be the resulting 
post-proposal subgame  with  responder 4.  Suppose player  4  refuses  and  makes  the 
proposition [1, (5, 3)].  Let C5 be the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder 
5.  By lemma 5.15  (and symmetry),  if player 5 refuses in C 5  then she receives payoff 
zero in any SPE. Thus there is a SPE of C5 in which player 5 accepts.  Let C 3 be the 
resulting subgame.  There is a SPE of C 3  in which player 3 receives a SPE payoff of 
zero by corollary  5.9.  Thus  by  lemma 5.8,  there is  a SPE  of C3  in which player  3 
accepts.  Thus there is a SPE of C 2  in which player  2 receives payoff S and player 3 
receives payoff zero.
High payoff equilibrium
Suppose player  3  makes  an  initial  proposition  of  [n. (2,4)]  in  A 3 .   Let  D o  be  the 
resulting  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder  2.  Let  D2  be  the  subgame  that 
results  if player  2  then  refuses.  It  is  shown  that  following  any  action  of player  2 
in V'2  other  than  a  unilateral  demand  to  player  1,  there is  a SPE  of the  lesulting 
subgame in which player  2  receives  a relative  payoff with iespect  to D2  of no moie
157than 72.  Lemmas 5.8  and 5.10 then show that  there is a SPE of Z?2  in which player 
2 accepts.
Suppose in T)2  player 2 makes the proposition [ < 72, (3)] or [cr2. (3,1)] where 0 2 < h. 
Let Z>4 be the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder 4.  In any SPE of T > \ 
player  3  must  receive  a  payoff of at  least  1  —   0 2   as  she  can  accept  the demand  of 
player 2.  By lemma 5.5,  player 4 is guaranteed a payoff of at  least n  in any SPE of 
Z > 4.  Thus it must be the case that the exchanges 23 and 45 form in any SPE. Hence 
in any SPE of Z>4 player 2 can receive a relative payoff with respect to V2  of at most 
02-
Suppose in V'2  player 2 makes the proposition [cr2, (1,3)].  Let M\ be the resulting 
subgame.  If <72 < n then in any SPE of A4 i player 1 accepts by lemma 5.5.  Otherwise 
suppose  player  1  refuses  and  demands  n.  By  lemma  5.16  there  is  a  SPE  of the 
resulting  subgame  .M4  which  produces  the  same  sequence  of  actions  as  the  SPE 
described  below  for  either  £ 4   and^4  (depending  on  the  value  of 02).  Both  result 
in the  exchange  34  forming  before  player  2  acts.  There  is  a  SPE  of the  resulting 
subgame with active players  1  and 2 in which player 2 accepts the demand h.  Thus 
by lemma 5.8 there is a SPE of  in which player 2 accepts the demand n.  Hence 
there is a SPE of M.\  in which player  1 takes the action described above since player 
1  cannot receive  a higher  SPE  payoff by  lemma  5.5.  In  this  SPE  player  2  receives 
payoff 8n relative to T>2,  as required.
Suppose player  2  makes  the  proposition  [a 2 ,  (3)]  in T >2  where  1  —  S + 52 < 0 2 -  
Let  £ 4   be  the  resulting  post-proposal  subgame  with  responder  4.  By  lemma  5.14 
(and symmetry) there is a SPE  /  of £ 4   in which player 4 receives a SPE payoff of no 
more than <5(1 -  5 +  S2).  Alter this strategy profile so that in £ 4   player 4 refuses and 
makes the proposition [1 -5 +  52,  (3, 5)].  Let £ 3 be the resulting subgame.  By lemma 
5.13 there is a SPE e of £ 3   in which player  3 accepts.  Further alter  /  by specifying 
that e is played in £ 3 .  Thus under J  a pre-proposal subgame of  £ 4   is reached with 
proposer  2  and only other  active  player  1.  The payoff to playei  2  undei  j  relative
158to T> 2 is thus n as required.
Suppose player 2 makes the proposition [< x2, (3)j  in V '2 where n < a?  <  1 -J -f 32. 
Let J-" 4   be the resulting subgame  and  J- 4  be the subgame resulting from refusal by 
player 4.  Suppose player  4  makes  a proposition of [cr4, (3,5)]  in T '4  for any cr4.  Let 
Tz be the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder 3.  By lemma 5.13, there 
is a SPE of  in which  player  3  accepts.  The remainder of the argument  for this 
case can be done in tandem with the next case.
Suppose player  2  makes  the  proposition  [<r2, (3,1)]  in V 2  where n <  < 72.  Let Q4 
be the resulting  subgame  and  Q'4  be  the  subgame  resulting  from  refusal  by  player
4.  Suppose player  4  makes  a propostion  of  [ < 74,(3 ,  5)]  in Q'4  for  any  < 74.  Let  Qs  be 
the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder 3.  Should player 3 refuse in Q4 
then by lemma 5.15,  player  3 receives  zero payoff in any SPE.  Thus there is a SPE 
of Qs in which player 3 accepts.
The above  arguments  show  if player  4  makes  a proposition  of  [ < 72, (3,1)]  in T '4 
and Q'4  then there is a SPE in which it is accepted by player 3.  The resulting game 
is essentially an alternating offers game between player  1  and 2.  Hence in any SPE 
of this  subgame  player  2  receives  a  relative  payoff with  respect  to  V 2  of no  more 
than h
Let H 4 be T 4 or Q4.  It is shown below that following any action of player 4 in 7i 4 
other than a unilateral demand to player 5, there is an SPE of the resulting subgame 
in which player 4 receives a payoff of 110 more than <72  relative to ?i4.  Application of 
lemmas 5.8 and 5.10 then shows that there is a SPE of H 4  in which player 4 refuses 
and makes the  proposition  described  above,  and player  2  receives  a relative payoff 
with respect to T)'2  of no more than  7 1 ,   as required.
Suppose player 4 makes a proposition [< 74, (3, 5)] in 7f4 for any value of < 74.  Let 
be the resulting subgame.  By the arguments above, there is a SPE of this subgame 
in which player 3 accepts the lowest demand available.  Thus in the case that <74  < < 72 
there is a SPE in which the demand <74 is accepted.  I1 1 the case that cr4  > < 72 theie is
159a SPE in which player 3 accepts the demand ot player 2,  as required.  The resulting 
subgame is essentially an alternating offers game between players 4 and 5.  Hence in 
any SPE of this subgame player 4 receives a relative payoff with respect to 7~L\ of no 
more than h, as required.
Suppose in H '4  player  4  makes  a  proposition  of  [cr4, (3)]  for  any  cr4.  Let  J 3  be 
the resulting post-proposal subgame with responder 3.  In the case that  V2  -   (3,1) 
in J 3 then lemma 5.13 can be applied,  and the arguments made above for H 3 hold. 
For the case that V2 =  (3)  in J 3, let  be the subgame generated if player 3 refuses 
in J 3.  Observe that  is equivalent up to discounting to A 3.  Recall the low payoff 
equilibrium found above for A 3.  By lemma 5.3 there is a SPE of J ! 4 in which player 
3 makes a demand to player  2  and it  is accepted.  In the resulting alternating offers 
game with player 5,  player 4 receives a SPE relative payoff with respect to 7-t'4  of no 
more than h, as required.
Suppose player 4 makes the proposition [04, (5, 3)] in Ti[v  Let /C5 be the resulting 
post-proposal subgame with responder 5.  In the case 04 < 02, player 5 is guaranteed 
a share of 04 in any SPE of /C5 and thus player 4 receives a relative payoff with respect 
to 7^4 of no more than o 2  in any SPE of /C5,  as required.  Suppose 04  > a2.  I1 1  case 
that V2 = (3,1) in /C5  and cr2  <  1 -  5 + S2, suppose player 5 refuses in /C5 and makes 
the unilateral demand n to player 4.  In some SPE of the resulting subgame, player 3 
accepts the demand of player 2 by lemma 5.13 and player 4 accepts in the remaining 
alternating offers game with player 5.  Thus there is a SPE of /C5  in which player 4 
receives  a relative payoff with respect  to 7t4  of no more than n as required.  I1 1  the 
case  where instead  cr2  >  1  —  5 +  suppose  player  5  refuses  in  /C5  and  demands 
05  such that  1  -  04  <  605  <  1  -  02-   Let  £3  be the  resulting subgame.  If player  3 
refuses then player 4 is guaranteed a share of 1 —  05  >  1 —  S  (I —  04) in SPE. If the 
exchange 34 forms in such a SPE then player 3 leceives a payoff of less than  1 —  04 
relative to JC3.  As this is worse than accepting the offer of playei  2, the exchange 34 
does not form in any  SPE of K,3-   Note that  05  1  5,  so this demand is accepted
160by player 4 in SPE of /C3.  Hence player 5 earns a relative payoff of at least  1 —  a2 in 
any SPE of /C5 and player 4 receive a relative payoff of no more than cr2 as required.
Consider the case that V2 =  (3)  in /C5.  Suppose player 5 refuses in /C5 and makes 
a unilateral demand of n to player 4.  Let £3 be the resulting subgame and let £3 be 
the subgame that  results if player  3 then refuses.  By lemma 5.16 there is a SPE of 
£3 which produces the same sequence of actions as the low payoff equilibrium of A j, 
described above.  Thus  by  lemma 5.8  there is  a SPE of £3  in which player 3 either 
accepts  the demand  of player  2  or  refuses  and  makes  a demand  to  player  2  which 
is accepted,  and in the resulting subgame  player 4 accepts the demand of player  5. 
The latter  action  is  SPE  as  in  this subgame  only  players  4  and  5  are  active.  This 
shows that  player  5  is  guaranteed  a relative  payoff of n  in  /Cr,  so  player  4  receives 
only Sn,  as required.
161Chapter  6
Simulation:  Background  and 
Overview
One approach to modelling  bargaining situations  is through the framework of evo­
lutionary game theory,  as briefly described in section 3.3.5.  This requires an under­
lying game with  relatively  simple strategy  sets.  Evolutionary  game  theory models 
based  on  the  Nash  demand  game  have  enjoyed  much  recent  success.  This  game, 
originally proposed by Nash in  [53],  models 2 player bargaining.  Both players must 
simultaneously  name  a  demand.  If  this  demand  pair  lies  within  the  utility  cake 
then each  player  receives  a payoff equal  to  their  demand.  Otherwise  both receive 
nothing.  In  contrast  to  the  alternating  offers  game,  this  approach  abstracts  away 
most  of the  details  of the  bargaining  process.  In  particular,  strategies  are simply 
demand values.  The Nash demand game supports all Pareto optimal outcomes with 
strict  (pure strategy)  Nash equilibria,  so there is a significant  equilibrium selection 
problem.  However,  the simple strategy structure of the game makes it amenable to 
evolutionary methods,  providing a potential method of equilibrium selection.
This chapter gives  an overview of an evolutionary model based on an extension 
of the  Nash  demand  game  to  general  bilateral  exchange  networks  with  a view  to 
implementing  the  model  as  a  computer  simulation.  The  relation  of  this  model  to
162the  literature  on  similar  models  is  also  discussed.  Chapter  7  explores  the  details 
of the  evolutionary  model,  and  chapter  8  presents  the  simulation  results.  Many 
unrealistic  assumptions  are  introduced  in  the evolutionary  model,  so  these  results 
are not intended to be used as quantitative predictions.  Instead  they are viewed as 
providing a useful qualitative  tool  to  investigate  evolutionary  pressures which may 
determine the outcome of bargaining.
Section  6.1  reviews  the  literature  on similar  evolutionary  models.  Such  models 
can  often  be  represented  mathematically  as  Markov  processes,  so  a  summary  of 
relevant  material  on  this  topic  is  included.  Section  6.2  gives  an  overview  of the 
proposed evolutionary  model  of bargaining.  Section  6.3  describes  how  this  model 
can be represented by a Markov process.
6.1  Literature  Review
A general introduction to the approach of evolutionary game theory is given in sec­
tion  3.3.5.  Section  6.1.1  gives  a  description  of the  features  of some  evolutionary 
models relevant  to  this  chapter.  These  models can  be represented  mathematically 
as perturbed discrete Markov processes.  Section 6.1.2 briefly defines these and sum­
marizes some relevant  results.  Section  6.1.3 describes some particular evolutionary 
models of bargaining based on the Nash demand game.
6.1.1  General  Features
A pioneering evolutionary model  is  that  of Kandori  Mailath  and  Rob  (IvMR)  [37]. 
Their  approach  produces  a  more  tractable  model  than  previous similar  work  (e.g. 
see Foster  and  Young  [26]  and  Fudenberg  and  Harris  [28]).  The KMR model  is  a 
dynamic model for a 2 x 2 symmetric game (as defined in section 3.3.2).  The game is 
played by members of a single large population.  I refer to these membeis as agents  .
JKMR refer  to  the  members  of this  population  as  players’.  The  main  part  of  this  chapter  is 
concerned with games which are not symmetric.  Thus I reserve term  player’ to distinguish between
163The model is a discrete time model with time values in N ~*~.  I refer to each time value 
as representing a round  of the model.  In a given round each agent  has a fixed pure 
strategy of the  underlying game.  In each  round all  agents  are repeatedly  matched 
to play the game in pairs using their fixed strategies.  Agents’ strategies in the next 
round depend 011 the payoffs received.  I refer to the particular method that agents 
use  to  update  their  strategies  as  their  learning  ride.  Whenever  an  agent  updates 
their  strategy,  they  have  a  small  probability  e  >  0  of  mutating  to  either  strategy 
with equal probability rather than using their learning rule.
KMR study the case where the underlying symmetric game has two strict Nash 
equilibria in which both players plav the same strategy.  Under the particular learning 
rules they consider, based 011 agents being more likely to update to the strategy with 
better  average  payoff,  the  model  has  two  stable  patterns  of behaviour  in  the case 
e  =  0.  These  are  the  two  population  states  in  which  all  agents  play  the  same 
strategy.  However,  in the case e > 0,  mutations occasionally disrupt the stability of 
these states;  if enough  agents  mutate  then  the  population  can eventually  settle  in 
the other state.  This enables selection between the two pure Nash equilibria.  KMR 
prove that  in  most  cases  the  probability  that  in  the  long-run  the  population  is  at 
one of these states2 tends to 1 in the limit e — »  0.  The exception is that for correctly 
balanced payoff values in the underlying game,  this probability tends to  ^  for both 
states.  The meaning of this  ‘probability in the long-run’  is made precise in section
6.1.2  below.
The framework  described  above  lias  been generalized  by many researchers and 
is  the basis  of the  evolutionary  model  used  in  this  chapter.  The  main  differences 
are that the model used here has multiple populations of agents,  uses an underlying 
game with more than 2 players which is not symmetric, and matches only one agent 
from  each  population  to  play  this  game  in  each  round.  A  model  similai  to  that 
of KMR investigating  asymmetric  games  by  using multiple  populations  is given  in
player positions  in games.
2That corresponding to the  'risk-dominant  Nash equilibrium.
1C4Binmore  et  al  [9]  and  discussed  below  in  section  6.1.3.  Some  other  extensions  to 
the  KMR  model  in  the  literature  include  looking  at  large  but  finite  populations 
(e.g.  Seymour  [61]),  studying  methods  of agent  matching  that  relv  on  structured 
populations  (e.g.  Ellis  [24]),  the effect  of state-specific  mutation  rates  (e.g.  Blume 
[14]), or populations which are heterogeneous in either preferences (e.g.  Young [76]) 
or learning rules (e.g.  Matros  [47]).
The attraction of models using the KMR framework is that they enable progress 
to be made on  selection  between  strict  Nash  equilibria such  as  those found  in  the 
Nash demand game.  Methods to study equilibrium selection are discussed in section
6.1.2  below.  As mentioned above these are ‘long-run’ selections.  The reason for this 
is that mutation events  large enough to  move the population between stable states 
occur rarely.  This raises the question of whether the timescale for which these long- 
run predictions are accurate is relevant to the setting being modelled.  It is difficult 
to answer this question in general as many factors specific to the setting may affect 
this timescale.  For example,  mechanisms to reduce the long-run timescale could be 
provided  by  correlated  mutations,  matching  based  on  structured  populations  (e.g. 
Ellis  [24])  or  noisy  learning  (e.g.  Binmore  and  Samuelson  [7]).  The  question  of 
whether the long-run timescale is relevant for the model of this chapter is discussed 
in section 9.2 of the conclusion.
The remainder of this subsection briefly discusses some of the relevant  features 
of the KMR model.  The  assumption  of a  large  population  of agents  who  interact 
repeatedly is natural for many biological3 and social settings.  Examples are landlords 
and tenants choosing contracts  or two  populations  representing predator  and  prey 
each containing various subpopulations with different  behaviours.  The use of large 
populations does not seem so reasonable for an underlying game with a laige number 
of players.  This case is discussed in section 7.2.4.  In a large population, the random
3For biological  models  the  'learning  rule'  should  be  replaced  with  rules  modelling  the  rates  ol 
birth and death of agents  based  on their  payoffs.  See Seymour  [61 j  lor example.
165matching process has the advantage that repeated matchings between agents are rare 
so that issues such as repeated game effects4  can be neglected.  Another advantage 
is that  some  variables  in  the  model can  be  approximated  by expected  values.  For 
example, KMR mention a setting where agents are matched a large number of times 
in each round and their average payoffs, used by the learning rules, are approximated 
by their expected payoffs.  Another example is in the proof that the ‘aspiration and 
imitation’  model,  an evolutionary  model using the framework described above,  can 
be  approximated  over  finite  time  periods  by  deterministic  equations.  This  model 
and the proof are given in section  3.1  of Samuelson  [57].
Mutation  plays  the  crucial  role  of introducing  noise  into  the model  which can 
occasionally disrupt patterns of play based 011 pure Nash equilibria.  This specifica­
tion of noise has the advantage of being introduced at an agent level,  and produces 
a more tractable model than some alternatives such as Foster and Young [26].  Some 
possible alternative specifications of noise are mentioned in section  7.2.6.
The  use  of short-sighted  learning  rules  in  evolutionary  models  is  discussed  in 
section 3.3.5.  KMR argue that they are especially relevant when the model displays 
what they refer to as inertia.  This is the case where the rate at which agents change 
their strategies is slow compared to how often they play the game.  Thus the expected 
payoff of a strategy changes only slowly and a good short-sighted choice of strategy 
also does well in the near future.
4  See proposition  10.2  of Muthoo  [51]  for  an  illustration  of how  a repeated  2  player  bargaining 
games can support a wide array  of SPE outcomes.
1666.1.2  Perturbed  Discrete  Markov  Processes
A  discrete  Markov process  is  a family of random variables  A?  with  the same finite 
or countable state space  Z for time values ( G  N with  the property
P (X t+i  = z'\Xt = z) =P(Xt+ 1  = z'\
Xt, —  Z,Xt-[  —  Zt-i,Xt,- 2  =   Zt-2,.  ■   •  )Vc/._ i .  Z f— 2  
=  P z z ’{t)
for  some values  Pzz> {t)  such  that  Pzz> (t)  = 1   for  each  2  and  t.  The  value  of
Xt is referred to  as the state of the system at  time t.  The values  Pzz'{t) are called
transition probabilities.  I1 1 the case that  Pzz>   is constant  over  t the process is called 
time homogeneous.  The Markov processes discussed in this thesis are discrete, time 
homogeneous and have finite state spaces.
A state  z'  £  Z  is  accessible  from  z  £  Z if there is  a positive  probability of the 
state  changing  from  z  to  z'  in  a  finite  number  of transitions.  This  is  defined5  to 
include  the  case  z  —  z'.  A  state  z  £  Z  is  said  to  communicate  with  z'  £  Z  if 
they are accessible  from  each  other.  This is  an equivalence  relation  and  partitions 
the  state  space  into  equivalence  classes  referred  to  as  communication  classes.  A 
recurrent class of Z is a communication class such that no state outside the class is 
accessible from any state inside it.  It  is straightforward that every Markov process 
with a finite set  of states has  at  least one recurrent class6.  States not contained in 
a recurrent class  are called  transient.  A Markov  process with exactly one recurrent 
class containing all states  is referred to as  irreducible.
5This material can be presented slightly  differently and sometimes  ‘accessible'  is delined so that 
it does not always  cover the  case  z  =  z  .  The presentation  used  in this section  is  based on section 
3.3 of Young [78].
0  Otherwise there is always a positive probability of leaving a communication class.  Since there 
can be only a finite number of communication classes,  there must be a positive probability of leaving 
one and  returning to  it.  But  this  implies  the existence ol  states  outside  this  communication  class 
which communicate with  its elements.
167Assume Z is finite and index its  elements  as  {zi, z2:... ,  -„}•  Let p be a proba­
bility distribution over  Z.  The probability distribution in the following time period 
is given by pP where P is the n x n matrix (PZ i  Zj) and p is written as a row vector. 
A  stationary  distribution satisfies
/' = tiP  (G.l)
An important case is where
for  z ^  z'
1  —  A t AQzz  for  z —  z'
and Yhz>  Qzz'  =  1-  That is,  A  is the probability that a transition occurs in any time 
period  and  Qzz<   is  the  conditional  probability  that  the  state changes  from  z  to  z' 
given that a transition occurs.  Then P —   (1 -  A)/T XQ where I is an identity matrix 
and Q is the n x  n matrix  (QZ iZ j).  Under these conditions,  equation  (6.1)  becomes
p = tlQ  (6.2)
This shows that  stationary  distributions depend only on the conditional transition 
probabilities to other states  given that  a transition takes place.
It is a well known result7 that any Markov process with a unique recurrent class 
has a unique stationary distribution p*.  Furthermore p*  describes the time-average 
asymptotic behaviour of the process  independently  of the initial state po i.e.
t= N
Jim   T7  ^°pt  =   V*  (6‘3) A —>oc  iv  ^ J  
7 =  1
For  each  state  z  G  Z  let  N z  be  the  set  of integers  n  >  0  such  that  there  is 
a positive  probability  of  the  state  moving  from  ;  to  2  in  exactly  n  periods.  An 
aperiodic  recurrent  class  C  is  one  in  which the greatest  common divisor of N z  is  1 
for all z €  C.  It  can be shown that  the greatest  common divisor of N z  is the same 
for any  z  €  C  so  ‘any’  can  be substituted  for  ‘all’  in  the  previous  definition.  If a
7A reference for proofs  of the results  0 1 1  Markov  processes in  this section  is Ghung  [20].
168Markov  process  has  a unique  aperiodic  recurrent  class  then  the  result  of equation 
(6.3)  can be strengthened to the following ergodicity result:
bin  {iqP 1   =  p*  (6.4)
That  is,  p  describes  the  long-run  expected  state  of the  process  independently  of 
the initial state.
The ergodic distribution p*  can be found by solving (6.1)  directly,  but the com­
putational cost of this is often prohibitive for a large state space.  Kandori Mailath 
and Rob in  [37]  present  the following  alternative  method8.  Recall  the definition of 
a  directed  tree  from  section  3.2.  A  tree  rooted  at  x  E  Z  is  a  directed  tree  with 
vertices  Z and  root x.  Given  a directed  tree T,  let  P(T)  denote the the product of 
the transition probabilities Pxy for all directed edges (x, y) of T.  Let v(x)  = £  P{T) 
where the sum is  taken over  all  trees  rooted  at  x.  The Markov chain tree theorem 
states that for an irreducible Markov process v(x)  is proportional to p*.  That is
*  =  7'Q-)
"x   E ^iy)
A proof of the Markov chain tree theorem is given in Young  [78]  (lemma 3.1).  Note 
that this theorem can easily be applied to Markov processes which are not irreducible 
but contain a unique recurrent class by removing the transient states from the state 
space,  as  it  is  straightforward  to  prove  that  transient  states  receive zero weight  in 
the stationary distribution.
The  following  methods  apply  for  perturbed  Markov processes.  See  section  3.4 
of Young  [78]  for  a  general  definition  of these.  For  the  purpose  of this  thesis,  it 
suffices to note that this definition encompasses Markov processes whose transition 
probabilities  involve  a  possibility  e  of  mutation  as  described  in  the  framework  of 
section  6.1.1  and  such  that  for  all  e  >  0  there  is  a  unique  recurrent  class.  The 
Markov process in the case e — 0 is called the  unperturbed process.
8This method  is a discrete version  of techniques given  in  triedlin and Wentzell  [27].
169For a perturbed Markov process, taking the low mutation limit of the stationary 
distribution, lime_*o p,*, allows a simplification of the tree analysis.  A state is said to 
be stochastically stable if it receives positive probability in this limiting distribution. 
Given  any  two  states  z, z'  E  Z ,  define  the  one-step  resistance  from  2  to  z'  to  be 
the minimum number of mutations  needed to move from  2 to  in a single round. 
If no such transition  is  possible define the one-step  resistance to be oc.  Define the 
resistance  of a directed  tree  to  be  the sum  of the one-step  resistances.  A  minimal 
tree  is a directed  tree  with  minimum  resistance.  The  Markov  chain  tree  theorem 
implies that  a state is stochastically  stable if and only if it is the root of a minimal 
tree.  A proof of this result is contained in Young [77]  (it is theorem 4 of this paper). 
The idea behind this result is that as e tends to 0, mutations become extremely rare, 
so the probability  of moving  between  two  states depends principally  011 how many 
mutations  it  involves.  A  survey  of methods  which  further  refine  this  technique  is 
contained  in  Binmore  et  al  [9].  Section  7.6  proves  a  theorem  on  the  evolutionary 
model of this chapter based on these tree methods.
6.1.3  E volu tion ary  M od els  of B argaining
Young  ([76]  and  chapter  8  of  [78])  applies  the  methods  of the  previous  section  to 
a model of the  Nash  demand  game.  Young's  model  has  two  populations;  one  for 
each player in the game.  In each round a single pair of agents are matched to play 
the Nash demand  game  once.  Agents  use  their  learning  rules  to  choose  strategies 
immediately prior to playing the underlying game, and this choice is determined by 
play in the n  most  recent  rounds.  Hence  the  fixed demands  of the  agents  become 
irrelevant  and  the  state  of the  system  can  be given  by  the outcome  of the n most 
recent rounds.  Young uses  a learning rule in which agents  play a best leply to the 
mixed  strategy  given  by  the  frequencies  of  demands  in  a  landom  sample  of m  of 
the 11 most recent  rounds.  The value of in  depends on which population the agent 
belongs to.  Young proves that under some mild conditions, the stochastically stable
170states  of  the  model  correspond  to  an  asymmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution  with 
bargaining powers corresponding to the values of  f   for each population.
Binmore,  Samuelson and Young in  [9]  present another model based on the KMR 
framework and apply it to the Nash demand game and some closely related variant 
games.  This  model  also  has  a  population  for  each  player  position.  Both  these 
populations  contain  M   agents.  The  paper  studies  two  dynamics  which  are  based 
on learning involving agents switching to a best reply to the mixed strategy profile 
given by the frequencies of strategies  amongst  the agents of the other population9.
The two dynamics are interpreted as representing the same process under differ­
ent assumptions about limits on M  and e and the occurrence of mutations.  Consider 
a process in which in every round every  agent  updates to the best reply mentioned 
above  with probability  A  if they  do  not  mutate.  The first  model  of  [9],  stochastic 
best  response  dynamics,  applies  the  usual  model  of  mutation  to  this  process  and 
investigates  the  behaviour  in  the  limiting  case  e  — >   0.  The  second  model,  deter­
ministic  best  response  dynamics,  can  be  interpreted  as representing the case where 
there is a probability A in each round of a ‘mutation event’.  If this occurs then each 
agent has a probability e of mutating in that round.  The deteministic best response 
dynamics capture the limiting case where the limits are taken in the order of A  — >  0 
then  M   — ►   oo  and  finally  e  — >   0.  That  is,  mutations  occur very  infrequently  but 
many may appear in the same round, and in between such rounds the dynamics fol­
low a deterministic path.  Thus after each mutation event the dynamics reach some 
recurrent class of the unperturbed dynamics with probability 1 before any more mu­
tations occur.  Thus setup simplifies the analysis of the case by tree methods.  Under 
an ordinary mutation scheme,  a least resistant path between recurrent classes might 
take a complicated  form involving  a burst of  mutations,  followed by  learning,  then 
more mutations10.
9Note that  under  these  learning  rules  it  is  not  necessary  lor  the  agents  to  be  matched  to  play
the game each  round.
10A concrete example ol  this is  given  in  lootnote  11  ot  [9]
171Binmoie  et  al  piove  that  both  these  dynamics  support  the  symmetric  Nash 
bargaining  solution  foi  the  Nash  demand  game.  However  for  the  contract  game 
the stochastic  dynamics  support  the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution  of [36]  (discussed 
briefly in  section  4.1).  This  game  is  a  modification  of the  Nash  bargaining  game 
in which the players receive payoff zero unless their demand pair lies 011 the Pareto 
boundary  of their  utility  cake.  In  the  latter  case  players  receive  payoffs  equal  to 
their demand.  The deterministic dynamics support the symmetric Nash bargaining 
solution for the contract  game.  This result shows that the relative values of AI and 
e may qualitatively  influence the behaviour  of an evolutionary  bargaining model in 
the KMR framework.
6.2  An  Overview  of the  Evolutionary  Model
This section  presents  the  main  algorithm  for  the evolutionary  model of bargaining 
proposed  in  this  chapter.  Outlines  of the  various  steps  are  sketched  here  and  are 
discussed in chapter 7.  The details of the steps are completed in section 7.5.
A  bilateral  exchange  network  N   =  (P.E.K.)  is  under  investigation.  For  each 
i € P there is a population  A 1  which is a set of agents.  Each population is assumed 
to contain  the  same  number  of agents,  M .  Each  agent  in  A 1  is  endowed  with  an 
individual state composed of a  demand  in  Dj  and an informational state in Ir.  The 
demand set  Dr   is  a finite set  of 11011-negative  reals.  Let  D —  {Dr),^p.  The form of 
the set Ii varies and is discussed below.  It is always a finite set.  An initial individual 
state for each agent must be given11.
There  is  an  underlying  game Af{N. D),  defined  shortly,  with  player  set  P  and 
strategy set Dj  for player i.  The evolutionary model is as follows.
n In the computer implementation  it suffices to give the number of agents in each initial state lor 
each  population.  See  the  discussion  on  the  computer  representation  of  the  aggregate  state of  the 
model in section  6.3.
172Algorithm  (M ain  loop).
1.  Randomly sample an agent  from each population using a uniform probability 
distribution.  These are referred to as the  active  agents.
2.  Call  a subroutine  to  play J\f  with  the  demands  of the  active  agents.  Assign 
the realised payoffs of the game to the active agents12.
3.  For each active agent  in turn,  call the updating subroutine to determine their 
new individual state.
4.  Alter the population state accordingly.
5.  Return to step  1.
An execution  of steps  1  to  5  is  referred  to  as  a  round.  The  number  of rounds 
performed measures how much time has been simulated by the model.  On the other 
hand  the  length  of  time  spent  by  a  computer  program  running  the  simulation  is 
referred to as the run-time.  When an agent is referred to as active it is usually with 
reference to a particular round.
The game Af(N, D)  is  the  following  extension  of the  Nash  demand  game.  Let 
d —   (di)iep  be  a strategy  profile.  This  is  also  referred  to  as a  demand profile.  Let 
T(d)  be the set of all  maximal  consistent  outcomes of N  given d.  These are defined 
shortly.  A  uniform  random  distribution  is  used  to  choose  an  element  of this  set. 
Players’ payoffs are given by their shares in this outcome.  Note that in the terms of 
section  3.3, Af is  a game in  which all player  make an action  in the first period and 
then a random move  decides  the  payoffs.  The algorithm outlined  above could also 
be used with other underlying games.
Recall  that  definition  3 .8  defines  a  feasible  outcome  of a  network  N.  Such  an 
outcome gives  a share for  each  player  and  a set  of realised  exchanges.  These must 
satisfy various feasibility constraints generated from the netwoik N.
12These payoffs are  used  in the  updating subroutine.
173Definition  6.1.  A  consistent  outcome  of  N  —  (P,E.JC)  given demand profile d = 
(^i)i€P is &  feasible outcome such that condition i)  below holds.  If condition ii) also 
holds then it is called a  maximal  consistent  outcome
i)  If playei  i  is involved in a realised exchange then their share equals d}.
ii)  If (dj^dj)  € KlJ   then at least one of  i  and j  is involved in a realised exchange.
The second condition means that  in a consistent outcome it is not  possible that 
two  neighbouring  players  do  not  exchange  but  have  a  demand  pair  which  lies  in 
the corresponding utility  cake.  Given  a consistent  outcome  which is  not  maximal, 
realised exchanges can  be added until a maximal consistent outcome is generated.
Agents use leaining rules to update their demands.  As discussed in section 3.3.5, 
these are relatively  simple shortsighted  heuristic rules.  It  is assumed  that  learning 
rules  are  deterministic13  and  all  agents  use  the  same  learning  rule.  The  role  of 
agents’ informational states is to provide the only additional input for learning rules 
beyond the demands and payoffs of the active agents.  An informational state might 
encapsulate information that the agent has learned from recent play (e.g.  the average 
of the realised  payoffs  for each  demand),  or  it  could contain information about  the 
agent’s  recent  play  (e.g.  average  payoff  received)  which  other  agents  sometimes 
observe.  Thus  the  specifications  of  /,  and  the  updating  subroutine  depend  upon 
which learning rule is  used.
There is assumed to be a possibility of mutation.  Upon updating in step 3, there 
is a probability e that an  agent  may switch to a random demand rather than using 
their learning rule.  The random demand is chosen by a uniform distribution on the 
corresponding demand set.  The updating subroutine must describe this possibility 
as well as the learning rule and the details of how the informational state is updated.
Note that some learning rules14  do not  depend on the payoffs agents receive.  In
13This  restriction  is  not  essential.  It  is  made  because  it  simplifies  some  later  exposition  and
because in practice only deterministic learning  rules  were used  in the course of this research.
14For example,  the sampled  best  reply  learning rule described  in  section  7.1.2.
174this case, step 2 of the algorithm can be removed to reduce the computational cost. 
For the results of the model to be based on the underlying game, such learning rules 
must use J\f directly.
Foi  the learning  rules  considered  below,  either  I,  is  a singleton  -  if agents  use 
only the most  lecent realised  payoffs and  demands of active agents to update their 
demands —   01  Ij  =  Dj  U {0}  and  an  agent s  individual  state represents  their most 
recent payoff1 J.  An example of the latter case is if the learning rule involves sampling 
another  agent  and  deciding  whether  to  imitate  them  based  on  their  most  recent 
payoff.
6.3  The M odel  as  a Markov  Process
The evolutionary model of the previous section can  be described as a discrete time
homogeneous Markov process.  The time value corresponds to the number of rounds
played.  A state of the model can be represented by a specification of the individual
state of each agent.  The state of the model is often referred to below as the aggregate
state to differentiate it  from the individual state of an agent.
Note that at no point in the model does the identity of an agent play a part, only
the population  to  which  they  belong  and  their  individual state.  This  suggests  an
alternative representation of aggregate state.  In a given round, each population can
be partitioned into subpopulations  which  are  homogeneous with respect  to agents’
individual  states.  The  vector  of  sizes  of  each  of  these  subpopulations  acts  as  a
representation of aggregate  state.  The  aggregate  state space in this  case is the set
of all such vectors which conserve  the initial  total population sizes.
The latter representation  is used in the computer implementation of the model,
as it makes less demands on storage10.  However,  the former representation is used
15In a variation where agents update their strategies  before playing the one-shot game.  /,  —  {(). 1}
can serve this purpose.  0 can represent a most recent pay  oh of zeio and  1   can repiesent most recent
payoff equal to the agent’s  demand.
16In the case where M  is small compared to the number of possible individual states in a typical
175for the remainder of this chapter.  Arguments expressed using this representation are 
easier to follow.  This is due to the fact that agents are given individual identities.  It 
is thus straightforward to refer to a particular agent, such as one which mutates, over 
several following rounds.  These references could easily be translated to accommodate 
the other representation of aggregate state but would be much less concise.
Under either representation of aggregate state, the transition probabilities can be 
calculated directly from the description of the model.  This completes the definition 
of a  Markov  process.  In  a  slight  abuse  of  terminology,  for  the  remainder  of this 
chapter I sometimes  refer to  features of the model when I strictly mean features of 
this Markov process.
Definition  6.2.  A  state  is  said  to  support  demand  rf,  for  population  A 1  if there 
exists an agent  in that  population  with  that  demand.  A  state  s  is said to support 
a demand profile  (dj)iep  if for  all  i  €  P  it  supports  d1   for  population A1.  A set  of 
states S is said to support a demand profile d if some state s 6 S supports d .
Given an aggregate state, a vector giving the number of agents in each population 
playing each demand can be calculated.  Such a vector is referred to as the aggregate 
demand state.
Lemma  6.1.  The  following  conditions  are  sufficient for  the  Markov process just 
defined to have  a unique  aperiodic  recurrent  class.
1.  e > 0
2.  There exists an n  such that the following is true.  If at least n rounds have been 
played then  the  learning rule selects  a new informational state  dependent only 
on  the  demands  and  payoffs  of  the  active  agents  and  the  aggregate  demand 
state in the  most  recent n  rounds
population, the former representation  might  become more efficient.  However,  for the simulations of 
chapter 8 this is  not the case.
176Condition  2  effectively  limits  the  informational  content  of informational  sttites 
to events in the  most recent  n rounds17.
Proof.  Fix iV, D, e  > 0, a demand profile cl of Af(N, D) and a learning rule satisfying 
condition 2 .  Choose some  n as described in condition 2.
Let 7T  be a possible payoff profile of Af(N, D) given demand profile d.  Let 9r  £ It  
be the informational state chosen by the learning rule for an agent in population A1  
if for the previous  n rounds:  the sampled  demand  profile is  c l,  the  resulting payoff 
profile is 7r and  for all j £ P the demand of every agent  in population AJ   is dr 
Let so be any aggregate state.  In any round there is a positive probability that 
the active agent in population A1 mutates to demand d,.  Assume this takes place for 
a ll i £ P throughout the following description.  Each round there is an active agent 
from some population  A1   who  does  not  use  demand  dj  until  no  more  such  agents 
exist.  Then n further rounds take place.  In each following round the realised payoff 
profile is 7r and there is an active agent  from some population A1  who does not have 
informational state  This results  in the state  s  in which for  all  i £ P the agents 
in population A1   have demand dj  and informational state 0l.
The  preceding  description  is  constructed  to  have  positive  probability.  Thus  s 
is accessible  from  any  choice  of so,  so  no  more  than  one  recurrent  class can  exist. 
From state s  there is a positive probability that in the following round all sampled 
agents  mutate  so  that  their  demands  are  unchanged  and  the  realised  payoff is  7r. 
The resulting  state  must  be  s.  Hence  the  greatest  common  divisor  of  Ns   is  1  as 
required.  O
An example of where condition 2 fails is in an implementation of fictitious play18.
17An alternative  would  be  to  require  that  each  agent  has  been  active  at  least  n  times  and  the
learning rule selects a new informational state depending on  the demands and payoffs of the active
agents and the  aggregate  demand  state  in  the  most  recent  n  lounds  in  which  the  updating agent
was active.  The proof  for this case  is similar.
18Fictitious play is a learning rule in which a mixed strategy for each population A,  is constructed
from  the  relative  frequencies  with  which  each  action  Ims  been  played  over  all  preceding  rounds.
177In this case, informational states must contain information on the entire past history. 
Another example is if an agent s informational state depends in part 011 their initial 
informational state.  I11 this case,  initial  informational states can effectively  classify 
the agents into different  types which cannot  be changed  by learning.
Note that  for  the case where  an  informational  state  represents the most  recent 
payoff, there usually also exist some transient states.  For example, an aggregate state 
in which all agents have an informational state representing receiving the maximum 
payoff is  not  accessible  from  any  other  state,  except  in  some  trivial  networks,  iis 
it would  require  all  active  agents  in  the  previous  round  to  receive  their  maximum 
payoff.  This  is  why  some  results  of section  G.1.2  are  quoted  for  Markov  processes 
with a unique recurrent class,  rather than for irreducible processes.
Agents then update to best replies to the resulting mixed strategy profile.  See chapter 2 of Fudenberg 
and Tirole  [29]  for  example.Chapter  7
Simulation:  Details
The chapter  explores  the  details  of the steps  of the  evolutionary  model  defined  in 
chapter 6.  Section  7.1  discusses various  learning rules which  agents  may employ  in 
the model and proposes several candidates for use.  Section 7.2 explains the reasons 
for the modelling choices made,  and discusses various alternatives.  Section 7.3 con­
tains predictions of the behaviour of the model under the candidate learning rules. 
Predictions of general behaviour are developed based on the preceding discussion of 
the candidate learning rules and the material of chapter 6.  There is also discussion 
of a theorem predicting the outcome for some positions in unit cake networks under 
certain learning rules.  Section  7.4 develops methods of reporting the results of the 
simulation based on the predictions of general behaviour.  Section 7.5 completes the 
description of the model by giving details  of various steps, paying particular atten­
tion to how these steps are implemented in a computer simulation.  Finally, section 
7.6 is an appendix which states  and proves the theorem mentioned above.
7.1  Learning  Rules
Sections  7.1.1  -  7.1.3  describe  various  classes  of learning  rules  adapted  from  both 
the sociology and economic theory literatures.  The theoietical lesults fiom chaptei
1796 are used to predict their behaviour in the model and assess their likely usefulness. 
Three learning rules aie identified as candidates for use in simulation:  imitate better, 
proportional  imitation  and  sampled  best  reply.  Some  variations  011  these  are  also 
defined.  Vaiious predictions of the behaviour of the model under the learning rules 
are made  in  this  section.  These  are  summarized  and  developed  further  in  section 
7.3.1.
Note  that  a  major  criterion  for  selection  of  learning  rules  for  use  in  computer 
simulation is  that  they  must  be reasonably  computationally  efficient.  The Markov 
process structure of the evolutionary model of chapter G  means that a large number 
of rounds must be used to gain an insight into its behaviour.  In this situation, every 
part of the main loop described in section G.2 is used a large number of times.  Slow 
subroutines can therefore have a large effect on the computational speed and reduce 
the maximum  size  of  networks  which  can  be  studied  in  a  reasonable  runtime.  In 
particular,  this  means  that  learning  rules  must  typically  be  based  011  information 
gathered from a few agents rather than 011 information aggregated from all agents1.
Recall  that  one  aim  of this  thesis  is  to  find  a  method  which  is  capable  of in­
vestigating  reasonably  large  networks.  This  means  that  memory limits  become an 
issue2.  Recall from section 6.3 that the computer implementation stores the state of 
the model as a vector of sizes of subpopulations which are homogeneous in individual 
state.  It is important that the informational state space remains relatively small to 
prevent the number of subpopulations from becoming too large for large networks.
7.1.1  Im itative  L earning  R ules
Imitative  learning  rules  operate  by  agents  sampling  others  in  the same population 
and sometimes switching  to  their  demands.  A  simple candidate  imitative  learning
1Some aggregated information is readily available. such as the number of agents in uk h individual
state.  However this alone is typically  not enough  lor  a learning lule.
2These are mainly the limits imposed  0 1 1 the size ol  arrays  by the programming language lather
than the available system memory.
180rule  is  imitate  better.  Under  this  rule  an  updating  agent  samples  another  in  the 
same population with a uniform probability distribution and switches if the sampled 
agent has a highei  most recent  payoff.  A variation is for the agent  to switch with a 
probability proportional to the payoff advantage of the sampled agent, or probability 
zero if the sampled  agent  has  a worse  payoff.  This yields  a proportional  imitation 
learning rule^.  A family of such rules exist depending on the factor oj proportionality 
used.  The  factor  of proportionality  must  be  selected  such  that  the probability  of 
switching demand is 110 more than  1.  These two simple imitative learning rules are 
used in many simulations  of  the next  chapter.  For both,  the informational state of 
an agent represents their most  recent  payoff and so I,  =  D, U {oj.
The following variations of these rules are also sometimes used.  These are called 
imitate better and  proportional  imitation  with sample  size  n.  Under these the up­
dating agent samples n agents from the same population with a uniform probability 
distribution and without replacement1.  For each demand d of a sampled agent,  the 
average  most  recent  payoff of  agents  in  the  sample  playing  d.  «(<:/),  is  calculated. 
A  demand  d*  maximising  a(d)  is  chosen  using  a  uniform  distribution  011  all  such 
demands.  The learning rule now proceeds as if the demand d*  and payoff a(d*)  had 
been sampled by an  agent  using the ordinary  imitate  better or proportional imita­
tion rule.  This learning  rule  allows  the  updating  agent  to  base their  new demand 
on  an  imperfectly  observed  picture  of  the  state  of  their  whole  population.  As  n 
increases the observation of the state becomes more accurate.
Some other possible variations of these rules include introducing a rule to decide 
whether to update at all  (e.g.  only if payoff falls below an aspiration level),  using a 
different rule to decide whether to switch the the observed demand, or increasing the 
amount of information observed 011 sampled players  (e.g.  the most recent  n payoffs 
could be observed).
3 As proposed  by  Schlag  [58].
4Sampling is  without  replacement  to  minimise  the  computational  cost,  tor  a  laige  population 
this is a good  approximation  of  sampling  with  replacement.
181The  remainder  of this  section  discusses  the  behaviour  of  the  model  under the 
imitate better and proportional imitation rules, and to some extent under any imita­
tive learning rule.  Consider the unperturbed model under an imitative learning rule. 
In this  model,  new  demands  cannot  be  introduced  into  populations.  Consider  an 
aggregate  demand state  such that  every  population  is  demand  homogeneous.  The 
set of all aggregate  states  corresponding to this aggregate  demand state must con­
tain a recurrent class.  Under the imitate better and proportional imitation learning 
rules  agents  never  imitate  others  with  equal  payoffs.  Thus  there  may  also  be  re­
current classes in which some populations contain agents playing different demands 
but all receiving payoff zero.  This result can be summarized as follows.  Every B set 
contains a recurrent class.
Definition 7.1.  An B set is a maximal set S of states such that for each  l € P one 
of the following conditions holds.
i)  All agents in A 1  have the same demand in all states of S.
ii)  If the game Af(N, D) is played using any demand profile supported0 by S then 
player i receives  an expected  payoff of zero.
An example  of a B  set  in  which  condition  ii)  holds  for  a population  is  the  fol­
lowing.  Let N be a 3 player line network in which /C12  is a 2-unit cake and /C26  is a 
unit cake.  There exists a B set in which all agents in population  1  make demand  ^, 
all agents in population 2  make demand  §  and agents in population 3 make various
demands and receive payoff zero.
It is shown6 in lemma 7.4 of the appendix to this chaptei  that foi  imitate bettei 
and proportional imitation there are no recurrent classes of the unpeituibed model 
which are not  contained  in  B  sets.  A  sketch  of  the  aigument  is given  heie  as it  is
° Recall the definition ol support  from  definition 6.2.
°In order to apply the  lemma to get  the result  described  it  is  also necessary  to observe that,  in 
the notation of appendix  7.6.  any  B  £ B  is  a subset  of a B set.
182persuasive foi  many other  imitative  learning rules,  although  a complete proof may 
be not  be straightforward.  In  the  unperturbed model,  for  populations  other  than 
A  there  is  a  positive  probability  of  the  same  agents  becoming  active  each  round 
and not changing their demands due to not  sampling  better alternatives  (e.g.  they 
might sample themselves).  Thus there is  a positive  probability that  every agent  in 
population A i becomes active in turn and makes a similar sample of the population. 
If they all sample an  agent  a  in population  A 1 '  with highest  payoff ,  then there is a 
positive probability that  every agent  with a lower  payoff will switch to the demand 
of agent  a.  A  feature  of  the  underlying game is  that  any  agent  receiving  the same 
payoff  as  agent  a  must  already  be  playing  the  same  demand,  unless  the  payoff of 
agent a is zero.  If this process is repeated,  a state in a B set is eventually reached.
The following argument suggests that  under imitate  better or proportional imi­
tation in the long term the model is more likely to select  B sets supporting demand 
profiles which are plausible as rational solutions of the underlying game such as strict 
Nash equilibria.  Consider a state in a recurrent class of the unperturbed model.  This 
state must lie in a B set.  For a population A 1 such that condition i) of definition 7.1 
holds, there is  a positive  probability  that  a state can  be reached without mutation 
in which every  agent  in  that  population  has  the same most  recent  payoff.  Then it 
requires only  a single  agent  in  population  A 1  to  mutate  to a different  demand  and 
receive a higher payoff for the state to leave this recurrent class of the unperturbed 
model.  However  this  argument  can  also  be  applied  to  some  B  sets  which support 
a  unique  demand  profile  which  is  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium  if there  are  multiple 
realisable payoffs to this profile.  For example,  in a network with an odd number of 
players one must  always  be excluded  from exchange.  Nonetheless  this argument  is 
useful in proving the prediction of theorem  7.3 in the appendix.
The multiple strict  Nash equilibria of J\f for a 2  pla^ei  netwoik all have unique 
realisable  payoffs.  Define  the  outwaf’ d  vasistciTicc  of  a lecmrent  class  of the unpei- 
turbed model to be the minimum number of mutations lequiied foi the state to leach
183another recuirent class of the unperturbed model.  For the 2 player case, it is easy to 
see that recurrent classes of the unperturbed model within B sets supporting demand 
profiles which are strict Nash equilibria all have outward resistance of more than 1. 
The following  aigument  shows  that  in fact  all  such  recurrent classes have outward 
lesistance of 2.  Suppose  an  agent  in each  population  mutates,  their new demands 
form a different strict Nash equilibrium, and in the next round these agents become 
active  again.  One  mutant  agent  must  earn  a  higher  payoff than  the  non-mutants 
in  the  same  population.  There  is  thus  a  positive  probability  that  this  mutant  is 
imitated by  all the non-mutants.  It  seems plausible from  the above argument  that 
under  these  learning  rules  selection  between  the  multiple  strict  Nash  equilibria of 
a 2  player  network  may  not  be  possible  by  the  resistance  arguments  described  in 
section 6.1.2 alone.  To make any progress theoretically it may be necessary to apply 
the Markov chain tree theorem directly.
Note that imitate better7 relies only on the ordinal properties of demands.  Given 
a path between two states, if all demands involved in the path are relabelled so that 
ordinal  relations  are  preserved  then  the  resulting  path  has  the  same  probability. 
Thus is seems likely that the results for this network under the imitate better learning 
rule are not robust8 to the choice of D.  Since demand sets are an exogenously chosen 
part of the model  this  raises  the  possibility  that  there  are many valid choices and 
so the  solution  is  indeterminate.  However,  in  a  bargaining  situation  players  can 
typically attach a great number of nuances and conditions to their offers, effectively 
allowing  an  interval  of  utility  values  to  be  attained.  This  suggests  using  evenly 
spaced demand sets9  across  the  range  of  players  feasible  demands and  taking the
7These comments  do  not  apply  for  imitate  better  with  larger  sample sizes.  For  these  learning
rules, the averaging of payoffs  means that cardinal properties are also  used.
8That is, the results depend only on the ordinal structure of the outcomes of the game Af.  Note
that  this  is  not  equivalent  to  the  results  being  dependent  on  the  ordinal  structure  of the  utility
cake.  As mentioned  in section  3.1.2  this would  imply  an  indeterminate solution.
9Recall that von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities are used.  These are unique up to positive affine
transformations so  ‘evenly  spaced’  demand sets  are  well  defined.
184limit  as  the  space  between  demands  tends  to  zero.  However,  it  may  be  possible 
to make  a case  foi  othei  choices  of  demand  set  to  be  more  reasonable.  A  possible 
example in a two player  bargaining situation  are demand sets such that the Pareto 
optimal  outcomes  of  Af  are  evenly  spaced1(1.  Thus  results  that  are  dependent  011 
the choice  of  D  are  hard  to  defend.  Proportional  imitation  also  involves  cardinal 
properties of demands and so may be more robust.
Imitate better  makes  robust  predictions in other networks.  Theorem  7.3 in the 
appendix proves that under certain conditions, some positions in unit cake networks 
receive payoff's  of approximately  1  and 0 in  any  stochastically  stable state for  both 
imitate better  and  proportional  imitation.  A short version of this  result is given in 
section 7.3 below.  A prediction of this form can be interpreted as especially powerful 
since it involves only mechanisms based 011 the ordinal properties of the payoffs.  This 
is a reason to pursue simulations using imitate better.
7.1.2  B est  R ep ly  L earning  R ules
This class  of learning  rules  groups  together  all  those  which  involve  changing  to  a 
best reply.  As described in section  6.1.3,  the best reply dynamics used in Binmore 
et al  [9]  proved to be a powerful selection  mechanism in the 2 player Nash demand 
game.  One motivation for the use of best  reply learning rules here is to see whether 
similar  results  hold.  The  best  reply  dynamics  of  [9]  involved  using  a  best  reply 
to the  aggregate  mixed  strategy  given  by  the  frequency  of strategies  in  the  other 
population.  This  is  computationally  costly  as  it  involves  calculating  the expected 
payoff of many  pure strategy  demand profiles  and taking  an  appropriate weighted
10An  argument  that  this  is  a  reasonable  choice,  of  demand  sets  is  as  follows.  The  only  serious 
candidates  for  recurrent  classes  oi  the  unperturbed  model  which  aie  stable  foi  t  >  0   aie  those 
contained in B sets supporting strict  Nash  equilibria.  Thereloie  the results ot  the model aie  likely 
to depend only on the ordinal structure ol  these outcomes.  11  they are unevenly spaced,  this biases 
the outcome.sum  .  For  use in  the  model of  chapter  6.  an  alternative  best  reply  rule is  sought 
based on taking the best reply to a smaller sample of demands.
In the  sampled  best reply  learning rule with sample size m,  the updating agent 
samples m agents fiom each other population with replacement ^ .  A mixed strategy 
is  constiucted  for  each  other  population  from  the  relative  demand  frequencies  in 
these  samples.  The  updating  agent  then  chooses  a  new  demand  which  is  a  best 
reply  to  these  mixed  strategies.  The  minimum  demand  which  is  a  best  reply  is 
selected.  In  this  learning  rule  informational  states  are not  required,  so each set  of 
informational states is taken to be a singleton.
Many alternative best reply learning rules exist.  One source of variation is what 
information is used to construct  the strategies  to which a best  reply is taken.  Some 
choices are to use a mixed strategy  profile for each population given by the relative 
frequencies of agents’ demands in:  the most recent m rounds played, the most recent 
m rounds in which the updating agent  was active,  the entire history  (i.e.  fictitious 
play), a random sample of m \ of the most recent  7 7 /.2 rounds, or the entire population. 
One example of another possible variation in a best reply learning rule is that agents 
could use a rule to decide whether to change demand at all.
A  simple  alternative  best  reply  learning  rule  to  sampled  best  reply  is  one  in 
which active  agents  update  to  best  replies  given  the  demands  played  by  the other 
active agents.  The following example illustrates that  the model under this rule can 
exhibit  problematic  behaviour.  Consider  a  two  player  unit  cake  network.  Choose 
demand sets  such  that  D 2  =   {1  —  x\x  £  Di).  Select  some  x\  £  D\  and  let  X2  = 
1 -  x\  £  D2-   Let  6i(t)  and  02{t)  be  the  number  of agents  in  populations  1  and  2
n One possible  method  is  to  calculate  and  store  the  expected  payoff  of every  pure strategy  de­
mand  profile at  the  start  of  the  simulation.  Alternative  code  using this  method  still  proved to  be
prohibitively slow for large  networks and  also  ran  into  memory limitation  problems.
12Sampling  is  with  replacement  to  minimise  computational  costs,  toi  this  learning  rule,  the
values of m used in  practice are  1  and  2   so  there should  be  little difference  between sampling with 
and without replacement.
180playing demands  x\  and  x,2  at  the  start  ot  round  t.  Let  a\  and  a2  be  the  active 
agents in a particular round.  In the unperturbed model if exactly one agent a\  or a2 
plays the corresponding demand aq  or x2  then in the next round one of di  and 02 is 
reduced by 1  and the other is increased by  1.  Otherwise both are unchanged.  Thus 
0\(t) -f- @ 2(t)  is constant.  Since this property of the aggregate state is conserved, the 
learning rule can only have very weak selective power.  The problem is that demand 
updating occurs bilaterally;  a\  £ A 1  updates based on a2 £ A2 if and only if a2 £ A2 
updates based on a\  £ A1.  Sampled best reply avoids this relationship.
All best reply learning rules  must deal  with  the case where more than one best 
reply exists.  From  the point  of view  of ease of implementation in  a computer sim­
ulation  two  appealing  methods  are  to  give  all  best  replies  an  equal  chance  or  to 
make a decision based on  a lexicographic  ordering.  As mentioned  above,  the latter 
is used in the sampled best  reply rule:  the minimum demand which is a best  reply 
is selected..
B sets, as defined in definition 7.1.  are simpler for a sampled best reply learning 
rule than  for  imitative  learning  rule  since  they  110  longer  need  cope  with multiple 
informational  states.  A  recurrent  class  of  the  unperturbed  model  contained  in  a 
B set must be contained  in  one  in  which  condition  i)  of definition  7.1  holds for all 
populations.  That  is,  it  must  be contained  in  a B  set  in which all  populations are 
demand  homogeneous.  Such  a  B  set  contains  only  a  single  state.  In  a  B  set  for 
which condition ii)  holds  for  a population,  agents in that  population have multiple 
best replies and there is  a positive  probability that  they all  update to  the minimal 
best reply.  A B set which supports a strict Nash equilibrium and in which condition 
i)  of definition  7.1  holds  for  all  populations is  a recurrent  class of the unperturbed 
model.  Clearly  a B  set  which  does  not support  a Nash equilibrium cannot contain 
a recurrent class of the unperturbed model.
It is not obvious that all recurrent classes of the unpeitmbed model are subsets of 
B sets.  For example, this could not be the case if an underlying game were used with
187no pure Nash equilibria.  However,  it  is  possible to  show  that  from  any state there 
is a positive  piobability  in  the  unperturbed process of  reaching  a state  s  in which 
every population is almost demand homogeneous using an argument similar to that 
described for imitative learning rules in section 7.1.11 A  Let  d be the demand profile 
which almost  all  agents  play  according  to  in state  s.  It  can  be shown  that  from  a 
there is a positive  probability  that  almost  all  agents  in  any  single  population now 
update to a best reply to d.  while the agents in the other populations do not change 
their demands.  For some networks this method shows that a demand homogeneous1" 1  
state supporting a strict Nash equilibrium can be reached with positive probability1A 
For the general case this conclusion is not so straightforward.  However, it shows that 
any recurrent class of the unperturbed model which is not contained in a B set would 
be very large,  and is therefore intuitively  unlikely to be very stable.
For  the  model  under  sampled  best  reply  011  a  2  player  network,  it  is  possible 
for the state to move between two B sets supporting different strict  Nash equilibria 
with a single  mutation.  An  informal  description  of how such a move  may occur is 
as follows.  An  agent  in  population  A 1  mutates  to  new  demand a.  Every agent  in 
the other population,  J 1   in turn becomes active,  samples this mutant m times and 
switches to a best reply,  (3 .  Meanwhile, the mutant does not become active and thus 
does not change  demand.  Once population  A J  has  become demand homogeneous,
13The  argument  is  as  follows.  Fix  an  agent  from  each  population.  Label  this  set  of  agents  C. 
Suppose over the  following  rounds  every  other  agent  becomes  active,  and samples only  the agents
in C .  Then all agents outside  C  update  to  the same demand.
14Suppose  all  but  one  agent  in  each  population  play  according  to  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium  e.
Let the set of such  agents  be  C.  There  is  a  positive  probability  that  from  this  state all  agents  in
C  become active  and  sample  agents  outside  C.  In  the  resulting  state  all  populations  aie  demand
homogeneous,  and  only  demand  profile  e  is supported.
15For  example,  consider  Lj  and  suppose  D\  =   D .> ,  =   {1  — .r|:r  €  Lb}.  It  has  been  shown  that
there is a positive  probability  of  reaching  a  state  in  which  almost  all  agents  use  a demand  profile
(x,y,z)  where  y  <  1.  There  is  then  a  positive  probability  of  reaching  a state  in  which  all  agents
play according to the strict  Nash equilibrium  (1  —  y. y. 1   —  //)■
188its  agents  continue  sampling  the  mutant  and  so  do  not  change  demand  again.  In 
population A 1   every 11011-mutant agent  in turn switches to a best reply to  3 .  I11 the 
case that a is the unique best reply to 3 this completes the argument.  The remaining 
details  of the  more  general  case  are  of  little  interest  here.  It  can  be shown1 1 *   that 
the preceding argument implies that every strict Nash equilibrium is supported by a 
stochastically stable state.  Sampled best reply is therefore not guaranteed to provide 
a clear prediction for this network, and it is an interesting setting for the simulation.
Best  reply  rules  are  fundamentally  more  abstract  than  those  of  sections  7.1.1 
and 7.1.3.  The detail of how agents  adapt  to  the outcomes of the underlying game 
are abstracted away into a procedure of ‘taking the best reply’ without a description 
of how this  is  performed.  Indeed  in  most  best  reply  rules  it  is  not  even  necessary 
for  agents  to  play  Af  in  the  simulation:  only  the  updating  subroutine  is  required. 
This introduces a conceptual  problem of how a best  reply is  arrived at.  For agents 
to  compute  it  directly  requires  a  lot  of  information.  Firstly,  knowledge  of other 
agents’  demands  is  required17.  This  may  not  be  easy  to  acquire  from  agents  in 
distant  network  positions.  Secondly,  knowledge  about  the  utility  cakes  and  hence 
the preferences of other players is required.  If agents learn the best reply by trial and 
error methods, then this prompts the question of what the details of these methods 
are and whether  they  can  be  implemented  directly  as  learning rules.  Nonetheless, 
best reply rules are pursued in simulation to find out whether they offer a means of 
equilibrium selection.
The main problem  of using  best  reply  learning  rules is  the computational  cost. 
Finding a best  reply  requires  finding the expected  payoff  of each  possible demand.
16The techniques of section  7 .G  can  be  used  to  prove this.  Oonsider a  minimal tree T  011  Z  with 
root  z  which  does  not  correspond  to  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium.  The  argument  in  the  main  text 
shows that there  is  a path  o ol  resistance  zero  (in  il)  from  to a state  .r  which  corresponds to a 
strict  Nash  equilibrium.  Delete  the  edges  of  all  states  in  0   from  T.  and  add  the edges  ol  0 .   The 
resulting graph T'  is clearly  a tree rooted  at  Since  the resistance of any outward edge  from
is non-zero,  this new tree  has  a lower  resistance.  This  produces  the required  contradiction.
17In some circumstances  a best reply  may  be  independent of some  players'  demands.
189Performing these calculations every round is a significant processing cost, especially 
if the best reply to a mixed strategy profile must  be found.  Costs are likely  to rise 
quickly with the number of players,  as this increases the time required to calculate 
the expected payoff under one demand profile.  One option  to reduce this cost is to 
cache  the  results  of these  calculations.  This  seems  especially  useful  if the  state 
spends most of its time in or near B sets, as a small set of the best reply calculations 
will  then  be  repeated  very  often.  However,  the  processing  costs  during  transits 
between B sets could still be large.
7.1.3  Learning  Rules  Independent  of Other  Agents
There are a lot of possibilities for learning rules where the updating agent’s new indi­
vidual state depends only on their payoff and current individual state.  The principal 
example I have in mind for this class is  the following heuristic which is widely used 
in the sociology literature19.  When possible, agents who are excluded from exchange 
lower their demands,  and  agents  who are included  raise  their demands.  Unlike the 
learning rules considered above, this directly exploits the structure of the bargaining 
game20; lower demands are more likely to be included.
This  heuristic  could  be  adapted  to  a  learning  rule  for  the  model  described  in 
chapter 6 as follows.  An agent who receives a positive payoff updates their demand 
to the next highest in their demand set, or leaves it unchanged if no higher demand 
exists.  An agent who receives payoff of zero updates their demand to the next lowest 
in their demand  set,  or  leaves  it  unchanged  if  no lower  demand exists.  Under this 
learning rule all sets of informational states are singletons.  Unlike the other learning 
rules  considered  so  far,  under  this  learning  rule  the  unperturbed  model  does  not
18That is, store the results of a fixed number of the most recently performed best reply calculations
to reuse if they are required  again.
19For example it  is a ‘scope condition'  lor  the theory of  Markovskv  et  al  [4oj.
20It  seems  reasonable  that  learning  rules  specially  adapted  to  social  exchange  exist,  given  how
commonly such situations arise.
190possess recunent classes  contained  in B  sets,  except  in some trivial networks.  This 
is because in any demand profile supported by such a recurrent class, all agents who 
exchange in any outcome would have to receive their maximum payoff, which is not 
possible.
Instead  a  recurrent  class  of  the  unperturbed  model  would  allow  considerable 
variations of aggregate demand state.  Such recurrent classes do not provide a mech­
anism to directly select between the multiple strict Nash equilibria of the underlying 
game J\f in the low e limit  as  the previous learning rules do21.  Without  the predic­
tion that the state  is usually  at  a B  set.  there  is 110 simple mechanism to hand for 
summarizing the state of the model.  Thus interpreting the data from such a model 
is a considerable  task  and  it  may  be often  be hard to  make  a case that  the  model 
supports any particular demand profile as a solution.  This learning rule is not used 
due to these difficulties.
Nonetheless, this learning rule may sometimes make reasonably clear predictions 
of behaviour.  For example consider the network L 3 .  I11 a round where an exchange 
forms, the demand of one agent in population A 1  or A3 is increased and the demand 
of another  in  the  other  population  is  decreased,  unless  these  agents  already  make 
maximal or minimal demands respectively.  I11 a round where 110 exchanges form, the 
demands of two  agents  in  these  populations  are decreased  unless already  minimal. 
Thus there  appears  to  be considerable  downward  pressure  011  the average  demand 
in these two  populations  and  it  seems likely  that the model provides support for  a 
solution in which player  2 receives most of the available payoff.
A  slightly  modified  version  of  this  learning  rule,  as  used  by  Bonacich  in  [15], 
does  allow  recurrent  classes  of  the  unperturbed  model  contained  in  B  sets.  The 
modification  made  to  the  learning  rule  is  that  agents  who  exchange  leave  theii 
demands unaltered.  However,  now  any  state  in  which  all  agents  exchange  foi ms a 
21 Indeed,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the  mutation  mechanism  plays  a  significant  iole  in  the  model 
under this learning rule.
191recurrent  class  of the  unperturbed  model.  Also  from  most  of these  classes  many 
single  mutations  can  result  in  another  recurrent  class  ol  the  unperturbed  model 
being reached.  This appears to leave little scope for evolutionary  pressure to select 
a solution  with  much  precision.  Also,  since  recurrent  chisses  of  the  unperturbed 
model can exist  which  are not  contained  in  B  sets,  the problem of interpreting the 
data applies to this case  also.
The  learning  rules  discussed  in  this  section  illustrate  the  problem  with  using 
this class  of learning  rules  in  the  model  ol  chapter  6.  The  choice  of learning  rule 
prescribes too closely which demands could be stable, independently of the structure 
of the  network.  The  only  options  which  avoid  this  are  to  allow  either  110  stable 
demands or a very wide range of stable demands.  Either choice does not appear to 
allow a precise solution and may result in difficulty in interpreting the data.
7.2  M odelling  Choices
There are many reasonable alternatives to various features of the evolutionary model 
outlined in section  6.2.  This  section  discusses  the theoretical  reasons  for the mod­
elling choices  made  and  highlights  approaches  which  seem  to  be  valid  alternatives 
or extensions.  Sections  7.2.1  -  7.2.3  discuss  variations  in  the  underlying  game J\f 
whereas sections  7.2.4 and 7.2.5 discuss variations to the evolutionary process.  The 
final section,  section  7.2.6,  contains miscellaneous variations of both types.
7.2.1  M atching  Rules
The matching  rule  is  the  part  of  the  underlying  game  that  determines  which  ex­
changes form  given  a demand  profile  d.  In Af the  matching  lule  used  is  to choose 
from the set of all maximal consistent outcomes22, r(c/), using a unifonn piobability 
distribution.
22Recall definition  6 . 1   of consistent  and  maximal  consistent outcomes.
192A simple possible  alteiation  is  to select  from  a different  set.  One alternative is 
the set  r  (d)  of  all  Paieto  optimal  consistent  outcomes.  That  is,  those  consistent 
outcomes  given  d  whose  share  vectors  are  Pareto  optimal.  Observe  that  T'{d)  C 
T(d).  To  illustrate  that  T'(d)  ^   T(d)  consider  the  demand  vector  d  =  (x. 1  -  
x,x, 1 —  x) for network L4.  Then T(c/)  contains an outcome with share vector (0.1 —  
x,x,Q)  but  r^cZ)  does  not.  A11  interpretation  of  these  alternatives  is  that  using T 
represents a local matching procedure,  while using T/  represents a procedure which 
allows participants to  propose alternative  global matching arrangements until none 
can  suggest  an  improvement.  Under  this  interpretation,  T  seems  more  relevant, 
especially for larger networks.
Another possible alteration is to adjust the probabilities by which an element of 
T is chosen.  For  example,  this  could  be  done  by  defining  a specific  local  matching 
procedure.  In the model of chapter (j. equal probabilities have been assigned to each 
element of T(d)  for simplicity.
Another alternative matching rule is to require players to specify a unique target 
for  their  demand.  That  is,  players  must  make  directed  demands.  In  this  case,  a 
pair of neighbouring players exchange if they have selected each other as bargaining 
partners  and  their  demands  lie  in  the  corresponding  utility  cake.  This  is  perhaps 
the simplest endogenised  matching  process.  Such a process can avoid the necessity 
of choosing between multiple realisable outcomes23.
As an example of the limitations of directed demands, consider the 3 player ring 
network with unit cakes,  R 4.  The following argument shows, informally, that under 
the three  candidate  matching  rules  of section  7.1,  the  unperturbed  model  cannot 
support a recurrent class corresponding to a solution in which all 3 exchanges some­
times  form.  If such  a  recurrent  class  existed,  it  must  contain  a state  in  which  all 
populations contain  agents  who  direct  demands  to  both othei  populations.  Undei 
2 3 A Iso note that  many of the solutions  described  in  sections  5.1.2  and  5.2.4  on extensions of the 
alternating offers game rely on players directing their offers correctly, so it seems unlikely that they 
can be captured  using the game A/.
193imitate  better  or  proportional  imitation,  this  arrangement  is  unstable for  the  fol­
lowing reason.  In any  realised  outcome  one  player  does  not  exchange  and  receives 
payoff zero.  There is a positive probability this happens in turn to all but one agent 
of a population  and  they all  imitate  the remaining  agent.  Under the sampled  best 
reply learning rule there is a positive probability that a state is reached in which all 
populations are almost  demand  homogeneous,  as described in section  7.1.2.  Under 
the  demand  profile  which  most  agents  play  according  to  in  this  state,  one  player 
must  receive  payoff zero.  Furthermore,  any  strategy  of this  player  is  a best  reply. 
Under  most  rules  for  choosing  between  best  replies,  this  allows  new  demand  val­
ues to be introduced to this  population.  Thus the recurrent class must represent  a 
broader range of possibilities than simply the solution mentioned.
In this example the model cannot  capture stable bargaining behaviour in which 
a small number of multiple  outcomes  are possible24.  However  such  behaviour does 
seem a likely possibility, especially as it is supported by the market bargaining game 
(see theorem  4.3).  The  problem  is  that  the  evolutionary  model and  learning rules 
under  consideration  cannot  easily  support  stable  behaviour  involving  more  than 
one  strategy  in  each  population20.  Such  behaviour  requires  agents  to  be  roughly 
indifferent  between these strategies.  However,  since agents update their  behaviour 
based on only a relatively small sample of randomly chosen other agents this allows 
small random  variations  in  the  numbers  of agent  playing each  strategy.  This  can 
easily  destabilize  the  behaviour.  The  advantage  of  an  exogenous  matching  rule 
is  that  it  allows  multiple  outcomes  of  the  game  based  on  strategy  homogeneous 
populations.  This is not to say  that  a matching rule with some endogenous feature
24For some  networks  it  can  capture  such  behaviour.  Consider  the  network  L: i   for  example  and 
the sampled best reply  learning rule.  Suppose min D\  =  min D.-j  = < 5  and  max D 2  =  1  —  d.  There is 
a recurrent class of the unperturbed  model  in  which  all agents in  populations A  and  A  make the 
demand 5 to player 2 and all  agents hi  population  .4  make the demand  1  —  5 .  with some agents in
this population directing their  demand to either  neighbour.
25In  is  often  difficult  for  evolutionary  models  to  support  solutions  to  games  involving  mixed
strategies.  See proposition  5.14  of  Weibull  [70]  for  example.
194may not be useful.  Sections 9.1.3  and 9.3 of the conclusion  take up this point.
7.2.2  Payoff Rules
The payoff rule  is  the  part  of the  underlying  game  that  decides  what  payoffs  two 
players  receive  conditional  on  exchanging  with  each  other.  In  M  the  payoff rule 
used is simply to award players their demands.  The matching rule ensures that this 
produces a feasible outcome.
One variation is to use a split sw'plus  rule.  Suppose neighbouring players x and 
y  make  demands  dx  and  dy  and  exchange  with  each  other.  A  split  surplus  rule 
specifies  that  if  (dx,dy)   is  not  on  the  Pareto  boundary  of  JCxy  then  they  receive 
some  payoffs  (X x,Xy)   E  JC xy  such  that  A .r  >  dx.  Xy  >  dy  with  strict  inequality  in 
at least one of these relations.  If the demand  pair  is  on the Pareto  boundary then 
both players  receive  their  demand.  Under  a split surplus  rule,  changing to  a lower 
demand  effectively  offers  potential  exchange  partners  a  higher  payoff.  There  are 
many  possible split  surplus  rules.  One  example  is  used  in  the  ‘cushioned  demand 
game’ of Binmore et al  [9]  in which  (Ax. Xy) —  0(dx, f x y(dx) ) — r- (1 —  0){fy' x{d y),dy)  
for some fixed parameter 6 E  [0,1].  It would be an interesting  extension to the sim­
ulations carried out in chapter 8 to investigate whether a split  surplus rule produces 
qualitatively  different results.
The  ‘contract  game’  of  Binmore  et  al  [9]  employs  another  payoff  rule.  This 
two  player  bargaining  game  gives  both  players  payoff  zero  for  any  demand  pair 
which  is  not  Pareto  optimal.  Pareto  optimal  demand  pairs  yield  payoffs  equal  to 
the demands,  as  usual.  The  contract  game  is  thus  a coordination  game  in  which 
players  must  propose  the  same  'contract  to  receive  any  payoff-  If  this  payoff rule 
were used in A/" then it would allow players to propose contracts between which they 
are indifferent  to  multiple  neighbours.  As  mentioned  in  section  6.1.3,  the contiact 
game  supports  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  bargaining  solution  in   some  models  of  [9], 
illustrating the qualitative  effect  that  an  alternative  payoff rule  can  produce.  This
195rule is unattractive for simulation purposes in the evolutionary model of this chapter 
under imitative  learning  rule.  This  is  because  it  would  be  much  more  difficult  for 
the state to move between the recurrent classes of the unperturbed model, since any 
unilaterally deviating player receives  a payoff of zero.  However, simulation with the 
sampled best  reply learning rule may  be possible.
7.2.3  Stochastic  Payoffs
The fact that a demand profile can sometimes produce multiple realised payoffs is a 
source of stochasticity  in the model described  in section 6.2.  For example,  suppose 
the demand profile (x, 1 -  x, x) is played in N  on the network L;i.  The payoff profiles 
(x, 1 —  x, 0)  and (0,1 —  x, x)  can both be realised.  Under imitative learning rules this 
can lead to  some  recurrent  classes  of the  unperturbed  model  having  low  outgoing 
resistances.  For example,  in the network  Lunder the imitate better learning rule, 
one of players  1  and 3 receives payoff zero in any realised outcome of J\f  ■   In a B set 
it is possible for all agents in one of the corresponding populations to receive payoff 
zero if the same payoff profile is repeatedly realised.  These agents will then imitate 
any  demand  which  receives  a  positive  payoff.  Thus  it  is  sometimes  possible  for  a 
single mutation to  be imitated  by an entire population.  This argument is a crucial 
part of the proof of theorem  7.3.
An alternative is to use expected payoffs in the model, eliminating this stochastic 
element.  This feature is used in the KMR model described in section 6.1.1.  Expected 
payoffs can be seen as representing a situation in which active agents play the game 
for an infinite number of times so that their average payoff equals the expectation or 
a situation where agents can calculate their expected payoffs.  The latter case seems 
to  involve  an  unreasonably  heavy  informational  requirement  on  agents.  A  model 
which preserves some stochastic element in pay'offs seems inoie natuial.  Howevei,  it 
would be interesting to see whether using expected pa\roffs has any qualitative effect 
on results as an extension to the simulations of chaptei  8.
196In the common case  where agents  informational states  represent  their most re­
cent  payoffs,  there  is  a practical  reason  for  concentrating  011  the case of stochastic 
payoffs:  using expected  payoffs  increases  the  size  of  the set  of individual  informa­
tional states.  This increase can be problematic in larger networks where it represents 
a significant increase in memory requirements.
7.2.4  M ulti-Agent  Populations
A central assumption of the model of chapter 6 is that for each player position in the 
network there  is  a  large  population  of agents,  and  samples  of one agent  from each 
population are repeatedly taken to play the underlying game M.   For small networks 
this  might  reasonably  model  a  situation  under  which  a  few  classes  of individuals 
repeatedly interact  with  one  another  011  similar  terms  (e.g.  landlords  and tenants, 
employers and several classes of employees).  However, large networks instead mainly 
capture  specific  social  or  economic  networks  of individuals.  In  a  large  network  it 
is  hard  to  imagine  a  situation  where  agents  repeatedly  play  in  one  position  of  a 
fixed  network  with  the  other  positions  filled  by  randomly  chosen  agents  from the 
other populations  which  differ  each  time  the  game  is  played.  It  seems  much more 
likely that bargaining situations faced by agents repeatedly will, at least in the short 
term, have fixed agents  in the other positions.  So it would be more natural to have 
a model with a single  agent  associated  with  each  network position.  However,  note 
that one interpretation of the model of section G.2 is that each population represents 
a mixed strategy  for  a  single  agent  at  the  corresponding  position.  Learning  rules 
then  represent  a  process  by  which  the  agents  make  small  changes  to  their  mixed
strategy each round.
Even if not  interpreted  as  a literal  description of a baigaining situation,  multi­
agent  populations  can  still  provide  a  useful  tool  foi  qualitatively  exploiing  evolu­
tionary pressures.  This  is  because,  as  argued  in section  7.1,  undei  the  3 candidate 
learning rules of that  section  the model  spends most  of  its time neai  to B sets and
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often.  This  suggests  that  the  results  of  a  simulation  011  the  model  of this  chapter 
will be relatively easy to interpret,  as discussed in more depth in section 7.3.  It also 
allows theoretical  results such as that  of section  7.G.
Models  involving  only  single  agents  in  each  position  offer  a  starting  point  for 
alternative  methods26.  W ithout  pursuing  these methods it  is  not  obvious  whether 
they allows the interpretation of simulation results as easily.  Also such methods must 
avoid  solutions  which  are  over-dependent  011  repeated  game  interactions  between 
agents27  and thus do not capture the influence of network positions.
7.2.5  Single  Agent  Updating
In the outline of the  model  in  section  G.2.  in  each  round  a single  agent  from each 
population  becomes  active.  These  agents  play  the  underlying  game  and  have  a 
chance to update their  demand.  I  refer  to  such a scheme as  single  agent updating. 
In contrast,  in  many  models  discussed  in  section  7.1,  such  as  the  KMR  model,  in 
each  round  all  agents  are  matched  to  play  the  game  and  then  have  a  chance  to 
update.  I refer to such  a scheme  as  all agent  updating.
The principal reason that the model uses single agent  updating is computational 
efficiency.  For example, consider the case where in each round samples of one agent 
from each population must be repeatedly drawn without replacement until no agents 
remain.  Using selection without replacement repeatedly would significantly slowr the 
simulation.  The fastest  option appears to  be single agent  updating.
An advantage of single agent updating is that it allows some opportunities for the 
state to move easily between recurrent classes of the unperturbed model which do not 
exist  for  all  agent  updating.  This  may  allow  interesting  featuies  of  the bargaining 
26See  Tesfatsion  [67]  for  a  model  of  bargaining  in  networks  which  uses  a  single  agent  in  each 
position of the network.  This  paper  uses  different  assumptions about what outcomes are available
from bargaining to those  used  here.
27See footnote 4 of chapter  6 .
198situation  to  be  found  from  simulations  with  shorter  runtimes.  In  a  learning  rule 
which  involves  agents  sampling  others  in  the  same  population,  under  single  agent 
updating it  is  possible  for  a mutant  to  be sampled  many  times  before  it  faces  the 
possibility  of updating  to  another  strategy.  Thus  it  is  easier  for  mutants  to  gain 
a  foothold  in  populations.  Even  in  learning  rules  in  which  agents  can  only  affect 
others by being selected to play the game and update, the fact the some agents may 
be more frequently selected  than others may well allow rapid change.  This feature 
could be interpreted as allowing short-term variations in the learning rate of agents, 
which seems realistic.
7.2.6  M iscellaneous
A  possible  variation  to  the  model  is  for  agents  to  use  a  learning  rule  to  choose  a 
demand before the underlying game is played.  This has more of a flavour of social 
learning;  agents  make  decisions  when  faced  with  a  problem,  rather  than  deciding 
upon a fixed strategy in advance.  Under the candidate learning rules, the behaviour 
in  the  case  where  the state  of the  model  is  near  a B  set  except  for  a few  mutants 
seems likely to be little different  under this variation.  Thus it does not seems  that 
this variation would produce any qualitative differences to the long-run behaviour.
Another  alternative  is  to  use  Young’s  model  of  [76]  described  in  section  6.1.3. 
This  uses  singe  agent  updating,  but  does  not  require  large  populations.  Instead 
learning rules act on the most recent m plays of the underlying game for some fixed 
m.  This  requires  a  considerable  assumption  of  public  information.  The  case  of 
restricted information embodied by the model in this chapter seems more general.
The  underlying  game  could  easily  be  extended  to  bargaining  situations  other 
than  bilateral  exchange  networks.  For  example,  the  case  of a 3  player  bargaining 
situation  in  which  players  can  split  a  payoff of one  unit  if they  all  agree  is  quite 
straightforward.  However,  the  general  case  of  multiplayer  bargaining  is  compli­
cated,  as  the  number  of possible  outcomes  given  a  particular  demand  profile  can
199become very large.  For this case,  the  approach of assigning equal probabilities to 
any maximal consistent outcome seems too ad-hoc to be natural and also becomes 
computationally cumbersome.
In the description given in section  6.2,  noise is introduced to  the model at  an 
agent level by using a probability e of mutating whenever they update their demands. 
This is a typical feature of models in the literature and has the advantage of being 
straightforward  to  implement  in  a  computer  program.  Also  it  is  uniform  in  the 
sense  that  mutation  probabilities  are  state  independent28.  Many  other  possible 
specifications  of  noise  exist.  Non-uniform  features  could  be  introduced  into  the 
specification of whether an agent mutates,  such as payoff dependence  (e.g.  agents 
with  high payoffs  are  less  likely  to  mutate),  or  correlated  mutation  probabilities. 
Also, the probability distribution by which the demands of mutants are chosen could 
be changed.  For example small changes in demand could be made most likely.  Other 
sources of noise in the  model could also  be introduced.  For example,  information 
could be observed noisily, utility cakes could vary slightly each round (e.g.  as in the 
smoothed Nash demand game of Nash [53]), learning could be noisy in the sense of 
Binmore and Samuelson [7], or realised payoffs could have a small random variation.
An alternative to using a finite demand set is to allow any demand in an interval. 
This goes beyond the discrete framework of the theory in section 6.1.2.  Also note 
that a computer simulation would not allow a truly infinite demand set due to the 
restrictions of floating point arithmetic.
28However, it may not be uniform in another sense.  If agent  a  €  A 1  mutates then there is an 
equal chance that it mutates to each strategy in  Di.  Recall  Di  is meant to model an interval of 
demands.  If the elements of D i  are not evenly spaced then the mutation probabilities will not be 
evenly distributed in this interval.  However,  in most simulations of chapter 8 the elements of D i 
are reasonably evenly spaced so this effect is ignored.  The exceptions are some simulations which 
are mainly used to point out that certain results are not robust to the choice of D i.
2007.3  Predictions
This section makes predictions of the behaviour of the model of chapter 6 under the 
candidate  learning  rules  discussed  above.  One motivation for this is that  it  allows 
the  development  of useful methods of reporting simulation  results,  as  described  in 
section 7.4.
7.3.1  General  Behaviour
This  section  begins  by  summarizing  the  material  of sections  6.1.2  and  7.1  on  the 
predicted  general  behaviour  of  the  model  for  the  three  candidate  learning  rules. 
Informal  arguments  are  then  presented  to  make  the  case  that  for  relatively  large 
values  of e  the  general  behaviour  is  similar  to  that  for  the  limiting  case  of e  — »   0. 
In  particular,  it  is  predicted  that  the  aggregate  state  may  still  spend  most  of its 
time  near B  sets  and  occasionally  be driven  by  mutations  to  move  between  them. 
Furthermore  it  is  argued  that  the  pattern  of recurrent  classes  of the  unperturbed 
model visited most often by the state has some degree of robustness to the choice of 
e.  This is crucial for simulation results to reveal much about the general behaviour 
of the model.
Under the conditions  of lemma 6.1  the model has a unique aperiodic recurrent 
class.  The first condition is simply e > 0 and the second is fulfilled by the 3 candidate 
learning rules  outlined  in section  7.1.  Section  6.1.2  includes  a result  that  this  is  a 
sufficient condition for the model to have a unique stationary probability distribution 
over  its  aggregate  states  which  gives  both  the  expected  and  time  average  state  in 
the  limit  t  — »   oo,  independent  of initial  state.  This stationary  distribution can  be 
found by a simulation from any starting state of sufficiently long runtime.  Of course, 
depending on the parameter values, the runtime required may be unpractically large.
Another  result  described  in  section  6.1.2  shows  that  in  the  limit  e  -»  0,  all 
of the  weight  of  this  distribution  is  placed  on  states  referred  to  as  stochastically 
stable which must lie in recurrent classes of the unperturbed process.  Furthermore,
201the  number  of  mutations  required  for  the  state  to  move  between  these  recurrent 
classes decides which classes contain stochastically stable states.  For the candidate 
learning rules  proposed  in section  7.1,  it  is  predicted29  that  these recurrent classes 
are  contained  in  B  sets  as  defined  in  definition  7.1.  These  are  sets  of states  such 
that each population either is demand homogeneous across the whole set or contains 
only agents who receive payoff zero given any demand profile supported by the set.
The set of stochastically stable states can be used as a selection mechanism be­
tween the multiple Nash equilibria of the underlying game in the long-run.  However, 
reducing e towards zero is not a practical method to generate predictions from a sim­
ulation.  This  is  because  it  also  increases  the expected  number  of rounds spent  at 
each  recurrent  class  of the  unperturbed  model.  In  a simulation of reasonable run­
time, it is quite possible that one such class is reached and the system then remains 
there30.  Furthermore,  the  limiting  case  of low  e  represents  a case  in which  agents 
experiment  or  are subject  to mistakes or other exogenous factors at  a much slower 
rate than they learn.  This may not be the most realistic or interesting case.
However,  if  a  relatively  large  value  of  e  is  used  then  the  formal  details  of the 
arguments  above  describing the  behaviour  of the model begin to break down.  For 
example  note  that  the  expected  number  of mutants  in  a  population  of size  M  is 
eM.  Thus for  eM  >  1,  the state  is  expected  to  be outside the recurrent  classes  of 
the  unperturbed  model  for  the  majority  of  rounds.  The  extreme  case  is  that  for 
sufficiently  large  e  the  model  becomes  mainly driven  by  mutations  and the weight 
of the stationary distribution is likely to be spread widely so that a precise long-run 
prediction cannot  be made.
The  3  candidate  learning  rules  outlined  in  section  7.1  provide  a mechanism  to
29This  prediction  is  proved  for  imitate  better  and  proportional  imitation,  but  not  for  sampled 
best reply.
3 0 An an alternative simulation  aim  in this setting would be to lind the recurrent class of the un­
perturbed model that is most commonly reached first.  However this does not necessarily correspond 
to stochastic stability.
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for  relatively  large  values  of  eM.  First  observe  that  in  a  B  set,  populations  for 
which  condition  i)  of  definition  7.1  holds  but  condition  ii)  does  not  are  demand 
homogeneous  and  receive  non-zero  payoffs.  Let  C  be  a  B  set  with  the  following 
property for all such populations A '.  If a single agent a 6 A1 '  mutates and becomes 
active  again in the following round,  then there is a significant  probability that  the 
agent  will  update  their  demand  back  to  its  pre-mutation  value.  A  B  set  which 
does not satisfy this property is unlikely to receive much weight31  in the stationary 
distribution  for  any  value  of  e.  Now  consider  a state  where  only  a small  number 
of mutants in a population whose agents receive non-zero payoffs in C deviate from 
their  demand  in  C.  Call  an  agent  whose  demand  matches  that  specified  in  C  a 
conformist  There  is  a  significant  probability  that  when  non-conformists  become 
active  all  other  active  agents  are  conformists  and  the  non-conformist  updates  to 
the  conformist  demand  for  the  corresponding  population.  Thus  there  is  a  high 
probability that the non-conformists die out faster than their demands are spread.
There are some cases  in which this argument seems especially strong.  The first 
is  when  imitative  learning  rules  are  used.  In  this  case,  from  many  B  sets  non­
conformists must first secure a high payoff by playing the underlying game against 
other non-conformists before they can be imitated by conformists.  A second case is 
when the learning rule requires samples of more than one agent to be taken and the 
new demand is based on the frequencies of demands in these samples.  An example 
is the sampled best reply learning rule with sample size greater than 1.  In this case, 
from many B sets conformists must typically sample more than one non-conformist 
to switch demands.  Also note that  in either of these cases,  a large value of M aids 
stabilization.  To summarize, near many B sets there is a significant probability that 
a low number of mutations die out even for relatively large values of e.
31 Except  in  the case  where no B sets satisfy  this  property.  This seems unlikely given that strict 
Nash equilibria satisfy this property and the underlying games in the model typically possess many.
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as follows.  A recurrent  class of the unperturbed model lies in a basin of attraction 
which  in turn  lies  within  a basin  of likely  attraction.  For  some  of these  recurrent 
classes,  the  '■centres’  of these  basins of likely  attraction  are  stable  in the short-run 
even for relatively  large values of e  and contain  the state of the model most of the 
time.  Movements  of  the  aggregate  state  between  these  centres  will  be  relatively 
rare,  so  the  model  acts  roughly  like  a  Markov  chain  with  some  B  sets  as  states 
and  probabilities  of moving  between  them  as  transition  probabilities.  I  refer  to  a 
movement  of the state between two B sets as a transit.  The stationary distribution 
of the system  is  now  determined  by the transit  probabilities.  In fact,  as shown by 
equation  (6.2),  it  is  the  transit  probabilities  conditional  011  any  transit  occurring 
that determine the stationary distribution.
This raises the issue of whether there is much similarity between these conditional 
transit probabilities for different values of e  .  For example, if two transit probabilities 
were  e2 + e3  and  10~fie2 -I- e3,  there would  be little similarity  in general.  For  these 
transit  probabilities  to  exist,  it  seems  necessary  for  3  mutations  to  allow  an  alter­
native  mechanism  of transit  between  some pair of B  sets,  rather  than just making 
the  2  mutation  mechanism  more  likely  due  to  higher  chance  of meetings  between 
mutants.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  low  probability  of 3  mutants  being  selected  to 
interact  in some sequence of events,  the new mechanism must be much more prob­
able.  This argument  generalises  to  other  numbers of mutations.  If the conditional 
transit  probabilities  are  similar  for  different  values  of e  then  the  behaviour  of the 
model  for  relatively  high  values  of e  gives  a  rough  indication  of the  results  for  all 
values.  However,  the best that can reasonably be hoped for is qualitative similarity. 
As mentioned  above,  as  e  becomes  larger,  the results will  become less precise until 
the system is mainly driven by mutation and learning has almost no influence.
The  qualitative  behaviour  of  the  model  may  also  vary  depending  on  M.  As 
discussed in section 6.1.3 the order in which the limits e — >  0 and M — >  00 are taken
204can  have  a qualitative  effect  on  the  behaviour  of evolutionary  models  of this sort. 
Informally speaking,  large values  of  M  mean that  the law  of large numbers causes 
the effect  of the stochastic components of the model to act closer the deterministic 
approximation  given  by  their  expected  values.  This  alters  the  relative  probability 
of transits between B sets.
One  consequence  of this  behaviour  for  large  values  of  M  is  that  the  expected 
time  between  transits  is  greater.  As  already  noted,  in  a state  close  to  a  B  set,  a 
small number of non-conformists are likely to die out.  To gain a sustainable foothold 
in the population,  they must enjoy several lucky conversions from non-conformists. 
For large M  the number of such conversions required is much larger and hence much 
less likely.  Also note that since transits between B sets are driven by mutations, the 
expected time between transits is clearly  decreasing in e.
7.3.2  Specific  Predictions
The experimental  data of section  2.7  and  the theoretical  results of chapters  4  and 
5  on  models  based  on  the  alternating  offers  game  all  produce  specific  predictions 
for  the  outcome  of bargaining  in  particular  networks.  These  are  summarized  and 
compared to the results of the simulation in the conclusion,  chapter 9.
Section  7.1  predicts that  recurrent classes of the unperturbed model containing 
stochastically  stable  states  correspond  to  nationally  plausible'  demand profiles for 
any  of the  candidate  learning  rules,  in  a  sense  described  there.  In  particular,  for 
the  sampled  best  reply  learning  rule,  recurrent  classes  of the  unperturbed  model 
contained  in  B  sets  must  correspond  to  Nash  equilibrium  profiles.  It  is  not  clear 
whether  much  selection  between  strict  Nash  equilibria  takes  place  in  a  2  player 
network  under  this  learning  rule.  Investigating  this  setting  is  a  key  first  task  for 
the  simulation.  One  prediction  that  is  made  for  this  setting  is  that  the  results of 
imitate better are predicted to depend only on the ordinal stiucture of the possible 
outcomes of Af.
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under  the  3  candidate  learning  rules  arise  from  the  choice  of  network.  Many  of 
the networks used in chapter 8 have symmetrical positions.  Thus if the simulations 
for  these  networks  support  unique  solutions  then  these  are  predicted  to  also  be 
symmetric.  Also,  note that the model under these learning rules does not provide a 
natural mechanism for asymmetries corresponding to the ‘bargaining powers’ of the 
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of section 4.1.  Note that asymmetries can also 
arise  from the  choice  of demand  sets.  Since  this is  an  exogenous  modelling choice 
that does not appear to correspond to a feature of the bargaining situation, I do not 
consider this to be a ‘natural mechanism'  for causing asymmetries.
It  is  possible  to  make  some  strong  theoretical  predictions  for  the  behaviour of 
the model.  Theorem  7.3  is such  a prediction.  The full statement  is  lengthy and is 
in appendix 7.6,  the bulk of which contains the proof.  The remainder of this section 
contains a brief overview.
The result  is  for  unit  cake  networks.  Certain conditions  are given under which 
subsets  of players  can  be  labelled  as  W  and  S,  corresponding to  weak  and  strong 
network  positions.  Theorem  7.3  applies  to  the  model  under  the  imitate  better or 
proportional  imitation  learning  rules  and  certain  restrictions  on  D.  These restric­
tions include min Di \ {0}  =  5 if i is a W player and maxf),; —  1 —  £ if i is a S player 
for some value of S >  0.  The theorem states that in any stochastically stable state 
all agents  in populations corresponding to  S  players make demand  1 -  < 5  and those 
in populations corresponding to W players make demand < 5 .
Definition 7.3 gives the conditions for the W and S labelling.  It is necessary that 
every neighbour of a W player is a S player,  at least one A  player does not exchange 
in any feasible outcome of N,  and that in any feasible outcome of N if an S player 
does not exchange then at least one of her neighbours must also not exchange and be 
a W player.  The full definition requires  a stronger version of the second condition. 
An  example  of this  definition  is  for  networks  L3  and  L5.  In  both,  odd  numbered
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odd length lines,  no players can be labelled as either W or S.
A brief sketch of the proof is as follows.  Consider a state not of the form claimed 
to be stochastically  stable.  In any round of the model an  agent  in a Y V population 
(i.e.  one corresponding to a W player)  does not exchange in the realised outcome of 
the underlying game.  This allows a positive probability that over several rounds all 
agents in a W population receive payoff zero by exclusion from exchange and switch 
to the demand of a single  mutant  playing  demand  6  and  receive a positive  payoff. 
In a network as described there is always  a positive probability that a demand of 5 
by a W player is accepted.  It can be shown that this process can take place in each 
W population  in  turn.  If all  agents  in  W  populations  make  the demand  S  then  S 
populations can similarly be colonized by single mutants making the demand 1 —  5. 
However,  from  a  state  of the  form  claimed  to  be stochastically  stable  at  least  two 
mutants are required to colonize a W or  S  population;  a single mutant cannot earn 
a higher payoff than non-mutants.  The proof is completed from these observations 
by the use of the minimal tree techniques of section 6.1.2.
In the simulations of the following chapter on unit cake networks, every demand 
set  typically  includes  the  demand  1,  so  theorem  7.3  does  not  apply.  As  discussed 
in  section  7.6.4,  it  is  difficult  to  extend  the  theorem  to  this  case.  However,  this 
section also discusses reasons why the result is intuitively very likely to hold in this 
setting32.
7.4  M ethods  of Result  Reporting
This  section  uses  the  predictions  of  the  previous  section  to  describe  methods  of 
reporting  the  data  produced  by  a  computer  simulation  implementing  this  model. 
As described in section 7.3.1,  the model under investigation has a unique stationary
32Simulations which are not included in chapter X  show that excluding the demand 1 from demand 
sets makes no apparent qualitative difference to results.
207probability distribution over states which gives both the expected and time average 
state of the system  in the  limit  t — * •   oc.  independent  of initial state.  This suggests 
result  reporting by  recording the time average  distribution.  This  is  impractical  as 
there  are  too  many  states  for  the  data  to  be  interpreted  easily.  Furthermore  this 
approach does not make it obvious to a user how often transits between B sets take 
place.  This  information  is  very  useful  because it  allows  the user  to decide quickly 
whether the current simulation permits enough transits in a reasonable run-time to 
provide results characteristic of the stationary distribution.
Instead the simulation uses a method of reporting based 011 B sets.  It keeps track 
of roughly which B set the state of the model is closest to.  The word roughly is used 
because  it  seems  very  laborious  and  unnecessary  to  keep  track  of the  details  of a 
population for which condition ii)  of definition 7.1  holds  (i.e.  a population in which 
all agents receive payoff zero).  Thus the actual information tracked is equivalent to 
any demand profile supported by the B set:  a player who receives payoff zero under 
this profile represents a population for which condition ii)  of the definition holds.
Recall  that  it  is  predicted  that  the  aggregate  state  is  usually  near  B  sets  and 
rarely  moves  between  them.  This  means  that  any  rough  method  of finding  a de­
mand profile supported  by the closest  B  set  should succeed  most of the time.  The 
computer implementation uses the method of finding the modal demand in each pop­
ulation.  The program reports to the user when the modal demand profile changes. 
It also records the total number of rounds that each demand profile has been modal 
and converts  this  into  a proportion of the total  rounds played.  This gives a rough 
indication of how strongly B sets are selected by the stationary distribution33.
The  average  number  of  rounds  between  changes  of modal  demand,  p,  is  also
33The  proportions  for  modal  demand  profiles  which  are  the  same  except  for  the  demands  of 
players who  receive  payoff zero  could  be  aggregated  to  reconstruct  B  sets.  For  the simulations  of 
chapter  8  this did  not turn out  to be  necessary.  There were almost  110 cases  in which two or  more 
demand profiles representing the same B set were both modal for a significant fraction of all rounds. 
The exceptions are in  section 8.4  and  are easy  to  interpret without making this aggregation.
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the possible B sets.  Low values of p may suggest that B sets are unstable and muta­
tions are too common to  reveal  much about  the  typical structure of the stationary 
distribution.  High values of p may suggest that the B sets are too stable and the sta­
tionary distribution will only be revealed by the simulation over a prohibitively long 
run-time.  It is difficult to record p precisely due to the problem of over-reporting.  A 
single transit  between B sets may involve the modal demand profile changing many 
times;  usually  repeated  changes  between  the  origin  and  destination  sets.  Also,  in 
large  networks  there  are  more  opportunities  for  transits  between  B  sets  to  take 
place34, so straightforward comparison between p values for different networks may 
not be revealing.
A  possible  pitfall  of  this  method  is  that  it  may  be  possible  to  partition  the 
B  sets  into  several  components  such  that  transits  between  components  are  very 
unlikely relative to transits  within components.  The method of reporting proposed 
may only find the stationary distribution restricted to one of these components and 
ignore the  others.  This  feature  seems  intuitively  unlikely  for  the  underlying game 
used  here.  Furthermore,  if any  plausible  demand  profile  is  absent  from  the  list  of 
most  commonly modal demand profiles in a simulation run then it  can be checked 
whether it has ever been modal.  If not then another simulation can be run in which 
this  demand  profile  is  initially  modal  to  test  whether  it  is  contained  in  a separate 
component of B sets to those investigated by the previous simulation.  For the small 
networks  used  in  chapter  8  this  method  did  not  find  any  separate  components  of 
the form described.  However,  for  large  networks  this  method may  not  suffice  as it 
is hard to enumerate all  possible plausible demand profiles30.
34For example, in a particular B set for each pair of players who exchange there is an opportunity
of a transit  to a B set  in which  the terms of their exchange are slightly  different,.
35Another  possible  test  is  run  many  simulations  starting  from  randomly  generated  states  uni­
formly distributed across the state space to determine whether the results are robust to this choice. 
The initial state  used  in the simulations  of chapter  8   all  agents  make the minimal demand  and,  in
209The simulation code also records x< a measure of how close the state of the process 
typically  is  to  a  B  set.  It  is  roughly  defined  as  the  average  over  all  agents  of the 
proportion of rounds in which an agent had the demand corresponding to the closest 
B  set.  However,  agents  are  not  counted  when  their  population  satisfies  condition
ii)  of definition  7.1  in the  closest  B  set  of the current  round.  A  full definition of x 
is  given by  equation  (7.1)  below.  The value  of x  in  a simulation  with  e —   1  gives 
a baseline value for the case where agents  update their demands at  random, which 
can be a useful comparison.
A  possible  extension  is  to  record  a  similar  measure  to  x  every  L  rounds,  and 
plot a histogram of the distribution of these xl values.  This would hopefully reveal 
a large region where XL  is high and the state is close to a B set,  and a small region 
where x l  takes  variable  values  and  a transit  between  B  sets  is  taking place.  This 
would reveal  how  close  the state  is to  B  set  when it  is  not  in transit  and also how 
much time the process spends in transit.
The  run-time  and  number  of rounds  that  have  taken  place  are  also  recorded. 
Prom these the simulation code calculates 7 , the average number of rounds performed 
per  unit  of run-time.  This  is  a  measure  of the  speed  of the  simulation36.  It  is  a 
rough  measure  as  the  run-time  can  be  affected  by  external  factors  such  as  other 
processes  running  on  the  computer  network.  Indeed,  in  practice  the  measure  of 
runtime generated by FORTRAN seemed to be incorrect by an order of magnitude. 
Statistics involving run-time thus only seem useful as relative measures,
the case Ii  =   Dr U {0},  have the  informational  state of 0  corresponding to a most  recent payoff of 
zero.  This provides some degree of random  behaviour early  in the model,  but it is conceivable that 
if multiple components of B  sets  of the  form  described  above exist then this  initial  state could be
biased towards one particular component.
36The internal setup of the code  (e.g.  details of caching)  is kept constant over the simulations of
chapter  8  and so does  not affect  the  value of  7 .
2107.5  Details  of the  Model
This section completes the description of the model begun in section 6.2 by describing 
the  details  of the  steps  in  the  main  algorithm  given  there.  Particular  attention  is 
paid to the implementation  of the model as a computer simulation.  Thus the steps 
are described as algorithms.
Section  7.5.1  describes the subroutine which plays the underlying game J\f.   An 
especially  important  part  of this  game  is  finding  the  different  possible  sets  of re­
alised exchanges.  Section  7.5.2  gives  an algorithm  for this step.  Sections  7.5.3  and 
7.5.4 describe the updating subroutines for the candidate learning rules described in 
section 7.1.  Section 7.5.5 describes how the result reporting described in section 7.4 
is performed.  Finally  section  7.5.6  discusses the parameters which can be adjusted 
by the user in the computer implementation.
The computer  implementation  is written  in FORTRAN  95  and  compiled  using 
the NAGware f95  compiler.  This language was chosen due to its inbuilt operations 
for handling arrays.  The code itself is available on request from the author37.
7.5.1  The  Underlying  Game
The algorithm of this section requires the following definition.
Definition  7.2.  A  subgraph  {V,K')  of  (V. I\)  is  a  consistent  subgraph  of  (V.K) 
if no vertex of  (y,K')  has  degree  greater  than  1.  A  maximal  consistent  subgraph 
(V,K') of (V,K)  is one such that the following property holds.  If ab E  I<  then there 
exists some x E   V such that  either  ax E   K 1   or bx E  K'.
The following algorithm implements the game M :
Algorithm   (J\f subroutine).
Input:  A network  (P, P, K.)  and a demand vector  c l = {di)r^.p
37Note that the version at the time of writing is  not  very user friendly!
211Output:  A payoff vector  it  —   (7r,,)7 ;6p
1.  Determine the set  J(d)  =  {ab € P   |  {da,db) e IC ab}.
2.  Call a subroutine to determine the set  6' of all maximal consistent subgraphs 
of (P ,J).
3.  Select  (P,X)  from S using a uniform probability distribution.
4.  For all ab € X  let  7ra = d ,a   and  7 = db.
5.  Assign all remaining players payoff zero.
Recall  definition  6.1  of  a  maximal  consistent  outcome.  It  is  straightforward 
from  this  and  definition  7.2  that  an  outcome  is  a  maximal  consistent  outcome  of 
N —  (P, P, JC )  given d if and only if its exchanges are a maximal consistent subgraph 
of  (P,J(d)),  exchanging  players  receive  shares  equal  to  their  demands  and  non­
exchanging players receive shares of zero.  Thus the above algorithm does implement 
the game J\f as claimed.
For each exchange ab 6  P, the computer implementation of the model stores the 
following representation  of JC ab.   One player  in each  exchange  is selected.  Suppose 
a is that player in the exchange ab.  For each xa   E  Da   a value representing f a,b(xu) 
is stored.  In step  1,  determining whether  {da,db)  6  JC a b   is  true is  done by  testing 
whether the condition  db  > f a,b{da)  holds38.
Note  that  this  algorithm  can  easily  be  modified  to  give  the  expected  payoff of 
each player.  This is required later to calculate best replies.  All that must be changed 
is to remove step 3,  perform steps 4 and 5 for each (P. X)  6 5, and take the average
of the resulting payoff vectors.
38The step proved to be very problematic in practice.  Trying to set the recorded value of 
equal to a particular demand value in Di,  often  resulted in a slightly  different value being recorded 
due  to  floating  point  errors.  This  led  to  demand  pairs  being  incorrectly  found  infeasible.  This 
problem was  resolved  by treating differences  below  a  certain  threshold as equality.
212One simulation in chapter 8 involves granting players outside options.  To enable 
this, some players are given an extra action in their demand set, representing accept­
ing their outside option, and the following modifications are made to this algorithm. 
In step  1,  the definition of J is extended so that ab ^ J if the action of player a or 
b is to accept the outside option.  In step 5,  a player whose action is to accept their 
outside option receives a corresponding fixed payoff.
7.5.2  The  Calculation  of all  Maximal  Consistent  Subgraphs
The  following  algorithm  is  highly  recursive.  This  is  manifested  in  the  fact  that  it 
repeatedly  calls  part  of  itself  as  a  subroutine.  The  instruction  “end  subroutine” 
should  be read  as  referring  to  the  most  recently  called  subroutine.  In  a computer 
implementation  of this algorithm it  is important that  care is paid to not  confusing 
variables from different levels of recursion.  The global variables have only one value 
at  any  point  in  the  subroutine.  The  subroutine  level  variable  v  takes  a  different 
value for every  level of the subroutine;  the value defined in the current level of the 
subroutine must  always  be used.  Fortunately,  much of this can be taken care of by 
the FORTRAN attribute RECURSIVE.
Algorithm   (Subroutine  to  find  maximal  consistent  subgraphs).
Input:  A graph  (V,E).
Output:  The  set  S  of  all  E'  C  E  such  that  (V,E')  is  a  maximal  consistent 
subgraph of (V,E).
Global  variables:  A  set  of edges  C\  and  a vector  ^  =  (z7 ;)7 .ey-  such  that  zt  € 
{0,1}.
Subroutine level variable:  A vertex  v.
Notation:  Let  Q{C, z) = {a E V  \   zu   —  0 and ax ^ C  for all x £ P}.
2131.  Let  C —  0 ,  6  —   0 ,  and Zi  —  0 for all  i E V.   Go to step  2  as a subroutine and 
terminate the algorithm on return.
2.  If Q(C,z)  is empty,  add C to S and end subroutine.
3.  A vertex v E  Q(C,z)  is picked  by an unspecified deterministic method.
4.  Loop over all w in Q(C,z)  neighbouring v.
5.  Add vw to  C.
6.  Go to  2  as a subroutine.
7.  Remove vw from C.
8.  End of loop.
9.  If zx —  0 for all  x neighbouring v in  (V, E)  then:
10.  Set  zv  —   1.
11.  Go to  2 as  a subroutine.
12.  Set  zv —  0.
13.  End of if statement.
14.  End subroutine.
It  is  not  necessary  to  use  a  deterministic  method  to  choose  v  in  step  3.  This 
requirement is given simply because a deterministic method is used in the computer 
implementation  (the value of v with lowest  index is selected)  and because it makes 
an argument later in this section slightly simpler.
Lem m a  7.1.  The output of the above algorithm is as described.  ■
This  is  easy  to  see  from  the  following  sketch  of  how  the  algorithm  operates. 
Suppose C° is an edge set such that no player occurs in more than one edge.  Suppose
214is  a value of vector  z  such that  if xy  G  (7°  then  z®  —  Zy —  0.  Then calling step 
2  as  a subroutine finds all maximal consistent  subgraphs containing edges C ()  such 
that  any player  for  which  z®  =  1  does  not  exchange.  This is  done as follows.  The 
set  Q(C°,z°)  contains  all  players  which  are  neither  involved  in  an exchange in  C,(l 
nor specified as not exchanging by  z°.  If Q(C{ \ zi]) = 0 then C{ )   is already the edge 
set of a maximal consistent subgraph.  Otherwise a vertex v G Q(C°. z°)  is selected. 
In turn,  the  algorithm  tries  adding  uw  to  C{ )   for each  w  G  Q{C( \z°)  neighbouring 
v,  and changing the value of  z®   to represent  v not exchanging,  unless v already has 
a neighbour  w who is  not  exchanging.  For  each of these cases,  the algorithm  finds 
all maximal consistent  subgraphs by calling step  2 as a subroutine.
Proof of lemma 7.1.  Suppose  S  is  the  output  of the  algorithm  and  E'  G  S.  If an 
edge  ab can  be  added  to  C  in  step  5  then  it  must  be the case  that  a, b G  Q(C,z). 
So  no vertex  may  occur  in  more  than  one  edge  of E'.   A  vertex  a  does  not  occur 
in any edge of E'  if and only if zu  —   1  when  C is added to S.  Therefore given two 
neighbouring elements  of  {V,E),  step  9  ensures that  at  least  one must occur in  an 
edge of E'.   Hence  (V, E')  is a maximal consistent subgraph of (V, E).
Now  suppose  (V, E')  is  any  maximal  consistent  subgraph  of  {V.E).  Define  a 
history of the algorithm as a description of what instructions have been performed. 
Let H° be the initial history of the algorithm.  A sequence of histories is now defined 
inductively.  Assume H n  has  been defined as  a history in which the algorithm is at 
the  start  of step  2.  Let  Cn  and  zn  be  the  corresponding  values  of C  and  z.  Let 
vn  be the first value of v chosen following  H n\   if no such vertex exists the sequence 
terminates.  Define wn such that vnwn  G  E' or, if no such element exists, let  wn  —  0. 
In  the  case  wn  ^   0,  it  is  shown  below  (a)  that  there  exists  a  history  in  which 
c  = c n U {vnwn},  Zi  =  Zjl  for  all  i  G  V  and  the  algorithm  is  at  the start  of step 
2.  In  the  case  w7 .   =   0,  it  is  shown  below  (b)  that  there  exists  a  history  in  which 
(j —   z^  ^   z.   —   zn  for  aq  i  ^   v. n   and  the  algorithm  is  at  the start  of step
2.  In either case,  let  H n+l  be the described history.  This proves that there exists a
215history in which C =  E' ,  Q = 0  and the algorithm  is at  the start of step  2.  In this 
history C is  added to the output  S as required.
It  remains  to  prove  claims  (a)  and  (b).  By  construction.  Cn —  {v^Wk  \   k < n} 
and  if zx  =  1  then  x  —   v i~   for  some  k  <  n.  Suppose  wn  ^  0.  Since  (V,E')  is  a 
maximal consistent subgraph of  (V. E), wn   G  Q(C"\ z").  Inspecting steps 4-8 shows 
that this proves  (a).  Suppose wn —  0.  Then vn   is not  a member of any edge in E'.  
Consider any vnx  G  E.  Since  {V,E')  is a maximal consistent  subgraph of (V,E), x 
must  be a member of some edge in  E'.   Hence  zn r  -  0.  Inspecting steps 9-13  shows 
that this proves  (b).  □
Note also that no set of edges E' is added to S twice.  Let (H{).  Hl,... , Hm)  and 
)  be two sequences of histories as defined in the proof which result 
in E' be added to F .  Define corresponding values of vt,   u/? ;,  and wr  as in the proof. 
Suppose Hn = Hn.  Then39  vn —  vn.   It  must  be the case  that  wn   = wni  otherwise 
the  edge  sets  added  to  S  are  different.  By  definition  H{ ]   —   H( \  so  it  follows  by 
induction that  H m —  H m.
This  fact  is  useful  in  implementing  the  above  algorithm  as  code,  because  it  is 
not  necessary  to  check  for  repeated  entries  to  S.  Any repeated entries would have 
to be found before a uniform  random selection  from the elements  of S were made, 
as is required in the algorithm for J \f .
7.5.3  T h e  U p d a tin g   S u broutine  for  Sam pled  B est  R eply
Recall that this learning rule does not use informational states.  Hence the informa­
tional state space is a singleton and it  is only necessary to compute a new demand.
Algorithm   (Sam pled  best  reply  updating subroutine).
Parameters:  Number of agents  to sample,  m,  demand sets.D ,  and mutation 
rate e.
39This is where the deterministic choice of  v  in  step 3  is required.
216Input:  The aggregate state of the model and the index z of the population A1  
containing the updating agent.
Output:  A new demand.
1.  Sample  a  random  number  p  £  [0, 1]  with  uniform  distribution.  If p .  <  e  a 
mutation occurs.  In this case choose a new demand from Dt  using a uniform 
probability distribution and terminate the algorithm.
2.  Sample the demands of m agents from each population other than A1  without 
replacement  using a uniform probability distribution.
3.  Count the values nJ x\   the frequency of demand x in the sample from population 
AP
4.  Loop through all values of d~l —  {dj)jep\r   such that n  ‘ tj  > (J for all j  £ P \ i.
5.  For  each  d7 ;  £  Dt,   calculate  7r,;(d,;. dTl)\  the  expected  payoff to  player  i 
from demand di  given the demands of d~l  for all other players.
6.  Calculate p(di,d~l) —  7rv  (d,. r/-7) IX/gpy: ndj ■
7.  End loop
8.  For each di £ Di,  calculate  q{dr) —  J2d~>  p(^t d~1 )-
9.  Let T —  argmaxd.eD? q(dl).  Let the new demand be minT.
Expected  payoffs  are  calculated  in  step  5  by  a  modification  of the  algorithm 
in  section  7.5.1.  The  details  of the  modifications  required  are  mentioned  in  that 
section.  Finally  note  that  in  the  computer  implementation  of this  algorithm,  the 
results of steps 3-9 are cached to improve performance.
2177.5.4  T h e  U p d atin g  Subroutines  for  Im itate  B etter  and  Propor­
tion al  Im itation
Recall  that  under  these  learning rules  an  agent’s  informational  state  is  their  most 
recent payoff.  Thus a new informational state and a new demand must be specified.
Algorithm   (Im itate better/proportional  im itation  updating subroutine).
Parameters:  Demand sets,  D,  and mutation rate e.
Input:  The aggregate  state of the system,  the realised payoff of the updating 
agent, p,  and the index,  z,  of the population A1   containing it  .
Output:  A new individual state for the agent.
Parameters:  Number of agents  to sample,  m,  and  (for proportional imitation 
only)  a factor of proportionality,  A.
1.  Let the new informational state be p.
2.  Sample  a  random  number  p  e  [0,1]  with  uniform  distribution.  If p  <  e   a 
mutation occurs.  In this case choose a  new demand from Dr   using a uniform 
probability distribution and terminate the algorithm.
3.  Sample  the  demands  and  most  recent  payoffs  of m  agents  from  A1   without 
replacement  using a uniform probability distribution.
4.  Calculate the average most recent, payoff a(d) earned for each demand d in the 
sample.  Let  S  be  the  set  of demands  achieving  the maximum value of a(d). 
Let q  be this value and let  d = miiiS'.
5.  IMITATE BETTER:  If q > p then let d be the new demand.  Otherwise leave 
the demand unchanged.
218PROPORTIONAL IMITIATION: If q > p then let c l be the new demand with 
probability40  A(q —  p).  Otherwise leave  the demand unchanged.
7.5.5  R ep ortin g
This section first describes what is reported to the user and then discusses the parts 
of the  implementation  which  involve  some  minor  complications.  Various  types  of 
reporting  are  used.  The  most  straightforward  but  also  most  cumbersome method 
is to display the entire current  aggregate state as stored by  the computer program. 
That is, to display for each population the number of agents in each individual state 
in the  current  round.  Typically,  this  display  is  only  useful  when the simulation  is 
displaying unexpected behaviour.  Otherwise it is set to appear very rarely as a check 
that  the  state  of the  simulation  is  as  surmised  from  other  more  concise  reporting 
methods.
At  regular  intervals  the  program  display  the values  of y,  p  and  7  as defined in 
section  7.4,  as well as  the number of rounds played  and total run-time so far.  This 
allows the user to  follow  the  general  behaviour of the model.  The calculation  of y 
is discussed shortly.
The main methods of reporting used involve tracking the modal demand profile 
as  described  in  section  7.4.  The  user  is  notified  when  this  changes  and  told  the 
identity  of the  new  modal  demand  profile.  Also  the  code  roughly41  calculates  the 
number of rounds that each demand profile is modal.  These values are periodically
40The  program  specifies  that  in  the  case  where  this  value  is  more  than  1  probability  1  is  used.
However,  in chapter 8  A  and  D  are chosen  so that  this case  never occurs.
41 For large networks the total number ol demand profiles is too large to do this precisely.  Instead,
this data is stored  for a large  fixed  number of demand  profiles.  When  the modal demand profile is
not  in this  list,  it  is  added  in  place  of the  profile  with  the  lowest  total  number of rounds.  Under
the assumption that most of the time is spent  near a relatively small number of B sets this method
should  not  be  problematic.  It  is  possible  to  check  the  accuracy  of this  method  by  calculating the
difference  between  the  sum  of rounds  in  all  these  stoied  iecoids  and  the  total  number  ot  iounds
played.  In all the simulations of chapter 8 this difference was negligible.
219reported to the  user,  as  well  as the corresponding proportions of the total number 
of rounds played.
As mentioned  in  section  7.4,  this  method  is  over-sensitive.  The modal demand 
may change several times during a transit between B sets and reporting each of these 
is  not  useful.  Instead  the  program  reports  to  the  user  whenever  a  modal  demand 
changes  and  there  are  no  more  changes  in  modal  demand  for  a  fixed  number  of 
rounds, given by a user chosen program parameter.
The value of x,  roughly defined in section  7.4,  is calculated as follows.  Let 6r{t) 
be the proportion  of agents  in  population  A1   playing  the  modal  demand  in  round 
t.  Define  to  equal  0  in  the  case  that  player  i  receives  an  expected  payoff of
zero from the modal demand profile and  1  otherwise.  The former case is meant  to 
capture rounds such that in the closest  B set condition ii)  of definition 7.1 holds for 
population A1.   This may occasionally  fail during transits between B sets, but since 
these are predicted to be rare,  it should have little effect  on the calculated value of 
X-  This is given by:
,,  E,:epE.s<,V.(s)^(«)  .  .
x(t) =   " e t t e t ^ t t   (71)
The code stores  the current values of the sums of the numerator and denominator. 
The calculation  of x becomes  problematic  when the denominator becomes so large 
that adding extra terms does not change its floating point representation.  From then 
on,  floating  point errors inflate the value of xM-  This occurred in a few simulations
of the following  chapter,  especially in networks with a large numbers of players.  The
values  of x  given  for  these  networks  are  taken  for  values  of t  before  this problem 
occurs.
7.5.6  P aram eters
Various parameters set by the user define a particular run of the simulation program. 
Two  major  choices  are  which  updating  subroutine  is  used  in  step  3  of  the  main
220algorithm  and  the  choice  of game  rules  i.e.  the  payoff  and  matching  rules42.  An 
initialisation  file  is  used  to  contain  the  remaining  parameters.  These  include  the 
probability  of  mutation,  e,  the  total  number  of  rounds  to  be  performed  and  the 
initial state of the model.  This file also includes the parameters controlling reporting 
to the user, parameters describing the availability and values of outside options, and 
the parameters used in the various  learning rules,  such  as  the number of demands 
to sample.  Details of the bilateral exchange network under investigation are defined 
here as well.  The definition of the players and edges is straightforward.  As mentioned 
in section 7.5.1,  utility cakes are described as follows.  For each exchange ab € E one 
player  is specified.  Suppose  it  is  player  a.  The utility  cake  for  the exchange  ab is 
defined by giving  f a,b(da)  for all da  6 Da.
Networks  with  simple  (e.g.  unit)  cakes  are  straightforward  to  define  directly. 
For  more complicated  networks  there  is  an  initialisation  routine  in which  the user 
need only specify a set of interpolation points on the outer boundary43 of each cake 
and the demand sets D.  The routine defines the cake for an exchange ab by taking 
the demand set  of one  player,  say  player  a.  and finding the image of each demand 
in  Da  under  f a’ b   assuming that  the outer  boundary of the cake  is piecewise  linear 
and passes through all the interpolation points.  Using piecewise linear interpolation 
is  not  particularly  restrictive  as  the  outer  boundary  of any  cake  in  this computer 
implementation  is  represented  by  a  finite  number  of  discrete  points.  However,  it 
would be straightforward to alter the type of interpolation used.
7.6  Appendix:  Theorem  7.3  and  Proof
7.6.1  S tatem en t  o f T h eorem   7.3
Fix a network with unit cakes  N =  (P,E,KU nit)-
42Q^iy £j.jaj rmis were done varying the game rules and these aie not  included  in chapter 8.
43See definition 3.6.
221D efinition  7.3.  A  SW labelling  on N is a function / :  P ->  {S, W, 0}  such that:
i)  Let  Pw  —   {p\l(p)  —   W}.  For  any  P'  C   Pq/,  let  H  be  the  set  of consistent 
subgraphs44  (P, F)  of (P, E)  satisfying the following property.  Every p E P' is 
either included in an edge of F or all of their neighbours are.  Then for every 
{P -, F) E H there exists some p E P\v \ P'  who is not included in any edge of 
P.
ii)  Any p E P  such that l(p) = W has at least one neighbour, and any neighbour 
q of p satisfies l(q)  = S.
iii)  Consider any consistent subgraph (P, F) of (P. E).  Let C be the set of players 
who are not involved in any edge in P.  If there exists p E C1  such that l{p) = S 
then there exists q E C such that l{q) = W and pq E E.
If in at least one SW labelling I on N ,  l(p)  = S then p is called a S player.  A W 
player is similarly defined.  These labels correspond to ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ positions. 
The  sense  in  which  this  is  meant  is  made  clear  by  theorem  7.3  below.  Note  that 
a  population  A1   of the  evolutionary  model  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  a  S  or  W 
population when i is respectively a S or W player.
Lem m a  7.2.  A player cannot be both a  W and S player of N.
Proof.  Suppose such  a  player p  existed.  Let  I   and  /'  be  SW  labellings  on  N  such 
that l(p) = W  and V(p) —  S.  Let  Fq = 0.  Construct  a sequence of edge sets by the 
following inductive step.  Let  Fn+1  =  Fn U {qx}  where qx E   E \ Fn,  l(q) = W and 
q ^  p.  If no such qx exists then terminate the sequence and let Ho be the final edge 
set  produced.  Construct  another  sequence  of edge  sets  by  the  following  inductive 
step.  Let Hn+\  =  Hn U {qx}  where qx E  E \ Hn  and  V (q)  = S.  If no such qx exists 
then terminate the sequence and let  H be the final edge set produced.
The  graph  (P, H)  is  a  consistent  subgraph  of  (P,E).  By  construction,  every 
player  in  {q E  P  \   l{q)  =  W} \ {p}  is  either  included  in  an  edge of H  or  all  their
44See definition 7.2.
222neighbours are.  Thus by condition i),  p is not included in any edge of H.  Thus by 
condition iii)  there exists some px 6 E \ H which is a contradiction.  □
Fix finite demand sets D  and  0 <  5 <  1  such that  min Du,  \ {0}  = < 5  for any W 
player w and max Ds —  1  —  5 for any S player s.  Let the learning rule be either the 
imitate better or a proportional imitation rule.  Choose any population size M >  1. 
The choice of TV,  D,  e,  M and a learning rule fully defines the model of section 6.2 
and a corresponding Markov process Se   as described in section 6.1.2.
T heorem   7.3.  In  all stochastically  stable  states  of the perturbed Markov process 
just described,  agents in population p make demand 5 if p is a W player and 1 —  5 
if p is a S player.
Sections  7.6.2  and  7.6.3  prove  this  result.  Recall  that  a  brief sketch  is  given 
in  section  7.3.2.  The  proof is  based  on  the  minimal  tree  techniques  mentioned  in 
section 6.1.2.  See Bimnore et  al  [9]  for further discussion of these methods.  Section
7.6.4  discusses extensions to the result.
7.6.2  N o ta tio n   and  Supporting  Lem m as
The proof of theorem 7.3 is complicated by the fact that unlike in  [9], the recurrent 
classes of the unperturbed process are not singleton sets.  Instead the sets described 
by the following definitions are required.
D efinition  7.4.  Let  B*  be  the  set  of  quadruples  (Q.Q1  .d, E)  which  satisfy  the 
following conditions
i)  Q and Q'  are a disjoint partition of P.
ii)  /  = (fiheQ  where fx   € D%
iii)  G —  (Gi)i£Qt  where Gx   C  A ,  and  >  1
223iv)  Given any demand profile d = (d7)7 ;eP  where dt  = ft  for i £ Q and dx  £ Gr  for 
i £ Q',  then for i £ Qf, the only realisable payoffs to player i in Af(N, D)  from 
demand profile d is zero.
D efinition  7.5.  For  (Q, Q', f, G) £ B \  let  B(Q, Q', /, G)  be the set of states of S(  
where:
1)  For  i £ Q,  all agents in population A   make demand /,.
2)  For i £ Q',  all agents  in population  A1   make a demand in Gr.
3)  For i £ Q'  and g £ Gi, some agent  in population A1   makes the demand g.
4)  For  any  %   £  P ,  the  informational  state  of any  agent  in  population  A1   is  one 
of the realisable  payoffs  to  player  i  of some  demand profile d as described in 
condition iv)  of definition 7.4.
Let B be the collection of all sets as defined in definition 7.5.  Note that the sets 
of ® are disjoint.  Let B be the union of all elements of B.  The sets in B are similar to 
the B sets of definition 7.1,  but are finer as that definition did not have restrictions 
on informational state.
Note  that  So  is the process  corresponding to the unperturbed model.  Let  Z be 
the set of states of So.  Note that Z is also the set of states of Se   for any e.  Let T be 
the set of pairs  (z,z') £ Z2   such that there is a positive probability of a transition 
from z to z'  in any Se   with e > 0.  Then Q —   (Z,T)  is a directed graph.
Lem m a  7.4.  Any B £ B  contains a recurrent class of So  and every recurrent class 
of So  is a subset of some B £ B.
Proof.  Fix  some  (Q ,Q /,/, G)  £  B*.  Consider  a  state  z  £  B  =  B(Q:Q', /, G). 
Suppose there is a positive probability of a transition to z' £ Z in S0.  To prove the 
first  part  of the  lemma it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  z’   £  B.  New demands cannot 
enter the populations in the unperturbed dynamics.  Hence conditions  1)  and 2)  of
224definition 7.5 continue to hold in z'.   Consider i  6 Q'.  In a round of play from state z, 
the active agent  in Al, a,,, samples an agent  with informational state corresponding 
to payoff zero and hence does not imitate her.  Thus condition 3) continues to hold in 
z'.   Condition 4)  holds by the definition of how the informational states are updated 
(i.e.  step  1  of the algorithm of section  7.5.4).
To prove the second part of the lemma,  it  is sufficient to additionally show that 
for  any  state  z  E  there  is  an  accessible10  state  b   E  B.  Thus  it  is  sufficient  to 
consider the case z 0 B.  Suppose only condition 4)  is violated  in z.  Then there is a 
positive probability that every agent in turn becomes active, samples themselves and 
does not change demand.  The resulting state must lie in B as required.  So suppose 
a condition other  that  4)  is  violated  in  z.  Then there must  exist some i  6  P such 
that the state  z supports46  more than one st rategy for A1   and at least one agent in 
A1   has non-zero informational state.
Let  J  be set  of all  realisable  payoffs  to  player  i  in Af(N.D)  from any  strategy 
profile supported by state z.  Let j —  max J.  Note that j  > 0 and that in J\f(N,D) 
a payoff of j  can only be achieved by making a demand of j.
By definition of J, there is a positive probability in So that in a round of play from 
state  z  the  active  agent  in  population  A\  a,  receives  payoff j ,  samples themselves 
and so does not switch demand from j.  Let  such a resulting state be y.
The following has positive probability from state y in So.  Each agent b e A' \{a} 
in turn becomes active and samples agent a.  If the realised payoff of b is less than j 
then the active agent switches to the demand j of agent a.  If the realised payoff of b  
is j then the active agent  samples  themselves  and so does not switch demand from 
j.  This process results in a state p(z)  in which every agent in A1   plays demand j.
As  mentioned  above,  once  all  agents  in  a population  play  a single demand,  no 
other demand enters this population  in the  unperturbed  dynamics.  The  state p(z)
has at least one more such population  than z.  Hence there must  be some state pm(z)
4oThis term  is defined in section  6.1.2.
46This term  is defined in definition 6.2.
225such that the transformation p cannot be performed.  This state satisfies conditions 
1  -  3 of definition  7.5.  There is  a positive probability that  from pm(z)  every agent 
becomes  active,  samples  themselves  and  does  not  change  demand.  The  resulting 
state  b must  also satisfy condition 4 and thus b <E  B  as required.  □
This result still holds under altered learning rules in which updating agents may 
not sample themselves but the proof is lengthier.  It is necessary to require all agents 
to become active  immediately after state  x  so that  their informational state lies in 
J.  Following this,  the agent  a cannot sample an agent  with a payoff greater than j 
and so does not switch demand.
Note  that  for  Q' ^   0,  the set  B(Q,Q\f.G)  contains  many recurrent  classes  of 
S0.   This  is  because  for  i  E   Q',   agents  in  population  A1   receive  payoff  zero  and 
sample other agents with payoff zero and hence never switch demand.  Thus any two 
states in B(Q,Q',f,G)  such that  population A1   is different  are not accessible from 
each other.
Recall  from  section  6.1.2  that  given  z,z'  E  Z.  the  one-step  resistance  of the 
transition from  z  to  z\ rzz> ,  is the minimum number of mutations required for the 
state  to  change  from  .3  to  z'  in  one  round  in  St  with  e  >  0.  If this  transition  has 
probability 0 then the one-step resistance is defined as oo.
Given a path47  a =  («i)o<»<n(a)  the resistance of a is defined as
77(a) — 1
r O )  =
7 =  0
Recall that the resistance, r(T). of a directed tree T on Z is the sum of the one-step 
resistances  associated  with  its  edges.  Also  recall  that  a minimal tree  is  a directed 
tree  on  Z  with  minimum  resistance.  A  version  of the  Markov  chain tree theorem 
mentioned in section 6.1.2 can now be stated for the model described in this section.
Lem m a  7.5.  A  state z  G  Z  is stochastically stable va the process Se   if and only if
there is a minimal tree rooted at z.
47This term  is defined in  section 3.2.
226Proof.  See theorem 4 of Young  [77].  □
Lem m a 7.6.  For any z E Z there exists a path in il of resistance 0 from z to some 
z' in a recurrent class of S q  .
Proof  Suppose  there  exists  z  E  Z  for  which  no  such  path  in  Q  exists.  Then  no 
element of a recurrent class of So can be accessible from .2 .  Let Z' be the states in Z 
which are accessible from z.  Clearly for any x E  Z' then no y g Z' can be accessible 
from x.  Thus it  is possible to  construct  a discrete Markov  process on Z' such that 
the probability  of transition  between  x.x'  E  Z'  is  the same as  in  Sq.  There exists 
a recurrent class  A of Z'  by the argument  of footnote  6 of chapter 6.  Clearly in So 
any x  E  A  must  communicate48  with every  x'  E  A  and 110 y &  A is accessible from 
x.  Thus A is  a recurrent  class  of So  and any  a E  A is accessible from z,  which is a 
contradiction.  □
Lem m a  7.7.  If z  is a stochastically stable state of St  then z is in a recurrent class 
of S0.
Proof.  Suppose there exists  a stochastically  stable  z  for which this claim fails.  By 
theorem 7.5, there exists a minimal tree T rooted at z.  By lemmas 7.4 and 7.6 there 
must exist a path a —   (cr7 ;)o<i<n(Q)  *n ^  such that zo = z,  zn(ft)  E B and r(a) = 0.
Let  Tq   =  T.  A  sequence  of directed  graphs  is  now  defined  iteratively.  Let  Tt 
be  the  directed  graph  generated  from  Tr- 1  by  deleting  the  outgoing  edge  of z7 ;_i 
and  adding a new edge  z7_iz7 ;.  Note  that  r{Tr)  < r(T)  since rZ i_lZ i  —   0.  Let  A be 
minimal such that  z\  E B.  Note this is well defined since zn   E B.  Let T' —  T\.
Let q be the unique longest path in T' from z.  By construction it must be of the 
form
q —  (zo,Z\,Z2, •  •  •   , ~  A  =   t-0, t-l, t‘ 2, •  ■  ■  . b i - 1 , tn  =   Zfc, . . .)
where  (toAiA-2 , ■  ■  ■  ,  tn)  are the first  terms of the unique longest  path in T from zA
48This relation  is defined in section  6.1.2.
227and tn  is the first element in this path of the form z,  where i < A.  Such an element 
exists since T is a tree rooted at  ^o,
By construction,  z\ E B but Z } c   B.  By the definition of a recurrent class, there 
must be some transition  with a positive resistance for (i < n.  Delete the edge
MaH-l  from T'  and denote the resulting graph T".   Then r{T") < r{T).
Consider any w E Z.  The unique longest  path in T" from w follows the path in 
T from w until a state Zi  is reached for z  < A.  Such a state is reached as T is a tree 
rooted  at  zq.  The  path  then  continues  by  following  the  path  q  constructed  above 
until it terminates at t^.  Hence Tn is a tree rooted at some state other than 2.  This 
contradicts the assumption that T is a minimal tree.  □
Let  U be the subset of B*  such that  Q contains all  S and W players,  and
Let  V  =  B*  \ U.  Let  U  and  V  be  the  sets  of  all  recurrent  classes  of  Sq   in 
U B(Q, Q',  /, G)  where  the  union  is  taken  across  all  {Q,Q\f,G)  in  U  and  V  re­
spectively.  Let W =  U UV be the set of all recurrent classes of So.  Let U, V and W 
be the respective unions of the states in these classes.
Note that  for  any  W  6 W there exists  a  unique  B e ® such that  W C  B.  This 
follows  by  lemma  7.4  and  the  fact  that  the  elements  of IB   are  disjoint.  Thus  the 
following is well-defined:
D efinition  7.6.  For W 6 W,  let  B = B(Q, Q', f, G)  be the unique B e ®  such that 
W CB.  Define d{W) = T,ieP0i(W )  where:
1 —5  for S player  1
f
for W player i
1  for W or S  player i € Q'
fi  for W player t € Q
O r(W )  =
1  —  /,  for S player i G Q
0 otherwise
2287.6.3  M ain  L em m as
The  following  lemma  describes  how  certain  skeleton  trees’  on  Z  in  which  not  all 
states have outward edges can represent directed trees 011 Z.
Lemma  7.8.  Suppose the directed, graph H  —   (Z,F)   satisfies the following proper­
ties:
i)  There  exists some x*  6  W  such that  every state with an outward edge in H 
has a unique path in H terminating at x*.
ii)  Each W E W  contains either x*  or at least one state w with an outward edge 
in H .
Then there exists a tree T on Z rooted at x*  such that r(T) = r(G).
Note  that  condition  i)  implies  that  x*  has  110  outward  edge  in  H.  Hence,  all 
that is required to prove this is to show that  it is possible to add outward edges to 
all other states without creating any cycles.  Note that the condition x*  6 W is not 
necessary for this result,  but simplifies the proof slightly.
Proof.  Let  W*  be  the  recurrent  class  of  S’o  containing  x*.   Let  W'  =  W \ {W*}. 
For  any  W  6  W',  let  X(W)  be  an  element  of W  with  an outward  edge  in  H.  Let 
A (W*) = x*.
Let  Hq   =  H  and  Fo  =  F.  A  sequence  of  directed  graphs  on  Z  all  of which 
support  H  as  a  subgraph  can  be  constructed  from  H( )   by  the  following  iterative 
step.  Choose some xGW\{x*}  which does not  have an outward edge in  Hr.   Let 
W  €  W  be  such  that  x  6  W .   By  the  definition  of a  recurrent  class  of So,  there 
exists  a  path  < f >  =  ^   resistance  zero  from  x  to  X(W).  Let j  be
minimal such that  < f > j   has  an outward  edge in  Hr.   This is well  defined since A(VF) 
has  an outward  edge  in  H  and  thus  also in  Ht.   Let  F,+i  =  F{ U {07 ;0*_|_i  |  i  < j}, 
and Hi+i = (Z, Fl+1).  Observe that this inductive step preserves the two properties
229described in  the lemma and  the property that  H  is a subgraph.  Also observe that 
r{Hi+\) —  r{Hj).  Let  J  be the final directed graph produced by this process.
A further sequence of directed graphs 011 Z all of which support J as a subgraph 
can  be  constructed  from  Jq  —   J  by  the  following  inductive  step.  Choose  some 
x E Z \ {x*} which does not have an outward edge in Jt.   By lemma 7.6 there exists 
a path  0  =  (0i)o< i< n {< j> )  in  ^   °f resistance  zero  from  x  to  some  x'  G  W.  Let j  be 
minimal such that  0j  has  an  outward  edge in  J ,.  This  is well  defined since x'  has 
an outward edge in J  and thus J7.  Add the edges  {0 ,0 , m  |  i < j)  to the edge set of 
Ji  to generate  J? ;+i-  The final directed graph produced by this process satisfies the 
properties described for T.  □
Lem m a  7.9.  Given W  E V.  there exists a path 0 =  (0t)o<*<n(0)  ^   of resistance
1 such that 0o  E W   and 0n(^)  €  W' for sonic W' G W  satisfying 9(W') < G(W).
Any path  0  =   (0 i)o<7<n(0)  ' L n  ^   such that  0o  G  U.  07t(^)  G  V  and  r(0)  <  M 
requires mutations in at least one  W and one S population.
Proof.  Part I:
Suppose z E W where W G V.  Let B = B(Q, Q'.  /. G) be the unique BE  B such 
that  W C  B.  It will be shown that from state z the model can generate a sequence 
of states requiring only  a single mutation  resulting  in a state in W' E   W such that 
0(W')  <  0(W).  A  description  of such  a  sequence  is  referred  to  in  this  proof as  a 
performance  of the model.
The following facts will be useful.  If a IT player demands 5 in Af(N, D)  and has 
any  neighbours,  then  there  is  a realisable  outcome  in  which that  player  receives  a 
positive payoff49.  In a round of So, for each population there is a positive probability 
that the active agent in that population does not change their demand, as they may 
sample themselves.  In each of the performances described below, it is assumed that 
the event just described takes  place in every round for every population other than 
A1.
49  This would  no longer  be the case if the demand  1  were added to the demand set of S players.
230Since  z E   V,  at  least  one of the following  possibilities must be true in the state
2:
1)  There exists a W or S  player  i E  Q'.
2)  There exists a W player i E  Q  such that  /,  > 6 .
3)  There exists a S  player  i E  Q such that  f)  <  1 -  S.
In the case that  1)  holds then the required performance is as follows.  A11 agent 
a E  A   mutates  to  demand  < 5 .  In  the  following  round  a  becomes  active  again  and 
receives a non-zero payoff.  In the following rounds, every other agent in A'  becomes 
active,  receives payoff zero,  samples agent  a and switches to demand 5.
In  the  case  that  3)  holds  but  1)  and  2)  do  not then  the required performance
is as  follows.  An  agent  c i E  A1   mutates to demand  1 —   < 5 .  In the  following round a
becomes active again,  receives payoff 1 —  5,  and does not switch demand.  Note that 
all agents in W populations have demand S in this round so it is possible for agent 
a to receive  payoff 1 —  S.  In the following rounds,  every other agent  in A'1   becomes 
active,  samples  agent  a and switches to demand  1 —  S.
The  remaining  case  is  that  2)  holds  but  1)  does  not.  Let  C  be  the  set  of  W 
players i such that  fz  = 5.  Given  a demand profile such that players  in C demand 
5,  the demand of each player  in  C  is feasible  to  all their neighbours.  Hence in any 
maximal  consistent  outcome  of J\f(N, D)  from  this  demand  profile,  each  player  in 
C either exchanges or all their  neighbours exchange.  Thus by condition i)  of a SW 
labelling,  some  W  player  not  in  C  must  be  excluded  from  exchange  in  any  such 
outcome.  Let  i  be such  a player  who is excluded  in one such outcome.  Let  e  be a 
demand profile supported by  z.  The required  performance is  as follows.  An agent 
a E A{  mutates to demand 5.  I11 the following round a becomes active again, receives 
a non-zero payoff, and does not switch demand.  I11 the following rounds, every other 
agent in A1  becomes active and the demand profile of active agents is e.  Each rounds 
the active agent in population A1  receives payoff zero, samples agent a, and switches
231to demand  S .
Part II:
Suppose there exists a path 0 =  (07 :)o<7 ;<n(c/o in ^  such tliat  6 U anci 0n(<*)  € ^  
r(0)  < M which is a counterexample to the second claim.
Suppose the path 0 requires no mutations in population AJ   and in 0q all agents 
in AJ   have  the demand  fj.  Then in all states  ql.  all  agents in A1   have the demand 
fj  since no new demands are  added by mutation  and  active agents who sample an 
agent with the same demand cannot switch demand.
Consider  the case  that  in  0  no mutations  are  required  in  S  populations.  Then 
in all states  0 *   all  agents  in  S  populations demand  1  —  S.  Thus by condition  ii)  of 
an SW labelling,  in any state 0 A   any agent in a W population who makes a demand 
greater than  6 receives  a payoff of zero.  Thus no agent  in a W population switches 
to any demand other than 5 except  by  mutation.  Since less than M mutations are 
required in 0, some agent in each W population must have demand S in state 0n(</,). 
Thus it cannot be the case that  0n(< /,)  E  V as assumed.
Consider  the  case  that  in  0 no mutations  occur  in W populations.  Then in all 
states  (p i  all  agents  in  W  populations  demand  5.  Thus by condition  iii)  of an  SW 
labelling,  in any state  0 7 ;  any agent in a S  population who makes the demand 1 —  6 
receives a payoff of 1 —  S.  Thus no such agent switches demand except by mutation. 
Since  less  than  M  mutations  are  required  in  0 ,  some  agent  in  each  S  population 
must have demand  1 —  < 5  in state  0n(f/> )-  Thus it  cannot  be the case that  0n(< ^)  €  V 
as assumed.  D
The following lemma can now be proved.  Theorem 7.3 follows by application of 
lemma 7.5.
Lem m a  7.10.  Any minimal tree on Z is rooted in an element ofU.
A sketch of the proof is as follows.  The proof is by contradiction.  By lemma 7.7, 
the only other possible case is that there exists a minimal tree T on Z rooted in an
232element  of V.  A  ‘skeleton  tree’  A  is  constructed  from T by  removing edges  which 
do not lie on any path in T between recurrent classes of Sq.
The following iterative step is then performed.  The root of the current skeleton 
tree lies in V.  By lemma 7.9 a path p in il of resistance 1 exists from this root to an 
element of a recurrent class of S q,  W.  with a lower 0 value than that containing the 
root.  This path is added to the current skeleton tree, erasing any old outward edges 
of elements of this path.  Some element of /  6  W is found with an edge leading out 
of W.  This edge is  deleted  and a path in il  from /  to the end of p is added,  again 
erasing old outward edges.  This path is chosen to have resistance zero.  Such a path 
exists as  W is a recurrent class of S q.
This  iterative step  produces a new skeleton tree on  Z and with resistance of at 
most  r(T )  and  whose root  lies  in a recurrent  class of Sq  with a lower  0 value than 
the corresponding 6 value in the  previous skeleton tree.  Eventually  a skeleton  tree 
B is reached such that there exists a  path S in il of resistance  1 from its root  b*  to 
an element u 6 W.  This concludes part I of the proof.
There must be a path p in B from u € U to b* £ V.  A segment of this path from 
an element of U to an element of V containing no other elements of W is considered. 
By lemma 7.9 this has resistance of at least 2.  The vertex corresponding to state in 
this segment  from which the second mutation is required is labelled a.  The part of 
the path 4 >  up until it reaches  an element of the segment of p mentioned prior to a 
is added to B ,  erasing old outward edges, to produce a directed graph C.
This  graph  satisfies  r(C)  <  r(T)  +  1  and  has  a  unique  cycle  including  a  and 
b*.  The cycle is broken by adding to  C a path in fl of resistance zero from a to an 
element  w*  of a recurrent  class  W *   of So,  erasing old  outward edges.  Such a path 
exists by lemma 7.6.  Let  the resulting directed graph be C .   Note that C has been 
constructed so that there is a path from every recurrent class to a.  Hence in C there 
exists an element  of W*  with an outward edge leading outside W*.  A path in Q of 
resistance zero from this element to w*  is added to C ,  erasing old outward edges.  It
233is shown that the resistance of the resulting graph is no more than r(T) —  1 and that 
it  satisfies  the conditions  of lemma 7.8.  This  allows  the construction of a minimal 
tree on  Z with resistance less than r(T),  producing the desired contradiction.
The following operation is used repeatedly in the proof.
D efinition  7.7.  Let  X   =  (Z,F)  be  a  directed  graph.  Let  0  =  {4> i.)o< l<n(( f ))   be  a 
path in ft.  Then X © 0 —   (Z,F")  where F"  is constructed as follows.  Delete from 
F all outward edges of elements of 0 and name the remaining set  F'.   Let
F" —  F' U {(07 ;, 07+ i)  |  (J < i < n(<r)}
Proof of lemma 7.10.  Suppose the claim is false.  Then by lemma 7.7 there exists a 
minimal tree T rooted at some a*  E V.
Part  I of the proof constructs a directed  graph  B =  (Z, H)  satisfying the prop­
erties of lemma 7.8.  The value of x*  in that  lemma is taken by  a state labelled b* 
satisfying  b*  E  V.  The  graph  B  satisfies  r(B)  <  r{T).  Also,  there  exists  a  path 
in  D  of resistance  1  from  b*  to  some  u  E  U.  Part  II  proves  the  lemma from these 
facts.  Note that many of the symbols used in the notation of part I are reused with 
different meanings  in part II.
Part I
First,  some  notation  is  defined.  For  z  E  Z  let pz  =  ( p f ) o<i<n(P=)  be tlie unique 
path in T from state z to a*.  By lemma 7.9 for any w E  IV such that W E V, there 
exists a path in  D  of resistance  1  from  w  to  an  element  of W   where W'  E W and 
0{W') < 0(W).  Let  (p w =  (0Ho<7<n(0"')  denote such a path.
Let A0  be the directed graph (Z,0).  Construct a sequence of directed subgraphs 
of T by the following inductive step.  Choose some W E W such that no w E W has 
an outward edge in  Ak-  If no such  W  exists  then terminate the sequence.  Choose 
any  w  E  W .   Let  A  be  minimal  such  that  either  pf  has  an  outward  edge in  or 
A = n(pw).  Define Ak+i  from Ak  by adding the edges of {p?)Q<i<\.
Let  A  be the  final  graph in this sequence.  Since  A  is  a subgraph of T,  r{A) <
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Let  Bq   =  A  and  bo  —   a*.  Suppose that  directed  graph  Bk  on  Z  and  bk  £  Z 
satisfy  the  properties  i)  bk  £  V,  ii)  bk  has  110  outward  edge  in  Bk,   iii)  from every 
z £ Z with an outward edge in Bk  there is a unique path in Bk to 5*., and iv) every 
W £ W either contains bk  or a vertex with an outward edge in Bk.   Construct  Bk+\ 
as  follows.  For  less  cluttered  notation,  let  b =  bk,  and  c  =  Let  X  be  the
set  in W containing  c.  Select  some d £ X  with  an outward edge in  Bk  to a vertex 
d'  0 X.  Such  an  edge  must  exist  by  the properties iii)  and  iv)  above  and the fact 
b  X.  Note  that  the  transition  dd!  must  have  one-step  resistance of at  least  one 
since  X   is  a recurrent  class  of  Sq.  By  definition of a recurrent class there exists a 
path in fl, ip =  ('0?:)o<i<n(vh °f resistance zero from d to c.  Let Bk+\ = {Bk®(pb)£)ip. 
Note that in this operation,  adding the edges of < p b  and ijj increases the resistance by 
1,  and removing the  outward edge of d reduces  the resistance by at  least  1.  Hence 
r(Bk+1)  < r(Bk).
It  is  now  shown that  in  Bk+i  every  z £  Z  with  an outward  edge has a unique 
path in Bk+\  to c.  In the case that ^ is an element of (pb, the required path in Bk+i 
is made up of the elements of < p b   from  2  onwards.  In the case that  2 is an element 
of ip,  the  required  path  in  Bk+ 1  is  made  up  of the  elements  of ip  from  z  until  an 
element  z1   of < p b   is reached,  followed by the elements of the path < p b   from  z' to c in 
Bk+\.  The remaining case is that  2 has an outward edge in Bk.   In this case there is 
a path £ in  Bk  from  z to b.  The required path in Bk+\  is made up of the elements 
of £ until an element  z’   of ip  or  (p b   is reached,  followed by the elements of the path 
in Bk+1  from z'  to c.
Note that  any vertex with  an outward edge in Bk  other than c has an outward 
edge in Bk+i-  This shows that  Bk+i  and bk+l  = c :  satisfy properties ii),  iii)  and iv) 
above.  It also shows that if Bk satisfies property ii) of lemma 7.8 then so does Bk+i 
with x*  = c.
This construction can be used to generate a sequence of directed graphs Bk 011 Z
235and vertices b^.  Let  W i~  be the element of W containing b^.  By construction 0{W]t) 
is strictly decreasing in  k.  Thus for some A*.  Ag-  6 U and the sequence terminates. 
The graph  and the vertices b^^i  and b^*  have the properties described above
for the graph B and vertices b*  and u.
Part II
Let  p —   (Pi)o<i<n(p>   be  the  unique  path  in  B  from  u  to  6*.  Let  A  be  minimal 
such that  p\  6  V.  This  is  well  defined  since  b*  6  V.  Let  A'  be maximal  such that 
X' < A and p\>   6 U.  By lemma 7.9, the path (p,.)a'<7 .<a lias resistance of at least two. 
Let a\  6  [A', A)  be minimal such that the transition paiPa^i  has one-step resistance 
of at least  1.  If the one-step resistance of this transition is at least 2 then let a = a \.  
Otherwise,  let  a be minimal in  (ai,A )  such that  the transition papa+i  lias one-step 
resistance of at least  1.  Let  a —  pa.
Recall  that  there  exists  a  path  in  SI  of  resistance  1  from  b*  to  u.  Let  0  = 
(<^)o<z<n(0)  be  such  a  path.  Let  b  be  minimal  such  that  4 > b   =  pi  for some  i  < a. 
This is well defined since b* —  p$.
Define  C  as  equal  to  B 0  {4> i)o< t< b  except  that  c p b   has  an outward  edge to the 
same  vertex  as  in  B.  Note  that  r(C)  <  r(B)  +  1  <  r(T)  -I-  1.  Also  any  state 
z 6 Z \ {a}  with an outward edge in C has a unique path in C to a, as follows.  Fix 
c such that  < p b  = P c-  If z =  P i.  for some a > i > c then the required path is given by 
the elements  of p from pi  to  a.  Ii z —  fa  for  some i < b then the required  path is 
given by the elements of 0 from < f r i   to < f i b,   followed by the elements of the path in C 
from 0b = pc  to a.  The remaining case is that  ~ has an outward edge in B.  In this 
case there is a path 0 in B from z to b*.   The required path starts with the elements 
of ( up to the first element  z’  such that z' —  & ,  with i < b or z' = pr  with a> i> c. 
The remaining element  are those of the path in C  from z  to a.
By  lemma  7.6  there  exists  a  path  0  in  U  of  resistance  zero  from  a  to  some 
w*  6 W.  Let  W* E W be the set such that  w*  6  W*.   Select some 0 €  W* with an 
outward edge in C to  0' such that the transition 00' has a one-step resistance of at
236least  1.  Some such (3  must exist for the following reason.  If W*  does not contain b*  
then  W*  contains  a element  with an outward  edge in  B since  B  satisfies condition
ii)  of lemma  7.8  (with  x*  —   b*).  Therefore  this  element  also  has  an  outward  edge 
in  C.  If W*  does  contain  b*  then  observe  that  6*   has  an  outward  edge  in  C.  In 
either  case,  there  is  therefore  a  path  in  C  from  an  element  of  W*  to  a.  Since  a 
lies outside the recurrent class W*  of the unperturbed dynamics So,  this path must 
have positive resistance.
By  definition  of a  recurrent  class  there  exists  a  path  y  in  il  of resistance  zero 
from (3  to w*.   Let  D —  (C © i/’ ) © X -
It is now shown that  any state  z with an outward edge in D has a unique path 
in D to w*.   If z is in y then the required path is given by the elements of y from z 
to w*.  If z is in ip then the required path starts with the elements of ip  from z to the 
first  z'  equal  to or following  z in  V’  which is also in  y.  The remaining elements are 
those of the path in D  from z'  to w*.   The remaining case is that  z has an outward 
edge in C  and there is a path £ in C from z  to  a.  The required path in D is made 
up  of the  elements  of  £  until  an  element  z'  of ip   or  y  is  reached,  followed  by  the 
elements  of the  path  in  D  from  z'  to  w*.   Such  an  element  z'  must  exist  since  ip  
begins at  a.
Note that  with the  exception  of w*,   all  states with an outward edge in  B  have 
an outward edge in D.  Thus D satisfies the second property of lemma 7.8 with w* 
taking the role of x*.   Observe that in the const ruction of D from C no edges which 
have been added correspond to transitions with positive one-step resistances.  Also, 
the outward edges of a and  8 have been deleted,  both corresponding to transitions 
of positive one-step resistance.  In the case that o = 8 then it must be the case that 
a —  a\  (see  the first  paragraph of part  II)  and  the  outward  edge of a  corresponds 
to  a  transition  with  one-step  resistance  of  at  least  2.  Thus  r(D)  <  R(C) —  2  < 
r(T) -  1  and by lemma 7.8  a minimal  tree exists with resistance r(T) -   1  which is 
a contradiction.  O
2377.6.4  Other  Conditions
This subsection briefly discusses whether theorem  7.3 holds under slightly different 
conditions.
Suppose demand  1  were included in the demand sets for S players.  This creates 
some difficulties in the proof.  If all the neighbours of a W player i make the demand 
1 then i receives payoff zero whatever demand they make.  This hinders the proof of 
lemma  7.9  (see  footnote  49  of  this  chapter).  However,  it  seem very  likely  that  the 
result  of the theorem  also  holds for this case.  Observe that no agent  ever switches 
to  demand  zero  under  the  imitate  better  or  proportional  imitation  learning  rules 
except  by mutation.  Thus it  must  be very  rare'  for demand zero to be made in the 
long run and so agents making demand  1  usually receive payoff zero.
Under  the imitate  better or  proportional  imitation learning rules,  it  is possible 
that  the  updating  agent  in  any  round  may  sample  themselves  and  thus  does  not 
switch  demand.  The  proof  of  lemma  7.9  relies  heavily  on  this  property.  Under 
modifications of the imitate better and proportional imitation learning rules in which 
agents only sample others,  the result still holds under the condition:
M > max IDA
ieP
Two  modifications  to  the  proof of lemma  7.9  are  required.  Recall  that  the  proof 
concentrates  on  agents  in  one  particular  population,  A1 .   The  first  modification 
is  that  in  the  performances  described  in  the  proof  agents  in  any  population  A3  
where j  ^   i  only  become active  if there is another  agent  with the same demand in 
population HU  The condition on  M  above ensures that  there are always  at least  2 
agents  in  any  population  with  the same  demand.  The second  modification is that 
the  active  agent  in  population  A3   where j ^  i  always  samples  another  agent  with 
the same demand and hence does not changed demand.
Note  that  the  proof of theorem  7.3  does  not  apply  for  the  sampled  best  reply 
learning rule with sample size m.  For example, consider the network L3 and consider
238a state z such that the only supported demand profile is (<5,1 — < 5 , 5).  Suppose an agent 
in population A2   mutates to a demand <72  <  1 —  T  There is a positive probability in 
the unperturbed process that in the following rounds each agent  in populations A1  
and A3  in turn sample this mutant  and switch to demand 1 —  <72  if 7 7 7  (1 —  <^2)  > $ ■  
If the demand sets contain sufficiently small demands then this will be true.  During 
this process the mutant agent in population A2   does not become active again.  Now 
there  is a positive probability  that  every  11011-mutant  agent  in  A2   in turn becomes 
active  and  samples  agents  in  populations  A1   and  A3  with  demands  1  —  02,  while 
the active agents in populations A1   and ,4 3  continue to sample the mutant agent in 
population A2.   Thus it is possible for the state to move from 2 to another recurrent 
class of the unperturbed process with only a single mutation.  Thus lemma 7.9 does 
not hold.
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Simulation:  Results
This  chapter  contains  the  results  of  the  simulations  using  the  evolutionary  model 
described in chapters 6 and 7.  The aims of the simulations are based on the general 
aims outlined in chapter  1.  In terms of simulation,  the three points become:
a)  Run simulations  using all candidate learning rules on small networks to check 
whether  they  produce  results  consistent  with  experiment  and  satisfy  other 
reasonable properties.
b)  Run simulations on large networks and characterise the general outcomes.
c)  Attempt to find relationships between network parameters and outcomes.
In practice,  this section concentrates on aim a).  However,  aim c)  is reflected in the 
fact that the focus in this section is on  the effect of network structure,  rather than 
the effects of varying the parameters and rules of the model, other than the learning 
rule.
The networks  investigated  fall into three overlapping categories.  The first cate­
gory is those networks for which experimental data and theoretical predictions exist, 
allowing a comparison with the results of the simulation as part of aim a).  The sec­
ond  category  is  line  networks  with  unit  cakes.  These  provide  a simple  setting  to 
investigate  the  effects  of  increasing  the  size  of  a  network  as  part  of  aim  b).  The
240third  category  is  networks  which  produce  particularly  striking  simulation  results. 
These include the two 4 player ring networks of sections 8.8 and 8.9.
Section  8.1  investigates  which  values  of M  and  e   are  appropriate to  use in the 
simulation.  Sections  8.2  to  8.11  each  study  one  network  by  simulation.  Each  of 
these sections  begins with  a discussion of the motivation for the choice of network. 
A  results  subsection  follows,  describing  several  simulations  under  various  learning 
rules  and containing  the  relevant  data.  The  results  are summarized  and discussed 
in a final subsection.  General  conclusions are postponed to the conclusion,  chapter 
9.
For  each  simulation,  the  values  of  M  and  e   used  are  selected  to  illustrate  in­
teresting  features  of the  simulation  results.  The  initial  state  of each  simulation  is 
as follows.  All  agents  initially  have  the lowest  available  demand.  In the case  that 
A  =  D j, U {0}  all  agents  have  an  initial  informational  state  of 0,  corresponding to 
a most  recent  payoff of zero.  The  other  case  is  that  It  is  a  singleton  and  there is 
only one possible choice of initial informational state.  The motivation for this initial 
state  is  simply  to  avoid  starting  in  a  recurrent  class  of the  unperturbed dynamics 
which is stable in the perturbed dynamics.
Each  results  subsection  begins  by  referring  to  an  inital  table  (or  tables)  giving 
details of the setup of each simulation,  including the values of M and e, the number 
of rounds  used,  the  learning  rules  and  associated  parameters,  and  other  relevant 
information  for  the  particular  network.  Note  that  in  this  and other results tables, 
the  names  of learning  rules  are  usually  written  as  initials.  Thus  imitate  better  is 
IB,  proportional  imitation  is  PI  and  sampled  best  reply  is  SBR.  This  initial table 
also includes the final values  of the statistics1   \\  p and 7  as  defined in sections  7.4 
and 7.5.5 to 2 significant figures.  Finally, this table includes a ‘minimum proportion
1  Recall  that  y  is,  roughly  speaking,  the  average  over  all  agents of the proportion  of rounds  in 
which a given agent had the demand corresponding to the closest B set.  p is the average number of 
rounds  between  changes  of modal  demand,  and  7   is  the  average  number of rounds performed  per 
unit of run-time.
241displayed’  row, the use of which is described shortly.
The main results comprise a table for each simulation which lists the most com­
mon  modal  demand  profiles  and  the  proportion  of  all  rounds  in  which  each  was 
modal.  The demand profiles displayed are those which were modal for a proportion 
of rounds  of at  least  the  ‘minimum  proportion  displayed’  value.  The  proportions 
are  given  to  3  significant  figures,  as  there  are  sometimes  interesting  profiles which 
are modal for a proportion of rounds which can only be shown by this level of preci­
sion.  Sometimes it is also useful to give the ordinal positions of each demand in the 
corresponding demand set.  These are included in brackets after the demand values. 
As discussed  in section  7.3.1,  this list  is expected  to give a rough indication of the 
stationary distribution of the model.  Results  are only given for a single run of the 
simulation.  This is because in practice,  as predicted in section 7.3.1, there was little 
significant difference in results in different runs of the same simulations.
8.1  General  Properties  and  Choice  of Parameters
This section investigates the values of x and p as M and e vary for different learning 
rules.  These indicate  how  stable  the  B  sets  of the  model  are.  Also  investigated  is 
pi7 ; the average run time per modal demand change.  The aim is to find values of M 
and e representing a middle ground between over-stable cases where an impractical 
run-time  is  required  to  build  up  a  reasonable  picture  of the  stationary  state,  and 
under-stable cases where the structure of the stationary state is eroded by mutation.
These  questions  are  explored  in  a  2  player  network  to  minimise  the  required 
run-time.  The results  are  used  to provide a rough indication of which values of M 
and e provide interesting results for other networks.  The simulations of this section 
use D\  = D2 =  {0, 0.1, 0.2,. .. , 1}.  The number of rounds played in each simulation 
is 2 x  106.  The statistics in all the tables are given to 2 significant figures.
Table  8.1  is  for  the  case  of  e  =  1.  This  produces  a  model  entirely  driven  by 
mutation.  The  results  provide  a  baseline  for  comparison  with  the  other  tables  of
242this section.  The value of 7 is also included in this table as it can serve as a baseline 
for all other values of 7 in this chapter.
.  M 20 40 G O 100 200
X 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13
P 5.6 8.1 10 13 19
p h 3.1  x  i t r 5 4.3 x  10~5 5.4 x  10"5 7.5  x  10~5 1.2 x  10~4
1 1.8 x  105 1.9  x  105 1.9  x  105 1.8 x  105 1.6 x  105
Table 8.1:  Statistics for e  = 1
Tables 8.2 -  8.5  are for the learning rules imitate better,  proportional imitation 
with factor of proportionality  1,  and sampled  best reply with sample sizes  1  and  2. 
Note  that  starred  values  of p in these tables  indicate that  a modal demand profile 
was quickly reached which did not change for the rest of the simulation.
M e X P ph
20 0.15 0.82 1.2 x  101 7.5  x  10- 1
20 0.19 0.72 4.8 x  102 2.9  x  10-2
20 0.23 0.54 6.5 x  101 3.8  x  10" 3
40 0.19 0.74 3.5  x  101 2,0
40 0.23 0.58 4.6 x  102 2.5  x  10~2
40 0.27 0.38 6.1  x  101 3.4 x  10~3
60 0.19 0.68 3.8 x  101   * 2.1
60 0.23 0.55 3.9 x  103 2.1  x  10“ 1
60 0.27 0.35 1.0 x  102 5.7 x  10~4
Table 8.2:  Statistics for IB
These results illustrate that there are a wide range of values of M and 6 for which 
the values of  and p are significantly different to theii  values in the case c  1.  This
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20 0.04 0.88 5.0  x  ID4 2.9
20 0.08 0.68 5.2 x  It)2 3.0 x  10“2
20 0.12 0.43 6.5  x  101 4.0  x  10“3
40 0.04 0.88 7.1  x  104  * 4.1
40 0.08 0.71 8.1  x  103 4.5  x  10-1
40 0.12 0.41 1.4  x  it)2 8.3  x  10“3
60 0.08 0.66 1.9 x  ll)4 1.1
60 0.12 0.37 2.6 x It)2 1.5 x  10“2
60 0.16 0.24 7.4 x  101 4.7 x  10“3
Table 8.3:  Statistics for PI
M € X P ph
20 10“4 1.00 4.0  x  103 6.1  x  10“2
20 10"3 0.98 5.6  x  102 8.8 x  10“3
20 10“ 2 0.85 5.8  x  101 1.0 x  10“3
100
1
o
f
H 0.98 2.2  x  103 3.3  x  10“2
100 10“ 3 0.92 6.6 x  102 1.1  x  10“2
100
<
M
1
o
r
“
H 0.57 8.4  x  101 1.4 x  10“3
200 10“4 0.96 1.5  x  103  * 2.5  x  10“2
200 10"3 0.82 4.6  x  1()2 7.5  x  10“3
200 10“ 2 0.46 1.3  x  102 2.2  x  10“3
Table 8.4:  Statistics for SBP  with sample size  1
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20 0.02 0.98 3.2  x  1(J3 1.0 x  KU1
20 0.06 0.89 2.6  x  102 1.0  x  10~2
20 0.1 0.77 7.8  x  K)1 G.i  x  io~3
40 0.02 0.99 7.1  x  10'1   * 1.7
40 0.06 0.91 4.5 x  103 1.2 x  10"1
40 0.1 0.80 4.6  x  102 2.1  x  IQ- 2
60 0.06 0.85 4.4 x  101   * 1.1
60 0.1 0.75 2.1  x  103 8.1  x  u r 2
60 0.14 0.63 3.2  x  102 2.3  x  u r 2
Table 8.5:  Statistics for SBR. with sample size 2
provides  some  support  for  the  prediction  of section  7.3.1  that  the  state  is  usually 
near  a B  set  even  for  relatively  large values  of e .  However  note that,  except  under 
sampled  best reply,  it  does  not seem  possible to have a value of x above 0.9 and a 
value of p sufficiently low for much to be revealed about the stationary distribution 
in a reasonable runtime.  This suggests that  it  is  rare for the state to be inside a B 
set for the typical values of M and e  used in this section.
Also, as predicted in section 7.3.1, the value of p is decreasing in e and increasing 
in  Af,  and  the  value  of x  is  decreasing  in  e.  Under  imitate  better  the  value  of x 
appears  to  be  increasing  in  A/.  For  the  other  learning  rules  there  appears  to  be 
a  more  complicated  relationship  which  cannot  be  characterised  given  the  limited 
results available.  Also note that rate of change: of p with e seems independent of the 
value  of M.  Thus  the  range  of values  of e   for  which  interesting  behaviour can  be 
found is of roughly the same size for any value of M.
The  values  of  M  used  in  the  simulations  of the  remainder  of this  chapter  are 
near  the  lower  end  of  the  ranges  used  in  this  section.  This  is  to  allow  a  lower 
value  of e  to  be  used,  and,  for  imitate  better,  to  minimise  the  value  of x-  These
245features should result in the state staying closer to B sets, and provide the resulting 
stationary  distribution  with  some  degree  of  protection  from  being  too  driven  by 
mutation rather than the probabilities of transits between B sets.
8.2  The  2  Player  Unit  Cake  Network
This  section  is  on  the  simplest  bilateral  exchange  network:  the  2  player  unit  cake 
network.  Recall  that  section  7.1.1  contains  a  prediction  that  the  results  for  the 
imitate better learning rule are sensitive to the choice of D.  To test this prediction 
and the robustness  of the other learning rules to variations  in D,  for each learning 
rule two simulations are carried out in which two choices of D are used.  In the first, 
B,  demands are evenly spaced:  B\  —   £2  -  {0,0.1,0.2..... 1}.  The second,  C,  uses 
very unevenly spaced demands:
Ci  =  {0,0.01,0.02,0.03,0.04,0.05,0.15.0.2,0.5,0.7,1}
C2 —  {1 —  x\x 6 Ci}
Results
Tables  8.6  and  8.7  give  the  details  of the  simulations  of this  section.  Recall  that 
m is the sample size  of a learning  rule.  Note  that  the factor  of proportionality  for 
the  proportional  imitation  learning  rule  is  1.  Tables  8.8  -  8.15  contain  the  data. 
Recall that in the latter tables, the figures in brackets after demands are the ordinal 
positions of the demands in the corresponding demand sets.
Summary  and  D iscussion
For  all  of the  learning  rules  used  here,  these  results  are  evidence  in  favour  of the 
prediction  of section  7.3.1  that  the  model  concentrates  011 strict  Nash  equilibrium 
outcomes.  Note that this prediction was made under the assumption of low e.  Thus
246Table 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11
Learning rule IB IB IB, rn = 12 PI
Demand sets B C B B
M 25 25 35 25
e 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.08
P 3.3 x  10- 1.8 x  101 1.2 x  102 1.0 x  103
X 0.56 0.56 0.69 0.59
7 8.4 x  103 3.4  x  103 6.7 x  103 1.8 x  104
Rounds played 5  x  10(i 5 x  106 5 x  106 5 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 8.6:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.2  (1)
Table 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15
Learning rule PI SBR, SBR, SBR,
m  —   1 771  = 2 ill = 2
Demand sets C B B C
M 25 100 50 50
e 0.1 0.001 0.1 0.15
P 2.9 x  102 4.5  x  102 9.4 x 102 1.5 x  103
X 0.60 0.94 0.67 0.76
7 6.3 x  103 5.9 x  104 2.3 x  104 2.6 x  104
Rounds played
X
t
—
‘
107 107 107
Minimum proportion displayed 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Table 8.7:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.2  (2)
247Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5 0.5 0.665
0.4 0.6 0.147
0.6 0.4 0.134
Others 0.054
Table 8.8:  IB on a 2 player unit cake network with demands B
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.05  (6) 0.95  (6) 0.674
0.15  (7) 0.85  (5) 0.144
0.04  (5) 0.96  (7) 0.133
Others 0.049
Table 8.9:  IB on a 2 player unit cake  network with demands C
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5  (9) 0.5  (3) 0.541
0.2  (8) 0.4  (4) 0.235
0.15  (7) 0.8  (4) 0.101
0.15  (7) 0.85  (5) 0.099
Others 0.024
Table 8.10:  IB on a 2 player unit cake network results with demands C and sample 
size  12
248Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5 0.5 0.812
0.4 0.6 0.110
0.G 0.4 0.028
0.4 0.5 0.025
0.5 0.4 0.018
Others
Table 8.11:  PI on a 2 player  unit cake network with demands B
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5  (9) 0.5  (3) 0.814
0.2  (8) 0.8  (4) 0.115
0.15  (7) 0.8  (4) 0.021
0.5  (9) 0.8  (4) 0.018
Others 0.032
Table 8.12:  PI on a 2 player unit cake network with demands C
^Modal strategy
Time 1 2
0.2 0.8 0.185
0.3 0.7 0.138
0.6 0.4 0.117
0.9 0.1 0.113
0.4 0.6 0.099
0.7 0.3 0.092
0.5 0.5 0.084
0.1 0.9 0.082
0.8 0.2 0.075
Others 0.015
Table 8.13:  SBR on a 2 player unit cake network with demands B and sample size 1
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5 0.5 0.614
0.6 0.4 0.191
0.4 0.6 0.181
0.4 0.5 0.004
0.5 0.4 0.004
0.7 0.3 0.001
Others 0.005
Table 8.14:  SBR on a 2 player unit cake network with demands B and sample size 2
250Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.5 0.5 0.985
0.7 0.3 0.007
0.5 0.3 0.006
Others 0.002
Table 8.15:  SBR on a 2 player unit cake network with demands C and sample size 2
the experimental results  provide some evidence  that  the qualitative  features of the
model are robust to variations in e  as predicted of section  7.3.1.
The  demand  profile  (0.5, 0.5)  receives  strong  support  under  all  learning  rules.
However,  as  predicted  in  section  7.1.1,  the  results  of  the  imitate  better  learning
rule  are highly sensitive  to  the  choice  of D.  This makes  it  problematic  to use the
results  of this  learning  rule,  as  discussed  in  section  7.1.1.  Nonetheless,  the  results
do  concentrate  on  a  small  number  of outcomes:  those  close  to  the  median  of the
Pareto  optimal  outcomes  of the  game  if they  are  ordered  according  to  the  payoff
to  either  player2.  This  suggests  that  if demand  sets  are  evenly  spaced  then  the
model under this learning rule might support  a  bargaining solution for the 2 player
problem in  which  the outcome  is  halfway  along  the outer  boundary3  of the utility
cake.  However,  more simulations would  be required to test  this hypothesis.
Imitate  better  with  a  larger  sample  size  is  more  robust  to  the  choice  of  D.
However,  the  sample  size  needs  to  be  quite  large;  the simulation  above  required a
sample size of 12 from a total population of 35.  Simulations with sample sizes close
to  1  have  very  similar  results  to  those  with  sample  size  1.  These  results  are  not
included  as  they  exhibit  no  novel  features.  This  learning  rule is  not  used often  in
2This is well defined since for the choices of D made in this section, the Pareto optimal outcomes
of the game are of the form  (a, 1  —  a).
3Recall definition  3.6.
251the remainder of this chapter as it becomes very computationally expensive in larger 
networks.
The  results  for  sampled  best  response  learning  rule  with  sample  size  1  show 
that  it  only  selects  very  weakly,  or  perhaps  even  not  at  all,  between  strict  Nash 
equilibrium  outcomes.  A  possible  explanation  for  this  is  that  in  states  close  to  B 
sets  there  is  no  mechanism  for  a  cardinal  comparison  of the  utilities  to  be gained 
from  playing  a  demand  against  a  mutant  and  a  non-mutant.  Suppose all  mutant 
agents  have  a superior payoff.  Then  an  updating agent  switches  away  from  the B 
set  demand if  and  only if they  sample a mutant.  Thus the  probability of a transit 
cannot involve utility comparisons and most  transits between strict Nash equilibria 
have  roughly  equal  probability.  With  a  larger  sample  sizes,  updating  agents  will 
sample both mutants and non-mutants more often than they sample only mutants. 
Averaging calculations  then allow cardinal utility effects.
The proportional imitation learning rule supports the solution (0.5, 0.5)  for both 
the  evenly  spaced  demand  sets  of  B  and  the  very  unevenly  spaced  sets  of C.  In 
the  latter  case  there  is  also  some  support  for  (0.2.0.8).  This  may  be  because the 
demands  vary  by  only  one  ordinal  position  from  the  main  solution  and  are  closer 
to the median demands, echoing the support of imitate better for median demands. 
A possible explanation  for the success of non-Pareto optimal strategy profiles such 
as  (0.15,0.8)  is that the  probability of agents with positive payoffs increasing their 
demands  to  Pareto  optimal  demands  is  often  low.  A  possible  explanation  for the 
success  of non-feasible  strategy  profiles  such  as  (0.5,0.8)  is  that  these occur when 
multiple  demands  coexist  in  populations  during  the  transit  between  B  sets.  For 
example consider a state which supports only the demands 0.2 and 0.5 in population 
A1  and only the demands 0.5 and 0.8 in population A2.   As agents are more likely to 
switch to demands earning higher payoff's,  the demand pair  (0.5,0.8)  could become 
modal for some rounds even though it is not a feasible pair.  This explanation would 
mean that the apparent success of such profiles is only due to the method of reporting
252used4.
8.3  A  2  Player  non-Unit  Cake  Network
This section  investigates  the  behaviour  of the  simulation  for  a  particular  2  player 
network whose utility cake is defined by a non-linear boundary function.  The cake 
is chosen to investigate whether the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
used in the axiomatic definition of the Nash  bargaining solution  (see definition 4.2) 
holds.  The cake  chosen is  a subset  of the unit  cake  containing the point  (0.5,0.5). 
If the  axiom  holds,  the  solution  should  be  (0.5,0.5).  The  cake  is  defined  by  the 
boundary function
1
0.8 -  0.62  for x < 0.5
l-x- 10(2 -  0.5)2  for x  >  0.5
1
1 0
Figure 8.1:  f 1,2(x)  fin- section 8.3
This  is  a  concave  function  over  [0,1].  One  reason  for  its  choice  is  that  it  is 
asymmetric.
4A  possible  alternative  is  as  follows.  Rather  that  count  the  number  of rounds  on  which  each 
demand profile is modal,  count the total contribution it)  \  on rounds in which each demand profile 
is  modal.  This puts a lower weight  on  those rounds  in  which the state  is far from a B set.
253In each simulation of this section, the demand sets are D\  = {0,0.05, 0.1,... , 0.7} 
and  D2  —   {f1,2(d)\d  €  Dj}.  Note  that  in  this  section,  a  demand  pair  is  Pareto 
optimal if their ordinal positions in these sets, given hi brac kets in the results tables, 
sum to  16.
R esults
Tables 8.16  and  8.17 give the details  of the simulations of this section.  Recall that 
m is the sample size  of a learning  rule.  Note  that  the factor  of proportionality  for 
the proportional imitation learning rule is  1.  Tallies 8.18  8.22 contain the data.
Table 8.18 8.19 8.20
Learning rule IB IB PI
M 25 35 35
e 0.19 0.08 0.08
P 1.2  x  103 1.2 x  103 7.6 x  102
X 0.60 0.93 0.71
7 1.4  x  104 4.3  x  104 1.4 x  104
Rounds played 5 x  10° 2 x  106 2 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.001 0.001 0.005
Table 8.16:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.3  (1)
Summary  and  D iscussion
Each  of  these  simulations  again  concentrates  011  a  few  demand  profiles.  Except 
under  imitate  better,  these  all  are  close  to  the  outcome  (0.5,0.5).  Imitate  better 
again selected  the median outcome  (in the sense described in section 8.2).
However, the profiles which were most commonly modal under the imitate better 
and sampled  best  reply learning rules with sample sizes  12  and  2 respectively were 
not  (0.5, 0.5).  In  the profiles which were most  commonly  modal for these learning
254Table 8.21 8.22
Learning rule SBR. y/i -  2 SBR,  m = 5
M 35 35
e 0.08 0.08
P G.G x  102 3.G  x  102
X 0.G4 0.63
7 4.5  x  103 l.G x  103
Rounds played 2  x  10° 2 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.005 0.005
Table 8.17:  Guide to the simulat ions of section 8.3  (2)
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.35  (8) 0.59 (8) 0.534
0.4  (9) 0.5G ( 7 ) 0.231
0.3  (7) 0.62 (9) 0.163
0.45  (10) 0.53 (6) 0.033
0.25  (6) 0.65 (10) 0.026
0.35  (8) 0.56 ( 7) 0.002
0.3  (7) 0.59 (8) 0.002
Others 0.009
Table 8.18:  IB on a 2 player  11011-unit cake network
255Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.4  (9) 0.56  (7) 0.597
0.45  (10) 0.53  (6) 0.346
0.4  (9) 0.53  (6) 0.016
0.5  (11) 0.5  (5) 0.016
0.35  (8) 0.59  (8) 0.005
0.45  (10) 0.5  (5) 0.001
0.6  (13) 0.3  (3) 0.001
Others 0.018
Table 8.19:  IB on a 2 player non-unit cake network with sample size 12
Modal strategy
Proportion L 2
0.5 (11) 0.5  (5) 0.681
0.45 (10) 0.53  (6) 0.173
0.45 (10) 0.5  (5) 0.094
0.4 (9) 0.56  (7) 0.021
0.4 (9) 0.5  (5) 0.009
0.4 (9) 0.53  (6) 0.007
Others 0.015
Table 8.20:  PI on a 2 player  non-unit cake network
256Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.45  (10) 0.53  (6) 0.686
0.4  (9) 0.56  (7) 0.266
0.4  (9) 0.53  (6) 0.021
0.35  (8) 0.59  (8) 0.005
Others 0.022
Table 8.21:  SBR on a 2 player non-unit cake network with sample size 2
Modal strategy
1 2 Proportion
0.5  (11) 0.5  (5) 0.680
0.45  (10) 0.53  (6) 0.235
0.55  (12) 0.425  (4) 0.035
0.4  (9) 0.56  (7) 0.025
0.45  (10) 0.5  (5) 0.014
Others 0.011
Table 8.22:  SBR on a 2 player non-unit, cake network with sample size 5
257rules,  player  2  received  a payoff  of slightly  more than  0.5.  However,  increasing the 
sample  size  of  sampled  best  reply  to  5  did  yield  a  most  common  modal  demand 
profile of (0.5, 0.5).
This indicates that the outcome of these learning rules is not completely robust 
to variations in the utility cakes which are irrelevant  under the axioms of the Nash 
bargaining solution.  However,  robustness does  appear to  increase with the sample 
size of each learning rule.
With the exception of the imitate better learning rule, the results of this and the 
previous section certainly do not contradict the Nash bargaining solution.  However, 
further simulations  or  theoretical  results  would  be required before concluding that 
they offer strong support for this solution.
8.4  A 2 Player Unit Cake Network with an Outside Op­
tion
This section investigates the effects of introducing an outside option for player 2 into 
a 2 player unit cake network.  The details of how the simulation code implements this 
are given in section 7.5.1.  The motivation for this investigation is to discover whether 
direct outside options have the same effect  as the indirect outside options implicit in 
the possibility of exchanging with another player in networks of more than 2 players. 
In all the simulations of the section,  both demand sets are  (0,0.05,0.1,... , 1}.
R esults
Tables 8.23  and  8.24 give  the details of the simulations of this section.  Recall that 
m  is  the  sample  size  of a  learning  rule.  The  -proportion  exercised’  row  gives  the 
proportion  of all  rounds  in  which  the  outside  outside  is  exercised.  Note  that  the 
factor of proportionality for the proportional imitation learning rule is 1.  Also, note 
that  a  table  of data  is  not  given  for  the  simulation  corresponding to  the  entry  of
258table  8.24  with  no  table  number.  Such  a  table  would  not  have  been  informative 
because  in  this  simulation  no  individual  strategy  profile  was  modal for  more  than 
0.1  of all rounds and the most common modal demand profiles all involved player 2 
taking the outside option.  Note that the unusually low value of p in the simulation 
of table 8.26 is probably a consequence of behaviour in population A1   being mainly 
driven by random mutations since the outside option is taken so often by agents in 
population 2.  Tables 8.25 - 8.29 contain the data.
Table 8.25 8.26 8.27
Outside option 0.41 0.6 0.41
Learning rule IB IB PI
M 25 25 25
e 0.21 0.21 0.07
Proportion exercised 0.05 0.33 0.16
P 9.6  x  103 56 3.0 x  102
X 0.50 0.49 0.54
7 9.5  x  103 8.4 x  103 8.6 x  103
Rounds played 5 x  10G 5 x  106 5 x  10°
Minimum proportion displayed 0.01 0.02 0.01
Table 8.23:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.4  (1)
Summary  and  Discussion
Section 4.2.1  mentions a variation of the alternating offers game incorporating out­
side options.  For a unit cake network with equal discount factors the game predicts 
that  an outside option of less than  \  leaves the outcome unchanged from the game 
without outside options:  both players receive a  payoff of  ■   For an outside option of 
more than  ^  it predicts that an exchange forms and player 2 receives a payoff equal 
to  the  value  of  the  outside  option.  Note  that  equal  discount  factors  seem  appro-
259Table n/a 8.28 8.29
Outside option 0.G 0.41 0.G
Learning rule PI SBR,  in —  2 SBR, rn ~ 2
M 25 100 100
e 0.07 0.1 0.1
Proportion exercised 0.82 0.12 0.33
P 1.1  x  103 1.6 x  102
X 0.G4 0.57
7 G.3 x  103 4.4  x  103
Rounds played 5  x  10l> 5 x  10(i 5 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.001 0.001
Table 8.24:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.4  (2)
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.45 0.55 0.306
0.5 0.5 0.297
0.4 0.6 0.150
0.35 0.65 0.046
0.45 0.5 0.011
0.4 0.55 0.010
Others 0.180
Table 8.25:  IB on a 2 player  unit cake network with outside option 0.41
2G0Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.3 0.7 0.108
0.3 option exercised 0.065
0.25 option exercised 0.062
0.35 option exercised 0.060
0.2 option exercised 0.056
0.15 option exercised 0.053
0.005 option exercised 0.044
0.1 option exercised 0.044
0.25 0.75 0.041
0.4 option exercised 0.029
0.45 option exercised 0.021
0.3 0.65 0.020
Others 0.397
Table 8.26:  IB on a 2  player unit cake network with outside option 0.6
261Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.45 0.55 0.289
0.4 0.6 0.180
0.5 0.5 0.136
0.4 0.55 0.049
0.45 0.5 0.042
0.45 option exercised 0.036
0.5 option exercised 0.034
0.4 option exercised 0.025
0.35 0.65 0.024
0.55 option exercised 0.021
0.35 option exercised 0.016
0.35 0.6 0.016
0.6 option exercised 0.015
0.4 0.5 0.010
Others 0.107
Table 8.27:  PI on a 2 player unit cake network with outside option 0.41
262Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2
0.55 0.45 0.858
0.5 0.5 0.114
0.45 0.55 0.015
0.5 0.4 0.005
0.4 0.6 0.001
0.55 option exercised 0.001
Others 0.006
Table 8.28:  SBR on a 2 player unit cake network with outside option 0.41 and sample 
size  2
Modal strategy
1 2 Proportion
0.35 0.65 0.839
0.35 option exercised 0.160
Others 0.001
Table 8.29:  SBR on a 2 player unit cake network with outside option 0.6 and sample 
size  2
263priate  as  in  the  simulation  there  are  no  asymmetries  between the two  populations 
corresponding to non-equal discount factors.
Most of the results of this section differ from this prediction.  For imitate better 
and  proportional  imitation,  an  outside  option  of  less  than  ^  increases  the  typical 
payoff of agents  in population 2.  This is similar to some experimental results, such 
as those of Binmore et al [10].  It is intuitively plausible that the existence of an out­
side option strengthens the bargaining position of player 2, justifying this increased 
payoff.  However,  I  do  not  have  a candidate  mechanism  explaining  how  this  takes 
place in the model.
For sampled best  reply with sample size 2.  ihe same outside option reduces the 
typical payoff of agents in population 2!   This is a counter-intuitive result.  However, 
note that in the most common modal demand profile the demand played by agents 
in population  2  is only one ordinal position lower than (1.5.  so there is a possibility 
that for finer demand sets agents  in population 2 receive payoffs very close to 0.5.
Under imitate  better an outside option of more than  is exercised quite often. 
When it is not exercised, the typical payoff of agents in population 2 is above that of 
the outside option  under imitate  better.  Under  proportional imitation the outside 
option is exercised in the majority of rounds.
Under  sampled  best  reply  with  sample  size  2.  an  outside  option  of more  than 
^  is exercised occasionally  and the results concentrate on an outcome where player 
2  exchanges  and  receives  slightly  more  than  the  outside  option.  This  is  the  only 
simulation of this section that matches the alternating offers prediction.
An  explanation  for  the  tendency  of  player  2  to  accept  the  outside  option  of 
0.6  under imitative  learning  rules is  that  the evolutionary  model does not  capture 
‘sensible’ behaviour of agents in the face of this outside option.  For example consider 
a state  where  all  agents  in  population  2  accept  the-  outside  option.  The  ‘sensible’ 
response of agents  in population  1  is to make low  demands in an attempt  to make 
exchanging more attractive  than taking  the outside option  to agents in population
2642.  However  under  imitative  learning  rules,  all  demands  of agent  1  receive  payoff 
zero, so there is no evolutionary pressure to make any response at all.  On the other 
hand, if agents in population 2 were exchanging with a third population and making 
a demand  feasible  to  population  1,  then  a low  demand  by  an  agent  in  population 
1  would  occasionally  receive  a  non-zero  payoff ,  providing  evolutionary  pressure  to 
reduce demands.  Thus in this case,  this direct outside option setting does not seem 
to correspond well to the indirect outside options sometimes available in networks.
8.5  The  3  Player  Line  Network with  Unit  Cakes
This  section  is  on  the  network  L3.  The  expected  outcome  here  is  that  player  2 
receives  a  high  payoff.  I11  particular,  theorem  7.3  proves  that  the  outcome  of the 
evolutionary model in the limit e — >  0 under the imitative learning rules considered 
here  and  a  few  other  assumptions  is  that  player  2  receives  the maximum  possible 
payoff.  One  motivation  for  simulations  on  this  network  is  to  determine  how  well 
this  prediction  holds  for  general  values  of e.  This  prediction  is  also  supported  by 
the market  bargaining  game  of section  4.4.  I1 1   all  simulations  of this section,  each 
player has the demand set5  {0,0.05,0.1.... ,1}.
R esults
Tables 8.30  and 8.31  give the details of the simulations of this section.  Recall that 
771  is  the sample size  of a learning  rule.  Note  that  the factor  of proportionality for 
the proportional imitation learning rule is  1.  I allies 8.32 —  8.36 contain the data.
Summary  and  Discussion
The strong prediction that  player  2  receives  the payoff 0.95  is only unambiguously 
supported by the sampled best  reply rule with sample size  1.  I1 1  other simulations
5Note  that  the  inclusion  of  the  demand  1  means  the  conditions  of theorem  7.3  do  not  hold. 
However,  other  simulations without this demand  produce veiv  sinnlai  icsults.
265Table 8.32 8.33 8.34
Learning rule IB IB PI
M 15 30 40
€ 0.14 0.19 0.06
P 5.8  x  102 2.7 x  102 5.9 x  102
X 0.09 0.54 0.61
7 7.1  x  103 G.9 x  103 6.4 x  103
Rounds played 2 x  10G 2 x  10G 2 x  10°
Minimum proportion displayed 0.002 0.02 0.02
Table 8.30:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.5  (1)
Table 8.35 8.36
Learning rule SBR.  m = 1 SBR,  7 ji = 2
71/ 50 40
e 0.2 0.12
P 3.8  x  102 5.0  x  IQ2
X 0.51 0.71
7 2.0 x  103 6.0 x  102
Rounds played 2 x  10G 10G
Minimum proportion displayed 0.001 0.01
Table 8.31:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.5  (2)
2G6Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.05 0.95 0.05 0.905
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.017
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.004
0.05 0.95 0.05 0.002
0.1 0.9 0.05 0.002
0.05 0.95 0.1 0.002
Others 0.068
Table 8.32:  IB on L3  (1)
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.473
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.317
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.055
0.05 0.95 0.05 0.043
Others 0.112
Table 8.33:  IB on L3   (2)
267Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.533
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.171
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.064
0.25 0.7 0.3 0.041
0.3 0.65 0.35 0.036
0.3 0.7 0.25 0.035
Others 0.120
Table 8.34:  PI on  L:{
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.05 0.95 0.05 0.979
0.1 0.95 0.05 0.003
0.05 0.95 0.1 0.003
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.002
0.15 0.95 0.05 0.001
Others 0.012
Table 8.35:  SBR 011  Ly  with sample size  1
268Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.842
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.108
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.012
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.016
Others 0.022
Table 8.36:  SBR  011  L3  with sample size 2
which are not recorded here,  this solution is found to be robust to variations in the 
parameters  M  and  e.  The  imitate  better  learning  rule  provides  some support  for 
the same prediction but this solution is not robust to M  and e.
Where  the strong  prediction  is  not  supported,  the simulations  instead  support 
an outcome  in which  player  2  makes a demand of between  0.9  and 0.7 and players 
1  and 3 make equal demands for the remainder of the unit of payoff.  In some cases 
a single such demand profile is modal most of the time, in others the time is shared 
between several similar profiles.
The  fact  that  all  learning  rules  support  qualitatively  similar  solutions  suggest 
that  the  evolutionary  mechanism  driving  this  outcome  is  simpler  than  in  the  2 
player case.  Even sampled best reply with sample size  1  has some predictive power 
in  contrast  to  the  2  player  case.  The  fact  that,  imitate  better  and  proportional 
imitation  have  qualitatively  similar  results  for  LA   suggests  that  the  evolutionary 
mechanism mentioned does not  depend 011 cardinal payoff comparisons.
The results for imitative learning rules are qualitatively similar to the prediction 
of theorem 7.3  but exhibit some differences.  This gives some support to the predic­
tion of section  7.3.1  that qualitative results are robust to small variations in e.  The 
prediction  that  M  and  e  can  affect  the  exact  outcome  selected  is  also  supported, 
as illustrated  by the difference between  the results of tables 8.32 and 8.33.  Further
269simulations,  whose  results  are  not  recorded  here,  show  that  the  most  commonly 
modal demand profile also varies depending on the choice of M but the qualitative 
outcome  is  robust.  This is reflected in the fact  that  different values of M  are used 
in combination with different values of e  to illustrate different possible outcomes.
Note that the typical demand difference between the central and outlying agents 
is smaller for proportional imitation than for imitate better.  A possible explanation 
for this is that since probabilities of imitating demands are lower under proportional 
imitation,  the  evolutionary  pressure  011  agents  in  populations  1  and  3  to undercut 
each  other,  captured  by  theorem  7.3.  is  weaker.  However  it  is  not  obvious  what 
other evolutionary force countervails this.
8.6  A 3   Player  Ring Network
This section investigates a 3 player ring network.  As discussed in section 4.4, under 
certain  conditions  such  networks  have  a  unique  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple 
containing  three  outcomes  and  the  market  bargaining  game  of  that  section  sup­
ports  all  of  these  outcomes  as  possible  results  of  bargaining.  The  interpretation 
of the solution  to  the market  bargaining  game  of that  section  is  that  one of these 
outcomes  occurs.  The  network  of this  section  is  constructed  so  that  it  supports a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern triple whose outcomes are all those in which two players 
receive payoff 0.5.
The outer boundary of each cake is constructed from two line segments from the 
point  (0.5, 0.5)  to points on each axis.  From definition 4.3 it can be seen that such a 
network supports the required von Neumann-Morgenstern triple.  Each cake can be 
described completely by giving the points at which its boundary function intercepts 
the axes.  These are as follows:  for /C12  (0,1.3)  and  (0.8,0).  for JC 23  (0,1)  and (1,0), 
and for /C31  (0,0.65)  and  (1.6,0).  Recall that a point  (x. iy) e ICab is written so that 
x is the payoff to player  a and y that to player  b.
The  demand  sets  are  given  by  D,  -   {0,0.1. 0.2.........M,}  where Mt  is  the max-
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Figure 8.2:  The network under investigation  in section 8.6
imum  feasible  payoff to  i  in  any  cake.  For  these  cakes  M\  =  0.8,  M2  =  1.3  and 
A/3 =  1.6.  This allows for easy presentation of the results.
It  can  be argued  that  this choice  of D does  not  produce outcomes of the game 
evenly spread along the Pareto  boundaries of the cakes  and that this factor poten­
tially biases the results.  However,  for networks of more than 2 players, such an even 
spread does not seem easy to achieve,  except in the most symmetric cases (e.g.  unit 
cakes).  The fact  that  the outcomes  are not spread evenly can be viewed as a small 
test of robustness.
Note  that  \  is  neither  the  median  demand  of  D\  or  D3  nor  the  payoff either 
player receives in the symmetric Nash bargaining solution1 ’  in two player bargaining 
on  /C12  or  /C31.  This  feature  is  chosen  to  prevent  the  model  concentrating  on  the 
demand 0.5 for these reasons.
°For these cakes,  whichever player receives a payoff of x  >  f  in an intercept with an axis receives 
a payoff of \x in  the symmetric Nash bargaining solution of that cake for the following reason.  By 
the scale  independence and  symmetry  axioms,  this  is  the  player’s  Nash bargaining solution  payoff 
in a cake whose outer boundary is formed by extending the line segment between this intercept and 
(0.5, 0.5).  By the axiom of the independence of irrelevant, alternatives,  the Nash bargaining solution 
is the same for the cake constructed in  the main  text.
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Tables 8.37 and 8.38 give the details of the simulations of this section.  Recall that ni 
is the sample size of a learning rule.  Note that  the  factor of proportionality for the 
proportional  imitation  learning rule is  the  reciprocal  of the maximum demand. 
Note that  a relatively small number of rounds are played in the simulation of table 
8.41  as  the  value  of  7  is  low.  The  large  value  of p  is  in  the  same  simulation  is 
probably simply due to the perturbations caused by the large value of e rather than 
illustrating common transits  between B sets.  Tables 8.39  8.41  contain the data.
Table 8.39 8.40
Learning rule IB PI
M 50 50
t 0.21 0.05
P 3.8  x  103 2.6 x  103
X 0.52 0.51
7 9.8  x  103 1.0 x  104
Rounds played 5 x  10° 5 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.001 0.001
Table 8.37:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.6  (1)
Summary  and  Discussion
All  the  learning  rules  discussed  here  provide  very  strong  support  for  the  demand 
profile (0.5,0.5, 0.5),  matching the prediction of the market bargaining game.  Other 
simulations,  not  included  here,  show  that  this  support  is  robust  to  changes  in  M 
and  e.  Indeed,  the  reason  that  such  a large value of e  is  chosen for the simulation 
of table  8.42  is  that  for  smaller  values  110 other  demand  profiles were  modal  for  a 
significant  proportion of rounds.
272Table 8.41 8.41
Learning rule SBR.  in. —   1 SBR,  in = 2
M 25 20
e 0.2 0.38
P 2.6 x  102 91
X 0.53 0.53
X 6.4 x  HP 6.4 x  102
Rounds played 5  x  10G 5 x  105
Minimum proportion displayed 0.001 0.01
Table 8.38:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.6  (2)
Modal strategy
1 2 3 Proportion
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.995
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.002
Others 0.003
Table 8.39:  IB  on a  3 player  ring network
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.950
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.022
0.5 0.4 0.5 0.012
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.005
0.5 0.5 0.3 0.001
Others 0.010
Table 8.40:  PI on a 3 player ring network
273Modal strategy
Feasbile exchanges Proportion 1 2 3
0.5 0.5 0.5 12.23,31 0.983
0.5 0.5 0.7 12 0.005
0.5 0.5 0.9 12 0.004
0.5 0.8 0.5 31 0.002
Others 0.006
Table 8.41:  SBR on a 3 player  ring network with sample size  1
Modal strategy
1 2 3 Feasible exchanges Proportion
0.5 0.5 0.5 12.23.31 0.955
0.4 0.5 0.5 12,23.31 0.020
Others 0.025
Table 8.42:  SBR on a 3 player ring network with sample size 2
274I  do  not  have  a  candidate  mechanism  which  explains  such  strong  support  for 
this  outcome.  It  seems  unlikely  that  minimal  tree  analysis  such  as  that  used  in 
section  7.6  can  be  used.  In  3  player  ring  networks  at  least  one  agent  is  excluded 
from exchange given any demand profile.  Under imitative learning rules these agents 
may imitate  any  demand with a positive payoff.  It  can easily  be shown that every 
recurrent  class  of the  unperturbed  model thus  lias  outward  resistance  of 1,  so  the 
resistance based arguments of minimal tree analysis seem to have little power.
8.7  A  4  Player  Line  Network with  Unit  Cakes
This section is on the network L4.  One motivation for studying this network is that 
the  experimental  data of section  2.7  indicates  that  players  2  and  3  do  better  than 
players  1  and  4,  but  the  alternating  offers approach did not  capture this result,  as 
shown in section 5.2.4 where the payoff vectors (-y.  and (0,  ^,0) are offered
as the only ‘plausible’  limiting solutions of a model 011 this network.
R esults
Table  8.43  gives  the  details  of  the  simulations  of  this  section.  Recall  that  m  is 
the  sample  size  of a  learning  rule.  Note  that  the factor  of proportionality  for  the 
proportional imitation learning rule is 1.  I1 1  the simulation of table 8.45 the demand 
sets were:
D l  = D:i = {0,0.01, 0.04, 0.09. 0.14.1).2, 0.3,0.4, 0.5, 0.75.1}
D2  —   D4  —   {1   —   x  \   x  D\\
In all the other simulations of this section,  all demand sets were {0,0.05.0.1,.... 1}. 
Note that a relatively number of rounds were played in the simulation of table 8.47 
as the final value of 7 was so low.  Tables 8.44  8.47 contain the data.  Recall that
in the  latter tables,  the figures in  brackets  after demands  are the ordinal positions 
of the demands in the corresponding demand sets.
275Table 8.44 8.45 8.46 8.47
Learning rule IB IB PI SBR,  m = 2
M 25 25 25 50
e 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.12
P 2.5 x  it)2 5.2 x  102 4.0 x  102 4.4 x  102
X 0.01 0.65 0.62 0.78
1 5.0 x  103 1.0 x  104 4.8 x  10:i 2.2 x  10‘ 2
Rounds played 2 x  10° 2 x  10° 2 x  10tt 5 x  105
Minimum proportion displayed 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Table 8.43:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.7
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.35 0.65 0.65 0.35 0.164
0.35 0.65 0.6 0.4 0.143
0.4 0.6 0.65 0.35 0.131
0.35 0.65 0.7 0.3 0.084
0.3 0.7 0.65 0.35 0.078
0.35 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.069
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.043
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.037
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.031
0.45 0.55 0.65 0.35 0.022
Others 0.198
Table 8.44:  IB on  L.\  with evenly spaced demand
27CModal strategy
1 2 3 4 Proportion
0.09  (4) 0.91  (8) 0.3  (7) 0.7  (5) 0.310
0.14  (5) 0.86  (7) 0.3  (7) 0.7  (5) 0.243
0.14  (5) 0.86  (7) 0.4  (8) 0.6  (4) 0.232
0.09  (4) 0.91  (8) 0.4  (8) 0.6  (4) 0.127
0.14  (5) 0.86  (7) 0.5  (9) 0.5  (3) 0.026
0.09  (4) 0.91  (8) 0.2  (6) 0.8  (0) 0.020
Others 0.042
Table 8.45:  IB  on L.\  with unevenly spaced  demands
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.45 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.220
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.167
0.4 0.6 0.55 0.45 0.165
0.35 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.031
0.45 0.55 0.6 0.4 0.067
0.35 0.65 0.6 0.4 0.040
0.4 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.027
0.4 0.6 0.55 0.4 0.021
Others 0.262
Table 8.4G:  PI on  L.\
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1 2 3 4 Proportion
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.799
0.45 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.053
0.45 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.032
0.55 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.015
Others 0.028
Table 8.47:  SBR 011  L.\  with sample size 2
Sum mary  and  Discussion
Both imitative rules provide support for the experimental observation of the central 
players receiving an advantage.  The similarity of these results to the outside option 
results  of  section  8.4  is  discussed  in  section  9.2.4  of  the  conclusion.  The  imitate 
better  rule  provides  stronger  support  for  the'  experimental  observation,  but  again 
fails to be robust to choice of JD,  as in the 2  player case.  Simulations for the other 
learning  rules,  which  are  not  recorded  here,  showed  they did not  suffer from  these 
robustness problems.  The sampled  best reply  rule supported the demand profile of 
(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5).
The results for proportional imitation show only a small advantage for players 2 
and 3.  In the most  commonly modal demand profile they receive a payoff only one 
ordinal position higher than 0.5.  This suggests the possibility that for finer demand 
sets  the  advantage  is  still  only  that  of one  ordinal  position,  and  so  tends  to  zero 
as  the  demand  set  size  becomes  larger.  Simulations  with  finer  demand  sets  show 
this to be incorrect.  These results  are not  included as for such demand sets a very 
large number of demand profiles are modal for a significant number of rounds so the 
results are hard to display using the reporting methods of this chapter.
2788.8  A  4  Player  Ring  Network
This  section  presents  a 4  player  ring  network  which can  support  a demand  profile 
in which all pairs of demands of neighbouring players lie on the Pareto boundary of 
the corresponding cakes.  This is similar to a von Neumann-Morgenstern triple.  The 
cakes  of this  network  are  defined  by  the  boundary  functions  f 1'2  —   / “’3  =  —
Z4,1  =  |( 7 —  lOx)  (see figure 8.3).  The outcome mentioned is (0.5. 0.5,0.5,0.5).  Note 
that  this  does  not  coincide  with the  Nash  bargaining solution in  any single utility 
cake.  The Nash bargaining solution  in the cake /C12  is  ( ^ ) .   In all simulations of 
this section,  all demand sets are  {0,0.05.1,... . 1.75}.
player  1
player 4
Figure 8.3:  The network under investigation  in section 8.8
R esults
Table  8.48  gives  the  details  of  the  simulations  of  this  section.  Recall  that  m  is 
the  sample  size  of a  learning  rule.  Note  that  the  factor  of proportionality  for  the 
proportional  imitation  learning  rule  is  4:  the  reciprocal  of the .maximum demand. 
A relatively low number of rounds were played  in the simulation of table 8.51 since 
the corresponding value of y was so low.  Table's 8.49 —  8.of  contain the data.  In all 
the demand profiles of these tables,  all exchanges aie feasible.
279Table 8.49 8.50 8.51
Learning rule IB PI SBR,  m = 2
M 35 40 20
€ 0.23 0.035 0.28
P 2.8 x  102 1.1  x  L O 3 3.6  x  102
X 0.55 0.60 0.58
7 2.7 x  103 1.5  x  103 85
Rounds played 2  x  10G 2 x  10° 2.5 x  105
Minimum proportion displayed 0.005 0.01 0.001
Table 8.48:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.8
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.897
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.011
0.5 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.008
0.5 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.008
0.45 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.006
Others 0.070
Table 8.49:  IB on a 4 player ling network
280Modal strategy
1 2 3 4 Proportion
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.693
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.057
0.5 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.055
0.45 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.051
0.5 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.043
Others 0.101
Table 8.50:  PI on a 4 player ring network
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.979
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.001
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.001
0.5 0.5 0.45 0.5 0.001
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.001
Others 0.017
Table 8.51:  SBR on a 4 player  ring network with sample size 2
281Sum mary  and  Discussion
All  the  simulations  of  this  section  provide  strong  support  for  the  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern  like  demand profile  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5. 0.5).  However,  as  for  results of the 3 
player ring network,  I do not have a candidate mechanism to explain this outcome. 
For this case,  it might  be possible to use minimal tree analysis,  as not all outcomes 
of the network involve a player being excluded  from exchange.
8.9  A  Second  4  Player  Ring  Network
This section presents a 4 player ring network which can support an outcome outside 
the  core.  The  cakes  of this  network  are  defined by  the  boundary functions  f  ['2  —  
f 3,4  ~  §(1  ~ x)>   f 2,3  ~  Z4’1  —   ^(3 —  4.r)  (see  ligure 8.4).  in  all  simulations  of this 
chapter all demand sets are  {0, 0.1, 0.2,.... 1.5}.
player  1
player  2 player 4
Figure 8.4:  The network under investigation  in section 8.9
Results
Table  8.52  gives  the  details  of  the  simulations  of  this  section.  Recall  that  m  is 
the  sample  size  of a learning  rule.  Note  that  the  factor  of  proportionality  for  the
282proportional  imitation  learning rule is  the  reciprocal  of the maximum demand. 
A relatively  low number ot rounds were played  in the simulation of table 8.55 since 
the corresponding value of 7 was so low.  Note that in the same simulation, although 
the value of p was very low,  in practice most  changes of modal demand only lasted 
for a short number of rounds before returning to the most commonly modal demand 
profile.  Tables 8.53 - 8.55 contain the data.
Table 8.53 8.54 8.55
Learning rule IB PI SBR,  in —  2
M 40 40 40
€ 0.00 0.04 0.075
P 3.1  x  I02 0.2  x  102 25
X 0.08 0.02 0.69
7 2.8 x  103 2.7 x  103 2.4 x  102
Rounds played 2 x  10(i 5 x  10u 5 x  105
Minimum proportion displayed 0.05 0.02 0.01
Table 8.52:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.9
Modal strategy
Feasible exchanges Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 12,34 0.502
0.6 0.6 0.55 0.65 12,34 0.073
0.55 0.65 0.6 0.6 12.34 0.072
0.6 0.6 0.5 0.75 12.34 0.068
Others 0.285
Table 8.53:  IB  011 a 4 player ring network
283Modal strategy
1 2 3 4 Feasible exchanges Proportion
0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 12.34 0.260
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.45 12,23.34.41 0.112
0.6 0.45 0.6 0.45 12,23.34.41 0.084
0.7 0.45 0.6 0.4 12,23.34,41 0.067
0.5 0.75 0.4 0.9 12.34 0.052
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.45 12,23.34,41 0.025
0.45 0.8 0.5 0.75 12.34 0.021
Others 0.379
Table 8.54:  PI on a 4 player ring network
Modal strategy
Feasible'  <  -xchanges Proportion 1 2 3 4
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 12,23.34,41 0.419
0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 12,23.34,41 0.251
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.45 12,23.34.41 0.197
0.7 0.45 0.6 0.4 12,23.34.41 0.070
0.6 0.45 0.6 0.45 12.23.34,41 0.034
Others 0.029
Table 8.55:  SBR on a 4 player ring network with sample size 2
284Sum m ary  and  Discussion
Table 8.56 contains all strategy profiles which ere modal for at least 0.1 of all rounds 
in any of the simulation of this section.  The demand of player i   is given in the column 
headed  The four columns on the right  illustrate whether these demand profiles 
lie in the core.  A non-core profile satisfies /'•'  1  (cr,)  < cr, + l  or f 4,1 {0- 4) < < J\.
C T l 0-2 0-3 (J4 f 4'[(0 4 ) f l' 2 (oi)
t
c
c
T
t
o
f 3A(os)
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0 0.75 0 0.75
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.45 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.45
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.45
0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.45 0.7 0.45
0.6 0.4 0.7 0.45 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.45
Table 8.56:  Illustration of whether most common demand profiles lie in the core
This demonstrates that sampled best reply  with sample size 2 and proportional 
imitation offer some support for demand profiles corresponding to non-core solutions 
to this network.  However imitate better selects a demand profile which corresponds 
to a core solution.  Proportional imitation also offer some support to a different such 
demand profile.
An explanation for non-core profiles receiving significant weight in these models 
is the matching rule.  For example suppose demand profile a is played, all exchanges 
are  feasible  and  / 2,3(cr2)  <  a3  but  f 2'l(a2)   -   rrj.  If player  2  raises  his  demand 
slightly then there are two maximal consistent outcomes, with corresponding sets of 
exchanges  {34}  and  {23,14}.  Player 2 gains in the second case, but this is offset by 
the possibility of exclusion from exchange in tin* hrst, case, so that player 2 does not
wish to change his demand.
The significance of support for 11011-core solutions and this explanation for their
285occurrence is discussed further in section 9.1.3.
8.10  The  5  Player  Line  Network with Unit  Cakes
This  section  is  on  the  network  L5.  Several  different,  predictions  for  the  outcome 
of this  network  have  been  made  in  the  course'  of this  thesis.  Theorem  7.3  proves 
that  the  outcome  of the  evolutionary  model  under  imitate  better  or  proportional 
imitation  in  the  limit  e  — »   0  and  under  a few  other  assumptions  is  that  players  2 
and 4 receive the maximum possible payoff.  One motivation for simulations on this 
network is to determine how well this prediction holds for relatively large values of 
e.  On the other  hand,  the models based 011 the'  alternating offers game of chapters 
4  and  5  allow  a  wide  range  of  solutions.  An  interesting  question  is  whether  the 
evolutionary model selects any of these solutions and how robust this selection is to 
the values  of M   and  e.  In  all  simulations  of this section,  each  player  has  demand 
set7  {0,0.05,0.1,... ,1).
Results
Tables 8.57  and  8.58 give the details of the simulations of this section.  Recall that 
m  is  the sample size  of a learning rule.  Note  1  hat  the factor of proportionality for 
the proportional imitation learning rule is  1.  Tables 8.59 - 8.64 contain the data.
Summary  and  Discussion
The prediction of theorem 7.3 of a demand profile of (0.05,0.95,0.05,0.95,0.05)  does 
not hold in general.  The only simulation for which it does hold uses imitate better, 
and even under this learning rule, the result is  not robust to variations in e and M.
Imitate better is the only learning rule to strongly select a single demand profile. 
For  proportional  imitation  in  particular,  a  large  number  of profiles  are  modal  for
7Note  that  the  inclusion  of  the  demand  1  means  the  conditions  of theorem  7.3  do  not  hold. 
However,  other simulations without  this demand produc e very similar results.
286Table 8.59 8.G O 8.61
Learning rule IB IB PI
M 15 40 15
€ 0.09 0.18 0.04
P 3.1  x  103 G.l  x  102 2.4 x  102
X 0.85 0.72 0.70
7 4.1  x  103 4.2 x  103 3.6 x  103
Rounds played 2  x  10u 2 x  106 2 x  10G
Minimum proportion displayed 0.01 0.01 0.02
Table 8.57:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.10  (1)
Table 8.62 8.63 8.64
Learning rule PI SBR,  m —  1 SBR, m = 2
M 75 40 20
e 0.09 0.002 0.0025
P 1.8 x  102 1.5  x  102 6.7 x  102
X 0.41 0.97 0.84
7 5.4 x  102 7.3 x  103 2.8 x  103
Rounds played 2 x  1(B 2 x  10G 2 x  106
Minimum proportion displayed 0.02 0.05 0.02
Table 8.58:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.10  (2)
287Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4 5
0.05 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.929
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.9 0.1 0.022
0.05 0.95 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.020
Others 0.029
Table 8.59:  IB on  L5  (1)
Modal strategy
Proportion 1 2 3 4 5
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.661
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.208
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.8 0.2 0.033
0.2 0.8 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.029
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.85 0.15 0.010
Others 0.059
Table 8.60:  IB for  Lb  (2)
288Modal strategy
1 2 3 4 5 Proportion
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.250
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.6 0.4 0.067
0.35 0.65 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.060
0.4 0.6 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.057
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.3 0.040
0.3 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.032
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.032
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.7 0.3 0.028
0.35 0.65 0.3 0.65 0.35 0.025
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.65 0.35 0.021
Others 0.388
Table 8.61:  PI on  L5  (1)
289Modal strategy
1 2 3 4 5 Proportion
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.115
0.45 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.106
0.4 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.069
0.45 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.4 0.066
0.4 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.4 0.037
0.35 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.036
0.45 0.55 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.033
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.35 0.033
0.4 0.55 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.028
Others 0.477
Table 8.62:  PI on  L5  (2)
Modal strategy
1 2 3 4 5 Proportion
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.85 0.15 0.212
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.100
0.2 0.8 0.15 0.85 0.15 0.085
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.9 0.1 0.057
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.054
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.75 0.25 0.051
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.050
Others 0.391
Table 8.63:  SBR on L5  wit h sample size  1
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1 2 3 4 5 Proportion
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.495
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.213
0.3 0.7 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.043
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.7 0.3 0.043
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.6 0.4 0.039
0.35 0.65 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.028
0.35 0.65 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.025
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.65 0.35 0.023
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.75 0.25 0.021
Others 0.070
Table 8.64:  SBR on  L5  with sample si/e 2
a significant  proportion of rounds.  Most  of the demand profiles selected  are of the 
form (1 —  x, x, 1 —  x, x , 1 —  x) with a- >  i, and the others differ only slightly.  The value 
of x  is  variable,  depending on  the  choice  of e  and  M .  However,  for  each  learning 
rule it is generally  lower  than the payoff player  2 receives in the simulations 011 L3. 
Note  that  again  the  sampled  best  reply  rule  with sample  size one does have  some 
predictive power,  in contrast to the 2 player case.
8.11  The  7  Player  Line  Network with  Unit  Cakes
This  section  is  on  the  network  L 7.  In  contrast  to  L3  and  L5,  theorem  7.3  does 
not  apply  to  here.  A  motivation  for  study  is  to  investigate  whether  the  patterns 
observed for L3 and L5 hold or break down.  More generally, this is an opportunity to 
investigate whether any qualitative differences are revealed as network size increases. 
In all simulations  of this section,  each player has demand set  {0,0.05,0.1,.... 1}.
291R esults
Table  8.65  gives  the  details  of the  simulations  of  this  section.  Recall  that  m  is 
the  sample  size  of a  learning  rule.  Note  that  the  factor  of proportionality  for  the 
proportional imitation  learning rule is  1.  Tables 8.66 - 8.68 contain the data.
Table 8.66 8.67 8.68
Learning rule IB PI SBR, m —  2
M 15 15 20
e 0.09 0.04 0.025
P 4.6  x  102 1.5  x  102 3.2 x  102
X 0.88 0.73 0.98
1 2.6  x  103 2.4  x  103 4.3 x  102
Rounds played 2 x  I0(i 2 x  10° 107
Minimum proportion displayed 0.01 0.015 0.01
Table 8.65:  Guide to the simulations of section 8.11
Summary  and  Discussion
The results  of these simulations  follow several  patterns  of L 3  and L5.  I1 1  the most 
commonly modal demand profiles, even numbered players make demands above 0.5 
and  odd  number  players  make  demands  below  0.5.  The typical demand  difference 
between even  and odd  players  is smaller than for  L 3  and L5.  Imitate better yields 
the highest payoff difference.  However, unlike I  5  and L5, I could not find a choice of 
parameters  M   and  e  which selected  a demand  profile in which even players played 
the  demand  0.95.  Demand  profiles  are  less  strongly  selected  than  for  Lj,  and  L5 ?  
and indeed most other networks investigated in this chapter, in the sense that more 
profiles  are  modal  for  a significant  proportion  of rounds.  This was  especially  pro­
nounced for proportional imitation where no demand profile is modal for more than
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Proportion
0.1 0.9 0.15 0.85 0.15 0.9 0.1 0.560
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.097
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.089
0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.081
0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.051
0.15 0.85 0.15 0.85 0.15 0.9 0.1 0.025
0.1 0.9 0.15 0.85 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.020
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.9 0.1 0.014
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.8 0.2 0.012
Others 0.051
Table 8.66:  IB on  Lj
0.1  of all rounds!
In any maximal consistent subgraph of L-.  as defined in definition 7.2,  players 2 
and 6 are included in an edge.  However there arc' subgraphs in which player 4 is not. 
This  suggests  that  player  4  is  in  a weaker  bargaining  position than players  2  and 
6 and must make more concessions to his neighbours.  Nonetheless,  the simulations 
show  that  the  even  numbered  players  usually  make  equal  demands.  Only  under 
imitate better is it  apparent  that there is  a slight  tendency for player 4 to demand 
less than the others8.
Finally,  note  that  the value  of p tends to  decrease  as network size increase.  In 
particular,  note that  for each simulation  on L-  in this section there is a simulation
8Given  the  fact  that  under  proportional  imitation  a  very  large  number of demand  profiles  are 
modal  for  a significant  proportion  of rounds,  it  is not  possible to rule out the existence of  a slight 
tendency  for  player  4  to  demand  less.  This  suggests  that  additional  methods of reporting should 
be used.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Proportion
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.064
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.035
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.032
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.029
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.35 0.021
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.55 0.45 0.65 0.35 0.016
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.016
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.55 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.015
0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.015
0.35 0.65 0.35 0.6 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.015
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.65 0.35 0.015
0.35 0.65 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.015
Others 0.611
Table 8.67:  PI on  L7
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Proportion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.517
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.155
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.103
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.051
0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.019
0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.015
0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.015
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.010
Others 0.115
Table 8.68:  SBR on Ly  with sample size 2
on L5  in section 8.11  using the same learning rule and values of M and e.  For each 
simulation in this section, the corresponding simulation in section 8.11 has a smaller 
value of p.  This suggests that a lower value of e may be required for larger networks. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  possible  interpretation  is  that  in  a  larger  network,  there  is 
roughly  the  same  possibility  of a  transit  occurring  in  each  realised  exchange  and 
more  transits  take  place  simply  because  there  are  more  realised  exchanges.  There 
may  be  networks  where transits  occurring in  any  exchange  rarely affect  the whole 
state of the model and thus a lower value of p  may not  indicate faster convergence 
to the stationary distribution of the model.  So lower values of p in larger networks 
do not necessarily indicate that  e should be reduced.
295Chapter  9
Summary  and  Conclusions
Section 9.1  discusses the suitability of the various models discussed in this thesis to 
the  task  of modelling  bargaining in  bilateral  exchange  networks.  Section  9.2  sum­
marizes  the solutions  of these models  which  have  been  found for various networks. 
These  results  are  also  compared  with  each  other  and  the  experimental  data  and 
theoretical  predictions  of  the  sociology  literature.  The  final  section,  9.3,  consid­
ers  possible  extensions  to  this  research.  Recall  that  the?  notation  used  to  refer  to 
networks,  such as Ln,  is defined in section 3.1.3.
9.1  The  Suitability  of the  Proposed  Models
Section  9.1.1  collects  the  various desirable  properties  of a  bargaining model which 
have  been  mentioned  throughout  the  thesis.  Sections  9.1.2  and  9.1.3  discuss  how 
well  the proposed  models  based  on the alternating offers and Nash demand games 
respectively meet these properties.
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C onsistency  w ith  Existing  Solutions  and  Experimental  Evidence
The bargaining models in this thesis are extensions of models for bargaining between 
2  players.  Hence  for  the  special  case  of a  2  player  network,  the solutions  of these 
new models should be consistent with at least some parts of the existing analysis in 
the  literature.  The same  is  true  for other special  cases  for which  analyses  already 
exist e.g.  3 player ring networks.
The  results  should  also  be  reasonably  consistent  with  experimental  results  un­
der  appropriate  conditions.  Sometimes  differences  between  the  assumptions  made 
in  a  model  and  the  design  of  an  experiment  may  mean  that  they  capture  differ­
ent situations.  So direct  comparison with experimental results under inappropriate 
conditions is not useful.
Robustness
The details  of a bargaining structure will be imprecisely known to an investigator. 
Also, they are subject to exogenous perturbations.  For example there may be varia­
tions in the quality of exchange items or in the preferenc es of bargainers.  For these 
reasons,  bargaining solution concepts should bo reasonably robust to small changes 
in the details of networks and other information on the bargaining situation,  other­
wise they have little predictive power.  An important example of this requirement is 
used  in section  4.4.4  where it  is  argued that  adding empty exchange opportunities 
should not  affect  the  outcome  of a  2  player  bargaining situation.  After  all,  a bar­
gainer  is  always  likely  to  have  all  sorts  of unprofitable  alt ernatives  to  engaging  in 
bargaining,  and it should be possible to neglect  the details of these.
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This  point  applies  to  computer  based  models.  The  computational  costs  involved 
in using these  models should be practical.  This is of particular  importance in con­
structing  models  that  can  be extended  to  large  networks  which  is  one  of the  aims 
mentioned in chapter  1.
Selection  of Solutions
Simple bargaining models  often support an extremely wide array of solutions.  Ex­
amples  are  the  Nash  demand  game  and  the  alternating  offers  game  without  time 
preferences1.  It is crucial that a model selects  tin* 'interesting' solutions from these. 
This  is of course  a subjective  decision,  but  it  can  also  be partly guided  by experi­
mental data.  For example,  the experiments  of the sociology  literature described  in 
section 2.7 often concentrate on a narrow range of possible outcomes2.  This strongly 
suggests that some selection beyond that mentioned for the simple bargaining mod­
els  is  appropriate.  Experimental  data  also  exists  on  two  player  bargaining  which 
supports similar conclusions for these cases  (e.g.  Bimnore et al  [G ]  and  [10]).
In  section  3.3.5  the  argument  is  made  that  evolutionary  methods  are  not  cur­
rently  available  for  extensions  of the  alternating  offers  game  and  there  is  no  firm 
intuitive  basis  to  pick  an  equilibrium  refinement .  In  the  absence of such  methods 
of equilibrium selection,  it  is  desirable  for  bargaining games to have a unique SPE 
(or  at  least  a set  with little  variation  in outcome).  Multiple solutions  can then be 
represented in a bargaining model by exogenising part of the structure which selects 
between outcomes,  as in the market bargaining game of section 4.4.
On the other  hand,  evolutionary  simulations,  such as those of chapter  8,  entail
*For brief discussions of these models see the introduction to chapter 6 and section 4.2.1  respec­
tively.
2It  is  possible  to  dispute  whether  this  evidence  is  sufficient.  The  outcomes  may  recur  simply 
because the subjects have all  been  picked  from  a society  which enforces one bargaining convention 
of many possibilities.
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place weight on several outcomes.  Here a judgement must  be made on whether the 
weight is spread across too many solutions for the results to be useful.  For example, 
it  is  straightforward  that  this  is  the  case  for  the  results  of table  8.13  which  place 
approximately equal weight on all Pareto optimal outcomes.
Instantly  A daptive  Exchange
It  seems  intuitively  likely  that  in  a  bargaining  situation  of  sufficient  complexity 
players sometimes form an exchange without realising that an exchange in a distant 
part  of  the  network  formed  very  recently.  As  discussed  in  section  5.3.1,  perfect 
information  models  of bargaining  seem  poorly  adapted  to  capture  this  possibility. 
Instead  whenever  one  exchange  forms,  the  remaining  players  typically  are  able  to 
instantly adapt their behaviours to take account of the reduced network of bargaining 
opportunities.  This  property  is  referred  to  as  instantly  adaptive  exchange  and  is 
discussed  in  more  depth  in  section  5.3.1.  It  is  desirable  that  a  bargaining  model 
should allow the possibility of exchange which avoids this property.
Realism ,  Tractability  and  Concision
These  three  properties  are  obviously  desirable.  They  are  grouped  together  since 
there are trade-offs  between achieving them in a  bargaining model.  Literal realism 
is  often  sacrificed  to  tractability  and  concision  in  constructing  any  mathematical 
model.  Examples of features whose literal  realism is doubtful in this thesis include 
the use of multilateral demands, as discussed in section 4.4.5, and insisting on perfect 
information.  It is more important that the model should capture realistic behaviour 
rather  than  include  all  its  details.  It  is  this  interpretation  of  ‘realism'  that  is  a 
desirable feature of a bargaining model.  Some examples are that players should be 
treated reasonably symmetrically except for the differences due to network position 
and that the level of commitment  available to players should be judged correctly.
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that  solutions  should not  depend 011  unrealistic  limitations  that  a model places 011 
players’  actions.  This is because players would not voluntarily submit to bargaining 
conventions which any of them have a unilateral incentive to break3.  This condition 
is based on the argument of Binmore in  [3]  mentioned in section 4.4.1.
9.1.2  M odels  B ased   on  the  A lternating  Offers  G am e
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss various extensions to the alternating offers game.  For the 
purpose of tractability,  all of them retain the feature of perfect information, with the 
exception  of the  model  of Corominas-Bosch  described  in  section  4.5.  As discussed 
in section 3.3.4, the natural solution concept for perfect information models is SPE. 
When  such  models  are  applied  to  networks  of  more  than  3  players,  the  solutions 
suffer from the limitations associated with instantly adaptive exchange described in 
section 5.3.1.  This problem is put aside as it may often not apply to small networks, 
and the proposed models are considered in terms of the remainder of the desiderata. 
Most  important  is the consideration  that  for these models to have much predictive 
power a unique SPE is required (or at least a set of SPE payoffs with little variation).
Section 4.3 introduces the telephoning model of Binmore  [3j.  Section 4.4.5 uses 
an  argument  of  Binmore  [3]  which  states  that  players  would  wish  to  unilaterally 
break  the bilateral  bargaining  convention  of this  model  and that  it  therefore does 
not describe the main case of bargaining.  This argument also applies to the bilateral 
bargaining  models  of Calvo-Armgenol  [16,  17.  18]  discussed  in  section  4.5;  indeed 
the  papers proposing these  models make explicitly  assume  a setting in which only 
bilateral bargaining is possible4.
Section  4.4  discusses  the  market  bargaining  game  of  Binmore  [3],  which  is  a
3This could be interpreted as an informal evolutionary stability crit erion on the bargaining rules.
4 Another reason  for not pursuing the bilateral bargaining approach is that these models already
deal  with  general  bilateral  exchange  networks,  although  they  have  the  limitation  that  bargaining 
stops after the first  exchange.
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do  not  allow  the  model  to  provide  consistency  with  the  2  player  solution,  and  a 
modification involving personal delays is proposed.  Otherwise, the model meets the 
desiderata quite well and is the basis of the novel  models in chapter  5.
Some  other  bargaining  models  from  the  literature  are  discussed  in  section  4.5. 
The  unilateral  demand  exogenous  order  models  of Binmore  [3]  allow  non-bilateral 
bargaining,  but  it  is  argued  that  to  also  treat  the  players  symmetrically,  and  thus 
provide consistency with the 2 player case, requires a very complicated order of play. 
This  seems  both  unrealistic  and  difficult  to  generalise.  The  model  of Corominas- 
Bosch  [23]  is  not  pursued  mainly  because  it  seems  difficult  to  generalise  to  11011- 
bipartite  networks.  Also  it  supports  multiple  SPEs  for  the  network  5  player  line 
network  L5.
Chapter  5  proposes  two  novel  extensions  of 1  lie market  bargaining game which 
can  be  used  on  any  bilateral  exchange  network.  The first,  the exogenous  ordering 
model, is a straightforward extension of the market bargaining game.  It requires an 
exogenously specified ordering over the players  which determines the order of play. 
Lemmas  5.1  and  5.2  illustrate  that  for  the  case  of the  line  network  L5,  different 
choices  of ordering can  permit  widely  differing  SPE  outcomes.  This does not give 
the model much predictive power.  A1 1  interpretation is that too much structure has 
been exogenised including features crucial to selecting the solution.  Furthermore, it 
appears that the model is not easily tractable as there are a large number of possible 
choices of exogenous ordering5  and there is no obvious general method of solution.
The second model of chapter 5,  the endogenous ordering model, attempts to re­
solve these difficulties by endogenising the order of play.  As discussed in section 5.2.1, 
this appears to necessitate  the introduction of rules which approach the acceptable 
boundaries  of realism  and concision.  Also,  in section  5.2.4  it  is demonstrated  that
5Indeed,  there are some for which I could  not solve the resulting  bargaining game.  See footnote
5 of chapter 5.
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ences.  Furthermore, the proof of this theorem is lengthy,  indicating that tractability 
of this model for more general networks is problematic.
To conclude,  in  addition to the problems of instantly  adaptive exchange,  it  ap­
pears that the approach of extending the alternating offers game supports too wide 
a  range  of solutions  and  produces  models  which  are  not  easily  tractable.  These 
problems are likely to increase for larger networks.
9.1.3  E volu tion ary  M odels  based  on  the  N ash  D em and  Gam e
Chapter  6  introduces  a  bargaining  model  for  general  bilateral  exchange  networks 
based on the Nash demand game in which strategics are simply demand values.  The 
simple strategy space of this game means that  it  is easy to use it as the basis of an 
evolutionary model which can be implemented as a computer based simulation.  The 
following is a brief recap of the evolutionary model defined in chapter 6.  A population 
of M  agents is associated with each network position.  Each agent is given an initial 
demand value.  In each  round of play,  an agent  from each  population is selected at 
random.  These  agents  then  play  the  bargaining  game  and  change  their  demands 
using simple learning rules based 011 their payoffs and some other information about 
the state of the  model.  Which  extra information  is used  is specific  to the learning 
rule.  There is also a small probability e > 0 that agents mutate to a random demand 
rather than use their learning rule.  In order that this model may be implemented as 
a computer simulation,  the strategy  space of the underlying game is discretised by 
nominating a finite demand set for each player in the network under investigation.
Section 7.1  proposes 3 simple candidate learning rules for use in the model:  im­
itate better,  proportional imitation and sampled  best reply.  Imitate better involves 
updating agents  sampling another agent  from the same population.  If the most re­
cent payoff of the sampled agent is higher than that of the updating agent then the 
updating agent  switches  to  the demand of the sampled  agent.  Under proportional
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ations on these learning rules with larger  sample sizes are also proposed.  Sampled 
best reply with sample size m involves the updating agent  sampling m agents from 
each other population.  A mixed strategy for each population is constructed from the 
frequencies  with which demands occur in the corresponding sample.  The updating 
agent switches to a demand which is a best reply to these mixed strategies.  For each 
of these learning rules,  in particular sampled best  reply, large sample sizes increase 
the computational cost.
Standard results of Markov chain theory are used to show that under a wide class 
of learning rules there is a unique stationary distribution over the possible states of 
the model,  and that this corresponds to the expected state of the model in the long 
term, independently of the initial state.  Furthermore, it is argued in section 7.1 that 
for the 3 candidate learning rules most  of the weight of this stationary distribution 
is  placed  close  to  B  sets.  These  are  sets  of states  in  which  some  populations  are 
demand-homogeneous and the other populations correspond to players who receive 
payoff zero from any demand profile supported by the set of states.  If the stationary 
distribution  places  most  of  its  weight  on  a  few  B  sets  then  the  model  effectively 
selects  a bargaining solution.  As  e  increases,  this solution  becomes more driven by 
mutation  until  it  has  little  connection  to  the  bargaining  situation.  However,  it  is 
argued in section  7.3.1  that  for small e.  the qualitative  features  of the solution  are 
likely to be relatively  robust to variations in e.
The stationary  distribution can be  investigated  by simulation.  As  discussed  in 
section  7.4,  it  is  sufficient  for the simulation to keep  track of which demand profile 
is  closest  to  the  state  of the  model  in  each  round.  Chapter  8  presents  data from 
simulations  by  listing  the  proportion  of  iouikF  that  the  most  common  demand 
profiles are modal.
This evolutionary  model has several  unrealistic  features.  One,  discussed in sec­
tion 7.2.4,  is that it seems unnatural to have a population of agents associated with
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Markov  chain  results just  mentioned  show  that  this  setting  may  often  permit  se­
lection  of solutions  by  simulation.  In  terms  of the  desiderata,  there  is  a  trade-off 
between tractability  and realism.
The  results  of section  8.2  show  that  the  results  of the  imitate  better  learning 
rule  are  not  robust  to  the  choice  of demand  sets  used  in  the  game.  As  discussed 
in  section  7.1.1  this  is  not  necessarily  a  reason  to  dismiss  it.  However  it  is  not 
a convenient  feature  for  simulation.  Considerable  effort  must  be  put  into showing 
that any solution it supports is robust to various 'reasonable' choices of demand sets. 
Some possible choices are demand sets which are evenly spaced, or demand sets such 
that  the  Pareto  optimal  outcomes  of the  game  lie  evenly  spaced  along  the  Pareto 
boundary.  Also, selecting demand sets satisfying certain ‘misonable’ properties may 
become a difficult  task for larger networks  in which  the demand sets of one  player 
can be used in several cakes.
Simulations detailed  in section  8.2 show that  the other candidate learning rules 
are reasonably robust to the choice of demand sets.  In particular, this includes imi­
tate better with a sufficiently large sample size.  However this learning rule becomes 
too computationally costly to use for larger networks.
The sampled  best  reply  updating rule with sample size  1  is  rejected  due to its 
behaviour for 2 player networks.  It does not select  between strict Nash equilibria of 
the underlying game,  instead  placing  roughly  equal  weight  on each.  This fails the 
‘selection of solutions’ item of the desiderata especially as these results do not match 
those  of experimental  studies  of 2  player  bargaining  (an  example is  Binmore et  al
[6]).  In these experiments bargaining outcomes in which one player takes almost all 
of the available cake are almost never observed.
For 2 and 3 player networks,  the learning rules proportional imitation and sam­
pled best reply with sample size 2 usually match some theoretical and experimental 
solutions  of the corresponding situations.  An exception  is  that sampled best  reply
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side option; table 8.28 shows that an outside option can sometimes reduce a player's 
average payoff.  Proportional imitation  has the particularly attractive feature of di­
rectly  describing  the  process  by  which  agents  update  their  demands  based on  the 
outcomes  of the  underlying game.  In  contrast,  sampled  best  response  requires  an 
undescribed mechanism to generate the best  response.
Many of the simulations detailed  in chapter 8  with the learning rules just men­
tioned do concentrate on solutions which are generally in accord with the desiderata. 
However two problems emerge.  As network size increases, the proportions of rounds 
in  which  demand profiles  are  modal  are  typically  spread  much more evenly  across 
demand profiles.  This is especially pronounced for the proportional imitation learn­
ing rule;  in table 8.67 no demand profile is modal  for more1  than 0.07 of all rounds! 
It is possible that the weight given by these proportions is still concentrated close to 
a small number of demand profiles but spread thinly between many profiles nearby 
to these.  To investigate  this possibility it would  be necessary to use other methods 
of interpreting the data.  One simple  method  would be to find for each  population 
the proportion of rounds for which each demand is modal.
The second problem is much more serious.  The1  simulations of section 8.9 are on 
a particular four player ring network.  For  proportional imitation and sampled best 
reply with sample size 2,  these simulations spend a significant proportion of rounds 
with  non-core  modal  demand  profiles.  In  this  situation  two  neighbouring players 
have  a  feasible  exchange  with  each  other  which  would  improve  both their  payoffs, 
but  they  cannot  unilaterally  raise  their  demands  to  take  advantage  of it  because 
this  causes  a  risk  of  exclusion.  I  interpret  this  as  revealing  that  the  underlying 
game places unrealistic limitations on strategies  and allows  artificial solutions to be 
supported by the evolutionary model.  Either of the neighbouring players mentioned 
would like to be able to make an offer to the other.  It seems reasonable that a player
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Such an option would allow the non-core outcome to be easily destabilized.
Altering  the  underlying  game  to  allow  such  options  does  not  seem  a  straight­
forward task.  For example,  section  7.2.1  discusses the limitations of using directed 
demands.  Also,  it  would  be  hard  to  prove  when  enough  options  had  been  added 
to prevent  artificial solutions  being supported.  Note that  increasing the size of the 
set of strategies  and the complexity of the underlying game is likely to increase the 
computational cost of simulation.
Another possible resolution  of this  problem  is  to adjust,  the probabilities of the 
outcomes  of the matching rule as discussed in section 7.2.1.  This might destabilize 
the particular non-core solution described.  However it does not appear obvious that 
this prevents the problem occurring for other networks.
In conclusion,  the simulation  performs well for  many small networks.  However, 
simulations reveal that the extension of the Nash demand game used as an underlying 
game does not allow players options they would realistically use in bargaining and the 
simulation thus sometimes supports unrealistic solutions.  In addition, the precision 
of the simulation results may be decreasing with network size,  in the sense that the 
most commonly modal demand profiles are modal for a smaller proportion of rounds, 
which would be problematic for investigating large networks.  There is certainly scope 
for attemping to resolve both these problems by altering the evolutionary model and 
the method of reporting results.
9.2  A  Comparison  of all  Results  and  Predictions
This section summarizes and compares the results and predictions about bargaining 
outcomes contained  in this thesis.  These comprise theoretical solutions of bargain­
' s  discussed in section 4.1  in bargaining situations in  which making such an offer does interfere 
with other bargaining opportunities, then there may well  he bargaining situations in which non-core 
solutions are reasonable.
306ing  models,  data  from  the  experiments  summarized  in  section  2.7,  data  from  the 
simulations  of chapter  8,  and  the  predictions  of the sociology  literature  of section 
2.5.  Section 9.2.1  discusses the extent to which the experimental and simulation re­
sults are comparable.  Sections 9.2.2 - 9.2.G each compare  the results found for one 
particular network.  Section  9.2.7 collates  other miscellaneous results.  Section  9.2.8 
discusses relations between the results of this thesis and the theoretical predictions 
of the sociology  literature.
9.2.1  T im e  Scales  and  C om parability
A  general  issue  is  whether  the  experimental  and  simulation  data investigate  com­
parable  time-scales.  After  all,  the  experiments  contain  a  maximum  of 60  rounds, 
whereas the simulations are run for at  least  10'*   rounds.
This raises the possibly that the experiments capture outcomes which would not 
be stable over a number of rounds representing the typical timescale in which social 
exchange  takes  place.  Indeed,  most of the sociological  experiments do not  directly 
investigate whether their solutions vary over time'.  On the' other hand, there is also 
the possibility that the simulation data investigates too long a timescale.  Over the 
long run,  the network may  change  as players  find new exchange opportunities and 
the values  of exchanges  alter.  So  behaviour  in  a  constant  network over  too long a 
timescale may be irrelevant.
There are several reasons why the timescales which the results of simulation and 
experiment represent may not be as far apart as is it appears simply from the number 
of rounds.  The fact that only one agent per population updates their individual state 
in each round of the simulation means that a round corresponds to less time than in 
the experimental setting.  As discussed in section 6.1.1,  there are many variations to 
evolutionary  models of the  sort  discussed  in chapter  6  which increase the speed  at 
which the stationary  distribution  becomes  relevant  and  furthermore often  increase 
the  realism  of the  model.  Also,  the  learning  rules  used  in  the  simulation  may  be
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more sophisticated learning rules, perhaps especially  adapted for use in bargaining 
situations,  could guide participants into reaching stable outcomes more quickly.
Even  if the long term  nature of the simulation  results  means that  they cannot 
be achieved in a timescale appropriate for application to social exchange,  they may 
still be of some use in indicating the evolutionary pressures that exist.  For example, 
the  simulation  results  for  the  3  player  ring  network  in  section  8.6  are  very  strong 
and  suggest  that  one  particular  solution  is selected  even  in the  short  run.  On the 
other  hand,  the  simulation  results  for  the  two  player  unit  cake  network  in section
8.2 suggest  that  the only outcome which is stable' in  the1  long run is an equal split. 
However,  over  shorter  timescales  near-equal  splits  may  also  be  stable  with  weak 
evolutionary  pressures present encouraging an eventual shift to the equal split.
Finally,  note that  since experiments have  a single agent,  at each position rather 
than a population, the structure of the evolutionary process - many stable solutions 
in the short  run,  some of which are selected  in  the long run - may not carry over. 
The agreement between repeated experiments in sociology  papers seems to support 
this7.  W ithout this property,  it  is possible that  there may  not  be a major qualita­
tive difference between short  and long run solutions of the experiments, so the low 
number of rounds may not be important.
9.2.2  2  P layer  N etw orks
The  alternating  offers  game  supports  a  unique  SPE  in  the  2  player  situation.  As 
discussed  in  section  4.2.1,  this  matches  the  asymmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution, 
as  defined  axiomatically  in  section  4.1,  with  the  bargaining powers  determined by 
players’  discount  factors.
The  simulation  results  of chapter  8  support  a  unique  outcome  for  all  learning
7  An alternative explanation is that agents are taken from the same society which use one specific 
convention of play.
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rules other than imitate  better  with sample size one.  the solution  (0.5,0.5)  for the 
unit  utility cake  /Cunjt  is conserved  for a utility  cake which is a subset of /Cunjt  and 
also contains (0.5, 0.5).  This is evidence that the axiom of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives  may  hold  under these learning  rules.  This offers  some support for the 
symmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution  since  the  other  axioms  hold  by  the  design  of 
the model8.
However,  the  simulations  with  an  outside  option  for  one  player  contained  in 
section  8.4  provide  some  odd  results.  In  particular  a simulation  for  sampled  best 
reply with sample size 2 illustrates a situation in which possessing an outside option 
worsens  a  player’s  payoff!  These results  certainly  do  not  match  the predictions  of 
the alternating offers game with outside options mentioned in section 4.2.1.
9.2.3  3  P layer  N etw orks
The  market  bargaining  game  is  a  model  for  3  player  ring  networks  and  possesses 
a unique limiting  SPE outcome  as  the delay  between  demands tends to  zero.  The 
results  fall  into  two  cases,  depending  upon  whether  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
triple  of outcomes,  described  in  definition  4.3,  exists.  In  the  case  of existence  the 
unique  triple  gives  all  3  possible  outcomes.  However,  which  of these  outcomes  is 
selected depends upon the exogenously chosen order in which the players act.
The  simulations  of  section  8.6  investigate  a  3  player  ring  network  in  which  a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern triple exists.  They provide very strong support for the 
corresponding outcome under all learning rules for at  least some parameter choices.
8An exception  is that  scale  independence does  not  hold  lor  the  proportional  imitation  learning 
rule.  Indeed,  this  learning  rule  is  not  even  always  well  delined  tmder  rescaling of utilities,  as this 
may  sometimes  produce  a probability  of switching  demand  of  more  t han  1.  A  possible  resolution 
of this  problem  is  to  make  the  factor  of proportionality  for  population  Ar   equal  to  the reciprocal 
of the  maximum  feasible  demand  that  player  i  can  receive*  in  anv  utility  cake.  In  this  case  scale 
independence would  hold  for  proportional  imitation.
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for  this  outcome.  As  discussed  in  section  8.6.  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  minimal 
tree analysis described in section  6.1.2  can  be applied to this case directly.
A  3  player  network  in which a von  Neumann-Morgenstern  triple does not exist 
is L3.  This case can be represented in the market  bargaining game by 3 player ring 
network  in  which  two  cakes  are  unit  cakes  and  the  third  contains  only  the  utility 
pair  (0,0).  The  payoff vector  associated  with  the  limiting  outcome  of the  market 
bargaining game in this case is (0,1, 0).  The generalisations of the market bargaining 
game considered in chapter  5 support the same limiting solution for L3  (see lemma 
5.4).  For  the  evolutionary  model,  theorem  7.3  supports  this  solution  for  imitate 
better  and  proportional  imitation  under  various  assumptions.  Other  bargaining 
models support  a different  solution.  For example  the telephoning game9  of section
4.3  can support limiting SPEs which are equal to the solution if a particular outlying 
player were removed10.
Section 4.4.5 argues that the crucial feature generating the qualitative difference 
between the SPE outcomes of the telephoning and market  bargaining games is that 
in the telephoning game only bilateral bargaining is allowed, whereas the market bar­
gaining game allows players to break this convention.  The existence of this feature is 
not investigated  by the simulations and experiments'11.  The rules of the underlying 
game of the evolutionary model of chapter 6  implic itly allow non-bilateral bargain­
ing.  Similarly,  the  sociology  experiments  are  computer  based,  and  so  pre-specify
9These solutions  are also supported  by  most other  models with  unilateral demands.
10That is,  the solution  to the  alternating offers  game  011  a  unit cake  between  players  1   and  2 or
player  2 and  3,  with  the same  discount  factors  as  used  in  the original  situation.  This is a result  of 
Binmore  [3].
n It  is not obvious whether this  feature  holds as  much  importance in  a evolutionary setting.  For 
example,  consider  an  evolutionary  model  for  the  network  L:i  based  on  an  underlying  bargaining- 
game  using  only  bilateral  bargaining.  There  still  appears  to  be  pressure  on  players  1  and  3  to 
undercut  each  other’s  demands  in  order  to  increase  their  chance  of exchanging  with  player  2  in 
future rounds.
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subjects  do not  have  a choice  of  whether  to  bargain bilaterally or  not12  and  these 
results  do  not  allow  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  whether  bargainers  choose  to 
use bilateral bargaining.
The  theoretical  predictions  above  for  this  network  can  be  compared  with data 
from simulations  and experiments.  Note that  in these cases the players are treated 
symmetrically  so  the  appropriate  version  of the  telephoning  game  is  one  in  which 
all  discount  factors  are  equal  and so  two  players  make  an  equal split  in  SPE.  The 
data supports outcomes  in between the extremes of this outcome and the outcome 
with payoffs  (0,1,0)  mentioned  above.  Typically  player  2 receives  0.5  < x <  1  and 
players 1 and 3 have an equal chance of receiving  1 —  x.  In the simulations the value 
of x varies from 0.7 to 0.95.  The value of x is shown to be sensitive to variations in 
M  and e.  Section 2.7 only contains data from two experiments on this network and 
the corresponding values of x are 0.67 and 0.83.  In conclusion, the arguments of the 
market  bargaining  game  and  theorem  7.3  appear  to  have  some  validity,  but  there 
seem to also be countervailing evolutionary forces preventing player 2 from reaching 
payoff 1.
9.2.4  T he  4  P layer  Line  N etw ork
The  only  theoretical  result  produced  for  this  network  is  that  described  in section 
5.2.4.  This gives  two  limiting  outcomes  for  the case of equal discount  factors  with 
limiting payoffs  alld (0,  0).  Eliminating the non-core solution leaves a
unique prediction.  Data from both simulations and experiments supports outcomes 
with  payoff  vectors  of  the  form  (1  -   x ,x ,x .l  -   x)  with  0.55  <  x  <  0.66.  The 
simulation  data  provides  some  evidence  that  these  payoffs  are  long-term  features 
of the bargaining situation  and do not simply occur in experiments because only a
12As noted  in  section  2.7,  it  is  not  always  clear  what  tin-  underlying rules of experiments are,  so 
it  is sometimes  hard  to infer  whether they allow  non-bilateral  bargaining.
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rule supported the outcome with payoff vector  1, 1, 1).
If  the  payoff  vector  were  the  result  of  the  current  bargaining  con­
vention then  player  2  would  be indifferent  about  exchanging  with players  1  and  3. 
Intuitively, there is therefore an incentive for player  1 to offer player 2 more to guar­
antee exchange.  However,  this thesis does not provide any grounds for a theoretical 
argument to capture this intuition.
Note  that  the  payoffs  typically  received  by  position  2  or  3  in  a  simulation  or 
experiment on this network are similar to some simulation results detailed in section 
8.4 for a player  in a 2 player  unit  cake network  with an out side option of less than 
This suggests that the mechanism providing players 2 or 3 with a payoff above  1 
is based on the outside options they provide each  other.
9.2.5  T he  5  P layer  Line  N etw ork
The two  models  of chapter  5  both support  a wide range of SPEs for this network. 
It  is shown  (corollary  5.6)  that  in any SPE the payoff of player i  lies in an interval 
Ii.  These are  I\  =  I3  —  h   —  [0, £]  and  Io  —   11   —   [^-1].  Furthermore,  in sections
5.1.2  and 5.2.4 SPEs for both models are shown illustrating that some player z may 
receive a payoff at either bound of I, .
Experimental and simulation data are within  these bounds, but do not seem to 
make  a clear  prediction.  Simulations  give  payoffs  in  the  range  [0.65,0.85]  to  even 
numbered players,  whereas experiments  have  the range  [0.55,0.88].  Note also that 
simulation results are sensitive to the choice of parameters M and e.
These results show that this network gives players 2 and 4 an advantage but the 
size of advantage  is  sensitive  to  details  of the bargaining situation.  However,  they 
do not indicate what the relevant details  might  bee
Theorem  7.3  predicts  the  solution  (0,1.0,1.0).  The  lack  of other  support  for 
this solution suggests that the limiting cast' of low mutation for which this theorem
312applies does not  represent the general case13.
9.2.6  4  Player  R ing  N etw orks
The simulation results of section 8.8 support a von Neumanii-Morgenstern triple like 
solution for a particular four player ring network.  That is. each player is guaranteed 
a particular utility level and may achieve this by exchanging with either neighbour. 
However,  as for the von Neuniaim-Morgenstern .solution for 3 player ring networks, 
no theoretical mechanism is proposed to explain the strong support for this outcome 
in simulations.
9.2.7  M iscellaneous
Section  7.3.1  predicts  that  the  state  of the  evolutionary  model  of chapter  6  under 
the candidate learning rules of section  7.1  spends most  of its time near B sets even 
for  relatively  large  values  of e.  The  simulation  results  of section  8.1  provide some 
support  for  this  hypothesis.  Section  7.3.1  also  contains  the  prediction  that  the 
qualitative results of the model are relatively robust to the choice of e.  The results 
of chapter 8 show this is often correct.  Some results, such as those for the 3 player 
ring  network  of section  8.6  are  very  robust  to  the choice  of e.  In  other  networks, 
such as odd length unit cake line networks,  the results are sensitive to the choice of 
e and M  but the same qualitative features are always present.
Theorem  7.3  predicts  that  certain  positions  in  unit  cake  networks  receive  pay­
offs of 0 or  1.  For the networks  L3  and  L5,  it  predicts that  even numbered players 
receive payoff 1  and odd number players receive, payoff 0.  This matches the qualita­
tive features of the simulation  and experimental  results,  but predicts more extreme 
payoff  values.  The  theorem  gives  the  behaviour  of the  evolutionary  model  under
13Recall  that  the  prediction  of theorem  7.3  only  applies  111  the  long  term. .However,  it  does  not 
seem possible to explain the discrepancy by interpreting all  the other results as short term solutions. 
The simulation  data shows  that  solutions  with  more ext reme  payoff values  than  those  most  often 
selected  are sometimes  reached  but are  less stable.
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of its results do not  hold for the relatively  large  values of c  used in the simulation. 
However,  the  experimental  results  also  only  support  the  qualitative  results  of this 
theorem rather than the extreme payoff values.  This suggests that the evolutionary 
pressures embodied in theorem 7.3 do not fully capture behaviour in the correspond­
ing  bargaining  situations.  Other  forces  exist  which  prevent  extreme  payoffs  being 
reached.
Lemma 5.5 predicts that players with only one neighbour in a unit cake network 
with  uniform  discount  factors  receive  limiting  payoffs  of  no  more  than  3.  This 
intuitively obvious14 result is also supported by experimental and simulation results.
9.2.8  T he  T h eoretical  P redictions  of the  Sociology  Literature
The results of theorem  7.3  have  some similarities  to the  'strong power'  predictions 
of NET  outlined  in  sections  2.5.1  and  2.5.2.  For  example,  many  of the  heuristics 
summarizing the properties of strong power in section 2.5.2 hold under theorem 7.3, 
if  “low strong-power position”  and  "high strong-power  position"  are interpreted  as 
S  players  and  W players  respectively10.  However  the  GPI  formula of section  2.5.1 
identifies many more positions as strong power than theorem  7.3.  For example the 
GPI formula predicts strong power in all odd lengt h line networks, whereas theorem
7.3  only applies to L3  and L5.
Section  2.5.2 contains the following quote from Markovsky et al  [44]:
“strong power structures exhibit  a •ratcheting'  process whereby actors in struc­
14This  situation  can  be  thought  of  as  a  2  player  bargaining  situation  in  which  one  player  has 
outside options.
15 “Weak or equal power positions"  should  be interpreted  ;is those players which are neither S or 
W players.  “Breaks”  should  be  interpreted  as exchanges  which  are  never realised.  Heuristic  iii)  is 
stronger  than the result  of the  theorem.  This  heuristic  predicts that  adding an  exchange between 
two  weak  positions  destroys  the  strong  power  structure.  Under  theorem  7.3.  some  players  may 
remain S or W players in this case.
314turally disadvantaged positions serially outbid out1  another..."
That  section  also  notes  that  in  [44].  the  threat  of exclusion  is  claimed  to  be 
the  driving  force  behind  strong  power  effects.  These  comments  could  also  serve 
as  an  interpretation  of  the  proof  of  7.3.  The  sketch  in  7.3.2  describes  how  the 
proof  is  driven  by  a  process  in  which  agents  in  \V  populations  are  excluded  and 
imitate  successful  low  demands.  This  creates  the  conditions  for  agents  in  other 
W  populations  to  be  excluded  and  switch  to  low  demands.  This  is  effectively  a 
mechanism  where  different  positions  undercut  each  other  and  their  demands  are 
driven down.
The other results of this thesis do not  correspond  as closely to sociological  the­
ories.  For  example  NET predicts  "maximum  differentiation"  of payoffs  for cases of 
strong power.  In the context of unit cake networks this means that players in some 
positions  receive  payoffs  of  0  and  1.  The  models  based  on  the  alternating  offers 
games  of chapters  4  and  5  predict  a  unique solut ion  with  maximum differentiation 
for the network L316  but not for other networks  for which NET predicts maximum 
differentiation,  such  as  L5.  In  the  experimental  and  simulation  results  of section 
2.7 and chapter 8 maximum differentiation  is rarely observed.  In particular, typical 
payoffs  are  often  less  extreme  for  larger  networks1'.  No  support  is  found  for  the 
GPI formula or the weak power theories of NET.  Also,  110 support is found for de­
gree dependence of section 2.5.3 but there has been little investigation of settings in
16 As noted in section 5.4.2,  lemma 5.4.  which support s t his prediction for Lj,. can he extended to 
other situations  where a player has  unit cake exchange opportunities  with at least  two neighbours 
who  have  no  alternative  exchange  opportunities.  This  prediction  and  lemma  5.4  itself  are  the 
only  cases  in chapter  5  where  models  based  011  the  alternating offers game  unambiguously  predict
maximum differentiation  (i.e.  the prediction  does  not  depend  011  exogenous structure).
17An  exception  is  in  the  “strong4”  network  of section  2.7.  The  positions  with  extreme  payoffs
in this  network  match the situation  described  in  footnote  10 of this chapter.  This suggests that in 
some networks the stable bargaining outcome is the same as if some exchange relations are removed 
and  the  network  is  decomposed  into  several  connected  components,  and  it  is  only  in  the  larger 
components that payoffs are  less extreme.
315which it might occur.
9.3  Future  Research
The difficulties summarized  in section  9.1.2  mean  that  it  does  not seem fruitful to 
pursue modelling bargaining in networks using perfect information extensions of the 
alternating offers game.  However the evolutionary model suggests many possibilities 
for future research.  There are two main directions.  The first is to further investigate 
properties of the model for simple networks in which the problems associated with 
non-core solutions discussed in section 9.1.3 seem  unlikely to arise.  The second is to 
attempt to alter the model so that it overcomes  these problems and can be applied 
to large networks.
There  are  many  small  networks  other  than  t hose  considered  in  chapter  8  on 
which  it  would  be interesting to  perform simulations,  such  its   the stem network  of 
section  2.7.  Other  subjects  which  can  be  investigated  by  simulation  include  the 
degree dependence hypothesis of section  2.5.3.  whether  results  are robust to small 
variations in utility cakes,  and whether a property similar to the axiom of indepen­
dence of irrelevant alternatives holds for general networks.  If this last property held 
then it would suffice to study networks whose cakes have linear boundary functions, 
simplifying the analysis of general  networks.  Alsu,  there arc- many interesting vari­
ations which could  be made to the model.  For  example the underlying game could 
be altered  to model a bargaining  problem in  which 3 players must split one utility 
cake.  Many other possible variations are given in section  7.2.
It  may  be  possible  to  obtain  theoretical  results  on  the  evolutionary  model  of 
chapter  6  in  addition  to theorem  7.3.  For example,  consider a  2 player  bargaining 
network  under  the  proportional  imitation  learning  rule.  In  the  limit  e  — *   0,  the 
state  of the  model  spends  most  of its  time  at  B  sets  corresponding to  strict  Nash 
equilibria.  It is shown in section 7.1.1  that a transit between such sets requires only 
two  mutations.  Thus  to  find  the  first  term  in  asymptotic  expansions  in  e  of each
316transit probability it suffices to investigate transits where only two mutations occur. 
During such a transit each population supports only two demands, which may allow 
approximate or numerical calculations to succeed.  This case is of particular interest 
as  it  may explain  the outside  option  results  of section  8.4  which  have implications 
for network results,  as discussed in section  9.2.4.
One method of altering the model to avoid the non-core solution discussed above 
is to alter the underlying game.  As discussed in section 9.1.3 in seems necessary to 
alter  the matching rule,  probably  by  endogenising part  of it.  Another  approach is 
to alter the evolutionary model.  For example a model placing a single agent at each 
network position seems more realistic  and  may make non-core solutions  less stable. 
Some methods for constructing such models are mentioned  in Tesfatsion  [67].
Finally,  relaxing the restrictions  placed  on bargaining outcomes in section 3.1.1 
could  enable  other  approaches  to  be  more  successful.  For  example  if each  player 
could  participate  in  two  exchanges,  then  it  would  be  easier  to  adapt  the  model 
of Corominas-Bosch  [23]  from  section  4.5  to  general  networks,  as  follows.  Rounds 
alternate  between  those  in  which  everyone  simultaneously  makes  a  demand  and 
those in which everyone  simultaneously  makes  an  acceptance decision.  A player is 
allowed to exchange once by being accepted  and once by accepting.  Altering these 
restrictions  would  mean  that  the  experimental  results  of section  2.7  could  not  be 
used.  However  the  results  could  still  be  interpreted  as  modelling social  exchange. 
As  discussed  in  section  2.4,  restricting  each  player  to  a  single  exchange  is  only 
introduced in the first  place on grounds of experimental expediency and simplicity 
rather than on conceptual grounds.
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